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“Man is a complex being: he makes deserts bloom - and lakes die.” 
 




Coming up with a list of folks to acknowledge in the process of writing a 
dissertation – truly a collaborative process – is a bit daunting because there are 
so many people to thank. This is of course particularly difficult when most of the 
field research revolved around visiting with and interviewing people, some of 
whose names I never knew and will never know. To make the task easier, I’ll 
divide it pre-field research, field research, post-research and those that assisted 
me throughout the process.  
 
Pre-field Research. Even before arriving in Chihuahua to begin the dissertation 
fieldwork, there were a number of individuals who assisted in preparing the 
groundwork. First of all, the topic itself – originally conceived as “following a drop 
of water down the Rio Conchos in a time of drought and free trade,” came in 
large part due to my employment at Texas Center for Policy Studies, where as 
an organization we had begun a project looking at water management in the Rio 
Grande watershed, including a particular focus on the Rio Conchos. For both 
offering me employment back in 1994, and including me – at least partially – in 
some of the work surrounding the Rio Conchos water management project there 
really is only one individual to thank: Mary Kelly of Austin, Texas. Her flexibility 
and support in the 1998-2002 period, allowing me to take significant time off for 
both my return to the University of Texas as a graduate student, as well as the 
rearing of my children, was truly remarkable in this day and age, as was her 
guidance within the confines of the office. Simply put, without her, the topic would 
not have presented itself for further research. Mary was also a key informant in 
the study, providing access to data and files, contacts in Chihuahua and advice 




There were a number of courses that I took at the University of Texas both 
before and during the onset of my fieldwork which were instrumental to the 
development of the topic and the ideas contained therein. First of all, Dr. Ian 
Manners graduate seminar on natural conservation and some of the ideas 
discussed in class – notably the idea of differential environmental perceptions – 
were key in the development of this PhD. In addition, both Dr. Gregory Knapp’s 
course on Latin American Development, Environment and Conservation as well 
as Dr. William Doolittle’s Environment, Development and Food Production 
introduced key concepts used in the methodology and fieldwork. Dr. Diane 
Davis’s graduate seminars on political ecology also introduced key ideas about 
coerced conservation and the distributive consequences of conservation 
projects. Both Dr. Paul Hudson’s undergraduate course on Fluvial 
Geomorphology and the graduate course on Human Impacts on Rivers gave the 
initial impetus to look at the different factors influencing low flows from the Rio 
Conchos during the 1990s, as well as introducing important concepts involving 
how rivers react to changing land use and environmental conditions. In addition, 
Dr. Peter Ward’s course on qualitative methods in social science studies 
confirmed both the power – and drawbacks – of conducting a study based 
principally on qualitative methods. In the realm of Community and Regional 
Planning, Dr. Patricia Wilson’s courses on alternative planning methods and her 
course on Latin American development issues were important in introducing 
concepts of power relations and decision-making important in farmer’s decisions 
on natural resource use, while Dr. Robert Patterson’s course on conflict 
resolution was obviously important in providing ideas and literature about how 
conflicts are resolved.  
 
Field Research. First of all, I would like to thank the Environmental Sciences 
Institute and the Department of Geography’s Veselka Award for providing travel 
and research grants in the summer of 2003 to conduct the preliminary fieldwork. 
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Those grants were a welcome relief to offset the suddenly higher gas prices in 
both the U.S. and Mexico. In addition, in 2005, the Mexico Center provided an 
E.D. Farmer PhD Fieldwork Research Grant, which again offset expenses during 
the approximate five months I spent in Chihuahua that year. The support of E.D. 
Farmer Application Review Committee Members Dr. Peter Ward, Dr. Bill Doolittle 
and Dr. Gregory Knapp for considering and ultimately approving the application 
are also appreciated.  
 
During fieldwork conducted in 2003, 2004 and 2005, a number of individuals 
served as “cultural bridges” in meeting and visiting community projects and 
getting the “lay of the land.” In Ojinaga, these individuals include Humberto 
Luján, high school science teacher and city council member in Ojinaga, his wife 
Leti and sons, and his mother and father – Natividad Lujan -- long-time 
agriculturalists in Valverde. This family rented me a little apartment next to their 
house overlooking the Rio Grande – and also provided important perspectives on 
the challenges facing local farmers. In the towns of San Francisco and 
Esmeralda, local grocery store manager Guadalupe Torres and his wife Maria de 
Jesus were key contacts providing access to other members of the community. 
In addition, the views and accessibility of former Paso del Norte Water User 
Association President Arnaldo Valenzuela, local canal operator Adrian, as well as 
former Santa Teresa – El Ancon Water User Association president Domingo Rey 
and local canal operator Sarmiento Rey were also key to this study.  
 
In the Delicias Irrigation District, Dr. Concepcion Luján, professor in the 
Agroforestry School of the Universidad Autonoma de Chihuahua in Rosales, 
Chihuahua –son of Natividad and brother to Humberto – was an important 
source of information on the Delicias Irrigation District and helped establish 
contacts and gain access to dams and CONAGUA officials. In addition, former 
Rosales Water User Association President Humberto “Beto” Serrano and his 
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family in Congregación Ortiz were also instrumental in providing information and 
shelter in the area: in particular, his sister “Nela” Serrano and husband Javier “El 
Chino,” and family, helped locate a small house to rent, invited me to attend their 
local church, and accompanied me to local festivities. In addition, current 
Rosales Water User Association president Jaime Rodriguez, general manager 
Jose Gomez, as well as the administrative assistants and canal operators were 
all key informants and provided data which was instrumental to understanding 
the changes occurring in the Rosales area of the Delicias Irrigation District. In 
Saucillo, Suacillo Canal president Rodolfo Parras and manager José García are 
credited with providing both their time, their data and helping visit projects being 
implemented in their area. In addition, local farmer and former El Suacillo Canal 
water user association president Martin Echaanic Chavez was an important 
source of historical information and giving a tour of his local pecan orchard. 
Finally, while the information was not included in the final version of the 
dissertation, Abelardo Lara, the manager of the Saucillo Water User Association, 
provided extensive information on  “Module 2”’s efforts to implement water 
conservation projects in his geographic area.  
 
In the Sierra Tarahumara, special thanks go to Maria Teresa Guerrero, director 
of CONTEC, along with her husband, photographer David Lauer both for their 
tireless efforts on improving the livelihood of the Sierra Tarahumara and 
improving their access to justice, as well as for their friendship, contacts and 
hospitality both in Chihuahua as well as in the communities of Carichí in the 
Sierra Tarahumara; Agustín Bravo and Gina Uribe of Fuerza Ambiental in setting 
up meeting and giving of their time in Chihuahua City and the Municipality of 
Bocoyna, Sierra Tarahumara; Padre “Nacho” of Carichí, and his partners at the 
Diocese. Their willingness to put me up in the church – in Carichi – as well as the 
“Casa del Padre” in the community of El Consuelo as well as offer insight into the 
development process of individual communities was instrumental. Appreciation 
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also to Randy Gingrich of the Sierra Madre Alliance and Dr. Hector Arias of 
World Wildlife Fund for perspectives and insights on the complex politics and 
practices of NGOs attempting to “help” the communities in the Sierra 
Tarahumara.  
 
In addition to these “cultural bridges,” academics and non-governmental 
representatives, there were a number of governmental representatives that 
provided important information both on the dispute between the U.S. and Mexico, 
as well as on providing data on agricultural use, water use and river flows. First 
of all, the International Boundary and Water Commission in both the U.S. and the 
Comision Internacional de Limites y Agua in Mexico provided both data and 
representatives. In particular, CILA Commissioner Arturo Herrera and deputy 
Gilberto Elizalde, as well as IBWC Commissioner Carlos Marín and Kenneth 
Rakestraw were key in understanding how the dispute emerged. In addition, 
“Buddy” Garcia of the Texas Secretary of State’s Office was also very important 
in providing insights and perspectives on the U.S. –Mexico water dispute.  
 
Similarly, several individuals from the Border Environment Cooperation 
Commission, located in Ciudad Juarez, and the North American Development 
Bank in San Antonio, most notably Gonzalo Bravo of BECC, provided insights, 
data and access into their role in certifying the water conservation project in the 
Delicias Irrigation District and related projects.  
 
In Ojinaga, a special appreciation goes to both CONAGUA Lower Río Conchos 
Irrigation District Manager Elías Calderón and Operations Manager Oscar López, 
who were always courteous and prompt in giving of their time, perspective and 
data. In addition, several individuals at the local offices of SAGARPA – the 
federal agricultural ministry – also provided their time, input and data, including 
Juan de Dios Guardarrama. Finally, “Pepe” Corrales at the Municipal Rural 
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Development office was also giving of his time and information about local 
agricultural support programs, while Dr. Vaca, who heads up the local cattle 
export corral outside of Ojinaga, was also a key informant.  
 
In Delicias, CONAGUA Delicias Irrigation District Operations Manager Ezequiel 
Bueno was instrumental in providing data, access to staff and input into this 
dissertation. In addition, engineer Lauro Fernandez, who headed the 
Construction Division of Irrigation District No. 5 was similarly helpful. SAGARPA’s 
Manuel Guerrero also kept his door open at the local delegation offices in 
Delicias. In the City of Chihuahua, CONAGUA director Ing. Flavío Acosta de los 
Ríos as well as Melchor Lopez were also prompt in responding to my frequent 
data requests. Similarly, Chihuahua delegate Pepe Treviño of SEMARNAT – the 
federal environmental agency – as well as several individuals with CONAFOR, 
the National Forestry Commission, including Nestor Chavez were also 
instrumental in providing data. Dr. Victor Reyes of the Drought Information 
Center also opened his offices and center to me, while providing another 
perspective on the causes and consequences of the drought.  
 
In Carichí, Carichí mayor Santiago Martinez Gutierrez, as well as rural 
development director Leopoldo Trujillo and SAGARPA representative “Chava” 
Vargas all gave of their time and input. Locally, ejido Comisariado Reginaldo 
Mendoza of Molinares and José Sinaloa of El Consuelo were key informants, as 
were brothers “Nacho” and Juan Rascón of Bacabureachi. 
 
Finally, there are the main subjects of this dissertation: the natural resource 
users, more commonly called farmers. During the course of my travels and 
research, I surveyed some 200 farmers in the Carichi, Delicias and Ojinaga area, 
and conducted informal interviews with dozens more; I drank numerous sodas 
and glasses of water and the occasional beer with them; I was offered their 
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goods, including cheese, pecans, chile peppers, peanuts, corn, beans, apples 
and honey; I was treated to a luxurious goat meat, cooked to perfection in a hole 
in the ground by local Ojinaga farmer “Pepe” Sanchez; I was summoned to an 
elaborate seafood and meat soup outside of Congregacion Ortiz; I was invited to 
pick corn and apples in Bacabureachi in the Sierra Tarahumara; sort through 
pecan nuts outside of Saucillo; load squares of alfalfa hay into a truck for export; 
and throw watermelons into a truck near the Cerro Alto on the banks of the Rio 
Grande. I also followed farmers as they made their rounds to the top of mesas in 
Bacabureachi and El Consuelo; to the dams of the Rio Grande and the top of the 
Cerro Alto in Ojinaga; to the banks of the Rio Conchos at too many points to 
mention; and to a bevy of pecan orchards throughout Delicias and Ojinaga.  
 
Post-Research Writing. Similarly, I must thank Dr. Ken Kramer, director of the 
Lone Star Chapter of the Sierra Club, who was flexible as I lobbied for Sierra 
Club during the 2005 and 2007 Legislative Sessions, while also working on my 
final draft. In addition, Tom “Smitty” Smith, Director of the Texas Office of Public 
Citizen, was instrumental as he rented me an office to both work on my 
dissertation and conduct my lobby and policy work.  Miguel Pavón with the 
Borderlands Information Center with the Texas Natural Resources Information 
Systems assisted in creating several of the maps used in the dissertation, 
transforming my amateurish efforts into truly readable maps.  
 
The Whole Enchilada. There are several individuals who assisted in the 
dissertation process who transcended the particulars of the fieldwork, but were 
there before, during and after the dissertation was completed. First of all, a 
special recognition must go to all the committee members, including original 
committee member Dr. Barbara Parmenter, who left the committee in 2006 after 
receiving an offer from Tufts University, but still provided important input into the 
comprehensive exams and initial proposal. In addition, Dr. Peter Ward, who 
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batted DH when Dr. Parmenter had to leave the committee, was invaluable for 
his insights, particularly on methodological concerns. The other committee 
members – Dr. Patricia Wilson from Community and Regional Planning, Dr. 
William Doolittle and Dr. Paul Hudson, from the Department of Geography and 
Environment – were all instrumental to the writing and editing of the PhD, and 
were patient during the rather lengthy fieldwork, writing and editing process. Both 
Dr. Doolittle and Dr. Wilson also wrote numerous letters of recommendations for 
various grant applications, most of which were unsuccessful, but their willingness 
to support these applications was appreciated nonetheless.  
 
There are not words to describe the help, assistance, patience, wisdom and faith 
displayed by Committee Chair Dr. Gregory Knapp. From the very beginning of 
the process to the end, Dr. Knapp encouraged me to go forward on a schedule 
that worked for a part-time student with two young children and a job that often 
involved long hours of non-PhD related work, most notable during two regular 
legislative sessions and several special legislative sessions when I worked for 
the Lone Star Chapter of the Sierra Club. And when that schedule had to be 
inevitably changed, he did not bat an eye, but worked on a schedule that worked 
for us both. In addition, Dr. Knapp took eight days out of his own research to visit 
me in the field, putting up with three flat tires, long drives through hot deserts, 
and frequent losses in direction to see and advice me as I finished up my 
dissertation research. His patience and indeed friendship as we discussed both 
dissertation and non-dissertation topics were most welcome.  
 
Finally, I must mention my immediate and extended family. My brother, Dr. Jason 
Reed and mother, Dr. Helen H. Reed were continually supportive that I could add 
to the “Doctors” in the family, while the memory of my father, Dr. Robert C. Reed, 
who was present in my memory as I trudged along in researching and writing the 
dissertation was much appreciated. Similarly, my extended family in Nicaragua, 
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including brother-in-law Ramón Antonio López Duarte and family and Manuel 
José López Duarte and family and sister-in-law Mayra Duarte de Reyes and 
family were all supportive in my frequent visits to Nicaragua during this period, 
much of which consisted of being holed up in their homes, studying for exams or 
writing the dissertations. They also helped look after my family when they visited 
during some of the summers I was in Chihuahua. 
 
Then there is the true trouper, Rosa Maria Lopez Reed, my wife and loving 
companion of these last 15 years. Since I began my return as a part-time 
graduate student, Rosa Maria gave birth and helped raise our two children, Oran 
Isaías López Reed (1997), and Marcel Oliver López Reed (2000), worked full 
and part-time at the ACC Child Laboratory School as a preschool teacher; 
accompanied me twice in 2003 and 2004 to some of the field sites, and took care 
of our cats, dogs, children and household during the last half of 2005 while I was 
again in Chihuahua. Her understanding, love, faith and trust in me are truly 
remarkable over these many years. That appreciation is also reflected in our 
wonderful sons, who put up with my long absences, and enthusiastically 
accompanied me on portions of the trips, put up with my mood swings and 
occasional panics, and told me of their lives by phone and e-mail. To quote Elvis 
Costello, my love for you is true.  
 
Finally, I cannot finish this acknowledgement section without thanking God – 
father, son and holy ghost -- who provided me with life, the “natural resources” 
which this dissertation discusses, and the faith to believe in myself to finish.  
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Between 1992 and 2005, Chihuahua’s Río Conchos outflows were at less than 
10 percent of their historical average, prompting a highly public dispute with the 
U.S. over water quantity under terms of the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty.  
Still, Mexico made a number of water “payments” and achieved an eventual 
resolution of the dispute. The resolution focused on a number of steps, including 
investing over $140 million in irrigation district water conservation projects in the 
Río Conchos, which has historically provided two-thirds of the Río Grande’s 
water below Fort Quitman. 
  
Utilizing a case study approach rooted in political and cultural ecology, the 
research examines the factors – from drought to land use change--  purported by 
different interest groups as contributing to the transboundary Texas-Mexico water 
dispute and finds at least three major “narratives” emerged in the period to 
explain the low flows, including drought, dam management and agricultural 
expansion and land use changes. The dissertation shows, however, that the 
reduced outflows and reductions in “dam” water to farmers was just one factor in 
a changing agricultural context in which new land tenure rules, decentralization of 
water management and the enactment of a more open economic framework 
precipitated resource use changes within the agricultural areas.
                                                         iv  
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In addition, the dissertation examines water and land resource use, including 
conservation projects, in three specific agricultural areas, and finds significant 
transformations in markets, policies and climate. Farmers were not just passive 
victims of reduced water use, the curtailment of government programs, and 
“privatization” of land and water resources, but adopted alternative water source 
strategies, began to examine more “conservationist-minded” agricultural 
practices and shifted cultivation to higher yield crops. Still, many farmers chose 
to abandon agriculture altogether, as there was some consolidation of resources 
among wealthier farmers.  
 
The “transnationalization” of the Río Conchos which has resulted from the new 
focus on its water users may influence local decision-making, but the research 
contends that resource management decisions in the Río Conchos Watershed 
are influenced and determined by local practices and environments as well as by 
economic and legal changes brought about by Mexico’s inclusion into a 
globalized economy.  
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Chapter One: The Tangled Web 
 9 You care for the land and water it; you enrich it abundantly. The 
streams of God are filled with water to provide the people with 
grain, for so you have ordained it. 
 10 You drench its furrows and level its ridges; you soften it with 
showers and bless its crops. 
 11 You crown the year with your bounty, and your carts overflow 
with abundance. 
 12 The grasslands of the desert overflow; the hills are clothed with 
gladness. 
 13 The meadows are covered with flocks and the valleys are 
mantled with grain; they shout for joy and sing.    
 
David, Psalm 65, 9-13. New International Version (International Bible Society, 
1984 version, Colorado Springs, Colorado) 
 
 5 This is what the LORD says: "What fault did your fathers find in 
me, that they strayed so far from me? They followed worthless 
idols, and became worthless themselves. 
 6 They did not ask, 'Where is the LORD,  who brought us up out of 
Egypt and led us through the barren wilderness, through a land of 
deserts and rifts, a land of drought and darkness,  a land where no 
one travels and no one lives?' 
 7 I brought you into a fertile land  to eat its fruit and rich produce.  
But you came and defiled my land and made my inheritance 
detestable. 
 
Jeremiah 2:5-7 (New International Version) New International Version; 1984 by 
International Bible Society, Colorado Springs, Colorado).  
 
I. Introduction 
Drought is a complex concept. While a technical term used by hydrologists and 
water managers, it also has a meaning for some of, well, biblical proportions, and 
is seized upon by farmers, politicians and the public as a socio-economic – and 
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not just hydrological or climactic – concept (Goodrich and Ellis 2006; Liverman 
1999; Reyes-Gomez 2005). As complex as its multiple meanings are the differing 
explanations that are offered as drought’s causes. The two biblical citations are 
case in point (International Bible Society 1984). On the one hand, God 
mysteriously provides the resources – the rain, the land, crops – that give 
humans the ability to produce food, all of which could be taken away. It is the 
grace of God or at least geoclimactic factors that contribute to aridity or fecundity. 
On the other, we humans by our own behavior can also bring about drought – 
either because we do not behave appropriately – or more in 20th century 
parlance, because we misuse our resources. We turn fertile land into desert. 
Between these two extremes – it’s the weather’s fault or our own – lie a multitude 
of explanations for the causes of drought. 
 
This dissertation examines changes in resource use among agricultural water 
users in one particular watershed while also looking at their discursive and 
practical reactions – as well as those of other interested parties – to one region-
wide drought reported to have occurred in northern Mexico roughly between 
1995 and 2004 (BECC 2002; Rodríguez Piñeda 2005 et al.; Brandes 2000; 
CONAGUA 2000). Hardly a “scientific” study determined to find out what caused 
the particular drought, it is a study of how drought – real and imagined -- causes 
different actors to react in terms of their resource use, and how geography — the 
particulars of a place and its resource users – influence these reactions.  
 
The 64,700 square-kilometer Río Conchos watershed in northern Mexico, the 
vast majority of which is contained in the State of Chihuahua, makes up about 14 
percent of the larger Río Grande Watershed.  Since the Río Conchos  itself flows 
into the Río Grande as it is called in the U.S. and the Río Bravo at is called in 
Mexico  it turns a case study of resource use in a time of scarcity into a 
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transboundary environmental issue (see Map 1).1 This political fact – that the Río 
Conchos flows into a river “owned” by both countries – led Mexico and the United 
States to sign a treaty in 1944 “sharing” the waters of both the Río Grande itself 
as well as some of the tributaries that flow into the river, including the Río 
Conchos (IBWC 1944). Historically, the Río Conchos has provided about two-
thirds of the Rio Grande flow below Fort Quitman, Texas (Collier et al. 1996).  
 
More recently, when the amount of water flowing from Mexican tributaries was 
considerably less than required to meet the terms of the 1944 Treaty, the Río 
Conchos and its flow became the subject of considerable dispute. Between 1992 
and 2004, outflows from Chihuahua’s Río Conchos – as well as five other 
tributaries along the Texas-Mexico border – were at about 10 percent below their 
historical average, prompting a highly public dispute with the U.S. over water 
under terms of the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty, a lawsuit by Texas farmers 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement for “expropriation” of their 
water, and highly charged political rhetoric from high-profile politicians on both 
sides (IBWC 2006).  Despite this, between 2001 and 2005, Mexico made a 
number of “payments” on the water debt, and U.S. and Mexican negotiators, 
working through the International Boundary and Water Commission, as well as 
new institutions like the Border Environment Cooperation Commission and North 
American Development Bank, were able to achieve an eventual resolution of the 
Texas-Mexico water dispute (IBWC 2005a; IBWC 2005b). The resolution focused 
on transfers from the binational reservoirs along the Río Grande, releases from 
some non-Treaty tributaries, but also major investments – including $100 million 
in one irrigation district alone --  in water and land conservation projects in the 
Río Conchos water basin in Chihuahua. In return, farmers in these irrigation 
districts were expected to give up about a third of their water rights by 2007, 
which by treaty amendment would flow to the U.S. (IBWC 2003). 
                                                





Source: Miguel Pavón, Borderlands Information Center, Texas Natural Resource 
Information Service, 2007.  
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Utilizing a case study approach rooted in political and cultural ecology and 
economic geography, this research looks at the potential factors – from drought 
to land use change -- impacting the transboundary Texas-Mexico water dispute 
and analyzes the different discourses utilized by different actors during the 
dispute. The dissertation then examines water and land resource use change 
between 1990 and 2005 in three specific agricultural areas, including the 
uplands, the major irrigation district in the central valley and the smaller irrigation 
district in the desert near the river outflow. In the process, the research highlights 
the practices of individual farmers and their communities within the context of a 
new transnational community of actors involved in the water decision-making 
process, including new binational institutions like the Border Environment 
Cooperation Commission and North American Development Bank, non-profit 
U.S.-based organizations like World Wildlife Fund and Environmental Defense, 
farmers in South Texas as well as  state and national political leaders on both 
sides of the border. The “transnationalization” of the Río Conchos which has 
resulted may influence local decision-making, but the research contends that 
agricultural decisions made about resource management in the Río Conchos 
Watershed are  influenced and determined by local practices and environments 
as well as by economic and legal changes brought about by Mexico’s inclusion 
into a globalized economy. It is thus an excellent example of the study of 
translocalized geographic space.  
 
II. Research Objectives 
 
The study has a number of research objectives and questions related to resource 
use and conservation, the role of different actors in decision-making about 




Basic research objectives include: 
1. Analyzing basic hydrological data, including average and peak flows, rainfall, 
and dam management in the watershed between 1990 and 2005;  
2. Comparing and contrasting the different factors and discourse “narratives” 
developed to explain the reduced outflow of the Río Conchos over the study 
period; 
3. Analyzing ownership and use of agricultural water and land in several 
selected agricultural communities, including what changes have occurred as 
a result of policy, economic and legal changes and why; 
4. Investigating how the reduced amount of water available has impacted the 
ownership, control and use of water and land resources, particularly with 
regard to both private and communal ownership of resources; 
5. Analyzing how local resource users – farmers – have responded to the lack of 
access to water, as well as to changes to policy involving land and water use, 
and new economic realities; and 
6. Investigating how local resource users have responded to new conservation 
and irrigation technology programs and their promoters introduced in the 
irrigation districts, and new land conservation projects in the uplands.  
 
Specific questions that the dissertation addresses and seeks to answer include: 
1. What different factors – and narratives -- were put forward by actors – 
including the farmers themselves -- to explain the reduced flow from the 
Río Conchos into the U.S.?  
2. What major changes occurred in the watershed of the Conchos in terms of 
land and water ownership and use? Were there differences in the impacts 
on larger and smaller farmers?  
3. Did decentralization and privatization of irrigation districts and water 
resources impact  the use and management of water and land?  
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4. Did changes resulting from changes in the Mexican Constitution involving 
land tenure actually lead to privatization and changes in land use in the 
specific areas of Mexico studied in this dissertation?  
5. Did the local soil conservation efforts and the wider water conservation 
efforts meet with success? Did farmers feel their participation was 
“coerced”?  
6. Were there equitable implications to the implementation of water and soil 




A. The Case Study Approach 
 
To achieve these objectives and answer the research questions, the project uses 
a multidisciplinary, multi-scale approach, employing a variety of quantitative and 
qualitative techniques to gather, analyze and decode this information. The overall 
framework used is the “case study” (Sjoberg et. al. 1991). This case study 
approach does not purport to be “scientific” or “objective”, but is a suitable 
approach to examine how a natural resource conflict over water quantity is 
impacted and framed by economic, social and political factors and how local 
resource users have responded to a changed environment. 
 
Just what is a case study? It is probably easier to say what it is not. Thus, a case 
study approach does not seek to study a particular issue from the inside and get 
a “world view” as a long-term ethnographic study might (Geertz 1973;  Leví-
Strauss 1963). Nor is it open-ended, where any subject, issue, focus might 
emerge from the research in the field.  
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Thus rather than what Clifford Geertz called “thick description” – ethnographic 
details about every aspect of a community (Geertz 1973) – the multiple cases 
presented here allow for comparisons and contrasts on specific issues – such as 
reactions to and perceptions of water and soil conservation projects among 
farmers and the changes made in terms of crop choices, inputs and technology.  
 
Thus, case studies may be used to “test” a particular hypothesis, to provide 
greater in-sights into a particular problem or offer a longitudinal perspective (see 
Stake 1995: 87). They are studies that are bounded in some way. Here, the 
geographic component is the Río Conchos Watershed as well as particular 
communities of farmers living within the watershed. Social and thematic elements 
involve the study of resource use – water and land – by farmers in a particular 
time period, generally the period following the onset of a regional drought – real 
or otherwise – which began in the mid-1990s through the end of the agricultural 
year in 2005.  
 
One of the major difficulties of using a case study approach – and one of its 
major  criticisms -- is how to generalize from the uniqueness of the case study 
involved to identify overreaching processes that may have more applicability than 
the particular cases (Stake 1978: 5). This has of course been a common criticism 
of geographic studies– to what extent is the study only unique to that one studied 
area or to, as Paul Robbins writes when discussing cultural ecology, to what 
extent “it remains parochial in its outlook, focusing almost exclusively on 
underdeveloped rural contexts (Robbins 2004: 36).” There are two responses. In 
one sense, the present study is by its very nature intrinsic: it is only relevant to 
the case itself. The study of resource use among farmers in the Río Conchos 
basin in a time of drought and dispute with the U.S. over water inflows to the Río 
Grande and changing economic realities is a unique case that provides insight 
into what happened in the Río Conchos basin itself.  The case study framework 
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is useful precisely because it helps us understand something that is unique and 
particular and this study adds to the literature in geography which states that 
place and location matter (Massey 1994; 1995a).  
 
At the same time, the present “case study” is a series of case studies within one 
geographic region. Thus, a way to get beyond the wholly “unique” is to compare 
more than one case. In this particular study, while it may be considered “one” 
case study of farmer resource use in the Conchos Watershed, in reality, it is a 
case study of case studies, including indigenous farming communities in the 
highlands of the Conchos, water user associations with geographic boundaries in 
the Delicias Irrigation District as well as in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation 
District in Ojinaga.  While the study does not try to directly “compare” each area 
with another – the highly modernized irrigation district of Delicias have little to do 
with the subsistence indigenous farmers of the highlands of the Sierra 
Tarahumara --- there is an attempt to compare different sets of farmers within a 
general region, as well as differences between the two irrigation districts. Why 
did farmers in one region within the watershed adopt these strategies while 
farmers in another adopted another strategy? What local differences led to these 
outcomes?  
 
While the main purpose of a case study is not to prove or disprove a general 
hypothesis, it still can provide insight into a wider issue or help refine hypothesis 
or theories or be relevant to other regions. Generalizations do not have to be 
emphasized in all research designs (Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg 1991). As 
discussed further, the present study has relevance to a number of issues in the 
cultural ecology/political ecology, transboundary resource conflict and economic 
geography literatures that move beyond the particular “bounds” of the present 
study to add to theory development.  
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B. Actual Techniques and Method Used for Present Study 
 
The case study, of course, is not a series of techniques or a method per-se, but 
“a choice of object to be studied (Stake 1995: 86).” The exact techniques and 
method utilized differ depending on the object of study and temporal aspects. A 
study of river flow might require an analysis of quantitative and longitudinal data, 
while an analysis of crop choice and resource use by farmers might require an 
analysis of relationships between the farmer, farmer organizations, market 
prices, government support programs and private agriculture supply companies 
(Doolittle 1984).  
 
While there have been a variety of qualitative and quantitative techniques utilized 
in these case studies, one useful starting point in studying human use of 
resources within a larger socio-economic context is Andrew Vayda’s 
development of “progressive contextualization” as an approach to understand 
human use of resources and choice among the many options they face in 
decisions about resource use. According to Vayda, progressive contextualization 
“involves focusing on significant human activities or people-environment 
interactions and then explaining these in interaction by placing them within 
progressively wider or denser contexts (Vayda 1983: 265).”  Vayda argues “we 
can start with the actions or interactions of individual living things and can 
proceed to put these into contexts that make actions or interactions intelligible by 
showing their place within complexes of causes and effects (Ibid: 270).”  In 
essence, this method argues that the decisions of local farmers can first be 
examined at the field level, and then through networks placed in a wider socio-
economic context, of core interest to studies of human-environmental studies.  
 
Vayda’s elaboration of this webbed approach has both usefulness as well as 
difficulties. Thus, Robbins contrasts the Vayda methodological progressive 
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contextualization approach with the “chains of explanation” as first developed in 
Land Degradation and Society, written by Harold Brookfield and Piers Blaikie, an 
oft-cited text in political ecology (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Robbins 2004). 
Robbins points out that Vayda’s approach assumes you can induce all of the 
factors that can influence “living things,” and empirically determine an 
explanation from simple observation (Robbins 2004: 74). Such a seemingly 
apolitical approach tends to ignore differing degrees of power and knowledge 
among users, disguises the politics of the observer/researcher himself and 
ignores the role theory plays in what issues a researcher will be examining. Thus, 
such an approach may allow someone to see resource exploitation but it might 
not allow you to see why (Robbins 74). According to Blakie and Brookfield, on 
the other hand, the chain of explanation approach: 
 
starts with the land managers and their direct relations with the 
land…the next link concerns their relations with … the wider society 
who affect them in any way, which in turn determines land 
management. The state and the world economy constitute the links 
in the chain. (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987: 27). 
 
Blakie and Brookfield’s seminal work points out that much of land studies have 
concentrated on the single cause explanation of PPR – pressure of population on 
resources. This includes “neo-Malthusians” like Eckholm and Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 
but also Boserup (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990; Eckholm 1976; Boserup 1965, 
1981). Boserup, however, turned the argument on its head, proposing that “the 
growth of population is a major determinant of technological change in agriculture 
(Boserup 1965: 56). Boserup utilizes PRP as the independent variable, and 
argues that as a reaction to these pressures, as well as improved technology and 
labor inputs, intensification and innovation can occur. Blakie and Brookfield point 
out instead that population pressure is just one factor contributing to agricultural 
change – sometimes leading to innovation and sometimes to degradation – and 
that their “chain of explanation” includes not only PPR, but also productivity of 
 12 
land, extension of cultivation, differing access to resources and even behavioral 
management issues (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987: 45). While they continue to 
advocate the need to consider the role of PPR as a causal component in 
agricultural and resource use change, their chain of explanation must also 
consider other links, including the wider link to the state and world economy. 
Thus, rather than looking for a single cause, their methodological approach 
seeks to understand how different factors put limits on the type of innovation that 
Boserup expounded (Blaikie and Brookfield: 48).  
 
The present study builds on the idea of multi-causality, in relation to both the 
reduced flows in the confluence of the Río Conchos in the 1995-2005 period, as 
well as actual on-the-ground agricultural changes. Often in works that look at 
environmental degradation and conservation, there is – as J. Ellis has noted – a 
tendency to essentialize a “root cause” in environmental degradation, be it 
overpopulation or overuse of resources, drought or global warming. This root 
cause becomes part of the environmental discourse used by certain interests 
(Ellis 1996). Instead, by adopting a multiple hypotheses approach, the study 
seeks to identify several hypotheses – and causes – that either explain the low 
outflow – or perhaps of more interest – are adopted as a discourse by differing 
interest groups to explain the “crisis.” The multiple hypothesis approach, first 
outlined by Chamberlain in the 1880s, stated that rather than testing a singly 
hypothesis, the researcher should be open to the possibilities and not let the 
evidence – the observations – fit into a pre-cooked hypothesis. (T.C. 
Chamberlain 1888).  
 
Both the progressive contextualization and chain of explanation approach are 
themselves open to criticism of reducing reality to a single root cause because 
they move “upward” in scale, suggesting a “conceptual hierarchy of power” 
where ultimately the world economy somehow directly determines the land use 
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choices made by local land use managers, albeit in an abstract sense. Instead, 
rather than a “chain of command,” political ecologists have advocated looking 
both outward toward the state and wider market, while also considering how local 
users interact directly with the global market through a network approach 
(Robbins 2005: 212). In particular, the identification of these communities as 
translocal – local communities which are connected through the economy to a 
higher scale of analysis through actual relations and not in some deterministic 
fashion – necessitates utilizing a variety of techniques to study both the individual 
decisions of farmers with the communal, regional and international structures that 
help determine those decisions (Swyngedouw 1997).  
 
Consequently, the present project utilized four primary techniques of analysis -- a 
literature review, open-ended interviews with a wide variety of actors, semi-
structured surveys and data analysis, including both the surveys themselves and 
secondary sources of information.  The majority of this work was conducted 
between 2003 and 2005. In 2006, the survey data was analyzed (see Table 1.1) 
 
Even before the present study began, the author had significant experience, 
contacts and communications in the region. From 1994 to the present, the author 
was employed at the Texas Center for Policy Studies, a 501-c-3 environmental 
policy and advocacy organization that has conducted frequent work, research 
and collaborations with organizations in northern Mexico. As such, the author 
developed relationships with a number of officials and organizations in 
Chihuahua that became important to the present study. In fact, one of the 
projects at TCPS during the late 1990s and early 2000s was to assess the 
impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on certain communities in 
Mexico, including in the forested ejidos of southern Chihuahua (Guerrero, Kelly, 
Reed and Vegter 2002). Finally, beginning in 2001, TCPS received funding to 
assess the binational water crisis in general and more specifically, issues in the 
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Río Conchos watershed (Kelly 2001). The research and results of that work were 
instrumental to the present study. Thus, without doubt, these relationships and 
experiences influenced the present study. 
 
 Table 1.1. Timeline and Methodology of Present Study 












Spring, 2003 Literature Review 
of Area and 
Analysis of 
Hydrological Data 




















Case Study areas 
Initial Interviews 



























































IBWC, BECC, and 
Texas Governor’s 
























After completing a proposal, the author conducted dozens of interviews with a 
wide variety of actors in the three geographic areas selected as case studies 
during the irrigation season in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Using in-depth open-ended 
interviews through a network approach of those participating in decision-making 
about water and land use, rather than a standardized sample, is an excellent way 
to assess local decision-making. People have differing access to resources and 
differing knowledge of reality, and both local factors as well as international 
forces impact local decision-making. Thus, interviews within the case study 
approach “can provide us with fundamental sociological knowledge of human 
agents, communities, organizations and civilizations (Sjoberg et al 1991:48).” 
 
In each of the three study locations, the groups interviewed and the meetings 
attended were slightly different. Often one interview would lead to suggestions for 
other important actors or farmers to interview. In addition to these dialogues, the 
researcher also walked with farmers in their fields and conservation projects to 
elicit more direct contact and understanding of the factors facing farmers. The 
author also participated and observed some formal and informal meetings.  
 
In addition to the local sources of information,  interviews were conducted with 
individuals with a more “watershed”  rather than local interest in the issues 
addressed in this study, including academics, non-governmental organizations, 
political leaders and officials at both the International Boundary Water 
Commission and Border Environment Cooperation Commission and individuals 
working for the state of Texas.  
 
In addition to these “expert” interviews, a common semi-structured survey was 
implemented in three different study areas (see Appendix A). While there were 
slight deviations in the survey to incorporate the uniqueness of each place, in 
general the same questions and unit of questions were asked of each surveyed 
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farmer. During 2005, the researcher approached and conducted surveys with a 
total of 175 farmers in the three areas. There were opportunities for both 
structured responses and open-ended answers. As per University of Texas 
guidelines, each farmer was given a one-page description of the purpose of the 
study, which was briefly explained (see Appendix B). Surveys were conducted 
both literally “in the field” as well as in farmer homes. The surveys provided both 
quantitative and qualitative information, as outlined in the case study chapters.  
 
Finally, in addition to the literature review, open-ended interviews, and semi-
structured surveys, the study also involved obtaining and analyzing a significant 
amount of “data,” mainly from government sources in Mexico, including water 
use, dam management information, precipitation, forestry, agricultural and 
industrial production, imports and exports of supplies, efficiencies of agricultural 
water delivery systems as well as some water quality and soil quality data. While 
data on sedimentation levels and studies of the dams and rivers was requested, 
in the end no data was provided. Instead, when discussing sedimentation, the 
author relied on personal observation – including multiple photographs -- the 
responses elicited from interviews and surveys, and data provided by the 
irrigation user associations in terms of the amount of money spent on cleaning 
out vegetation and sediment in the main canals.  
 
While there are significant data limitations to some of these sources – discussed 
in detail in subsequent chapters – the data does provide an important backdrop 
to the present study. Indeed, one of the principle findings of the present study is 
to show how this data was utilized by different interests to support certain views 





C. Dependent and Independent Variables?  
 
This study is not a scientific approach attempting to prove a particular hypothesis 
in a quantitative manner. That being said, the study has a series of “dependent” 
and “independent” variables, at least implicitly.  
 
First of all, the river flow itself – the actual volume of water which flowed past the 
International Boundary and Water Commission water flow gauge just above the 
outflow to the Río Grande – could be considered a dependent variable, 
influenced by a number of factors, including dam management, rainfall, water 
use, land use changes, regional or global climate changes, direct river channel 
modifications and other factors. Viewing the outflow as the result of actions and 
factors within the watershed is an important unifying, geographic concept.  
 
Moreover, in terms of the case study chapter, independent variables –as 
developed in the land and water use survey – include such variables as size of 
land holdings, type of tenure (ejido versus private holdings), age of farmer, crop-
based subsidies, and participation in soil or water conservation projects, while 
dependent variables include amount of land in cultivation, types of crops grown, 
changes in water source and water use efficiencies and other agricultural 
changes enacted over the years. While there is no “regression” analysis or real 
attempt to explain the weight of different factors, there is an attempt to see how 
the category of farmer by size of area irrigated might influence their answers, 
participation in programs, access to credit and type of crop grown.  
 
D. Methodological Challenges  
 
The present study adopted a variety of techniques within a case study approach 
to analyze water and land use changes among farmers in different locations 
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within the Río Conchos watershed, and then attempting to see the causes and 
effects of this interaction in progressively wider contexts. In enacting any project 
of this scope, it is apparent that the researcher needs to take methodological 
care, particularly when examining actors’ choices and perceptions. For when 
studying other cultures – particularly in another language – it is easy to ignore, 
misinterpret or misunderstand these cultural perceptions and choices, impose 
preconceived notions or ignore the impacts of the researcher on those studied. 
Fortunately, a body of literature in the alternative planning, empowerment and 
communicative action fields exists which offers at least partial solutions to the 
methodological challenges of studying other cultures (Umemoto 2001; Glesne 
1984).  
 
At the heart of this call for participatory planning is a recognition of the need for a 
kind of communication built on trust, rather than upon imposing views or power 
(see Friedmann 1992: 101-103; and Peattie 1987). A traditional planner or 
development agent might assume what is good for the community, while the 
reflective practitioner assumes that both the community and the planner have 
knowledge that can be useful. Planning becomes “learning-in-action (Wilson 
1997: 748).” Other so-called social learning methods -- including Paulo Freire’s 
“concientización”, and other proponents of social learning have called for a 
dialogue as “a means to individual and group empowerment (Wilson 1996: 625).” 
More recent efforts for bottom-up development including Participatory Rural 
Appraisals, and the use of technology for indigenous mapping (Poole 1995 and 
Rocheleau et al. 1995), all of which point to ways for “experts” to bridge learning 
and vision for the community (Wilson 1996).  
 
These experiences have relevance for the present study. Skills discussed and 
developed in participatory planning literature have relevance to any researcher 
operating in another culture and include active listening, relationship skills, 
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groups process skills, such as conflict resolution, team building and leadership 
skills. Some of these same skills have been noted in the dispute resolution 
literature  (Fisher and Ury 1981; Moore 1996). Thus, Moore mentions the need to 
help reframe discussions, develop trust, structure communication, establish 
legitimacy and know how to manage strong emotions as part of the required 
skills in mediation (Moore 1996: 161-190). 
 
Geographers have made similar points of the need for researchers to have 
methodological care. When observing social relations, landscape or alternative 
cultural practices, the observer can misread what he is observing. The “outsider’s 
trap,” as geographer Anne Buttimer terms it “is one that looks at places from an 
abstract sky (Buttimer 1980: 171).” Buttimer notes “ he or she tried to read the 
texts of landscapes and overt behavior in the picture languages of maps and 
models and is therefore  inevitably drawn toward finding in places what he or she 
intends to find in them (Buttimer 1980: 171).” At the same time, Buttimer notes 
that there is also an insider’s trap – who “may be so immersed in the particulars 
of everyday life and action that he or she may see no point in questioning..or 
seeing home in its wider or social context (Buttimer: 172).” It is the role of the 
geographer to be both the insider and outsider and avoid these difficulties. 
 
Another methodological challenge is to recognize and understand the role of 
power within a community, difficult to ascertain as an outsider. Here, Umemoto 
recommends the use of “cultural translators.” Cultural translators are: 
 
people who are culturally rooted in a traditional community and who 
are versed in the language of modernity. They often serve as bridges 
and help to identify differences in interpretation and facilitate cross-
cultural communication (Umemoto: 26).  
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Several specific steps were taken to avoid some of these methodological 
challenges. First of all, even before the first field visit, the researcher was familiar 
with the area, had read extensively on many of the cultural features and local 
history, and had many contacts in the immediate area.  This knowledge helped 
build initial trust.  
 
Moreover, the study’s purpose was made evident with every contact. Every 
farmer surveyed, every community leader or official interviewed was presented 
basic information – in Spanish – that listed the purpose of the study – dissertation 
research and subject area (Appendix B). In addition, in the Sierra Madre, as well 
as in the communities in the irrigation districts, the researcher made use of 
cultural translators. These were individuals well known in the community that 
helped the researcher make contacts, build trust and help interpret local culture.  
 
Thus, in the case of the forest ejidatarios at the Conchos headwaters, the 
researcher worked primarily with CONTEC – a non-profit technical forestry 
training organization – to help identify and interview leaders within the ejidos. By 
following some of the projects developed in the community with the assistance of 
CONTEC and accompanying CONTEC to participate in workshops in the area, 
the researcher was “exposed” to the community, and gained a certain level of 
trust with local leaders. Similarly, through another community-based group – 
Fuerza Ambiental – the researcher was able to make in-roads into other 
communities in the area though in a more superficial manner. These cultural 
“bridges” thus became part of the study’s methodology to overcome the difficulty 
of gaining trust and access to information in a different cultural context.  
 
In Delicias and Ojinaga, the researcher – more through chance than design – 
developed close relationships with members of the community that helped bridge 
cultural gaps and gain access and insight. Thus, in Ojinaga, the researcher 
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rented a room in the home of a local high school science teacher – Humberto 
Lujan – who was also a member of city council. The son of a farmer in the nearby 
community of Valverde, this individual helped the researcher gain access to both 
government officials and local farmers, and also helped answer and “interpret” 
questions about agricultural practices and local environmental challenges. In 
addition, the researcher utilized the assistance of a local grocery store owner –
Guadalupe Torres -- in one of the agricultural communities who accompanied the 
researcher on several trips to survey local farmers. Having a “local” cultural 
bridge to interpret answers following the visits and introduce the researcher to 
local farmers was invaluable in gaining trust, access and understanding.  
 
In Delicias, a local academic – Dr. Concepcion Lujan, brother to Humberto Luján 
– with substantial knowledge about local agricultural and forestry practices and 
connections to local irrigation officials also served as a “cultural” bridge for the 
researcher. These initial visits and connections proved invaluable in the design 
and implementation of the study.  
 
Finally, in the small agricultural community of Ortiz, near Rosales, the researcher 
rented a room from the family of then water user association president Humberto 
Serrano. The relationship that developed with the family proved invaluable to 
understanding the history, culture and agricultural practices of this part of the 
Delicias Irrigation District, as well as having contacts with other farmers in the 




The dissertation is organized geographically. Following this introduction, Chapter 
Two introduces readers to the region, including the Río Conchos watershed, and 
the on-again, off-again regional dispute over water and its use. Entitled River 
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Basin Woes, the chapter outlines the purported drought that impacted northern 
Mexico, the differing explanations and narratives offered to explain its causes 
and impacts, the dispute between the U.S. and Mexico – or more specifically 
between Texas and Chihuahua – over water and its (partial) resolution through 
the introduction of water and soil conservation projects. As such, the chapter is 
an indispensable recording of the overall socio-political context in which 
individual and community decisions were made about agricultural land and water 
use in specific communities, as well as the political reactions to it. 
 
Chapter Three – entitled Why the Pitiful Flows? Narratives and Facts about the 
Río Conchos Flows, 1990-2005 --  outlines the major factors purported to have 
caused the low-flows of the Río Conchos in Chihuahua, and provides some basic 
data about these factors, including rainfall, dam management, agricultural 
changes and water use, land use changes and some of the other major policy, 
economic and physical changes occurring within Mexico. The chapter helps shed 
some light on changes occurring in the region during the period, and while not 
necessarily arriving at a conclusion about which factors were the cause of the 
low-flows, helps crystallize the likely multi-causality of low-flows.  
 
Chapters Four through Six present the actual on-the-ground case studies in three 
specific areas in the State of Chihuahua (see Map 2). While it was not possible 
given the time spent in each community to examine the political contexts of these 
case studies in the same way as the larger U.S. – Mexican debate, it was 
possible to detail the material changes and perceptions occurring there. Chapter 
Four – entitled  Mountain Voices -- examines resource use – including soil, 
forestry products and water – by local farmers, most of them with strong ties to 
indigenous cultures,  living in the mountainous oak and pine forests of the upper 
Río Conchos watershed. Specific land “conservation” strategies being 
implemented by subsistence farmers in concert with both governmental and non-
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governmental organizations are also presented in this chapter as well as a wider 
effort to implement a regional biosphere reserve. Along the way, differing 
narratives of environmental degradation and discourses are examined in the 
context of the debate over low-flows from the Río Conchos.  
 
In Chapter Five – The Delicious Valley -- the major resource use changes that 
have occurred during the 1990s and early 21st century in the farms of the Delicias 
Irrigation District – a humongous 100,000 hectare irrigation community fed by two 
gigantic reservoirs are presented, as well as efforts to both conserve and sell  
water rights in an effort to reduce overall demand on the system (Jimenéz 2002). 
Moreover, the chapter also presents a much more detailed analysis of farmers 
reactions to those changes in two particular subsets of Mexico’s second largest 
irrigation district. Known as “Modulos” or Modules, these two geographically 
based areas near the towns of Saucillo and Rosales are run by farmer-led water 
user associations which manage and operate the distribution of water, reflecting 
the move in Mexico toward decentralization and privatization of resource use.  
 
In Chapter Six – Pearl of the Desert or Gateway to Hell? Agricultural Change in 
the Lower Río Conchos (Ojinaga) Irrigation District, 1990-2005 – the farmers and 
resource use of this desert gateway to Mexico are highlighted. Located in the 
sandy soils and arid plains which surround the outflow of the Río Conchos, the 
roughly 1,000 farmers who once farmed 6,000 to 7,000 hectares of cotton, 
wheat, corn and sorghum have been reduced to a few hundred who still make a 
partial living off the land (Jiménez 2003). The chapter examines change in 
resource use, as well as the effort to shrink and consolidate the Lower Río 
Conchos Irrigation District through the sale of water rights and water 
conservation (Calderón 2005). More in-depth analysis was conducted on two of 
the “Modulos”– one in the hills overlooking the City of Ojinaga where cotton 
farming is still practiced widely – and one along the banks of the Río Grande.  
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Note: The three case studies are in the Municipality of Carichi, in the Delicias Irrigation 
District and in the Bajo Río Conchos Irrigation District. 
Source: Miguel Pavón, Borderlands Information Center, Texas Natural Resource 
Information Service, 2007.  
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In the finale – Chapter Seven – Droughts, Disputes, Discourse, Decentralization 
and Natural Resource Use in the Río Conchos Basin -- the major conclusions of 
the dissertation are presented, as well as reaffirming its importance to academic 
and geographic research as well as to water management policy in a semi-arid 
climate. Developments in the watershed since the completion of the research are 
also discussed as well as what the future might hold if drought-like conditions 
were to persist in the wider Rio Grande basin. 
 
V. Literature Review and Importance of Present Study  
 
This dissertation sheds light on three processes of international significance: 
resource management, economic integration and environmental conflict 
resolution. It thus makes a significant contribution to understanding political and 
cultural ecology – the nexus of political and economic forces on human use of 
resources  -- while adding to the growing literature on resolving transboundary 
environmental conflicts.  By providing on-the-ground analysis of the attempts to 
work with farmers toward more efficient water and land use as part of the 
resolution of an environmental conflict, as well as the wider attempt to improve 
“stewardship” in local communities through government and non-governmental 
organizations efforts, the dissertation also add to the literature on participatory 
development programs, while providing important lessons to geographers, 
development practitioner and water management specialists. Although not the 
primary focus, the dissertation is informed by and contributes to the literature of 
human impacts on watersheds by pointing to the complexity and interaction 
between climate, water use and management, land use and economic change.  
 
 26 
A. Political and Cultural Ecology.  
 
The present study moves beyond purely physical geography concepts of land-
use change to examine social, cultural and perceptional factors. Cultural ecology 
focuses its attention on local agents’ use of natural resources – the actual 
practitioners of land management – in examining land use change (Brookfield 
and Brown 1963; Boserup 1965). Political ecology looks at the empirical claims 
of ecological destruction and often finds that when political factors such as 
differential access to resources are ignored, people acting directly on the 
environment are “blamed” for their problems (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Blaikie 
1999). This has led to “coercive” conservation programs, imposed by government 
(Peluso 1993) or outside conservation organizations, which create “truths” 
through their discourse of wilderness and conservation, ignoring local realities 
and conflicts (Proctor 1996; Sundberg 1998).  
 
Cultural ecology has attempted to apply the concept of systems and ecological 
relationships to human societies, usually by focusing on local communities and 
impacts upon the land (Sauer 1938). In the 1960s and 70s, cultural ecologists 
began to study subsistence producers in the light of ecological systems theory 
(Bennett 1976). By its very nature, cultural-human ecology is an attempt to 
examine the interactions between people and their biophysical environments 
(Butzer 1992). Much of this early work looked at decisions about natural resource 
use and attempted to show how it made sense “in terms of maintaining cultural 
ecosystems (Knapp 1991: 13).” Cultural ecologists then saw the sustainable use 
of resources -- as  the “choice of options”, an “ongoing process of adaptation” -- 
as conflicts and contact between groups, changes in goals and catastrophes 
influenced choices made about natural resource exploitation (Knapp 1991: 2).  
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Historical geographer William Denevan notes that cultural geographers has at 
times suffered from a tendency to “look at cultures as uniform and relatively 
stable” when in fact, cultures have a “range of options to choose from,” or “a 
reservoir of alternatives that may be essential to survival (Denevan 1983: 400).”  
Instead, Denevan, Turner, Knapp and others looked toward cultural ecology as a 
subdiscipline that focuses on “cultural adaptation” to change (Knapp 1994). 
Denevan defines “cultural adaptation” as “the process of change in response to a 
change in the physical environment, or a change in internal stimuli, such as 
demography, economics and organization (Denevan 1983: 401).”  Thus, the 
focus on adaptation looks at the question of why and when a particular 
technology or cultural practice is used (Ibid: 405). Thus, “adaptation is not a 
simple initial process which .. ceases … to allow the real business of culture to 
proceed, but involves continual choice, continual competitive evaluation of 
alternative cultural traits with respect to efficiency, flexibility and coevolution 
potential: it can in its broadest sense be seen as a synonym for culture itself 
(Knapp 1991: 15).” 
 
An important component of this cultural ecological tradition has been the focus 
on the sustainable – and unsustainable – use of resources and the concept of 
conservation. (Sauer 1938; Meyer and Turner 1996; Bennett 1976). Bennett, in 
The Ecological Transition, attempted to show how modern non-traditional society 
had incorporated nature into culture in its use of natural resources. Bennett 
contrasts the more harmonious relationship with nature in traditional cultures as 
gradually losing out once “outside forces” gain control of locally shared 
resources. These outside forces make it more difficult to maintain 
“conservationist practices.” (Bennett 1976: 268). The “ecological transition” is the 
“tendency to seek ever-larger quantities of energy in order to satisfy the demands 
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of human existence, comfort and wealth (Bennett 1976: 5).” Yet, ironically, out of 
this transition can come the recognition of the need for conservation.  
 
Similarly, Charles Bowden contrasts how different cultures used water resources 
in the American southwest, and how technology and the need for ever larger 
amounts of energy – spurred by technological improvements like wells -- 
transformed their balance with natural resources, but lead to degradation, and 
eventually to a conservation ethic (Bowden 1977). 
 
More recent work by cultural geographers has examined the relation between 
cultural preservation and environmental conservation (Johnson 1989, Sundberg 
1998). In some case, these studies also show how “well-meaning appropriate 
development and environmental conservation projects can undermine indigenous 
self determination (Knapp 1994: 7).” Thus, geographers have begun to examine 
the impacts of the “imperialism” of environmental NGOs, who bring their 
concepts of environmental conservation to the developing world. Throughout 
highland Ecuador, this has led to “NGO landscapes,” with “their earnest plantings 
of introduced crops, optimistic terraces, transplanted raised fields, and proud 
signs with their international flags and logos (Sundberg 1998).”  
 
Nonetheless, even more modern, less mechanistic cultural ecology has been 
subject to criticism for being either too  “culturally” or too “environmentally 
deterministic” and for failing to address people’s interaction with the environment 
beyond a local scale (Batterbury et. al. 1997; Blaikie 1985). Taking a more 
structural approach, political ecology began to look at the empirical claims of 
ecological destruction (Blaikie 1985) and how when political and social factors 
are ignored – including differential access to resources – people acting directly 
on the environment are “blamed” for the problems, often in a coercive fashion 
(Peluso 1993). Thus, political ecology looks at differential access to resources,  
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connections to the wider “structural” economic programs implemented in 
developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, and the role of international trade 
and investment (Batterbury et. al 1997) 
 
Political ecology itself has since come under some attack from cultural ecologists 
for being overly structural --  ignoring “ecology” and “human agency” (Vayda and 
Walters 1999) --  and ignoring the real decisions made by local resource users 
like farmers, irrigation system managers and others (Chowdhury and BL Turner II 
2006; Batterbury et. al. 1997).  Since then, political ecology has taken a wide 
variety of approaches, including a more poststructural approach, which begins to 
consider sociology of knowledge and postmodern approaches to understand 
nature. The “social nature” approach of political ecology, for example, contends 
that the knower/observer of nature is imbued with his own biases and social 
context and that is it therefore imperative to show how opinions of nature reflect 
social origin and to discern the “discourses of nature” (Castree and Braun 2001; 
Proctor 1996; and Zimmerer 1993).  
 
These “post-structural” approaches have themselves been challenged by more 
political geographers as ignoring actual on-the-ground material use of resources 
– within the social relations of productions or what Peet and Watts call “the 
natural construction of the social (Peet and Watts 1996: 262-63).” 
 
James Proctor, on the other hand, attempts to combine both a consideration of 
the objective social and economic context, as well as the subjective views of 
“constructed nature” within his own work on logging in the northwest and differing 
views of nature (Proctor 1996).  Similarly, coming out of a more land-use, land-
cover traditional cultural approach, B.L. Turner II has cited the emergence of a 
“hybrid” approach that seeks to balance the “structural” and political explanations 
for resource use change of political ecologists with the land manager agency 
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approach of cultural ecology – “often employing an actor-conscious approach” 
(Chowdhury and B.L Turner II 2006; Zimmerer and Bassett 2003). Actors are 
bounded by structural and politico-economic realities, but also are active agents, 
reacting and choosing among options, and even at times transcending them. 
(Chowdury and B.L. Turner II 2006). 
 
Cultural and political ecologists have also looked at the “internationalization” of 
the conservation movement, including the attempt to impose a particular view of 
conservation worldwide as well as the problems that can occur when U.S. –style 
conservation is imposed from above, whether when saving the rain forest in 
Brazil or attempting to create a Biosphere Reserve (Sachs 1991; Cockburn and 
Hecht 1989; Batisse 1986; Flores, Valentine and Nabhan 1990). 
 
In the present study, in fact, there was a brewing debate in 2004 and 2005 over 
the possibility of creating a biosphere reserve in the Sierra Tarahumara, including 
parts of the Río Conchos watershed, which is explored in Chapter Four (Gingrich 
2005).  
 
Other geographers have focused more specifically on the specific role that Non-
Governmental Organizations have played in promoting one particular view of 
environmental conservation or another (Dowie 1996; Sachs 1991; Price 1994). In 
looking at organizations in Latin America, authors have contrasted a first-world 
focus on conservation of natural resources and preservation of species, with a 
third-world focus on quality of life, livelihoods and control of resources, at times 
leading to conflict over methods and goals (Price 1994:  Meeker-Lowry 1993; and 
Bebbington 1997;  2004). Others have studied the attempt by some international 
NGOs to create networks with local communities for the purposes of 
environmental stewardship and management, as well as certification of 
“products,” be it fair trade coffee, certified forest products or organic agriculture, 
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and geographers and others have been interested in analyzing these new 
networks (Espach 2006; Meeker-Lowry 1993).  
 
In Mexico, geographers and others have studied the 10-year experiment with 
certification of Mexican forested communities by meeting the Forest Stewardship 
Council’s certification standards (Gerez Fernández and Alatorre-Guzmán 2005). 
Nevertheless, these attempts are often perceived as a way to add additional 
“northern” conceptions of sustainability on southern communities, and because of 
the way markets and networks work, have not led to more material improvements 
in the forested communities themselves (Klooster 2006). There is a contrast 
between words, visions and deeds.  
 
This dissertation both borrows and adds to this discussion within cultural and 
political ecology on natural resource use, discourse and conservation ideas and 
practice. Thus, in Chapter Two and Three,  the dissertation considers the 
narratives that emerged among different actors to explain the low-flow and 
drought conditions. In particular, the notion that bad management practices 
among local user managers – such as upslope farmers in the forested regions of 
the Río Conchos --caused sedimentation in the dams, or changed local climate 
patterns, leading to less rainfall, is an important part of this dissertation. Or that 
inefficiencies in water use or expansion of agriculture by farmers and officials 
contributed to low outflows is a similar notion. Sometimes these discourses are in 
fact used as control methods to assure there is central control of communal 
resources (Blaikie and Muldavin 2004: 541). Recent literature on narratives of 
environmental degradation  looks at “claims” of environmental degradation – be it 
deforestation, desertification, wood fuel crisis and overstocking of animals – and 
examines their legitimacy (Fairhead and Leach 1996; 2003). Thus, Blaikie and 
Muldavin detail how the notion that upstream erosion, deforestation and local 
wood fuel use in Indian and Chinese watersheds caused downstream flooding 
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and sedimentation of local dams continues to be utilized as an official discourse 
among national environmental planners and policy implementers even as it has 
been debated and debunked by social scientists (Blaikie and Muldavin 2004).  
 
In the later chapters, on the other hand, which focus more at the individual and 
communal land use decisions, a more agency-structure approach is examined, 
borrowing from both traditional cultural ecology and political ecology (Chowdhury 
and Turner II 2006). Here, the focus are the actual changes made by individual 
farmers in terms of water use and crop choice, as well as the water conservation 
and soil conservation projects being implemented in different communities both 
on an individual and communal level.  
 
In these case studies, there is also attention to the different roles taken by both 
private farmland and communal lands through Mexico’s ejido structure. While 
traditional development approaches – often based on biologist Hardin’s “tragedy 
of the commons” idea – called for privatization of public lands as “the way to 
solve resource degradation in the arid tropics,” alternative agricultural 
development theories call for support for the continued sustainable use of public 
lands (Hardin 1968; Bromley 1989: 868).  
 
Since 1992 changes to its constitution, Mexico has been allowing ejidos to 
“privatize” these officially communal lands, and the State of Chihuahua began a 
process called “PROCEDE” to allow a wide variety of changes in land tenure. 
Rather than a simple story – ejidos turning toward privatization – the dissertation 
finds a complex process of some ejidos turning without hesitation toward 
privatization and others instead seeking to develop more explicit rules on use of 
the communal property so that it would not be used, abused and lost. Thus, the 
present study adds to this discussion of how communities utilize communal 
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resources at a time when there is an official call and developed policy for 
privatization of these resources (Batterbury and Fernando 2006).  
 
In addition, the present study also adds to the specific discussion of the politics of 
decentralization, in this case the decentralization of irrigation districts in Mexico, 
a process that began with changes in the 1992 National Water Law. There was 
substantial literature at that time about the need for Mexico to modernize 
regulation of its natural resource, and devolve control to the actual natural 
resource users. Among the arguments made were that such users would make 
their use of land and water more “efficient”.  Recent scholarship, however, has 
suggested that this “efficiency” has come at the cost of equity, and, indeed, 
paints a considerably more complex picture of the decentralization process in 
Mexico’s irrigation districts (Wilder 2002: Wilder and Romero Lankao 2006).  
 
The  present dissertation also adds to the literature within political/cultural 
ecology on the differing narratives related to concepts like wilderness, 
environmental conservation, as well as the role that different actors “play” in 
developing those concepts, such as the idea of the “pristine” wilderness 
(Denevan 1992). In particular, non-governmental organizations with some U.S. 
influences have been important actors in the discussion over water and forest 
conservation within the Río Conchos watershed, including Environmental 
Defense, World Wildlife Fund, more “local” groups like Sierra Madre Alliance with 
international funding, and the Smithsonian Institute. In addition, the emergence of 
global warming as an international and national issue has also opened up a new 
dialogue about forest preservation and conservation being an option toward 
meeting global goals of reduced carbon emissions, and discussions, and 
programs, have begun which consider the Sierra as a “sink” for carbon emissions 
through local action. Some of these programs and narrative emphasize a 
caretaker role for indigenous communities and farmers, while others are more 
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focused on the unique ecosystems of the region. Thus, an “environmental” role 
for Chihuahua’s forests and agricultural lands has been added as part of the 
larger discussion to counteract the rise in global warming gases.  
 
B. Economic Geography and “Transnational” Free Trade Studies.  
 
The present study also contributes to transnationalism research through the 
lense of economic geography, regional studies, and the study of the 
environmental and social impacts of free trade (Kelly and Reed 2003). Economic 
geographers have examined the process by which the “local” and “global” 
become increasingly intertwined through social relations of production. 
(Swyngedouw 1997) Economic geographers have insisted that space and place 
must consider the connection to outside economic forces, and that no place can 
be considered an island (Massey 1993, 1995). Some geographers have argued 
that the mitigating power of the state has been eclipsed, as local communities 
negotiate their existence with the global economy. Thus, “A new scale -- the 
“glocal” -- is continually (re) constituted, and requires researchers to look at both 
scales, and more importantly, at the social process between them (Swyngedouw: 
139).”  
 
Similarly, Massey is interested in how to incorporate the study of the spatial 
consequences of globalization with the importance of individual locations. 
Important in her theory is her definition of space and place and the necessity to 
look at both local (place) culture, social organizations, as well as the wider 
relations with the national and international economy. Her definition of space 
combines her idea that space is constituted through social relations and material 
social practices, with the idea that those social relations are spatially constructed 
(Massey 1994).   
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The definition "necessitates standing back, taking a broader view and setting (the 
place) in a wider context (Massey 1993: 144)." It is this definition of space which 
allows Massey to argue that culture and specific places are not being wholly 
subsumed through a globalized culture and economy, and that in fact, the 
meaning of culture and locality can be found in the relation between the two. As 
she states in her influential article “Questions of Locality:”  
 
The challenge for geographers is to retain an appreciation, and an 
understanding of the importance, of the uniqueness, of place while 
insisting always on the other side of the coin, the necessary 
interdependence of any place with others (Massey 1993: 146).  
 
Thus, the study counteracts a traditional state-centered view of power, "in which 
the space occupied by states is seen as fixed (Agnew 1999: 174)." Thus, 
geographers like Massey have pointed to the need “to understand not only how 
the local is affected by the global, but how the actions of local people at local 
level are fully implicated in, and thus have some responsibility for, events in, and 
conditions of, people in lands which may often seem remote (Massey 1993: 
144).”  
 
Thus, rather than the often simplistic discourses of “scale” – the local use of 
resources versus the global power which ultimately sets the rules – and 
attempting to pinpoint an explanation of which holds sway in changes, the 
dissertation views scale as “highly fluid and dynamic” and thus in terms of 
research the interest is not in explaining which scale explains changes, but how 
local producers negotiate and operate across differing scales, “the process 
through which scales become (re)constituted (Swyngedouw 1997: 141).” The 
present research fits into this “politics of scale” discussion, as it attempts to 
consider both the local biophysical processes – land and water -- and the social 
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processes – the harvests of crops, timber and cattle -- which go beyond the 
watershed scale  (Zimmerer and Bassett 2003). 
 
This particular research takes this concept of place, space and scale – as a 
process-based mechanism -- and applies it to the Río Conchos watershed, from 
the Sierra Taruhamara to the arid plains of the Río Grande, and looks at how 
different agricultural communities have reacted to both local policies and 
practices and global changes. Of particular interest in the present study – as 
mentioned in the previous section – are the changes related to land tenure, 
including the 1992 Constitutional Change and resulting implementation of 
“PROCEDE”; changes in forestry law which opened up forested communities to 
outside investments and larger tracts of land development; and changes in the 
water policy which moved Mexico to a more decentralized and privatized 
approach to water management. In addition, the 1994 North American Free 
Trade Agreement opened up the Mexican economy to investment from abroad 
as well as slowly loosening restrictions on imports and exports. Thus, rather than 
a look at the contrasting power of local and global scales, it is an examination of 
the politics of scale itself.   
 
C. Transboundary Environmental Conflict Resolution.  
 
Recent literature has come to recognize how differences in water policy between 
the U.S. and Mexico makes binational collaboration on water management – 
including  resolution of environmental conflicts -  challenging (Nalven 1986; 
Browning-Aiken et. al. 2004; Brown and Mumme 2000). These include 
differences in the roles of local, state and national governments, a differences in 
some cases in water rights and water ownership and differences in the power of 
private and collective ownership of water.  
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In addition, under terms of the 1944 Water Treaty, water planning is placed in the 
powers of the binational commission known as the International Boundary and 
Water Commission. This agency has been subject to criticism for being unable to 
overcome institutional challenges as population and economic growth has 
increased along the border, necessitating a new role in issues like drought 
management and water quality issues (Brown & Mumme 2000). Some have 
given examples of how negotiating binational resource management has shifted 
from a purely state-department diplomatic process to one including translocal 
and transborder institutions (Milch & Varady 1999; Vasquez-Castillo 2001).  
 
The research details how new actors – including farmers in South Texas, 
academics at state institutions, representatives from state government in what is 
traditionally handled as a “national-level” dialogue, and environmental groups 
helped influence the negotiation process. The Mexican-US dispute over water 
also relied on new institutions like the Border Environment Cooperation 
Commission and North American Development Bank to fill in the gaps. By the 
same token some of the solutions offered – notably the use of water conservation 
as a “win-win” solution to free up water to meet the terms of the treaty– was 
offered by local and state politicians and even CONAGUA itself as a solution to 
municipal water needs, showing how negotiated settlements are continually 
reinterpreted among societal actors.  
 
D. Land Use/Land Cover Change and Its Impacts on River Systems 
 
While by no means a “physical” geography work, the research does rely on and 
contribute to the discussion of the impacts of human land use change and water 
management on river systems. Land-use cover/change analysis in geography 
looks at global land-cover change trends and human activities that directly alter 
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the physical environment (Goudie 1982, Meyer and Turner 1996). A much 
smaller subfield concerns human impacts on rivers.  
 
The impacts of land use change on lands and water upstream and downstream 
are varied and not well understood. A number of  factors– temporal, spatial, 
climate, habitat, scale and size, the timing and sequence of events and the 
multiplicity of causes – impact  the consideration of the impacts of land use 
change (see Schumm and Lichty 1965; Schumm 1991; Wolman and Gerson 
1978; Luna 1997; Wolman and Miller 1960; Macklin and Lewin 1989). Still, there 
is substantial evidence that certain land-use changes –such as the conversion of 
forested lands to agricultural fields (Wolman 1967; Knox 1977; Magilligan and 
Stamp 1997), the use of grasslands for grazing or the general phenomena of 
urbanization (Wolman 1967, Knighton 1988) – do have significant consequences 
both uplands and downlands. The impacts of cattle on land use change and 
downstream impacts have often been exaggerated, or consequences in one 
particular climate and habitat – usually the Midwestern and western U.S. --have 
been extended to other more tropical or arid environments without sufficient 
evidence (see especially Trimble and Mendel 1995). Many of the physical 
changes in rivers attributed to human impacts have been challenged by some as 
“received wisdom” not born out by actual on-the-ground studies (Trimble 2000; 
Fairhead and Leach 1996; 2003).  
 
It is important to recognize that the consequences of land use change are not 
static. In addition to the natural feed-back loop of rivers, as they adjust to 
changes in flow or sedimentation, human decisions about land-use are also 
impacted by and impact downstream changes. Humans witness changes in the 
land, and may change their own practices accordingly, which in turn impacts the 
land. Fallow lands or agricultural  fields affected by overgrazing, highly salinized 
waters or “tired” soils may be abandoned, thus allowing for restoration to occur, 
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both on the fields and downstream. Humans react and adapt to land use 
changes and its impacts, including by improving land management (Doolittle 
1984; 1989; Trimble 2000).  
 
In the Río Grande basin, studies of the impacts of dams, vegetation and drought 
have also shown the importance of different factors – and their interactions -- in 
determining sediment and water flows (Everitt 1993 and 1998, Collier et. al. 
1996), and this research contributes to that discussion. However, the research 
will seek to avoid the narrow focus on geomorphologic process, since it often 
ignores the larger driving forces of political and economic change.  
 
It is also important to look at different scales. Thus, at a very localized level, 
construction of earthen canals in agricultural “arroyos”—intermittent streams – in 
eastern   Sonora  to capture flood waters, widen and deepen of their own accord 
once sufficient  floods arrive, resulting in scouring and degradation (Doolittle 
1984: 131). This leads to other consequences downstream and over time: 
 
Reorganization of agricultural space is a significant characteristic of the 
temporal landscape.(Doolittle 1984: 134) 
 
Several studies of the use of water for irrigation and other uses have shown how 
technology has made some of these changes more permanent and potentially 
more damaging on the ecosystem (Bowden 1977; Green 1973). The present 
study – which looks at change in land and water use in certain agricultural 
communities since the advent of drought-like conditions – analyzes on-the-
ground conditions and water use and flow data which suggest how particular 
communities reacted to and contributed to geomorphologic changes on the land. 
In particular, the change from strictly relying on “dam” water to the increased 
reliance on alternative sources such as direct river water pumping, shallow and 
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deep groundwater wells is an important documented reaction which may have 
led to wider consequences.   
 
VI. Findings and Conclusions 
 
Through the close analysis of the various “glocalized” spaces covered in the 
research, a number of overall and site-specific findings are developed. These 
can be categorized into changes in the roles of key actors, socioeconomic and 
policy changes, and adaptive strategies implemented by the farmers themselves. 
Moreover, some findings are only applicable to certain areas, since, as this 
dissertation shows, location does matter.  At the same time, there are several 
findings that could have implications beyond the specific application to the time, 
space and place covered in this dissertation.  
 
A. Overall Findings 
 
The Dispute. First of all, the debate, discussion and dispute between Mexico and 
Texas over water resources led to the utilization of partial data by different 
interest groups, depending on their underlying presuppositions and interests. 
Thus, while Mexico’s official position focused on average dam levels, average 
rainfall data and water releases to irrigation districts in the Río Conchos 
watershed and other tributaries contributing to the Río Grande, U.S. interests – 
such as the USDA, IBWC and south Texas farmers focused on “positive” 
balances in the dams, satellite imagery of dams and agricultural districts showing 
water levels and green fields, and total acreage irrigated over the period. Not 
surprisingly, the different sources and interpretation of data led to different 
discourses and responses.  
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While these two positions led to some interaction in the negotiation process, the 
opening up of the discussion to wider societal interests also led to new narratives 
about the causes and consequences of low flows into the Río Grande. These 
focused on climate change, land use change and water efficiencies rather than 
on overall dam management or rainfall. Still, these discourses were also tied to 
interests in opening up resources for riparian restoration and reforestation 
projects tied to environmental discourses of biodiversity.  
 
While not a quantitative or scientific study intend on finding the causes of low 
flow over the period, the various discourses and data suggest that rather than a 
“root” cause, be it deforestation, agricultural water waste, “stealing our water” or 
simply less rainfall, both the surveys of the actual observers of climate and water 
– the farmers –suggest that geomorphologic changes in water flow were actually 
due to a myriad of changes occurring within the watershed. Thus, drought was 
just one factor, both a cause and a contributor to the low outflow of the Río 
Conchos to the Río Grande, which set in motion the dispute between the two 
countries. Other likely factors included: changes in the timing of rainfall; dam 
management as Mexican administrators chose to change the dam release 
schedule to favor summer crops over winter crops; the agricultural crop change 
as perennial and some summer crops “won out” over spring and winter crops that 
had been previously grown in the major agricultural district;  the physical 
expansion of the districts in the 1980s which increased the demand on the dams; 
and physical changes in the landscape which increased sedimentation and 
choked the riverbed with sediment and vegetation; as well as an increase in the 
use of groundwater, impacting the river’s base flow.   
 
Part of the story of these changes is also the decentralization of the irrigation 
districts themselves, which perhaps contributed to the lack of oversight by the 
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federal government as farmers turned increasingly to groundwater and other 
alternative water sources, potentially impacting riverflow.  
 
B. Agricultural Change 
 
This dissertation also revealed a watershed in the midst of major changes in 
agricultural production. In the upper watershed, where temporal, rain-fed, largely 
subsistence agriculture was examined, farmers continued to grow corn and 
beans as they have for decades, and indeed, centuries. Nonetheless, farmers 
said that the timing and amount of rainfall had impacted their production, and that 
local erosion, secondary vegetation and loss of forest cover had impacted 
erosion and soil retention. They had also been impacted by the loss of market 
outlets for selling any additional production or to sell more commercial crops like 
apples due to the loss of some government programs and the import of crops 
from the U.S. Still, farmers with stronger communal and indigenous ties rejected 
the use of hybridized seeds and continued to preserve native crops, albeit at 
times having to struggle to find them due to reduced yields. Farmers were also 
turning more to organic fertilizers – often from their own domestic animals – due 
to tired soils and increases in fertilizer costs.  
 
Rather than the feared sell-off of ejido communal land that some predicted with 
changed in the forestry laws and Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, many 
ejidos and ejido-like structures in the upper Río Conchos had reasserted the 
power of the community as important to their cultural and economic survival and 
had rejected calls for straight privatization of their resources. In the forging of this 
identity, they relied on new networks with local NGOs, new international 
institutions and NGOs. Some of these networks did suffer from differences in 
discourse and underlying interests common in such undertakings. Thus, in 
particular in the Municipality of Bocoyna, there seemed to be a disconnect 
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between larger plans to “save” the watershed and the actual on-the-ground 
plants implemented through contracts with the World Wildlife Fund.  
 
Still, within communities, the discussion over privatization of communal 
resources had resulted in continued tension, and in some cases, the de-facto 
privatization of communal resources was and continued to happen, even 
predating policy changes in forestry and land tenure laws. The basic reasons 
appeared to be the failure for many ejidos to develop internal rules on how to 
prevent a “tragedy of the common” –like situation from developing.  
 
In response to drought and concern from local, governmental and international 
organizations over land degradation, a smattering of local reforestation, soil 
conservation and others projects were enacted throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s.  While there appeared to be disconnect between the small scale of the 
projects and the larger goals of these projects, local farmers were supportive of 
programs which they helped design, and indicated they did not feel “compelled” 
to participate or that the conservation programs had been imposed upon them. 
 
In the agricultural irrigation districts, there was a shrinking of irrigated acreage 
between 1990 and 2005, the period of study. Similarly, official data from both the 
National Water Commission – CONAGUA – and individual water user 
associations revealed that overall water use declined over the period. 
Nonetheless, rather than a simple tale of contracting acreage and water use, 
overall district data as well as surveys revealed complex changes in the types of 
crops grown, their seasonality and the amount and source of water. Thus, in the 
Delicias Irrigation District in particular, there was a shift toward perennial crops 
like alfalfa and pecans – which require watering all year long – and a shift away 




First of all, farmers turned to these crops for several simple reasons – they were 
fairly tolerant of drought but of more importance the return on their investment in 
terms of profit compared to the input costs – including water – were favorable. 
Even though alfalfa and pecans required higher water inputs and costs than did 
other crops that fell out of favor, the result for the individual farmer was positive. 
Secondly, the turn toward higher water-use crops can also be explained by the 
use of “non-district” water as individual and communal farmers turned to a wide 
variety of “alternative” sources to water their crops as the “official” water rights 
were curtailed. Thus, farmers surveyed in both the Rosales and Suacillo area 
within the Delicias Irrigation District noted that a significant change had been the 
use of private and communal well water, direct pumping of the river itself, and a 
system of shallow wells and pits used on emergency basis to water their crops. 
This finding helps explain why negotiators were often split over the fundamental 
question of whether farming and water use was increasing and decreasing during 
the late 1990s. It depended on the water source. 
 
Did producers increase their production of perennial crops like alfalfa and pecan 
production after normal winter releases were ended by CONAGUA, or was the 
decision to seriously curtail winter releases a reaction to the elimination of major 
winter crops like winter wheat?  Again, while the two decisions – the turn toward 
perennial crops and the decision to curtail winter releases from the dams – were 
self-reinforcing, the surveys and interviews strongly suggest that farmers turned 
toward perennial crops because they were a better solution, and then figured out 
how to get them irrigated, rather than as a response to the curtailment of normal 
water releases from the dams.  
 
While there was anecdotal and survey evidence that “wealthier” farmers with 
access to land, water, and especially bank and government support, had been 
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able to make this transition easier, many smaller private farmers and ejido 
farmers were still making a living farming. Much of this limited “success” can be 
attributed to their ability to organize their production communally. Thus, a 
government program which relied on organized private and ejido farmers allowed 
farmers to grow crops for their dairy cattle and then sell the milk to local 
collection centers at a price above market, while local cooperatives helped 
farmers purchase inputs at below market cost.  
 
While “communal” land – ejido common property – was not a major factor in 
Delicias, other than being an emergency place to graze cattle, communal water 
resources – such as shared deep wells -- were. Thus, in Congregación Ortíz, an 
ejido was able to utilize their access to communal wells to counteract the impacts 
of the drought and curtailed water use, and even gain access to additional 
resources which could be used for their own use or rented – for a profit – to 
others. Interestingly, this “shared” use of a communal resource was occurring 
even as the ejido itself sought to privatize its lands through the PROCEDE 
process.  
 
In other ejidos, however, it was clear that the changing agricultural landscape 
impacted by drought and the import of basic grains from the U.S. after enactment 
of NAFTA had impacted their viability, and many farmers chose to rent or sell 
water and land rights.  
 
In the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District in Ojinaga, where alternative sources 
of water were not available, the impacts of the “drought” – the loss in water 
releases from the major dams – was not as severe as in Delicias precisely 
because farmers had already abandoned agriculture with their feet. Thus, as 
water levels dropped precipitously in the late 1990s and early 2000s, entire 
communities and farmers had already left the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation 
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District through out migration to the City of Ojinaga and into the U.S. The major 
factors facing farmers there were fundamentally changes in the social network of 
production. Wheat and cotton – the longstanding crops of choice historically in 
the region – both underwent severe crisis during the 1990s. Wheat mills and 
cotton gyns closed up shop, and the only locally-run cotton gyn was operating 
sporadically and below production capacity levels.  
 
Farmers in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District that remained largely turned 
to production of cattle feed, including oats, sorghum and alfalfa. Indeed, whether 
producing feed as an input to cattle herds for meat or for producing cheese, or 
selling them to larger farmers or to the local cattle processing center, it can be 
said that the primary reason agriculture still existed in the Ojinaga area in 2005 
was cows.  A number of important networks had developed locally, with U.S. 
purchasers of young cattle working directly with cow producers and agricultural 
producers in a new network of agricultural production.  
 
There also appeared to be an equitable component to this transformation, with 
smaller ejido farmers continuing to grow cotton in the upper part of the district, 
while the lower district turned increasingly to cattle feed, and in some cases, to 
pecan production. Generally, it was the wealthier farmers who were able to make 
this transition, and the buying and renting of land and water rights in the district 
allowed some farmers to consolidate holdings to make this transition.  
 
C. Geographic Components of Agriculture Change 
 
There were geographic consequences of agricultural change in the irrigation 
districts. First of all, as water conservation projects were being implemented, 
certain lands were “favored” over others. Thus, where canals were being lined or 
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relined, “hydrants” placed at the corner of a farmer’s land, that land became more 
valuable, since ultimately the land could be irrigated more efficiently.  
 
In places like Rosales, this meant that the lands that had received significant 
investment in irrigation infrastructure – particularly around Congregación Ortíz – 
were being farmed more frequently and more intensely. This is also related to the 
interconnection of communal wells owned by the farmers of Congregación Ortíz. 
These farmers in essence had an additional water supply that could be used in 
both summer and winter months when the main dam was no longer releasing 
waters during drought years.  
 
In the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District, lands nearest to the Conchos River 
– and to the main irrigation canal – were favored during the period, while more 
outlying areas – and particularly those relying on water that needed to be 
“pumped” to higher ground were not. This is related to both the higher cost of 
pumped water, the small amount of water conservation investment that went into 
these areas, problems of salinity on these lands, and water management issues. 
As CONAGUA transferred ownership of the pumps and canals to the Water User 
Association as part of the changes contained within the 1992 National Water 
Law, these associations clearly struggled with this responsibility, made more 
difficult by the abandonment of many of these lands. There was little money 
coming in to keep the pumps running, leading to further abandonment of these 
lands. The emergence of a water rights buy-back program sponsored by 
CONAGUA and SAGARPA, the agricultural ministry, complicated the issue, as 
water conservation projects scheduled for these areas were abandoned until a 
clear picture of who was still actually farming emerged.  This geographic reality 
had an equity issue, since it favored private farmers with lands along the banks 
of the Conchos.  
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D. Communal Response to Soil and Water Conservation 
 
Water conservation became a buzzword in the watershed in the period of study, 
and supported by millions of dollars in government programs – including monies 
from NADBANK, a unique binational bank – CONAGUA, and the agricultural 
ministry, the water user associations and individual farmers made significant 
changes in water distribution and water technology in both the Delicias and 
Lower Río Conchos Irrigation Districts.  
 
In Delicias, the water conservation projects filtered down from CONAGUA to the 
individual water user associations. While local water user officials were critical of 
some initial problems – notably that CONAGUA wanted them to try every 
possible water saving technology and device – they were generally positive of 
the program, and the program appeared to be working. While there were some 
complaints that the program had had equitable consequences – with wealthier 
farmers seeing more benefits – the decision by local leaders to place much of the 
resources into “Communal” systems such as jointly-shared well distribution 
system or in Saucillo, the relining of a major earthen canal, appeared to have led 
to more efficient distribution and conservation of water. As such, the newly 
devolved power of the water user association appeared to be working to improve 
environmental management in the district in these cases.  
 
Still, by utilizing access to loans and government programs, larger farmers with 
pecan and alfalfa fields were the major winners, utilizing water conservation to 
improve their efficiencies and yields. Interestingly, while farmers recognized that 
they might “lose” some of their water rights through agreement signed with the 
government – in which water savings would flow back to the government as 
water concessions were being curtailed– because they had not enjoyed their full 
rights in most years they were not overly concerned with the “reduction.” Indeed, 
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more successful farmers saw the water conservation projects as a means to 
actually increase their acreage irrigated and their yields.  
 
In the multiple contracts and increase in farmer interest in water conservation 
technology, a handful of local companies – some with international connections –
entered the market, creating new social networks with farmers.  
 
In the Ojinaga area, the experiment with water conservation was slightly less 
successful due in part to the overall loss of farming in the area. There were 
simply less farmers still actively engaged in farming and willing to take advantage 
of government programs. There were significant complaints that the water 
conservation projects were improperly implemented or had not benefited all 
farmers.  
 
Part of the discord also flowed from a new government program designed to 
shrink the district and buy back water rights from farmers. While many initially 
balked, many farmers with land served by pumps, with salinized lands or land 
simply far from the main water distribution sold off their water rights. Indeed, an 
entire water user association ceased to exist in the space of a single agricultural 
season as farmers en masse chose to abandon their fields for a small cash gift. 
A similar program in Delicias also led to mass sell-offs of water rights in one 
particular geographic area, an area that had not been farming for several 
agricultural seasons and where water delivery was especially problematic.  
 
While not a technical study of water use, survey results, data analysis  and 
observation suggested that water conservation did appear to have resulted in 
water savings and decreased water use, although not to the degree promised in 
initial plans. It also appeared that where farmers helped design and implement 
the actual water conservation projects they were most likely to have reduced 
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water use. Thus, not surprisingly, people involved in the decision-making process 
about how to reduce resource use were more likely to reduce it and report that 
water conservation was working for them.  
 
In the upper portion of the watershed, where farmers rely on rainwater and not 
irrigation, there were a number of soil conservation and erosion control, 
reforestation, check and filtration dams and other projects designed to help 
increase water flows of the tributaries and creeks flowing to the Río Conchos. 
The analysis found that the discussion over the lack of rainfall in the watershed, 
and water in the Río Conchos had been a primary rationale for these projects, 
although more local concerns were also expressed. There was a different 
discourse between one local group working with several communities – 
emphasizing control of resources, participation by local actors and internal 
regulation of communal lands – and others, which emphasized more the physical 
benefits to the environment of better control.  
 
An effort to “coordinate” funding and programs in the upper watershed between 
NGOs and government agencies was credited with improving coordination and 
progress toward common goals. Still, the particular issue of creating a “biosphere 
reserve” with United Nations funding created local tensions. Some saw it as a 
way to bring benefit to the local community while also benefiting environmental 
regional goals like protection of endemic species and increased water flow. 
Others feared that it would be use to take away local control and decision-making 
and embraced a “northern” vision of conservation that excluded people’s basic 
right to control resources.  
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E. Role of NGOs and Farmer Organizations 
 
In general, farmers were supportive of organizations like cooperatives, 
associations and non-governmental organizations that worked in the community. 
Nonetheless, while farmers that lived in ejidos that were still “active” felt that the 
ejido leadership was useful to their livelihood, overall farmers were not supportive 
of the ejido structure, and many ejidos in Chihuahua did not appear to be active. 
In the more indigenous ejidos and agricultural communities in the upper Río 
Conchos watershed, on the other hand, the ejido was seen as an important 
mechanism toward agricultural change and improvement.  
 
In Delicias, there appeared to be a much more active structure of farmer 
producer associations, cooperatives and other mechanisms to improve farmer 
livelihood and advocate for programs before the local, state and federal 
government, while in Ojinaga, those structures had either failed or simply did not 
exist. Ejido and private farmers alike appeared to be largely on their own, and 
relied only on governmental support programs to boost their livelihoods. Both 
Ojinaga and Delicias-area farmers complained that many government grant and 
loan programs were designed to assist wealthier farmers, and that with the 
reduction in credit opportunities, farming had become almost impossible for those 
with small tracks of land.  
 
F. Decentralization of Water Management 
 
One of the major policy shifts in water management in Mexico occurred over the 
last 15 years. Both the Delicias Irrigation District and Lower Río Conchos 
(Ojinaga) Irrigation District saw their water management shift from a model based 
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on state-led management and operation to a more decentralized state-water user 
association shared responsibility.  
 
This analysis found that there were differing degrees of “success” in this 
decentralization experiment. While most farmers surveyed were supportive of the 
notion that water management should be left up to the farmers themselves, they 
believed the transfer had been accomplished with little oversight, little support 
and little training. Because the transfer occurred only a year or two before the 
drought severely restricted access to water, these new geographic units of 
management were put in a difficult constraint – managing and distributing water 
at a time of scarcity. Many farmers complained that this distribution did not 
always occur equitably, with some farmers favored over others.  
 
At the same time, the decentralization of water management allowed individual 
“Modules” to supplement their “cut” of the federal water rights distributed from the 
main reservoirs with “communal water supplies” such as river water, or deep 
wells, in essence creating a market for water rights and supplementing their 
incomes. Thus, those modules with additional water rights outside the “normal” 
irrigation system were able to improve access, affordability and more equitable 
distribution of water.  
 
G. Glocalization?  
 
Farmers in Carichi in the upper watershed, in the Delicias Irrigation District and in 
the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District in Ojinaga were clearly involved in 
activities that extended well beyond the actual geographic region in which they 
were located. For one, the debate and discourse about the low flows from the 
river and the 1944 Water Treaty had “internationalized” the river to a greater 
extent, and caused activities in each area to be analyzed in terms of how it 
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impacted other regions, as well as in the U.S. Farmers were generally aware that 
their use of land and water were part of a larger debate over resource use.  
 
In the upper Río Conchos, they were also aware of the debate over a biosphere, 
its potential implications as well as government programs designed to pay them 
for environmental services. Similarly, farmers in Delicias and Ojinaga were 
generally aware that the water conservation projects were in part a response to 
the dispute between Mexico and the U.S., and thus the attempt to decrease 
water use and improve water efficiency was part of a larger discussion over 
resource use. They were also aware that another “giant”– the City of Chihuahua 
– was also eyeing these same water resources, which might ultimately impact 
their access to resources even more.  
 
In addition, to this regionalization of resource use, farmers were part of a network 
of relationships which transcended their local scale. Thus, in Ojinaga, farmers 
both large and small were acutely aware that their economy and potential for 
farming was not only determined by local access to credit, inputs, land and water, 
but also to markets, contracts, prices and tariffs. Thus, more than local resource 
use and the impacts of drought, farmers in areas like Ojinaga saw input and 
output prices as the fundamental driver of agricultural change.  
 
In Ojinaga, in fact, while a handful of farmers continued to grow cotton – with 
substantial state subsidies and interventions and one local cotton gyn supported 
by both local and regional investors – most had turned to a network of producers 
ultimately linked to the export of cattle to the U.S., a change necessitated both by 
more favorable rules for cattle exporters, as well as the disappearance of crops 
previously grown in the district, including corn, wheat and beans.  
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In Delicias, where farmers produce both for the domestic and export market, 
some export related crops like Chile peppers were being supported by a new 
network of credit and contracts with a foreign-based company, while local 
investors – having gained experience in the U.S. market – were setting up 
middleman companies for the buying and selling of pecan nuts and chile 
peppers. The expansion of pecans was helped in part by hurricanes in the 
southeastern U.S. which had reduced overall supplies. The local government-
producer association pesticide board played a key role in the emergence of this 
new network by moving toward “organic” forms of pest control.  
 
H. The Environment Makes its Own Statement?  
 
The “environment” – that is the natural flow of the river, the birds and bees, 
native and invasive vegetation – was not absent in the practice and discourse of 
local resource managers. Farmers in the upper, middle and lower sections of the 
Río Conchos complained that the environment had negatively reacted to human 
modification of the “natural” environment. Thus, flooding in the lower section of 
the river caused shifts in the course of the river, and the lower flows that followed 
were joined by vegetation – notably tamarisk – taking over the banks and 
previous riverbed, impacting agricultural decisions and access to land. In the 
upper part, lower rainfalls led to dry conditions conducive to forest fires, which 
impacted successive species, leading to a prevalence in some cases of 
Manzanillo, which farmers claim dry up and lowers soil humidity, while local 
erosive properties decreased topsoil. Mining of sand and pebbles from riverbeds 
for roads and tourism development may have resulted in braided streams that 
adjusted, causing reduced flows into the Río Conchos, while local herders were 
forced to shift their normal grazing patterns in search of water and grass on 
higher ground.  
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I. Concluding Statement 
 
This dissertation examines agricultural resource use within a particular 
geographic area – the Río Conchos Watershed – within the context of a 
particular issue – the reduction of outflows of the Río Conchos to the Río 
Grande, which set in motion a series of disputes between the two countries as 
well as a variety of proposed solutions, including water conservation. The debate 
often revolved around different narrative explanations of the cause of the low-
flows, from a simple tale of drought to another of resource exploitation and 
expansion, with a third narrative focused more on land use change, and in 
particular, deforestation. For all these narratives, reduced resource use through 
conservation emerged as a win-win compromise strategy, though with differing 
strategic interests. The dissertation shows, however, that the reduced outflows 
and reductions in “dam” water to farmers was just one factor in a changing 
agricultural context in which new land tenure rules, changes in water 
management and the enactment of a more open economic framework 
precipitated changes within the agricultural areas.  
 
Farmers were not passive victims of reduced water use, the curtailment of 
government programs, and “privatization” of land and water resources, but 
instead adopted alternative water source strategies, began to examine more 
“conservationist-minded” agricultural practices even as they shifted cultivation to 
higher yield crops. Still, the traditional ejido structure seemed to lose power and 
prestige, and many farmers chose to abandon agriculture altogether, as there 
was some consolidation of resources among wealthier farmers. Water 
conservation projects appeared to benefit wealthier farmers more in the two 
districts. Still, new networks of relations developed between individual farmers, 
producer associations and organizations  -- as well as the wider water user 
associations – to adapt to these new resource and market conditions. While the 
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research also reveals that soil and water conservation projects were generally 
successful when they included farmer involvement, they are not of themselves 
ultimate solutions to the wider problems facing farmers, which revolve around 
creating the networks to be successfully linked with the wider economy. How to 
create this link in an economically and environmentally sustainable way is 
another matter entirely.  
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Chapter Two: River Basin Woes 
 
“But averages aren’t real,” objected Milo. “They’re just imaginary.”  
 
“That may be so,” the child agreed, “but they’re also very useful. 
For instance if you didn’t have any money at all, but you happened 
to be with four other people who had ten dollars apiece, then you’d 
each have an average of eight dollars. Isn’t that right?  
 
“I guess so,” said Milo weakly.  
 
“Well think how much better off you’d be, just because of 
averages,” he explained convincingly. “And think of the poor farmer 
when it doesn’t rain all year; if there wasn’t an average yearly 
rainfall of 37 inches in this part of the country, all his crops would 
wither and die.” 
 
--A Conversation between Milo and the 0.58 child in the Land of 





At the Binational Río Grande/Río Bravo Summit held in November of 2005 in 
McAllen, Texas,  academics, irrigators, mid-level workers from federal, state and 
local governmental agencies, environmentalists, and municipal interests came 
together,  ostensibly to express their ideas on how to better manage the waters 
of the Río Grande/Río Bravo, which forms the border between Texas and Mexico 
(IBWC 2006). But they couldn’t help rehash a debate that had gripped key 
interests along the border and beyond throughout the last 10 years: what were 
the causes of year after year of low-flows from Mexican rivers into the Río 
Grande, and more specifically, what had happened in the State of Chihuahua 
that caused the Río Conchos outflows to be so paltry?  
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“What we need to recognize is that there was a drought… for 13 years,” 
announced Luis Raul Caballero Ortíz, a major pecan producer from the Delicias 
Irrigation District “005,” and an official in the Sociedad Rural Limitada del 
Conchos, the farmer’s umbrella organization charged with distributing water to 
farmers from the main Conchos Canal in Mexico’s 2nd largest irrigation district. 
“Delicias Irrigation District 005, was formed before there was an international  
treaty and … for the last 13 years we have only irrigated 30 percent of our lands.” 
 
Jaime Garza, president of the “Bajo Río Bravo” Irrigation District “025” in 
Tamaulipas, had a slightly different perspective. “CONAGUA began to give new 
water concessions without having a good idea of the volumes available, and that 
is the origin of the over-appropriation of the rivers,” Garza explained. “There may 
have been a drought, but there is an over-appropriation of water which affected 
us. Those of us downstream are suffering.”  
 
If these differing opinions between two figures from competing Mexican irrigation 
districts emerged at the “Cooperation for a Better Future” forum, they were 
relatively tame and constructive compared to years of contradictory discourses 
on the causes and effects of low-flow into the Río Grande, expressed in press 
conferences, lawsuits, newspaper articles, and private meetings, particularly 
among the farmers of South Texas, also impacted by low inflows from Mexican 
rivers. As Commissioner Arturo Herrera, long-serving head of the Comisión 
Internacional de Aguas y Límites (International Boundary and Water 
Commission), told the forum participants at the concluding session, it had been 
difficult for the U.S. and Mexican officials to even speak to one in late 2004.  
 
In 2004, the situation had been critical, not only between official negotiators for 
the two camps, but by continued pressure from “outside” negotiators, most 
notably major South Texas irrigation farmers. On August 27th 2004, various 
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South Texas farmers gathered at the Austin State Capitol for a hastily called 
press conference, and were joined by then Texas Department of Agriculture 
Susan Combs, Texas Commission on Environmental Quality Chairwoman 
Kathleen White and representatives of several other state agencies and political 
leaders. The 17 irrigation districts, 29 individual water rights holders and one 
water supply corporation used a controversial provision of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement -- known as Chapter 11, Article 1102 – to claim that 
Mexico had “expropriated” their water by not meeting the terms of the 1944 
Water Treaty between the U.S. and Mexico (NAFTA Secretariat 1994).   
 
Officially known as the ‘Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico 
Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana River and of the Río 
Grande entered into on February 3, 1944,’ this treaty obligates Mexico to deliver 
an annual minimum of 431.72 million cubic meters (350,000 acre-feet) per year, 
averaged over a five-year basis from six tributaries into the Río Grande (IBWC 
1944). Noted Washington-based property-rights lawyer  Nancie Marzulla, 
president and founder of “Defenders of Property Rights”, and co-counsel with her 
husband to the powerful Washington, D.C. law firm of Marzulla & Marzulla, stated 
simply: “Mexico has seized and diverted 1,013,056 acre-feet of water over a ten 
year period, while tripling their crop production… and then selling that water to 
the U.S. in the form of crops.” (Marzulla & Marzulla 2004).  
 
Then Agricultural commissioner Susan Combs pointed to a satellite photos of the 
Venustiano Carranza Dam in Coahuila produced by UT-Austin Space Scientist 
Dr. Gordon Wells, and noted that in Carranza alone, Mexico could nearly pay 
back the remaining debt since the dam had swelled to over 600,000 acre-feet 
(740 MCM) (Center for Space Research 2003). While she mentioned the 
Coahuila dam, the brunt of official and producer “anger” was directed at 
Chihuahua. The claim from Marzulla & Marzulla noted that “from 1992 to October 
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of 1999, Mexico kept all of the water that fell above the Luis Leon Reservoir, 
retaining approximately 5 million acre-feet (6 billion cubic meters) of extra water 
that could have been used to fulfill the deficit.” (Marzulla & Marzulla 2004).  The 
Luis Leon Reservoir is in the heart of the Chihuahuan desert, some 120 
kilometers from the Texas-Mexico border.  
 
“Mexico allowed its own farmers in Chihuahua to expand at the expense of its 
own farmers in Tamaulipas and the farmers in South Texas,” forcefully explained 
Joe Joe White, who headed up the Mercedes Irrigation District. “The water 
shortage was man-made, not an act of mother nature.”   
 
As if solidifying these claims, a press conference was held earlier that month on 
August 3rd, 2004, in the Sierra Madre Occidental mountains of Chihuahua, some 
five kilometers west of the town of San Juanito in the Municipality of Bocoyna.  It 
is in this region that the Conchos River begins its snakelike voyage from the 
Mountains of Chihuahua and Durango through agricultural valleys and the 
Chihuahua desert to emerge into the Río Grande just upstream of the Ojinaga-
Presidio bridge.  
 
At the foot of a new dam, the  Presa Sitúrachi, sporting a baseball cap, President 
Vicente Fox (2000-2006) shook hands with Chihuahuan Governor Patricio 
Martínez (1998-2004). It was – in the fourth year of his six-year term -- only the 
second visit Fox, the first man ever elected President from the opposition center-
right PAN party, had visited Chihuahua and the more populist Martínez. The dam 
– conceived, constructed and built in less than 18 months -- was officially 
intended to supply water to San Juanito and other smaller communities but also 
to become a recreational center for the Mexican and U.S. tourists who flock each 
year to the oak and pine forests of the  “Sierra Tarahumara.” (see Photo 2.1 and 
Photo 2.2).  
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Governor Martinez announced that “all the water is for Chihuahua and not one 
drop will leave this entity.” (Topete 2004: A1). Echoing Martínez’s statement, the 
President announced that the “Presa San Juanito is for Chihuahua and not one 
liter will go for payments to the exterior.” Continuing, the president stated that the 
main concern of the country was not to comply with a treaty, but water for 
Mexicans and Chihuahuans. Later the President announced that payment of the 
remaining debt would depend “upon a good season of rain.” (Topete 2004: A1).  
 
Encapsulated in these differing views and perspectives on the water “debt” 
between Mexico and the U.S. is a fundamental split between those who lay the 
cause of blame for the lack of inflow to the Río Grande on basic drought-like 
conditions and those who portray the situation as mismanagement and theft of a 
basic and precious natural resource.  
 
This chapter examines the water debt incurred by Mexico, the dispute between 
the two countries which emerged roughly between 1997 and 2004, and the 
negotiations leading to its eventual resolution, focusing its attention to one of the 
six tributaries covered in the 1944 Water Treaty and the subject of this 
dissertation – the Río Conchos. Following a brief description of the river and 
watershed itself, this chapter will briefly revisit the high and low points in the 
international dispute, and some of the narrative discourses and data utilized by 




Photo 2.1. The Rio Situriachi Valley. The Agricultural Valley formed by the Río 
Situriachi and the Arroyo Setiapachi would become the site of the Situriachi, or San 
Juanito Dam. The photo was taken in 2003, about a year before the dam was completed 




Photo 2.2. The Situriachi, or San Juanito, Dam, 2005.  The Dam was conceived and 
constructed on one of the tributaries of the Río Conchos during a time of conflict 
between Chihuahua and Texas over water flows. Photo taken in August of 2005.  
 
II. Overview of the Río Conchos River Basin 
 
The Río Grande, known as the Río Bravo in Mexico, divides two nations.2 
Stretching nearly 3,000 kilometers between Southern Colorado and the Gulf of 
Mexico on the Texas-Mexico border, for some 1,900 kilometers it “marks the 
border between the United States and Mexico—the longest river border in the 
world between countries at dramatically different levels of development” 
(Schmandt 1993: 1). Today the river is neither “Large” nor “Fierce”. Nearly 100 
years of substantial human management, primarily for agricultural use, and more 
                                                
2 The name of the river in the United States – the Río Grande – will be used in this 
document.  
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recently to provide water for a growing municipal population on both sides of the 
border, have left it a faint trickle of its former glory, as both the mainstem and its  
tributaries have been dammed, channeled and rerouted. In essence, the river 
and connected basin have been disjointed hydrologically, as well as politically, as 
a potpourri of governmental and non-governmental bodies control the flow, 
storage and discharge of the river and its tributaries (Natural Heritage Institute 
2001: 2-3). The substantial human impacts on its quantity and quality caused 
American Rivers to list it as the nation’s fifth most “endangered” river in 2003, 
although this particular report focused only on U.S. demands and decisions on 
river management (American Rivers 2003). 
 
Flow in the middle section of the river is controlled by releases from Elephant 
Butte Reservoir and Caballo Reservoir in New Mexico, a gigantic reservoir 
completed in 1916 in New Mexico. Research examining this section of the river 
suggests the management of the Elephant Butte Dam, and resulting loss in 
historical spring flooding has been the main cause of the shrinking and 
aggradations of the once grand river in its middle section (Everitt 1993; Everitt 
1998). A secondary effect and at least a partial subsequent cause of lower flows 
has been the more recent historical encroachment of various species of salt 
cedar, Tamarix chinensis, which was imported into the southwest as an erosion 
control device.3 (Everitt, B.L. 1998;  Sudbrock, A. 1993). 
 
Below  Presidio, the river's flow is fundamentally altered by the Río Conchos. The 
Río Conchos River Basin makes up 14 percent of the entire Río Grande/Río 
Bravo River Basin. Depending on definitions, the drainage area of the Río 
Conchos River Basin is approximately 68,000 square kilometers, although if the 
                                                
3 Salt cedar taxonomy is still being developed. There are at least eight species, or 
subspecies found in the U.S. according to authors. While some continue to distinguish 
many species, others consider these shrubby plants as one variable species best 
referred to as T. pentandra (Sudbrock 1993).  
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subregion of the Mapimi River is included, that total increases to over 100,000 
square kilometers.4 The Basin includes nearly a third of the total area of the state 
of Chihuahua but also drains a small portion of the State of Durango (see Map 
3). Beginning in the pine-forested areas of the Sierra Tarahumara, a range of the 
Sierra Madre Occidental, the primary tributaries and mainstem flow 
northeasternly before converging in the arid Chihuahuan desert and turning in a 
northernly direction and flowing into the Río Bravo/Río Grande near Presidio, 
Texas just upstream from the International Bridge (Photo 2.3). The basin drains 
important ranching, farmland, forests and forest activities, as well as metropolitan 
areas, some of which have important industrial centers of production. Table 2.1 
provides basic information on the Rio Conchos watershed’s physical and 
hydrological characteristics, while Figure 2.1 shows the land use within the basin, 
most of which is pastureland and non-populated. In all, an estimated 1.39 million 
people in 2005, with the majority living in the capital City of Chihuahua, as well as 
in Cuauhtémoc, Delicias, Hidalgo de Parral, Camargo, Jimenez, Meoqui and 
Ojinaga (INEGI 2000; 2005) (Table 2.2). 
 
Interestingly, between 1990 and 2005, estimated total population within the basin 
increased some 26.5 percent, according to official census samples, yet the vast 
majority of this increase occurred in Chihuahua City, and to a lesser extent in 
Cuauhtémoc, Delicias, Hidalgo de Parral, and Meoqui. Smaller municipalities in 
both the forested mountain areas (Carichi, Nonoava), middle savannahs and 
plains (Cusihuiriachi, Valle de Zaragoza, San Francisco de Borja, San Francisco 
de Conchos, Camargo) and in the desert (Coyame de Sotol and Ojinaga) 
actually witnessed declines or virtually no population growth.  
 
 
                                                




Source: Miguel Pavón, Borderlands Information Center, Texas Natural Resource 
Information Service, 2007.  
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Figure 2.1. Land Use by % of Watershed in the Rio Conchos Basin, 1995 
Source: CONAGUA 1997 
 
Table 2.1. Major Hydrological, Population and Topographical Characteristics of 
Río Conchos Watershed 
 
Characteristic Value 
Basin Area 68,386 km2 
Estimated Population (2005) 1,399,000 
Population Density >20 people/ km2 
Mean Discharge 20.5 m3/s 
Mean Annual Temperature 170 Celsius 
Mean Annual Precipitation 40 cm 
Terrestrial Ecoregions Sierra Madre Occidental Pine-Oak Forests, 
Chihuahuan Desert 
Length of Mainstem 640 km.  
Relief 2700 m 
Number of Major Dams Seven (Luis León, La Boquilla, Francisco Madero, 
San Gabriel, La Colina, Chihuahua, Pico de Aguila) 
Number of Fish Species 53 (38 native) 
Number of endangered species 5 
 
Sources: CONAGUA 1997; Kelly 2001; Kelly and Contreras 1998; Contreras-Balderas 




Photo 2.3. Confluence of Río Conchos and Río Grande. The  Río Conchos –the 




Table 2.2. Municipalities of Río Conchos Basin, Population and Change, 1990-2000 








 % Change,  
1990-2005 
Chihuahua 530,783 627,662 671,790 758,791 42.96%
Cuauhtémoc 112,589 120,140 124,378 134,785 19.71%
Delicias 104,014 110,876 116,426 127,211 22.30%
Hidalgo de Parral 90,647 98,385 100,821 103,519 14.20%
Camargo 45,814 46,386 45,852 47,209 3.04%
Jimenez 37,052 39,746 38,323 40,467 9.22%
Meoqui 34,995 38,152 40,018 41,389 18.27%
Ojinaga 23,910 23,581 24,307 21,157 -11.51%
Saucillo 32,612 31,048 30,644 28,508 -12.58%
Bocoyna 22,417 25,824 27,907 29,907 33.41%
Aldama 17,169 19,998 19,378 19,879 15.78%
Rosales 14,154 14,809 14,969 15,935 12.58%
Carichí 9,527 8,188 7,760 8,377 -12.07%
Valle de Zaragoza 6,641 6,123 5,309 4,341 -34.63%
Cusihuiriachi 6,467 6,198 5,784 4,835 -25.24%
Julimes 5,641 5,335 5,165 4,507 -20.10%
Nonoava 3,516 3,246 2,946 2,810 -20.08%
San Francisco de  
Conchos 3,231 2,991 2,843 
 
2,669 -17.39%
San Francisco  
de Borja 3,220 2,635 2,341 
2,243 
-30.34%
Coyame de Sotol 2,262 2,114 1,708 1,453 -35.76%
Total Conchos  
Basin 1,106,661 1,233,437 1,288,669 
1,399,992 
26.51%
Total State 2,441,873 2,793,537 3,052,907 3,241,444 32.74%
 
Sources: INEGI 1991; 1996; 2001 and 2006.  
 
The Río Conchos is fed and sustained by four major tributaries (see Table 2.3). 
The sub-basins which contribute most of the river’s flow begin in the pine-oak 
forests of the Sierra Madre Occidental. Both the Arroyo San Juanito, often 
referred to as the headwaters of the Río Conchos, and the Río Sisoguichi, begin 
their journey to the Río Grande in Southern Chihuahua at the foot of several 
large mountains, in the Municipality of Bocoyna (see Chapter Four).  
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Table 2.3. Description of the Main Tributaries of the Río Conchos 
Name of Main Tributary  Major Feeder Rivers to 
Tributaries 
Location  
Río Florido Río Parral Begins in mountains of Durango 
and flows through south 
Chihuahua, joins up with Río 
Conchos near Camargo. 
Río Sisoguichi Río Nararachi 
Río Aguas Caliente 
Río Nonoava 
Río Balleza 
Begins east of San Juanito in 
High Mountains of Sierra 
Tarahumara in southwest 
Chihuahua, passes through 
Bocoyna and becomes Conchos, 
passing into the Boquilla Dam. 
Río San Pedro Río Satevo 
Santa Isabel 
Begins in Southwest of state, 
passes through San Francisco 
de Borja and flows into Francisco 
Madero Dam (Las Virgenes), and 
then through Rosales and 
Meoqui, before meeting up with 
the Conchos near Julimes. 
Río Chuviscar None Begins in western hills, passes 
through Ciudad Chihuahua and 
Aldama and enters the Conchos 
upstream of the Luis Leon Dam.  
 
Source: Comision Nacional de Agua 1997: 3-10 
 
The municipalities of Bocoyna and Carichí in the High Mountains of the Sierra 
Tarahumara through which the river flows are sparsely populated, and the major 
economic activities include farming, ranching, forestry, and tourism (see Chapter 
Four). Some 23 percent of the population above five in Bocoyna  and about 43 
percent of the population above five in Carichí  is self-defined as “Tarahumara” or 
Raramuri, an indigenous peoples which have inhabited the area for centuries, 
migrating there once the Spaniards began to inhabit the area and enslave the 
indigenous for mining purposes (see Table 2.4) 
 
The river proceeds easterly, descending rapidly, passing through the sloping hills 
home to acres of apples, corn, oats as well as cattle ranches. It passes near the 
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burgeoning city of Cuauhtémoc, with its mix of mestizos, temporary indigenous 
workers from the Sierra Tarahumara and Menonites, descendents of the 
Canadian families of German heritage, who were invited to move to Chihuahua in 
1922 by President Alvaro Obregón (Macías and Torres 2001: 13). Here, 
precipitation averages 400 mm per year (Schmandt 1993: 43). After being joined 
by the Nonoava and Balleza Rivers and other tributaries, the Conchos flows 
through central Chihuahua in the heart of the Chihuahuan high plains into the 
Valle de Zaragoza and La Boquilla Dam, also known as Lake Toronto. Begun in 
1910, it is Chihuahua's largest dam.  
 





























Bocoyna 24,221 5,608 869 25 3,873 5 
Carichi 6,844 2,940 791 25 2,164 8 
Source: INEGI 2001.  
 
The Río Florido for its part begins in the State of Durango near the Sierra's 
highest peak – Mount Mohinora – and passes into the San Gabriel dam at the 
border between Chihuahua and Durango. The dam is one of two serving the 
10,000-hectare Río Florida Irrigation District. After being joined by the Río Parral, 
the Florido turns to the northwest and joins the Río Conchos downstream of the 
La Boquilla Dam south of Camargo, which is the main source of waters for the 
Delicias Irrigation District and other irrigated lands in the area (See Chapter 
Five). 
 
The river itself continue in a north-easterly direction, passing near the City of 
Saucillo, where the old Saucillo Canal, built originally in 1884, spins off for some 
40 kilometers to irrigate 4,000 hectares of pecans, chile and peanuts. The river 
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continues to the north and east, passing near the City of Delicias, while the 
Conchos Canal – the main canal serving the irrigation district -- moves in a 
parallel fashion, moving past Estación Conchos, Saucillo, Delicias, Lazaro 
Cardenas and La Reforma before part of the canal shifts due north toward the 
Francisco Madero Dam, where it feeds into a control structure below the gates of 
the Francisco Madero reservoir, fed by the Río San Pedro.  
 
The San Pedro River descends from the oak savannah hills near San Francisco 
de Borja and Cusihuriachi toward its impoundment at the Francisco Madero 
reservoir. Completed in 1949, this reservoir – more commonly known as Las 
Virgenes --  is used for sediment control and to supply irrigation to a large part of 
the Delicias Irrigation District. Below the dam, the San Pedro has become an 
intermittent stream which meets the Conchos near Julimes. Its artificial limb, the 
San Pedro Irrigation Canal, travels north, feeding thousands of hectares of  
irrigated lands near Rosales, Meoqui, Lazaro Cardenas and La Reforma, 
eventually petering out as it passes the Río Chuviscar. 
 
Originating in the Serrania de Mesa Montosa in Western Chihuahua, the 
Chuviscar flows into the small Chihuahua Dam above the Capital City. Once 
used to supply the capital city’s water, it now only supplies about five percent of 
the capital’s water supply (Junta Municipal de Aguas y Saniemiento Chihuahua, 
Personal communication with author, 2003). The Río Chuviscar then proceeds 
through the city as a canalized flood control device before passing by the City of 
Aldama and San Diego de Alcalá. The Río Chuviscar joins the Conchos in the 
increasingly arid plains before it enters Luis Leon Dam (also known as El 
Granero).  
 
Built in 1968 to provide irrigation and flood control, its waters are used for 
irrigation of pasture, alfalfa and cotton, both in smaller Unidades de Riego along 
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the mainstem of the river and more importantly, for the Bajo Río Conchos 
Irrigation District  (090), known more commonly as the Lower Río Conchos 
Irrigation District (see Chapter Six).  
 
The Conchos travels 120 kilometers through the heart of the Chihuahuan desert 
after leaving Luis Leon, passing by smaller municipal centers such as San Pedro, 
Coyame and Cuchillo Parado, before the river enters two diversion dams – the 
Peguis and the Tarahumara – both of which siphon of river water for irrigated 
desert lands. Eventually, the river skirts around the City of Ojinaga and meets the 
Río Bravo/Grande, just one kilometer west of the main bridge which crosses 
between the bordering cities of Ojinaga, Chihuahua and Presidio, Texas. Annual 
flow at the mouth of the river averaged 910 Million Cubic Meters (737,000 acre-
feet) per year through the 1980s, or about five times the Río Grande’s flow 
before it meets up with the Conchos (Collier 1996: 36). 
 
The climate of the basin varies considerably from subhumid, to semi-arid, to arid 
and very arid. In terms of vegetation, the oak-pine forests in the mountains give 
way to oak-juniper savannahs, and grasslands and eventually to the Chihuahuan 
desert ecosystem. Annual precipitation over the entire basin averages 393 mm 
per year, though this total varies considerably from the more humid headwater 
area in the Sierra Madre – with average annual precipitation of 838 mm at San 
Juanito  to only 250 mm (about 10 in/year) at the mouth of the river, in the heart 
of the Chihuahuan desert (CONAGUA 1997).  Throughout the entire Basin, 
almost all of the rain occurs in the summer and early fall months between June 
and October. Thus, some 73.4 percent of rain at the mouth of the river occurs in 
these summer and early fall months, while upwards of 80 percent of rain in the 
agricultural valleys of Delicias and Parral occur in those months as well  
(CONAGUA 1997: 5.1.1. a-8).  Below average precipitations are relatively 
common historically, with a 30 percent probability that a region within the Basin 
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will receive less than 80 percent of the annual precipitation, one potential index of 
drought conditions (CONAGUA 1997: 5.1.1-a-15).  
 
III. The Dispute and its Aftermath.  
 
When ill-fated Spanish explorer Cabeza de Vaca explored the area known as La 
Junta – the joining of the Río Conchos and Río Grande – and marveled at the 
vast farming communities and huts there, the Conchos already flowed into the 
Río Grande (Thompson 1985.) However, that was well before the Río Grande 
became “internationalized,” with the signing in 1848 of the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo after the United States –Mexico war. The  Río Grande/Río Bravo was a 
physical boundary, easily visualized, and the fate of its water supplies was never 
a major international issue. Instead, the dispute over the river following the war 
involved the location of  the boundary, not what to do with its waters.  
 
The Convention of 1889 established an actual commission  -- at that time known 
as the International Boundary Commission –to deal with the fact that the river – 
the boundary – was in continual motion, meaning that one day a piece of land 
might be on the United States side, and the next it might be on the Mexican. In 
the 1890s, disputes over utilization of the waters began to emerge between the 
two countries. The U.S. practiced what was known as the “Harmon” Doctrine. 
Named after Attorney General Judson Harmon in response to a dispute over the 
utilization of the Rio Grande in 1895, Harmon declared that "the rules, principles, 
and precedents of international law impose no liability or obligations upon the 
United States.” The Harmon Doctrine asserts that in the absence of established 
law to the contrary, states are free to exploit resources within their jurisdiction 
without regard to the extraterritorial effects of such action (Lipper 1967).  
In 1906, the first Convention specifically dealing with water deliveries was signed 
between the two nations, assuring a delivery of Río Grande waters to farmers 
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near Ciudad Juarez, across from El Paso. The Convention of 1906 guaranteed 
these farmers 74 million cubic meters of water per year (60,000 Acre-Feet), to be 
delivered to the Acequía Madre, literally the Mother Canal, on a monthly 
scheduled basis. As part of the Convention, and to meet the provisions, the 
United States constructed the Elephant Butte Dam in its territory. The Convention 
includes the provision that in case of extraordinary drought or serious accident to 
the irrigation system in the United States, water delivered to the Mexican Canal 
shall be diminished in the same proportion as the water delivered to lands under 
the irrigation system in the United States (Kelly 2001). The treaty was a result of 
the plan to build large-scale dams in New Mexico as part of the development of 
large-scale irrigation projects in the U.S. Those dams – Elephant Butte and 
Caballo – would fundamentally change the flow of the upper Río Grande in the 
mid-to-late 1910s and the Convention assured Mexican farmers operating in 
Chihuahua that there would be a spring supply for their crops (Everitt 1998).  
 
Still, the U.S continued to practice the Harmon Doctrine, which meant that any 
waters in the U.S.—such as the Pecos and Colorado – flowing into Mexico were 
still considered U.S. waters.  
 “The United States was trying to impose the vision of a country with “upstream 
waters” and it adopted for many years the Harmon Doctrine, according to which 
they could do anything they wanted without taking us into consideration,” 
explained Dr. Alberto Székely, who served as the Foreign Ministry’s chief 
negotiator during the recent dispute over the 1944 Water Treaty. “Mexico fought 
precisely the opposite thesis, which is now internationally consecrated, and that 
is the equitable and rational use of an international watershed.” (Abella 2001).  
 
Mexico began to develop its own irrigation districts and dams in the 1920s and 
1930s and demanded that the different basins that stretched between the two 
countries – the Rio Grande, Colorado and Tijuana river basin be linked as part of 
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one negotiation, which the U.S. resisted. With improved relations between the 
two countries during the Second World War, Mexico and the U.S. negotiated a 
treaty in Washington over allocation of the international waters, including the Río 
Grande. The Harmon Doctrine was dropped, and with it, rivers like the Conchos 
in Mexico and the Colorado in the U.S. became shared waters. Mexico also 
agreed to support the U.S. call for a United Nations as the Second World War 
winded down, as the water issue was linked with the U.S. attempt to increase its 
international presence (Fischhendler, Feitelson and Eaton 2004: 638).  
 
Officially known as the “Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico 
Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana River and of the Río 
Grande,” the 1944 Water Treaty guarantees deliveries of U.S. waters from the 
Colorado River to Mexico, while also establishing that the U.S. has rights to one-
third of the flow reaching the main channel of the Río Grande from the Conchos, 
San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido, Salado and Las Vacas Arroyo, so long as 
the flow averages at least 472 million cubic meters (350,000 acre-feet) per year 
averaged over five consecutive years (IBWC 1944).(see Table 2.5).  
 
Under Article 4 of the agreement, if the annual 472 million cubic meter 
requirement is not met due to "extreme drought conditions" -- a term which is not 
defined in the treaty itself or subsequent amendments --  the amount should be 
made up in the next five year period (Brandes 2000: 1). The Treaty does not 
address what happens if drought-like conditions extend beyond a five-year 
period, however, which became a major sticking point between the two countries 
(Kenneth Rakestraw, IBWC, Personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
The implementation of the 1944 Treaty is administered by the International 
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) in the United States and the Comision 
Internacional de Límites y Agua (CILA) in Mexico. The 1944 Treaty gave the 
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bifurcated agencies their new names and increased their role to more explicitly 
deal with the allocation and management of international waters.  
Table 2.5. Water Allocations Under U.S. –Mexican International Treaties  
Treaty RIvers Mexico United States 
Convention of 1906 Río Grande above 
Fort Quitman 
Mexico allotted 74 
Million Cubic Meters 
(60,000 acre-feet) per 
year of the waters of the 
Río Grande to be 
delivered at the 
headgate to Mexico's 
Acequia Madre just 
above Ciudad Juárez, 
Chihuahua for irrigation. 
Charged with building 
Elephant Butte 
Reservoir to control 
discharges in Upper Río 
Grande; Deliveries can 
be reduced in “extreme 
drought” by same 
proportion as allocations 
U.S. farmers receive. 
Convention of 1933 Río Grande above 
Fort Quitman 
Agreed to “straighten” 
and stabilize 249 
kilometers of 
international boundary 
in upper Río Grande 
Agreed to “straighten” 
and stabilize 249 
kilometers of 
international boundary 
in upper Río Grande 




Fort Quitman to 
Falcon Reservoir 
One-half of all flows 
occurring in the main 
channel, including from 
unnamed tributaries. 
One-half of all flows 
occurring in the main 
channel, including from 
unnamed tributaries. 
 Río San Juan and 
Río Alamo 
All water reaching main 
channel, including return 
flow from lands irrigated 
by two rivers.  
None 
 Pecos and Devils 
Rivers, 
Goodenough  
Spring and  
Alamito, Terlingua, 
San Felipe and 
Pinto Creeks 
None All water reaching main 
channel, including return 
flow from lands irrigated 
by named rivers and 
streams. 
 Río Grande below 
Falcon Reservoir 
One-half the flow in the 
main channel of the Río 
Grande below lowest 
international storage 
dam (Falcon Reservoir). 
One-half the flow in the 
main channel of the Río 
Grande below lowest 
international storage 
dam (Falcon Reservoir). 




Salado and the 
Las Vacas Arroyo 
Two thirds of the flow 
reaching the main 
channel from six 
Mexican tributaries, 
subject to U.S. right to 
an average of at least 
431.7 MCM/yr (350,000 
AF/yr) in cycles of five 
consecutive years.  
 One-third of the flow 
reaching the main 
channel from six 
Mexican tributaries, 
providing that this shall 
not be less, as an 
average amount in 
cycles of five 
consecutive years, of at 
least 431.7 MCM/yr 
(350,000 AF/yr). 
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Treaty RIvers Mexico United States 
 Colorado River Guarantees the annual 
delivery of 1,850 
MCM/yr (1.5 million 
AF/yr) to Mexico south 
of the border. 
Delivery subject to 
drought conditions. If 
irrigators in California 
receive reduced 
deliveries, deliveries to 
Mexico can also be 
reduced by similar 
amount.  
Minute No. 242, 1973 Colorado River  Establishes minimum 
and maximum salinity 
standards for delivery of 
Colorado Rivers under 
terms of 1944 Treaty. 
Sources: International Boundary and Water Commission website 
(www.ibwc.state.gov/html/about_us.html), accessed December, 2005; and Kelly and 
Contreras 1998: 13.  
 
Despite a few disputes over the movement of the boundary – resolved with the 
1963 Chamizal Convention and subsequent “minutes” or amendments to the 
Treaty – and an ongoing dispute over salinity levels from the Colorado – in part 
resolved in the 1970s -- relations between the two Commissions have been fairly 
harmonious. Until the late 1990s. 
 
The dispute between the U.S. and Mexico over Mexican water deliveries under 
the terms of the 1944 treaty began innocently enough, according to onlookers 
and participants. By the mid-1990s, agriculturalists from South Texas – the 
downstream users of the Falcon and Amistad dams – were already alerting 
politicians and the U.S. State Department that Mexico “was not complying with 
water deliveries.” (Buddy García, Texas Deputy Secretary of State, Personal 
communication with author, 2005).  The 1995 Hydrological Year hit several 
regions hard, including Chihuahua – where no water was released from the 
irrigation dams – Nuevo León, Tamaulipas and the Lower Río Grande Valley. 
Water levels in the Falcon and Amistad International Dams began to fall 
precipitously as years of low inflow into the Río Grande and low precipitation 
locally took their toll. 
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Little happened diplomatically. Following the 1992-1997 five-year cycle, IBWC 
and CILA huddled and came to a rapid agreement on the total water deficit that 
had accumulated over the cycle.  
 
“When the end of 1997 revealed the large debt, there was no official action, just a 
passing of letters recognizing there was a large debt of over one million acre-
feet,” noted acting IBWC Principal Engineer Kenneth Rakestraw. Rakestraw 
headed the Water Accounting Division at the time, and was thus most directly 
responsible for analyzing the numbers (Rakestraw, IBWC, personal 
communication with author, 2005). “It was the first time that there was a failure by 
Mexico to deliver…. It was an observation, but there was no real search for 
solutions.”  
 
Rakestraw’s counterpart in Ciudad Juarez, CILA Principal Engineer Gilberto 
Elizalde, remembers a similar situation. “At that time there was concern about the 
deficit (with the U.S.), but we also recognized that rains might come … but the 
drought was much more extensive than had ever been known historically.” 
(Elizalde, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Despite official agreement about the amount owed by Mexico, by 1998 there 
were already differences emerging about the reasons why. For Mexico it was an 
extraordinary drought, for the U.S. it was a lack of political will.  
 
“Mexico already carried with us the concept internally that the payment troubles 
were because of the extraordinary drought, while the U.S. said no,” noted 
Elizalde. “The polemical situation existed because (Article 4 of) the treaty didn’t 
specify what it (extraordinary debt) meant.” (see also Mumme and Aguilar 
Barajas 2003: 64-65). 
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Rakestraw said the IBWC recognized there was reduced rainfall throughout 
much of the Southern U.S. and northern Mexico, but believed the real dispute 
had emerged by 1999 or 2000 “when it became clear that Mexico was not going 
to do anything.” Rakestraw said that as the issue began to show up in 
newspapers, politicians began to pay attention and call for action.  
 
Politicians weren’t alone. South Texas farmers, incensed that the IBWC had no 
real enforcement powers, began to call for more drastic action – including 
boycotts of Mexican products or non-payment of the Colorado waters – the two 
riverbasins in fact linked by the 1944 treaty -- while Non-Governmental 
Organizations like World Wildlife Fund, and the Texas Center for Policy Studies 
with an “environmental” focus called for improved water management in the 
entire Río Grande basin – and more efficient use of water -- as the solution  
(Brock, Chapman and Kelly 2001; TCPS 2001).  
 
The deficit continued to rise.  
 
In response, in 2000, then IBWC Commissioner John Bernal commissioned 
Austin-based engineer Dr. Robert Brandes to assess the deficit. The idea for the 
study emerged from Bernal himself and an ad-hoc working group formed with 
U.S. farmers and officials, according to Rakestraw (Rakestraw, Personal 
communication with author, 2005). The study – Preliminary Analysis of Mexico’s 
Río Grande Water Deficit under the 1944 Treaty -- did not bring the two sides 
closer together, since it largely blamed Mexican management of dams for the 
lack of inflow into the Río Grande (Brandes 2000).  
 
The “Brandes” report concludes that the inflow reduction to the Río Grande is 
fundamentally the result of Mexican water management. The report states: 
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Mexico has substantially more storage capacity (than before) and 
therefore has the ability to store and use more of the runoff from the 
tributary watersheds before it reaches the Río Grande (Brandes 
2000:16). 
 
Rakestraw said despite the report, the IBWC never had a real interest in 
pinpointing the cause of low-flow, but wanted to point out that Mexico was not 
managing the dams as if the 1944 treaty existed. “Basically we agreed with the 
Brandes report that the reservoirs were not managed to meet the 1944 treaty and 
that they have never released any water to meet provisions of the treaty.”  
 
The report was followed somewhat predictably by a Mexican written response led 
by CONAGUA – the National Water Commission --  although CILA also 
collaborated (CONAGUA 2000; Elizalde, CILA, Communication with Author, 
2005). The CONAGUA report again emphasized that the water management 
policies were in response to the drought, which again was the primary cause of 
low in-flows. This in turn was responded to internally by another Brandes report 
which detailed more explicitly storage levels (Brandes 2002).   
 
The Brandes report was seized on by South Texas farmers as proof that Mexico 
had no interest in meeting their treaty obligations, while the Mexican response 
was used by Mexico – and widely reported by the Mexican press and politicians -
- to prove that the real problem was both a drought and the silting up of their 
dams, meaning the actual amount of water flowing in the dams was much 
smaller than gauges and satellite photos might indicate.  
 
In the meantime, the Texas Center for Policy Studies5, a small non-governmental 
organization in Austin, Texas, with a long history of working binationally on 
                                                
5 The author of this dissertation first began working at TCPS in 1994, and has served as 
its director from October of 2002 to the present. However, he was not the principal  
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border issues, released a report in January of 2001 (Kelly 2001). The Río 
Conchos: A Preliminary Report, was intended, according to its author, to present 
the facts, plane and simple, for a watershed which was suddenly in the spotlight 
in Mexico City, Washington and Austin.  If nothing else, the report offered people 
a no-nonsense description of the basin and the challenges facing the irrigation 
districts.  
 
“There were a lot of statements from a lot of people about the causes of the 
drought and the intentions of Mexico and Chihuahua,” noted Kelly. “But we felt 
with a little truth shined on the subject there would be realization that there were 
both challenges and opportunities to solve the crisis.”  
 
In February of 2001 a truly extraordinary event occurred – the Río Grande dried 
up at its mouth. While the sand bar that formed across Boca Chica Bay probably 
was the result of unusual wave action, the reduced flow of the Río Grande and 
the increased vegetation choking its course were factors as well, and the 
symbolism was seized upon by politicians and policymakers alike (García, 
personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
That same month, President George W. Bush and Mexican President Vicente 
Fox huddled at a ranch in Guadalajara Mexico to discuss a variety of topics, 
including the water deficit. Fox came armed with a proposal – a promise to 
deliver 740 million or  600,000 AF by September 2001, which was seized upon 
by Bush and the leaders pledged to make the promise a reality. 
 
The IBWC continued to meet with their counterparts in Ciudad Juarez to work out 
the details of Fox’s proposal, and the main players soon moved to Washington, 
DC, where the two sections were serving as the technical advisors to the main 
                                                                                                                                            
author of the TCPS report on the Conchos, which was written by then director Mary 
Kelly.  
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negotiators, led by the State Department and Mexico’s Secretaría de Relaciones 
Exteriores (Foreign Ministry). On March 16, 2001, both Commissioners – Acting 
IBWC Commissioner Roberto Ortega and CILA Commissioner Arturo Herrera – 
signed Minute 307, confirming the presidential agreement signed the month 
before (IBWC 2001). 
 
Both governments were anxious to present some good news and the signing of 
Minute 307 in Washington was an indication of just how important the 
negotiations had become. Minute 307 also indicated both governments would 
begin work on a drought management plan and other measures to reduce overall 
water use.  
 
“It made for good sound bites,” noted then-Texas Deputy Secretary of State 
“Buddy” García, a point man for Texas Governor Rick Perry on both border 
issues and the water debt.  “But it didn’t lead to satisfaction and actually raised 
the ire of South Texas farmers, who felt that we – the United States – were 
hoodwinked.” 
 
Seizing on the apparent progress, TCPS began to meet individually and 
collectively with other Non-governmental Organization in the U.S. and Mexico 
and arrived at a common set of principles – a “Binational Declaration on the Río 
Conchos and the Lower Río Bravo/Río Grande” – that was meant to help both 
governments “work jointly to identify measures of cooperation on drought 
management and sustainable management of this basin,” as in fact Minute 307 
had announced (TCPS 2001: 1).” Among a host of measures, the declaration 
specifically called for international monies to be earmarked for water 
conservation, water use efficiency and water quality, better dam operation 
procedures, as well as plans to leave some waters in the increasingly dry rivers 
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for “environmental needs,” sustainable forestry projects and a stakeholder 
process to develop a drought management plan.  
 
Signed by 22 primarily environmental organizations, the declaration was an 
attempt to bring a different perspective into the negotiation process and highlight 
some of the efforts being pushed by the NGOs themselves (Mary Kelly, personal 
communication with author, 2005). The signers included some of the leading 
environmental organizations in Mexico such as ProFauna and Pronatura 
Noreste, as well as local groups like the Comision de Solidaridad y Defensa de 
Derechos Humanos, international groups like Environmental Defense and World 
Wildlife Fund-Chihuahua, and a host of smaller regional organizations such as 
the Southwest Environmental Center, Río Grande Institute and Friends of Big 
Bend National Park (TCPS 2001).  
 
 “There was a real optimism in 2001 that we could use the crisis of payments to 
change policy in both countries,” noted Mary Kelly, who was TCPS’s director at 
the time. “And in fact it helped focus attention on the need for water use 
efficiency in both countries, but many other opportunities for change were missed 
in the post-9/11 atmosphere and bickering between the two sides.”  
 
Despite an early good faith payment, the resulting 740 MCM never arrived. By 
April of 2002 the total deficit had risen to not only some 1.25 billion cubic meters 
(1.02 million acre-feet) from the first cycle, but also nearly 620 MCM (500,000 
acre-feet) from the second.  
 
Again, the two sides repeated nearly the same discourse, with Mexico insisting 
2000-2001 had been a particularly dry year, making it impossible to keep their 
commitment, and the U.S. simply repeating the mantra that they must comply 
with the treaty (Brandes 2002). “The climactic situation (discussed in Minute 307) 
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simply did not occur,” maintains Elizonde (Elizonde, personal communication 
with author,  2005). 
 
Chief negotiator Székely, in an interview with a Mexican radio station in October 
of 2001, reiterated the Mexican position in regards to the water deficit.  
 
 “It is not really a debt, it is a treaty by where we are obligated to give some 431 
million cubic meters to the U.S. annually, which comes from the Conchos system 
and that empties out into the Bravo,” explained Székely. In fact, Székely insisted 
that Mexico was complying with the treaty by paying off the 1992-1997 cycle with 
the waters entering the Río Bravo during the ensuing cycle of 1997-2002 and 
would have the 2002-2007 cycle to pay off the 1997-2002 debt. “It is not about a 
problem of a strict debt, nor even non-compliance with the treaty, but if we have 
not delivered all the water, it is because there wasn’t the water, and the Mexican 
users have suffered just as much the Americans.” 
 
The American farmers were incensed by Mexico’s interpretation. “We are upset, 
angry and scared,” stated Gordon Hill, general manager of the Bayview Irrigation 
District  to The New York Times in September of 2001. “We’ve got farmers going 
out of business because Mexico has broken its promises on releasing water.”  
(Milloy 2001: A14).  
 
 “They (the State Department) had expected to get praise, but received only 
criticism,” noted García. “After (Mexico failed to comply with) the Minute, they 
turned to the State (of Texas) and said what can we do?” (Garcia, personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
 
García said from 2002 to 2005 the State of Texas was included. He said part of 
the difficulty between the two sides was the discourse. While Mexico, as 
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expressed in Szekely’s statements, essentially wanted to treat the water deficit 
like a loan that they would pay back over time, the U.S. wanted a quick resolution 
and wanted Mexico to admit it was not complying with the treaty. The rhetoric 
and blame-game continued over the next six months.  
 
“For Mexican politicians, it would be suicide to announce we are not complying 
with the treaty and must pay it back as soon as possible,” García noted. García 
noted that Texas Governor Perry and Governor Martinez from Chihuahua were 
often at odds over the issue during the annual Border Governors Meeting and the 
2002 to 2003 period was one characterized by strident rhetoric from Texas 
politicians.  
 
At a rally organized by South Texas farmers in March of 2002, some six months 
before his election, Governor Perry personalized the message toward Governor 
Martinez. “Governor Martinez and President Fox need to know that Texans are 
hurting,” Perry told the farmers and officials in attendance. “We have lost a billion 
dollars in economic activity because of Mexico's failure to deliver promised  water 
.. and more than a half-million acres of irrigated  crops because of Mexico's 





Water is available in more than a dozen upstream reservoirs 
on Río Grande tributaries. That's how Mexico can irrigate 
crops in Chihuahua instead of living up  to its treaty 
obligations. Since 1992, Mexico has kept all water that fell 
above the  Luis Leon Dam on the Río Conchos, and 
Mexico's current  debt is more than 1.4 million acre feet of 
water………Mr. President, "entrega nuestra agua!" Governor  
Martinez, please send us our water! (Perry 2002). 
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Governor Patricio Martínez was already doing some grandstanding of his own. In 
November of 2001, Martínez staged a mini-invasion of the desert dam of Luis 
León. State police agents seized the sleepy Comisión Nacional de Agua workers, 
charged with overseeing operation of the dam. For a time, they wouldn’t even let 
the workers speak with their superiors in Chihuahua and Mexico City 
(“Rodriguez,” Luis León Dam, CONAGUA, Personal communication with author, 
Luis Leon Dam, 2003). 
 
Martínez’s rationale was to ensure that with the main irrigation season having 
ended, no waters from the dam should be released during the winter to the U.S. 
Eventually, communication lines were opened, Martínez was reminded that the 
dam belonged to the Federal Government and not the state, and the state guards 
and police left in their helicopters and trucks as mysteriously as they had arrived 
(Rodriguez, 2003).  
 
Still, US and Mexican officials and both sections of the IBWC continued to meet, 
and in June of 2002, signed Minute 308. Minute 308 obligated Mexico to pay a 
one-time contingency of 111 MCM (90,000 Acre-Feet) to the United States by 
releasing waters from the Amistad and/or Falcon Dam that had been attributed to 
Mexico (IBWC 2002). In addition, Minute 308 made reference to a Mexican 
program to invest monies in the modernization of irrigation districts in Northern 
Mexico and use the resulting savings in water to help meet their treaty 
obligations. While the Minute contained no details about the program, it was the 
first recognition that water conservation and efficiency projects might be used to 
help pay off the deficit. Minute 308 also discussed setting up a Drought 
Management Plan and an Advisory Council to help come up with solutions to the 
water management problems. While a somewhat ambiguous text, the Minute 
appears to recognize that the present water crisis was potentially due both to 
drought conditions and inefficient management practices.  
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Rakestraw said he is not sure where the decision to include information about a 
Mexican water conservation program came from, but said they viewed it as a 
way to put some positive ideas into the document. Elizalde said that CONAGUA 
had had a program to modernize and rehabilitate the irrigation districts for many 
years, but around this time had begun a more intensive program to “optimize” 
volumes within the Irrigation District and they began to share this information 
about efforts with their U.S. counterparts (Elizalde, Personal communication with 
author, 2005).  
 
“It was the drought that caused CONAGUA to begin to look at the sustainability 
of the watershed,” Elizalde stated. “We began to share information about the 
whole Río Bravo watershed.” 
 
Elizalde’s boss, long-time CILA commissioner Arturo Herrera, said the idea to put 
money into the irrigation districts as a solution to the water dispute came from 
CILA’s internal analysis of the causes of the water crisis (Herrera, Personal 
communication with author, 2005). 
 
“We saw there being three causes of the drought in Mexico and we gave these 
three observations to the SRE (Foreign Secretary) as part of the negotiations. 
The first was the lack of rainfall and the climactic change which is a global 
problem where CILA has no jurisdictional power; the second was a regional 
problem which had to do with the problem of deforestation and deterioration – 
which we insisted could be solved but over the long term by beginning specific 
programs; and the third was a local problem – the overuse and inefficient use of 
water, which could be solved by investing money in water conservation.”  
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Kelly for her part, said the NGO Binational Declaration on the Río Conchos, as 
well as her long-time friendship with chief negotiator Szekely – a leading 
environmental lawyer in Mexico – helped put a focus on water conservation and 
drought management (Kelly, Personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Elías Calderón, CONAGUA’s Manager of the Ojinaga Water District, said the 
roots of conservation as a solution to the water deficit actually lie in changes in 
Mexican law (Calderón, Personal communication with author, 2004). “The 
changes in the Water Law forced us (CONAGUA) to look at water rights on a 
watershed basis and we saw that the amount of water was no longer sustainable 
in our dams to meet water concessions to the districts.”  Calderón said the 
obvious solution was to reduce the water concessions by investing in the 
irrigation districts.  
 
Following Minute 308, border agencies were quickly put into action to try and put 
teeth into the Mexican commitment to increase water conservation in the 
irrigation districts to “free up” water to the Río Grande.  
 
The primary institutions were the Border Environment Cooperation Commission 
(BECC), headquartered in Ciudad Juárez and the North American Development 
Bank (NADBANK) – based in San Antonio, Texas. These binational institutions 
were established by a 1993 agreement between the U.S. and Mexico parallel to 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (BECC 1993; Varady et al. 1997.) 
 
The BECC’s stated goal was to assess potential environmental infrastructure 
projects within the first 100 kilometers of the border – principally potable water, 
wastewater treatment and solid waste management – and “certify” them for 
potential binational funding if they met basic certification criteria. Their sister 
organization – the NADBANK  -- was a development bank  which operates with 
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“paid-in” and callable capital from both governments to lend out as well as grant 
to build the projects certified by the BECC. (Varady et. al. 1996).  
 
While the focus of both institutions had largely been municipal border projects – 
wastewater treatment plants, landfills, and laying pipes – a reform effort in 2000 
led the two institutions to add agricultural water conservation as another priority 
(Kelly and Reed 2000). The effort proved prescient as the two institutions 
became recast as instruments to help solve the water dispute. Both the BECC 
and NADBANK had Board of Directors that included representatives from many 
of the institutions involved in the water deficit dispute such as the IBWC, CILA, 
EPA, State Department, Treasury, SRE and Hacienda, and observers say it was 
only natural that these institutions would be asked to step into the ring (Arturo 
Herrera, CILA,  personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
More specifically, BECC was asked by its Board to assess, certify and make 
CONAGUA’s proposed district modernization project eligible for binational 
funding, and to do so in a matter of months, rather than the regular process, 
which often takes years (Gonzalo Bravo, BECC, personal communication with 
author, 2005).  
 
Under BECC certification criteria, public meetings were required as well as 
acceptance by local communities, meaning the farmer associations making up 
the irrigation districts had to show approval of the project and it all had to be done 
publicly and quickly.  
 
The elected presidents of every individual farming association from all three Río 
Conchos irrigation districts – Delicias, Florido and Bajo Río Conchos -- were 
called to a meeting in Delicias, Chihuahua so that officials from CONAGUA, 
BECC and the state government could explain the water conservation program in 
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August of 2002 (Kelly and Luján 2003). Essentially, the leaders were told that 
they would be getting a vast influx of cash and modernization in the districts, but 
in return, they would be asked to sign what essentially was a contract agreeing to 
reduce their water rights once the modernization project was complete. While 
initial plans called for BECC certification of water conservation projects in all 
three Río Conchos irrigation districts, eventually they reduced the number to one 
– the Delicias Irrigation District, by far the largest and logically the one where 
investments would lead to the greatest water savings. Still, the water 
conservation projects were also approved in the other two districts as national 
projects (see Chapters Five and Six).  
 
After CONAGUA decided to refocus the project on Delicias Irrigation District 
itself, dozens of meetings were held in all 10 irrigation associations making up 
the district, and eventually with the upstream “old” irrigation units in Camargo and 
San Francisco  leading to the signing of the paperwork by each individual farming 
association making up the district, with the exception of two “Modules” which 
initially refused to participate in the program (Luján and Kelly 2003).  
 
Former Chihuahua State Rural Development Agency representative Martin 
Herrera  said the process was intense and conflictive. “In essence we were under 
pressure to get these farmers to agree to give up their water rights, but do so in a 
way that showed them they would ultimately benefit which was difficult” (Herrera, 
Personal communication with author, 2005). The documents were signed by the 
Irrigation User Associations, the State Government through the Rural 
Development Agency, and CONAGUA officials in all three Districts, with the 
exception of the two Modules  -- “Seven and Eight” -- within Delicias which 
missed out on the first year of water conservation funding.  
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The documents themselves state that the savings from modernization and from 
increasing irrigation technology would be split three ways: 25 percent to the 
farmers; 50 percent to meet Treaty Obligations; and 25 percent for CONAGUA to 
use as they saw fit. Most observers, however, knew what CONAGUA’s portion of 
the water likely referred to: the behemoth that the City of Chihuahua has become 
with its vast and increasing water needs.  
 
Under the project certified by the BECC in October of 2002, CONAGUA 
committed to spending over $104 million in the Delicias Irrigation District between 
October of 2002 and September of 2006, while the BECC certification would lead 
to an additional $40 million being spent with NADBANK monies earned from 
interest paid on the capital put in the bank by both countries (BECC 2002).  
 
The prospect of paying Mexican farmers to give up their water rights did not sit 
well with many individual farmers who still felt the money should be used to free 
up water for further irrigation expansion. Some Mexican irrigation farming 
association leaders signed the documents reluctantly, remembered Herrera and 
other observers, while others initially refused.  
 
“We said from the beginning that we would only reduce our water rights after the 
conservation projects were completed, and after they verified that the savings 
had actually occurred,” remembered Arnaldo Valenzuela, President of Module 5 
in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District from 2002 to 2005.  (Valenzuela, 
Personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Many US farmers were also angered by the project, viewing it  as a bribe to get 
Mexico to comply with the treaty. To sweeten the deal, negotiators – which 
included for the first time representatives from both the U.S. Treasury and the 
Finance Ministry (Hacienda) from Mexico -- doubled the amount of the 
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NADBANK grants to $80 million, with $40 million going to each country. The U.S. 
conservation projects – which stretched from California to Texas -- were 
designed and certified over the next several years, while the Mexican project was 
designed and certified in a matter of months.  
 
In October of 2002, the Delicias project was certified amid some fanfare in 
Ciudad Juarez. The key to the certified project was that it obligated Mexico to 
make some of the water savings available to the Río Grande Basin, a fact that 
was put into writing in Minute 309, signed in July of 2003 (IBWC 2003). Minute 
309 actually put information about the NADBANK and Mexican federal monies as 
an official amendment to the 1944 Treaty, listing what water savings could be 
expected and therefore the expected increased flows to Río Grande provided 
those savings occurred.  
 
Interestingly, however, Minute 309 – which indicates all flows will flow to the Río 
Grande – contradicts the agreements signed by the farmer associations, which 
state that only 50 percent of the water conservation savings would flow to the Río 
Grande, indicating that the state-farmer agreements at the local level were 
different than the international agreements. 
 
Rakestraw said the U.S. side was not so concerned with the details of the 
amount of water savings, but merely wanted to make sure there would be 
increased flows to the Río Grande. “They did release some additional waters in 
Mid-January to March 2005 from Río Conchos and we were advised it was due 
to savings,” he stated. (Rakestraw, Personal communication with author, 2005). 
 
“You have to remember in Mexico water is a nationally-owned resource so 
basically CONAGUA decides where all the savings will go, and how to manage 
the water,” the CILA’s Elizalde explained. “If we deliver the water (required under 
 94 
the Treaty), the U.S. section doesn’t have any reason to complain about where 
any savings might go.” (Elizalde, Personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Still, if U.S. and Mexican meetings were leading to greater understanding, a 
unique agreement to pay for conservation in Mexican irrigation districts to free up 
water, and a less conflictive relationship, the lack of actual deliveries in HY 2002 
and HY 2003 still caused ire among Texas politicians and farmers. In August of 
2003, for example – after the BECC certification and Minute 309 had already 
been signed -- Perry would actually call for cutting off water deliveries from the 
Colorado River. "If diplomacy will not yield a fair result for our farmers, then 
maybe withholding regular releases to Mexico will get their attention," Perry told 
the Austin-American Statesman.” (Herman 2003). 
 
Even more vociferous was Texas Agricultural Commissioner Susan Combs. 
Combs continually took pains to present the water deficit as simply a matter of 
Mexico not wanting to comply, and used reports and satellite imagery to bolster 
her case. In October of 2002, Combs took part in a rally with South Texas 
farmers in calling for an economic boycott on Mexican products and economic 
sanctions for Mexico’s failure to release more waters. Combs cited studies and 
satellite imagery provided by the University of Texas’ Center for Space Research 
disclosing that Mexico had three times more water in its dams than it needed to 
pay off the U.S. (NewsMax.com 2003; Center for Space Research 2003).  
 
According to Combs and the report, Mexico had more than 3 million acre feet of 
water in storage, and Combs used the report to tell White House officials that 
there were and are unprecedented amounts of water stored in Mexico. ``It's 
unbelievable that we can't push them on this, '' she told U.S. Water News, an 
online publication on water issues (U.S Water News Online, October 2003). 
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Combs’ actions did not always sit well with some.  
 
“We were not winning by calling (Chihuahuan Governor) Martinez names,” 
recalled García. “Threats to boycott Mexican products was hardball… and you 
get more from honey than from vinegar.”  
 
García viewed the NADBANK/BECC projects as positive long-term, but said they 
were never going to resolve the crisis itself. “Even as they devised it as a 
solution, it was always intended to benefit the Río Conchos, and never intended 
to meet the needs of the Río Grande or Texas farmers,” García asserted. 
(García, Personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
García said the eventual roots of the resolution of the debt lay in two factors: 
increased rains and quiet, flexible diplomacy. “We weren’t concerned anymore 
where the water came from because it wasn’t going to come from Chihuahua.”  
García said that Perry and Martínez eventually agreed not to beat each other up 
in the press.  
 
Perry and Mexican President Vicente Fox met in Austin for face-to-face 
discussions on the water debt in November 2003, at which time Perry proposed 
that Mexico could repay its water debt by using water available in Mexican 
reservoirs other than Falcon and Amistad, or the Chihuahua dams.  
 
At the same time, near record rains in several areas of the basin in the HY 2004 
led, in Rakestraw’s words to “the 2nd wettest year for wild water.”6 The rains 
helped ease diplomatic tensions and put a positive balance on the books as 
Mexico made a series of “payments”, whether intentional or not.  
                                                
6 Wild water refers to the runoff into Río Grande tributaries that is not released from 
dams but comes from localized rains and run-offs. 
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By October of 2004, in fact, the “deficit” from the 1992 to 2002 period had been 
reduced from some 1.7 billion cubic meters (1.5 million AF) to less than half, or 
883 MCM (716,000 AF) (IBWC 2005). In March of 2005, Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice and Mexican Foreign Minister Luiz Ernesto Derbez came 
together for a one-day meeting in Mexico City on March 10th. Mexico agreed to 
repay the debt fully by September 30th of that year (IBWC 2005a).  
 
Perry called a press conference in Mission, Texas the following week, and was 
joined by State Senator “Chuy” Hinojosa and other local politicians from the Río 
Grande Valley.  
 
The new agreement was both specific and flexible (IBWC 2005a; Weissert 2005). 
It called on Mexico to: 
 
• Transfer water from the Amistad and Falcon reservoirs to Texas, raising 
U.S. reserves from 95 percent of their storage capacity to 103 percent. 
• Deliver at least the average minimum of 350,000 acre-feet of water per 
year for the remaining three years of the current cycle (from 2005-2007), 
and end the cycle without a deficit. 
• Deliver remaining debt from any Mexican tributary, including those not 
covered by the 1944 Treaty;  
• Give Mexico credit for evaporation and infiltration losses, in essence 
lowering the total amount of water owed by 170 MCM (138,000 acre-feet). 
(IBWC 2005a) 
 
That same month, Mexico made the first transfer, some 210,000 acre-feet of 
water from the Anzalduas Dam, a small check dam upstream of the international 
dams, as well as from the Amistad and Falcon Reservoirs on the Río Grande. 
The Anzalduas relies on irrigation return flows from the San Juan watershed, 
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which is considered 100% Mexican in the 1944 Treaty and thus not a required 
source of waters.  
 
“To tell us to release water from the Conchos during a drought made no sense 
because the loss of water in the course of delivery was going to be enormous by 
the time it got to the Valley and no one would have benefited,” explained CILA’s 
Elizalde. “It was preferable … to say I am going to give you water where it makes 
sense for me to give you water.” (Elizalde, Personal Communication, 2005).  
 
As September of 2005 drew to a close, negotiators and observers anxiously 
waited to see where the remaining water would be delivered. In fact, with less 
than 20 days left, Mexico still owed nearly 125 million cubic meters from the 
original debt of 1992-2002 as well as waters owed in 2005 (Osorio 2005: B1). 
Still, the debt was paid in full by September 27th, 2005 as Mexico made a series 
of transfers from the San Juan and Salado Rivers as well as from the 
international dams, some 13 years to the date from when “deficits” officially 
began to accrue (IBWCB 2005b). It would take a few more weeks to get totally 
caught up on the debt incurred in HY 2005, however (IBWC 2005c).  
 
The final transfers actually came after CONAGUA reached an agreement with 
farmers in an irrigation district in Tamaulipas, similar in many respects to the 
agreement with the Chihuahuan farmers. In return for releasing water from their 
dam at the end of the irrigation season – thus lessening the amount of water they 
might have access to the following spring – CONAGUA agreed they would both 
spend money on “modernizing” the district, and build a rubber dam at the dam’s 
spill to increase the dam’s holding capacity by a reported 300 million cubic 
meters (Klerigan 2005). Thus, as in Chihuahua, CONAGUA felt it necessary to 
negotiate with farmers –- sweeten the deal -- to help Mexico comply with the 
 98 
1944 Treaty. They would be giving up present waters in return for access to 
waters in the future.  
 
“This is a tremendous victory for both countries,” Governor Perry said in a press 
statement following the IBWC announcement (Perry 2005). “Our farmers, 
ranchers and cities will have 100 percent of the water they are entitled to, not just 
for the rest of this year, but for all of 2006. Now that the debt is paid, both 
countries must continue to work in good faith to meet the water demands of 
citizens on both sides of the Río Grande for years to come.” 
 
Again, South Texas farmers were less thrilled because they felt it was nature, 
and not political will that had allowed Mexico to meet its obligations. In fact, in the 
end rains – wild waters -- in the Conchos, Salado and San Juan watersheds led 
to much of the payments that reduced the debt in 2004, although Mexican also 
released waters from the international dams, the Conchos and San Juan River 
basins as good faith payments in 2005.  
 
And just what lessons were learned from the last 13 years? According to the 
IBWC’s Rakestraw, what is positive is that IBWC and CILA became more open, 
more responsive to the public and still remained a positive mechanism in place to 
talk about the debt. On the other hand, “progress was slow and there was no 
enforcement … and there is a general acceptance they didn’t comply with the 
treaty.” 
 
Rakestraw says Mexico “was generally more concerned with their own social 
situation than complying with the treaty,” a fact also agreed to by García.  
Elizalde did not disagree. “The two sides had always worked together in times of 
normal climate, never had we been faced with such an extensive drought,” 
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Elizalde noted. “The IBWC-CILA mechanism worked, but it had to be handled at 
higher levels, but always with our technical guidance.” 
 
“What is lacking in the Treaty is a specific rule or regulation on how to manage 
watersheds in times of normal rainfall, in times of abundance and in times of 
drought,” Elizalde explained. “During the drought, every person in Mexico saw 
their local problem, and what is needed is a more general vision in the country, a 




A fierce debate brewed between U.S. and Mexican officials during the late 
1990s, as inflows from Mexican tributaries dried up or at least never reached the 
Río Grande, putting Mexico out of compliance with the 1944 International Water 
Treaty between U.S. and Mexico. In fact, between 1993 and 2002, Mexico built 
up a deficit under the 1944 Treaty of more than 1.5 million AF or 1.85 billion 
cubic meters. Because the Río Conchos – contained almost entirely in 
Chihuahua -- historically provided the majority of inflows to the Río Grande, much 
of the debate and discourse of different interest groups focused on rainfall and 
riverflow in that large subbasin, which stretches from pine forests in Southern 
Chihuahua to the outflow near Ojinaga in the heart of the Chihuahuan desert. 
While South Texas farmers and many Texas officials blamed expansion of 
Mexican irrigated agriculture in Chihuahua and management of the dams for 
internal use as the cause of low inflows, Mexican officials and academics put the 
blame almost squarely on the lack of rainfall – drought plain and simple. A more 
nuanced discourse among academics, environmental groups and some 
government officials focused on deforestation and land management as having 
impacted both sedimentation of the dams and local rains.  
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The negotiations went beyond the efforts of the official guardians of the 1944 
Treaty – the  International Boundary and Water Commission and the Comision 
Internacional de Limites y Aguas – to the highest level of government, including 
face-to-face meetings between President Bush of the U.S. and President Fox of 
Mexico. Negotiations both within the IBWC/CILA and at the higher-levels led to a 
number of important efforts and changes. For one, on the U.S. side, the State of 
Texas became part of the negotiation process. In addition, in 2002, the Border 
Environment Cooperation Commission and North American Development Bank, 
approved funding to improve water conservation in Chihuahua’s irrigation 
districts, with the expressed intent of reducing water use in the districts, and 
increasing flows to the Río Grande (IBWC 2003). Significant monies were poured 
into water efficiency and conservation projects, particularly in the Delicias 
Irrigation District.  Finally, however, negotiators reached a flexible agreement in 
March of 2005 and Mexico “paid” off the water debt it had incurred at the end of 
September of 2005, in part by releasing waters – the result of heavy hurricane-
aided rains -- from tributaries not covered in the 1944 Treaty (IBWC 2005). 
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Chapter Three: Why the Pitiful Flows? Narratives and Facts about the Río 
Conchos Flows, 1990-2005 
 
“The river fell lower and lower as they went until there was almost 
no water in it. But where the Conchos entered from Mexico the river 
sprang back to life again with renewed flow from the great tributary; 
and similarly the life of faith was redoubled again in the friars when 
they came to first Indian town in the Junta Country and saw the first 
church built….  
 
Horgan 1954: 299 reporting on the trip of Fray Nicolás López along the Río 
Grande in 1683.  Paul Horgan.  The Great River: The Río Grande in North 





Just what did happen to the Rio Conchos between 1990 and 2005? Why did a 
river which had always provided sufficient waters to the Río Grande Basin 
suddenly provide so little? Why did the ire of U.S. farmers and officials turn so 
virulently against Chihuahua as the main culprit in the water dispute? Why not 
Coahuila, or Nuevo Leon, or the growing city of Monterrey? This section 
analyzes the reduced flows themselves, before the next section turns to several 
of the potential factors in the reduction of flows, from drought to dam 
management, and what key actors said – or didn’t -- about those potential 
factors. Thus, the chapter provides insight into both the facts of the dispute as 
well as the narratives, and finds that most likely rather than a simple essential 
cause, a multiplicity of causes – sometimes one producing another – was the 






II. Just the Facts Jack: What Happened to the Río Conchos 
 
A. The Conchos Water Station 
 
Water flow data for the Conchos River at its mouth near Ojinaga, Mexico comes 
from a hydrological station maintained by CILA. Located approximately two 
kilometers upstream from where the clearer Conchos waters enter into the 
muddy Grande waters, the station has been in its present location since April of 
1954. Previously, CONAGUA maintained a station closer to the actual outflow, 
but only yearly averages are available from 1940 to 1954. In fact, while officially a 
CILA station, it often fell upon CONAGUA to provide monies and personnel to 
maintain the station, and it is only after 2003 that CILA has assumed full 
responsibility and maintenance of the Ojinaga station (Elizalde, CILA, Personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
 
The Ojinaga Streamflow Gauge consists of two structures (See Photo 3.1 and 
3.2). One, located on a sandy bank filled with mesquite, grasses and tamarisk, is 
simply a 20-foot tower leading to a caged transport device – a kind of  mini-
gondola, which can travel by cranking a shaft toward the second tower. Resting 
on a cement pillar, which enters the sandy bottom of the Conchos, the tower 
houses a small platform above and a stream-stage ruler below. There is also – 
below the surface – a streamflow gauge. To one side, on the top of the pillar, a 
door is opened, revealing a lithograph paper which continually records the flow 
being measured by the gauge itself just below the surface of the water. To the 
other, and above, is a small caged container which, when unlocked, reveals a 
box containing a laptop attached to a satellite. This box dates only from 1999, as 
CILA added satellite telemetry to its Ojinaga station. The funding came from 
CONAGUA. Then, in August of 2005, CILA again upgraded its satellite 
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technology, adopting the same satellite technology used by the US side, made 
by a company called Sutron, as part of a binational effort to improve the 
technology (Elizalde, CILA, personal communication with author,  2005).  
 
Photo 3.1. CILA Hydrological Station, Ojinaga, 2005. Stream gauge is located two 
kilometers upstream of where the Conchos enters the Río Grande.   
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Photo 3.2. Close-up of CILA hydrological station. Round structure houses 
lithography, while box houses the satellite telemetry station.   
 
Far removed from international negotiations or disputes over low-flow, the actual 
mechanisms – and personnel -- involved in measuring flow are decidedly 
rudimentary. Both the IBWC – from its new offices in Presidio, near the local High 
School and CILA – with its single office on the banks of the river in Ojinaga – 
share information from stations in the area (see Photo 3.3). “Nacho” Bañuelos is 
a young Mexican engineer who arrived with his wife in 2005 for the first time as a 
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new CILA employee. His charge? Measure the flow of the Conchos, and watch 
the diversion of the Río Grande at El Mulato, some 30 kilometers downstream of 
where the Conchos flows into the Río Grande. There, a Mexican farming 
community has historically watered some alfalfa and cotton fields along the 
banks of the river. Other minor diversion points along the include a diversion 
device upstream within the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District near Cuesta 
Alta on the Río Grande. There, farmers from “Modulo 5 –Labores del Paso” 









Photo 3.4. Diversion dam near Cuesta Alta, on the dry Río Grande, 2005. 
 
Bañuelos job is relatively simple (Bañuelos, personal communication with author, 
2005). His office is in the old structure that housed the Mexican Customs Office 
of the original international bridge between Ojinaga and Presidio. A 
meteorological station sits in one corner, and his wife has assumed the 
responsibility of checking the readings and writing them down. Every two or three 
days, he gets up at the crack of dawn – to beat the hot Ojinaga sun – and visits 
the Ojinaga gauge, traveling in his CILA-commissioned pick-up truck along the 
levees of the Río Grande toward the Conchos outflow. Descending from the 
levee, he backs his truck to the banks of the Río Conchos, puts on his waders, 
and prepares his equipment. He will measure the flow at various points and 
depths across the river using a standard rod with a propeller before comparing 
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Photo 3.5. CILA employee measuring flow near Ojinaga Gauge Station 
 
He then goes back to report his findings by telephone and/or e-mail both to his 
direct bosses in Ciudad Acuña, Coahuila, as well as to his counterparts in IBWC-
Presidio. Every month it will be time to change the lithograph paper, and about 
every two to three months, or more likely after every big local rain, he will help 
clean the base of the station and small well underlying the water flow gauge itself 
as it tends to fill up with sand and silt, affecting the results. Bañuelos believes 
that there are times when water flow following storms is underreported since it is 
hard to take hand-held readings right after a storm and the gauge itself can be 
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affected by sand and silt kicked up from the rains. Could the international dispute 
between the U.S. and Mexico been affected by mismanagement of the gauge 
station or misreporting of the numbers? While it is not likely, it is worth noting that 
Bañuelos was hired as a replacement after the previous manager in Ojinaga was 
let go. The rationale? He was not visiting el Mulato or the Ojinaga gauge with 
frequency, or cleaning out the silt and sand which can affect readings. Instead, 
he was using the old international bridge office as a car repair shop to make a 
little money on the side.  
 
1. Average Daily Discharge at the Mouth 
 
Daily discharge over the 1954-2005 time period averaged 24.25 cubic meters per 
second (CMS), with substantial variations by year (see Figure 3.1). Including 
yearly flow records available from CONAGUA from HY 1940 to 1954, the 
variation in flows by decade is clear (see Figure 3.2). While the data from the 
1940s and early 1950s indicates an annual daily average of some 29 CMS, the 
1955 to 1960 period – widely considered as a period of historic drought – 
dropped to 26.41 CMS. The 1960s saw further reductions overall, while the 
1970s saw average daily discharges of some 31.4 CMS, the decade which was 
characterized by the highest flows. These high  “averages” were paced by HY 
1978, when huge floods spilled over the gates of Chihuahua’s major dams and 
flooded huge swaths of fields. Taken as an average, the 1980s were a period of 
“normal” flows, while the average of the 1990s – at 22.67 CMS, was only slightly 
lower than the fifty-year average. Buried in these averages, however,  were both 
high water years – 1991 and 1992 – and beginning in 1993, low water years. In 
fact, within that decade, the flows have varied from a high annual average of 91 
CMS in Hydrological Year 1991, to a low of only 2.3 in HY 1998. 
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Source: CILA, Ojinaga Steam Gauge, 2005. 
 
Between HY 2001 and HY 2005,  the average daily flow plummeted to some 6.0 
CMS, and even the supposedly wet year of HY 2004 saw daily averages of only 
12.1 CMS flowing from the Conchos.  The HY 1993-2003 period was particularly 
low, averaging only 7.5 CMS, while the 1954-57 period was similarly dry, with 
average daily discharges of only 12.7 CMS (see Figure 3.2).  In fact, the more 
recent low-flow conditions – hydrological years 1993 to 2003 – compared with 
the low-flow conditions of hydrological years 1954 to 1967 there has been no 
comparison to the recent low-flow period. The record of fifty years for the gauge 
reveals a river that has suffered from three low-flow periods – 54 to 57, 62 to 67 
and 1993 to 2003 -- with individual years of significant high flows, including HY 





Figure 3.2. Average Daily Discharge by Decade in CMS, 1940-2005 
 
Source: For 1940-1954, CONAGUA 2005.  




Figure 3.3. Average Daily Discharge for Different Low-Flow Periods at Conchos 
Outflow 
 
Source: CILA, Average Daily Discharge, Ojinaga Stream Gauge, 2005.  
 
Looking at data from the two nearest IBWC-run hydrological stations, the impact 
of the lack of flows in recent years from the Conchos is stunning (see Figure 3.4). 
Before the Upper Río Grande was dammed, the Río Grande itself provided some 
35 percent of the average flow downstream of the entrance of the Conchos, while 
during the 1930s and 1940s, the Río Grande provided only 15 and 20 percent 
respectively of the flow at the Below Conchos station. Throughout the 1950s, 
60s, 70s and 80s, the flow attributable to the Río Grande itself was less than 25 
percent of the total flow – as the Río Conchos was providing between 75 and 98 
percent of the flow in this section of the river through the 1960s. By the 1990s, 
however, the percentage attributable to the Río Grande itself shot up to 45 
percent, a figure that would rise to some 60 percent between 2000 to 2005. The 
Río Conchos was no longer bringing the Río Grande back to life (Horgan 299). 
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Figure 3.4. Río Grande Flows Below Río Conchos in CMS and % of Río Grande 
Flow Below Río Conchos Attributable to Río Grande Above Conchos, 1900-
2005
 
Source: IBWC, Daily Stream Flow Data at Rio Grande Stations and CILA, Ojinaga Stream Flow 
Data, 2005.  
 
2. Peak Discharges 
 
In general, high peak flows at the Ojinaga station occur in September or October. 
There have been 17 daily peaks above 1000 CMS through the period of record, 
but nearly all of them concentrated around three flood events in Hydrological 
Year 1959 (10/02/1958), in HY 1978 ((9/24/78) and HY 1991 (9/26/91), indicating 
the possibility of major flooding throughout the period of record. Peak discharge 
has varied considerably over time, though without a significant trend. In general, 
peak discharge values have fallen over the period of record. A closer look at the 
two periods of relatively low-flow (1954-1967 and 1990-2005), with some 
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individual higher flow years, reveals that the average daily peak discharge has 
declined slightly in the present low-flow period. 
 
Table 3.1. Peak Discharge Values for Different Low-Flow Periods at the Río 
Conchos Outflow 
Time Period Average Daily 
Discharge in CMS 
Highest Peak  
Discharge in CMS 
Date of Highest  
Peak 
1954-2005 24.25 1490 10/01/1978 
1954-1967  23.50 1340 10/02/1958 
1954-1957 12.49 337 8/23/1954 
1990-2004 18.5 1200 9/26/91 
1993-2003 6.81 263 07/26/93 
Source: CILA, Ojinaga Stream Flow Data, 2005.  
 
It is apparent that in high flow years, peak discharge occurs later than in low-flow 
years. Thus in low-flow years, peak discharges occur earlier, such as in May, 
June, July or August, as opposed to September or October. Or perhaps more to 
the point, in low-flow years, the expected fall rains either do not occur, or have 
not made it all the way down the river system to the mouth of the river during the 
fall months.  
 
An analysis of discharges during the period of record, as well as the two “low-
flow” periods shows that the later period (1993-2003) has less high and low 
values and generally has a “flatter” flow duration curve. Again, the tables and 
figures suggest that there has been less variability than during the previous low-
flow period in the present period, and a generally flatter flow duration curve, not 
unexpected with lower flows.  
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Table 3.2. Peak Values, as well as 5, 50 and 95% flow values during different time 
periods 
Category 1954-2004 1954-57 1993-2003 
Peak Value 1490 337 263 
5 % Value (high 
flows) 
920 52.4 24.0 
50 % Value (median) 11.1 6.63 2.11 
95% Value (low flow) 0.6 0.08 0.38 
Source: Author calculation from information provided by CILA 2005.  
 
B. Other Hydrological Stations 
 
The Ojinaga Hydrological Gauge is of course just a point on the river, although 
an important one because its flows are calculated as part of an international 
treaty guiding water distribution (IBWC 1944). Both CONAGUA and the Junta 
Central de Agua y Saneamiento from the state government have also invested in 
a network of hydrological stations. Many of these, however, are not currently in 
operation or have not been operating for long periods of time, making analysis of 
their daily discharge and flows difficult. In addition, many of the original stations 
were designed to measure flow in the series of canals making up the three 
irrigation districts of the watershed, not in the river itself. Sixteen different stations 
that were operating have been closed, most of them by the early 1990s. In 2004, 
only 14 stations were operating (CONAGUA, information provided to author, 
2004). Several of these are located in the dams and serve more as “control” 
devices to measure outflows and inflows into the storage and distribution dams 
(see Map 4) In fact, there are no stations located in the Upper Conchos in the 
Municipalities of Bocoyna or Carichí, and there appears to be only one station 
along the Conchos itself which measures “natural” river flow: Las Burras near 
Julimes. Operations at Las Burras were suspended in 2003, however.  
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Still, there are some flow stations which serve as a relative yardstick of flows. Las 
Burras is located just downstream of where the San Pedro enters the Río 
Conchos as well as downstream of the major irrigation district. In addition, the 
Jimenez station along the Río Florido indicates the health of one of the main 
tributaries to the Conchos downstream of La Boquilla Dam. Finally, the Colina 
station indicates the amount of water being sent down the river just downstream 
of La Boquilla on the Conchos itself, but before being impacted by return flows. 
However, these last two have only been operated since 1983.  
 
Average monthly flow data reveals that total flow in these stations correlates 
closely with flow at the Ojinaga station. Thus, for example, at Jiménez, La Colina 
and Las Burras, the 1993-2003 period had significantly less flow than in the 
previous 10 years (see Figure 3.5). Interestingly, during the later time period, 
flows at Las Burras were actually lower than those upstream at La Colina, 
indicating that flows released directly to the river from the distribution dam as well 
as from localized rains were not making it downstream, or that return flows from 
irrigation and municipal discharges were not entering the river itself. A look at the 
period of record also indicates that the timing of flow appeared to change slightly, 
with less flow available in winter months than in previous decades (see Figure 
2.8). In fact, for approximately four months of the year (October to March), flows 
in both the Florido River downstream of the Florido Irrigation District as well as 
the Río Conchos, both upstream and downstream of the Delicias irrigation district 
appeared to come to a virtual stop.  
 
 116 
Map 4.  Hydrological Stations Operated by National Water Commission in Río 
Conchos, 2004 
 
Source: CONAGUA, information provided to author, 2004.  
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Figure 3.5. Total Annual Flows (MCM) at Various Hydrological Stations, Conchos 
Watershed 
 
Source: CONAGUA, Information provided to Author, 2004.  
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Figure 3.6. Annual Flow from October to March at Three Hydrological Stations in 
Million Cubic Meters, Río Conchos Watershed, 1983-2003 
 
Source: CONAGUA, 2004, author calculation.  
 
C.  Conclusions 
 
Average daily flows fell precipitously decade by decade in the Río Conchos. In 
addition, yearly flows also fell, with a few years of significant discharge, and 
many low-flow years, particularly between 1993 and 2003. Finally, a look at peak 
discharge revealed that the present low-flow period has a much “flatter” flow 
duration curve. In general, peak discharges in the more recent time period tends 
to occur earlier in the year rather than during the September and October period 
more characteristic of high flow years, as well as earlier decades. Data from 
hydrological stations both above and below Chihuahua’s major irrigation district 
reveals a denuded river that flowed only sporadically during the winter months of 




III. The Causes: From Drought to Dam Management 
 
This section looks at several of the potential factors in the reduced flow of the 
Conchos,  including precipitation, dam management changes in crop production 
and land use changes and considers the evidence presented by various interest 
groups. In addition, it introduces some additional factors not often considered, 
such as legal changes that occurred in this period in water, forestry and 
agricultural laws, which have, at least partially, privatized and decentralized the 
management of water, land and forests,  as well as  economic and institutional 
changes as a result of Mexico’s inclusion into the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. For the water crisis that engulfed both Chihuahua and by extension 
Texas can not be understood without also understanding the changes that 
occurred politically and economically, in part because of the changes brought 
about by NAFTA and related policy changes. In essence, the section argues that 
both local management decisions, climactic changes and more regional 
economic shifts must be considered when assessing changes in the physical 




Press releases, interviews by politicians, and official responses to U.S. 
government reports, as well as personal communication with officials indicate 
that officials from Mexico and Chihuahua have maintained that low-flows into the 
Río Grande have one overriding cause: drought (CONAGUA 2000; Rodríguez 
Piñeda, et. al. 2005). Drought itself is difficult to define. While climactic indexes 
such as the PDSI --Palmer Drought Severity Index -- are well established and 
important climactic and hydrological tools droughts are not only climactic 
constructs, but human and political constructs as well. Increased water use and 
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increasing populations can make a relatively mild dry spell a drought, as 
demands on a river system increase.  
 
In the Southwestern U.S. and Northern Mexico, drought is a common occurrence 
(Liverman 1999). Climate in Mexico is influenced by latitudinal belts of 
atmospheric circulation which occur seasonally, ranging from the westerlies, 
which bring precipitation to northern Mexico in the late fall and winter, while in the 
center and south, the intertropical convergence zone (ITCS) deliver summer 
rains (Liverman 1999: 100). In Northern Mexico, droughts often correspond to 
"La Niña" years, when high pressure systems cool the Atlantic Ocean, 
weakening storm systems that bring rains to areas. Thus, droughts in Northern 
Mexico occurred in La Niña years, such as in the 1950s, 1974 and 1988, when 
average winter rainfalls were reduced, while droughts in Southern Mexico 
corresponded to "El Niño" events, when summer rains were reduced due to 
displacement of the ITCZ (Liverman 1999: 102-103). 
 
The most obvious characteristic of a drought is lack of precipitation. It rains less. 
Complicating any examination of precipitation data, however, are changes in the 
location of meteorological stations, potential changes in the technology used to 
measure rainfall as well as data collection issues and human error. For example, 
in the Río Conchos watershed, there have been dozens of stations operated by 
the State Government, by CONAGUA, and even some operated “voluntarily” by 
individuals not directly employed by CONAGUA. Thus, there were 51 stations in 
Chihuahua that at one time were operated by entities that were no longer 
operating in 2004, including 27 within the Río Conchos watershed (Comision 
Nacional de Agua, 2004).  Most of these were shut down in the early 1990s at a 
time of budget constraints, before the supposed drought occurred. While the 
state ran approximately 10 stations in the Rio Conchos, CONAGUA operated 24 
stations within the State of Chihuahua, including 17 in the Río Conchos 
watershed. There are another five CONAGUA stations run by volunteers. 
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Based on these stations, CONAGUA has come up with an annual precipitation 
total for the Río Conchos watershed. By charting the annual discharge at the 
mouth of the Río Conchos in Ojinaga against annual precipitation throughout the 
basin, it is revealed that annual discharge from the Ojinaga station closely 
correlates with annual basin-wide precipitation (Figure 3.7). Nonetheless, the 
correlation between rainfall and runoff in the basin show it to be a highly variable 
basin in terms of flow. For example, while the ratio of runoff to precipitation 
shows an average of 2.39 million cubic meters of water flowing at the Río 
Conchos mouth per millimeter of rainfall over the period of record (Figure 3.8). 
However, the correlation between rain and runoff has been stronger in recent 
years during high rains and weaker during low rain periods, such as the past 
decade.  
 
During the 1995-1999 five-year period precipitation averaged 412 mm per year, 
and annual discharge averaged only 131 million cubic meters per year, indicating 
a much lower rain to flow correlation than in past decades.  The problem with 
these comparisons is of course they are only averages, and only by examining 
individual precipitation stations and their correlation to runoff and flow is it 
possible to make more definitive statements. Still, as a general rule, it shows that 
there appears to be less of a correlation between rainfall and outflow in the more 
recent low rainfall period than previously.  
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Figure 3.7. Calendar Year Outflow in Million Cubic Meters and Average Annual 
Basin-Wide Precipitation in Millimeters, 1940-2002 
 
Source: CILA, Ojinaga Streamflow Gauge Data, 2005; CONAGUA, Rainfall Precipitation 
Data, Information Provided to Author.  
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Figure 3.8. Runoff/Precipitation Ratio on Río Conchos, 1940– 
2002
 
Source: Author Calculations from information provided by CONAGUA 2004.  
 
The 2000 Brandes report – which became a bible of sorts to the South Texas 
farmers demanding their share of the Río Conchos water – makes similar 
observations by looking at dam inflows, precipitation and the outflow to the Río 
Grande. Thus, the report compares the 1958-1963 period of low rainfall with the 
1992-97 period and finds that while the average amount of inflows into Mexican 
reservoirs was similar, the amount of water making it to the Río Grande was 
considerably less in the more recent period, approximately 179 MCM (145,000 
acre-feet) rather than 567 MCM (460,000 acre-feet per year) (Brandes 2000).  
 
Thus, there has been a fundamental shift during recent years as the 
discharge/rainfall correlation at the outlet has weakened, with less flows than 
would be expected from the rains, based on similar rainfalls in past decades. On 
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the other hand, during times of high rains, such as in the HY 91-92 period, 
discharge is greater than annual precipitation levels would predict.  
 
Still, Mexican academics and research centers have their own publications and 
monthly maps insisting that the drought in Chihuahua – and in the Río Conchos 
watershed in particular – was very real and is the primary factor in the low inflows 
to the dams and outflows to the Río Grande. One of the more prolific institutes 
has been the Centro de Investigación Sobre Sequía del Instituto de Ecología, AC 
(CEISS or the Drought Investigation Center of the Ecology Institute, A.C.). Born 
in 1996, but consecrated in 1998 with state and federal monies, the center is 
located in a spacious building among the pecan tree farms and desert plains just 
south of Aldama on the road between Ojinaga and Chihuahua. CEISS boasts 
modern offices, state-of-the-art GIS equipment and even a small meteorological 
station. With a small staff of eight in 2005, CEISS is dedicated to the study of the 
flora, fauna, water and climate of Chihuahua and northern Mexico, with a 
particular focus on drought, hydrology and forest fires (Dr. Victor Reyes, 
Personal communication with author, September 2005).  
 
While director Dr. Victor Reyes said the nascent center has had no direct 
involvement in the conflict with the U.S., they have participated in meetings with 
CONAGUA and CILA as technical advisors and observers. They are trying to 
establish themselves as an entity similar in many respects to the U.S.’s Drought 
Monitor Center, only, as he remarks, “a whole lot poorer.”  
 
CEISS follows the same SPI (Standardized Precipitation Index) developed by 
Thomas B. McKee, Noland Doesken and John Kleist at Colorado State 
University, taking as its base monthly precipitation records at meteorological 
 125 
stations and comparing them to historical records7 (McKee, T.B., N. J. Doesken, 
and J. Kliest 1993; CEISS 2004). Thus, CEISS publishes a monthly drought 
index for the entire state and uses a GIS system to produce a series of maps 
which help officials and farmers visualize drought regional impacts. Reyes credits 
the visual drought monitoring network with allowing CEISS a seat at the table in 
discussions on state policy.  
 
In recent years, CEISS and its investigators have published a series of articles 
on the Chihuahuan drought. Thus, CEISS’s Jose Alfredo Rodriguez Piñeda 
presented “Crisis Hidrológica Mexico-USA: Hubó o No Sequía en la Cuenca del 
Río Conchos en el Periodo 1993-2002?” (Mexican –USA Hydrological Crisis: 
Was there a drought or not in the Río Conchos Watershed during 1993-2002?) at 
the Binational Río Grande “Cooperation for a Better Future” Forum in 2005. 
Using data from 30 state and CONAGUA meteorological stations, the 
investigators analyzed data from 1970 to 2002, and concluded that drought had 
affected much of the state, most notably the “temperate zone of the State, that is 
the headwaters of the Río Conchos basin, which impacts the replenishment of 
the aquifers and availability of water (Rodríguez Piñeda et al 2005: 5).” With the 
exception of 1997, the report states that all 10 years had negative 12-month SPI 
values for the arid, semi-arid and temperate regions of the state. The extended 
drought in Chihuahua – including the Río Conchos riverbasin – can be classified, 
wrote Rodriguez, as “an extraordinary drought” since it is the “most extensive 
drought of the 20th Century.” (Rodríguez 2005: 5).  
 
While obviously a summary of data collected and analyzed by CEISS, Mexican 
participants cited the study presented at the Forum as confirmation that the 
geographical and temporal extent of the drought was the cause of the 
                                                
7 SPI is based on the number of standard deviations – literally the square root of the 
variance, a measure of the dispersion of values around a mean --  between a particular 
set of precipitation data and the historical average. 
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hydrological crisis in the Río Conchos. A longer unpublished article by some of 
the same investigators, however, gives a much more nuanced approach to the 
Chihuahuan drought (Reyes-Gomez, V.M. et. al 2005). In their article, the 
authors utilize information from 32 meteorological stations and compare different 
time periods to show that the present drought-like conditions were less “severe” 
than, 1970, but were more extensive geographically and more extended 
temporally. It was the extent and not the severity of the drought that caused a 
mild “meteorological drought” to lead to a hydrological, agricultural and socio-
economic drought.  They state: “It is an evident result that a prolonged drought 
can have more impacts in terms of runoff capture, than an intense drought of less 
duration (Reyes-Gomez 2005: 10).”   
 
The authors then analyze the entrances and extractions of water from the major 
dams themselves, showing that in the last “six decades, the entrances have been 
affected by lack and variability of rainfall distribution,” impacting in particular Luis 
León and Francisco Madero. The authors claim that rainfall data upstream of the 
major dams confirm that lack of rain can explain between 67 and 71 percent of 
the correlating decline in dam levels, although they note that these statistics 
“should be taken with much care” and “can not be validated until a greater 
number of observation and a better and more convenient distribution of rainfall 
gauges are obtained (Reyes-Gomez et. al. 2005).” The authors state that the 
lack of rainfall gauges upstream in the Conchos headwaters – where presumably 
most of the runoff getting to the dams actually comes from – is a major detriment 
to be able to correlate rainfall with water flow and dam inputs. The deficit 
approach used by these authors contrasts starkly with the Brandes report, which 
reports “accumulations.”  
 
In another of its publications, researchers associated with CEISS make a similar 
case that for certain regions of Chihuahua and the Conchos River Basin, the 
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drought has been “severe” and in some cases “exceptional” (Gadsen et al 2003). 
The article puts the blame on low reservoir levels on drought in the Southwest of 
the State, and makes the case that some 59 percent of the forested areas – 
including areas in the “high parts of the Conchos River basin” – were suffering 
from severe to exceptional drought over several years according to a 12-month 
SPI. The article blames “the accelerated fragmentation over many years of the 
forest ecosystems located in the high parts of the Conchos River basin…. 
(which).. has made for rapid soil erosion and the decrease in replenishment of 
both the underground aquifers and the surface water supply.”  
  
Thus, in concluding, the article states: 
 
In recent years we have found recurrent droughts that vary from 
severe to exceptional in the forest regions of Chihuahua’s 
Southwest. This may explain in part the reservoirs’ low levels in the 
Conchos medium basin; it affects agricultural productivity in this 
area and diminishes the amount of water that can be sent to the 
United States (Gadsen, et al, 2003: 107). 
 
The articles and presentations by Chihuahua’s principle students of droughts 
show that even among their own publications, there is an ambiguity about the 
causes and severity of the drought. Clearly, however, they support the official 
view that the meteorological drought – the lack of rain – was the major factor in 
the hydrological drought – the lack of water in the dams and the outfall to the Río 
Bravo.  
 
Thus, data from CONAGUA and other meteorological stations support the view 
that the drought was extensive and extended from 1992 to 2003 throughout 
Chihuahua, with the exception of HY 1997.  It was not the intensity of the 
drought, but its duration, that led to such low outflows at Ojinaga according to this 
thesis. It is important to note that the lack of rainfall stations in the upper 
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Conchos complicated calculations and conclusions (Gadsen et al 2003). In  
addition to this discourse about the impact of climate and specifically drought, 
water use, dam management, land use and landscape are all recognized as 
important factors in the Río Conchos River Basin. Thus, within Chihuahua, 
important thesis began to emerge about the impacts of water use and 
degradation of landforms – including deforestation and soil erosion – which are 
also posited as major factors in the lack of water available to the river and users. 
 
B. Damn the Dams?  
 
Beginning in the 1910s, major dam construction along the river –primarily for 
agricultural use – has interrupted the natural flow and sediment regime of the 
river. There are eight major dams along the Río Conchos and its tributaries, as 
well as some 30 minor dams catching small amounts of water for irrigation and 
domestic water uses along both the tributaries and main stem (Schmandt 1993: 
46). While the largest dam – Las Boquilla – was built long before the 1944 Treaty 
with the United States – Chihuahua’s other major dams, including Francisco 
Madero (1949), Luis León (1968), and San Gabriel (1981) were completed after 
the 1944 Treaty was signed. In 2004, Chihuahua even added a small dam on 
one of the tributaries of the Río Conchos, near San Juanito in the Municipality of 
Bocoyna just 15 kilometers from where the river begins its course (Topete 2004).  
 
By far the biggest dam in the state is La Boquilla, often referred to as Lago 
Toronto (see Photo 3.7). The history of the dam is a microcosm of Mexico’s, 
spanning the Porfiriato – the hard-line regime of Porfírio Diaz – the Mexican 
Revolution, land reform and the development of major irrigation projects in 
Northern Mexico during the 1930s and 40s. It is also inextricably linked to the 
founding and development of Ciudad Delicias, Chihuahua’s major agricultural 
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center, and in fact to the 1944 Treaty signed with the United States (See Chapter 
Five).  
 
The dam was built in the 1910s as a major energy project by the Compañía 
Agrícola de Luz y Fuerza, but post-revolutionary political figures viewed the dam 
as a wasted resource for a state which desperately needed employment and 
development. General Ignacio Enriquez, who as general of Chihuahuan forces 
often fought alongside Pancho Villa, was the catalyst (Jordan 1956). Enríquez 
was Chihuahua’s first governor in the tumultuous post-revolutionary period 
(1916-20), and shortly after stepping down in 1920 worked with his successor 
Abel Rodríguez to turn Chihuahua – and the as-yet unnamed Delicias -- into a 
major agricultural center (Club Rotário 1983: 7).  
 
In 1927 – with a federal water concession in hand -- a new study began under 
the White Engineering Corporation to irrigate 70,000 hectares from the Río 
Conchos and 80,000 hectares from the Río San Pedro. The major engineer on 
the project was Carlos Blake, founder of the City of Delicias. By 1936, all 105 
kilometers of the Conchos Canal had been constructed, serving some 53,000 
hectares of irrigated lands, in a stunning transformation of the Chihuahua’s 





Photo 3.6. Statue of Carlos Blake, Considered Founder of Delicias. 
 
The  dam planned for the “San Pedro Irrigator Association” was originally to be 
located at Villalba, well upstream of the present San Pedro dam at Francisco 
Madero. Difficulties in the financing, design and political maneuverings led 
Mexico in 1942 to begin construction of a much smaller Francisco Madero just 
upstream of the historic town of Rosales. In 1943 and 44, while negotiating the 
Water Treaty with the U.S., Mexican negotiators – led in fact by Blake himself – 
 131 
assured the U.S. that the Madero Dam was smaller than originally planned and 
therefore the district would be closer to 100,000 hectares and not 150,000 or 
200,000 hectares as originally conceived. The Madero dam was completed in 
1947 (Photo 3.8).  
 
The Rio Concho’s other major dams were similarly conceived and built for the 
twin goals of irrigation and flood control. Planning for the Luis León Dam actually 
began in the 1950s, as local farmers complained of the frequent flashy rains 
which continually destroyed their crops. While paperwork was filed in 1955, the 
dam was constructed and finished in 1968, and the Lower Conchos Irrigation 
District 090 itself became official in 1976 as an 11,000 hectare area located 
some 120 kilometers below Luis Leon itself (see Photo 3.9). Similarly, the Florido 
Irrigation District between Hidalgo de Parral and Jimenez was initiated in 1981 
with the completion of the San Gabriel dam, just south of Chihuahua in Ocampo, 
Durango, leading to the eventual irrigation of some 10,000 irrigated acres. Thus, 
three of the four major irrigation areas – San Pedro, Florido and Ojinaga --  and 
associated dams were completed after the signing of the 1944 Water Treaty, two 
of which came after the drought of the 1950s and 1960s.  
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Table 3.3. Major Dams in the Río Conchos Watershed 
Official 
Name 







La Boquilla Lago 
Toronto 
1916 2,822.8 Conchos,  























































































   
Source: Comisión Nacional de Agua, Gerencia Estatal, Chihuahua, Provided to Author 
September of 2004.  
                                                
8 Useful Capacity varies by source. Information from the Irrigation District offices run by 
CONAGUA provided these figures, which are slightly lower than those provided by 
CONAGUA’s central Chihuahua offices. The lower figures are probably more realistic  
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Photo 3.7. Boquilla Dam (Lago Toronto), 2003 at very low levels. 
 
Thus, while Chihuahua’s major dams irrigating the central valleys have been 
operating since the 1940s, the other dams – and irrigation districts – have only 
been operating since the 1960s. Historical records since the 1950s for La 
Boquilla and Francisco Madero of the annual storage, inflows and outflows from 
the two dams show that inflows, storage levels and extractions –both releases to 
the rivers and diversions to the canals -- all witnessed declines throughout the 
1990s, compared with averages over the period of record. Most notable are the 
exceptional low levels of inflows in 1994 and the near zero releases in 1995, 
which followed high inflows and releases in the early 1990s. Similarly, after 
increased inflows in 1996, outflows increased substantially in 1997, only to fall 
again in 1998. The same occurred between 2000 and 2001. Higher inflows one 
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Photo 3.8. Madero (De Las Virgenes) Dam, near Rosales, which serves Delicias 
Irrigation District, 2005 
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Photo 3.9. Presa Granero (Luis León Dam) provides storage for the Lower Río 








Source: CONAGUA, information provided to author, 2005.  
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Figure 3.10. Inflows, Storage Levels and Extractions from (De) Las Virgenes 
(Franciso Madero) Dam 
 
Source: CONAGUA, information provided to author, 2005.  
 
Luis León has witnessed a similar trend in recent years. Data from 1982 to 2005 
shows a dam that was in continual decline in inflows, storage levels and releases 
beginning in 1994, with a slight upward trend in HYs 2004 to 2005. The levels are 
in stark contrast to the 1980s and early 1990s (Figure 3.11).   
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Figure 3.11. Inflows, Storage Levels and Releases at Luis Leon (El Granero) Dam, 
1983-2005 
 
Source: CONAGUA, information provided to author, 2005.  
 
Dams are controlled by humans, not simply by rainfall, and decisions were made 
that would fundamentally affect flow in the Río Conchos and by extension the Río 
Grande. Since 1995, virtually no surface water has been released from La 
Boquilla or Francisco Madero to the Delicias Irrigation District after the summer 
irrigation season ends on September 30th, meaning crops needing water in the 
winter – winter wheat, perennials like pecans and alfalfa and winter onions – 
have been watered with other surface and groundwater resources if at all. (see 
Chapter Five for full discussion). Thus, the amount of return irrigation flow during 
the winter months and of course direct river flow above Luis Leon Dam has been 
severely curtailed from October 1st to February 28th. At Luis Leon itself, releases 
during the winter months have also been severely curtailed.  In fact, water 
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released from the main gates of the Luis Leon Dam during winter months have 
been made on three occasions to help meet U.S. demands for more water, and 
not as a response to pressure from downstream Mexican farmers whose own 
water use was reduced. Releases occurred during the winter months of HY 1997, 
HY 2001 and HY 2005. (Oscar Lopez, CONAGUA, Lower Rio Conchos Irrigation 
District, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Average monthly releases from the three dams during the winter months 
between 1985 and 2005 clearly indicate how quickly winter releases dropped 
following the end of the regular irrigation season. This is in stark contrast to 
previous years, when both irrigation needs, and major storms in October – such 
as those that occurred in 1991 and 1978 – led to severe flooding in Chihuahua, 
bolstering flows in the Río Grande (see Table 3.4). Because Luis Leon is 
operated as much as a flood control dam as an irrigation source, releases from 
Luis Leon are frequent to avoid the possibility of such flood spill events. Only in 
October of 1978 did waters actually spill over the dam doors (Interview, 
“Rodriguez,” CONAGUA official at Luis Leon Dam, August 2003).  
 
Because of La Boquilla’s large size, flood spills have been infrequent there as 
well, occurring only in 1968 and during 1991-1992. Madero is another story, 
frequently spilling over its doors into the Río San Pedro, and thus increasing 
flows downstream at Julimes where the San Pedro meets the Conchos. 
However, only one flood event has occurred since HY 1992 – in September of 
1996 – and the Río San Pedro has been turned into a denuded bank of 
construction materials, fundamentally affecting the flow of the Río Conchos at 
Julimes and below.  
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Figure 3.12. Winter Releases (October 1 – February 28th) from Luis Leon, La 
Boquilla and Francisco Madero Dams, 1985-2005 
 
Source: CONAGUA, information provided to author, 2005. 
 
While extensive studies of the upstream and downstream impacts of dams have 
not been conducted in the Conchos River Basin, considerable evidence from 
other semi-arid river systems show how dam construction can variably impact the 
flow and sediment transport functions of natural rivers. Thus, Williams and 
Wolman, from their classic 1984 study of the effects of dams on alluvial rivers, 
conclude that dams do generally affect river flow, depending upon the use of the 
dam and climatological conditions. Overall, their study of 21 U.S. dams found 
that average annual peak flows decreased between 3 and 91 percent, and 
similarly five percent flows – high flows -- were in most cases also reduced 
(Williams and Wolman 1984: 8). In general, you may expect to see a flatter flow 
duration curve, with more values in the middle range, and less at the very high 
and very low extremes (Williams and Wolman 1984).  
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1955  26.1   26.1 
1957  26.3   26.3 
1958  185.4   185.4 
1959 8/28/59  
(12 Days) 
184.6   184.6 
1960 8/19/60  
(37 Days) 
157.6   157.6 
1966 6/6/66   
(68 Days) 
55.3   55.3 
1967 6/6/66   
(68 Days) 
320.3   320.3 
1968 8/26/68  
(41 Days) 
175.5 9/8/68  
(30 Days) 
273.1 448.6 
1969 8/26/68  
(41 Days) 
62.8   62.8 
1972 9/12/72  
(22 Days) 
133.8   133.8 
1974 9/24/78  
(109 Days) 
63   63 
1975 9/24/78  
(109 Days) 
273   273 
1978 9/26/78  
(43 Days) 
70.6   70.6 
1979 9/26/78  
(43 Days) 
250   250 
1980 9/01/80  
(16 Days) 
20.9   20.9 
1981 9/16/81  
(12 Days) 
150.3 10/07/81  
(23 Days) 
406.5 556.8 
1984 8/16/84  
(16 Days) 
38.5   38.5 
1986 9/03/86  
(17 Days) 
107.3   107.3 
1990 8/10/90  
(70 Days) 
475.6   475.6 
1991 8/11/91  
(143 Days) 
565.1 8/28/91  
(62 Days) 
816.2 1,381.3 
1992 8/11/91  
(143 Days) 
70.8 8/28/91  
(62 Days) 
729 799.8 
1996 8/29/96  
(35 Days) 
295.8   295.8 
1997 8/29/96  
(35 Days) 
0.3   0.3 
Source: CONAGUA, Gerencia Estatal Chihuahua, Information Provided to Author, 
September 2004. 
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Dams could also impact flows simply by the complex changes they beget in the 
geomorphology of the channel itself. While there is no universal pattern, many do 
lead to significant aggradations and channel narrowing, as is the case in the 
middle section of the Río Grande – impacted by the construction of dams 
upstream in New Mexico (Everitt 1993).  
 
On the Río Conchos, the literature suggests that unlike the middle section of the 
Río Grande, dams have not significantly affected the flood history. For one, the 
literature emphasizes that dams operating on the Río Conchos have not 
traditionally been used for flood control, but for temporary water storage and use 
(Collier 1996: 35). Thus, flooding has continued to occur downstream at the 
entrance to the Río Grande after construction of the dams, while the largest flood 
on record is estimated at 162,000 CFS in 1904 (Collier 1996: 36).  
 
Still, dams also obviously increase surface area and interaction between water 
and the atmosphere, leading to significant evaporation losses which would not 
occur at such high rates within rivers, reducing the overall flow of the river. 
Evaporation rates from CONAGUA show high evaporation rates over the last 10 
years at La Boquilla and Madero, although similar to other periods of low rainfall, 
such as the 1950s (see Figure 3.13).  
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Figure 3.13. Average Monthly Evaporation Values at Chihuahua’s Major Dams, 
1950-2005 
Note: Information not available for Madero Dam in 1988 and 1989.  
Source: CONAGUA, Gerencia Estatal Chihuahua, Information Provided to Author, 
September 2004 
 
Local farmers surveyed in Ojinaga and Delicias cited the sedimentation of the 
two dams providing water as one of the major causes for the lack of water 
available to water their crops (see Chapters Five and Six). Figures for the levels 
of sedimentation of the dams were not made available despite requests, but all 
local officials and farmers claim that sedimentation of the dams has occurred and 
insist that ongoing studies – never released – confirm this (Melchor Lopez, 
CONAGUA, Personal communication with author, October 2005). In fact, the 
supposed high sedimentation levels of Madero led farmers in the mid-1990s to 
press CONAGUA to increase the capacity of the dam even as no official study of 
sedimentation levels existed. Initially, CONAGUA had contemplated raising all 
dikes, cortinas and vertedores by six meters, but the cost was estimated at 200 
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million pesos, or about $20 million. In 1998, with funding of $30 million pesos 
from state, federal and user association help, a three-meter high inflatable 
“rubber dam” was added to the vertedores at Madero, increasing the capacity of 
the dam by 102 MCMs. (Ezequiel Bueno, CONAGUA, Delicias Irrigation District, 
2005). The action incensed U.S. farmers and politicians.  
 
“It was a problem between the two countries,” noted Genaro Sanchez Huerta, 
who works for FIRCO, a federal government agency which provides funding and 
technical assistance for agricultural and watershed projects in Chihuahua. “By 
satellite, the United States saw loads of water, but the base was full of sediment.” 
(Genaro Sanchez Huerta, FIRCO-Chihuahua, Personal communication with 
author, 2005). 
 
Another major impact of dams in Northern Mexico and the American Southwest 
is the impact on bank vegetation. In the lower Río Conchos, the impact of years 
of flooding followed by years of drought is apparent to local farmers (see Chapter 
Six and Luján 2004). The river actually changed course following the floods of 
the early 1990s in Ojinaga, setting a new path through sandy soils, and denuding 
the landscape.  According to local farmers, the floods also led to bank failure, 
apparently because the dry periods that have followed the flooding caused the 
banks above to be dry and be unable to support their weight. Essentially, the 
“angle of repose” becomes too great to be maintained (Knighton 1998: 113-118).  
Sandy islands in the Río Conchos have become common within the Lower Río 
Conchos Irrigation District and the denuded landscape has become lush with the 
invasive salt cedar Tamarix peralta. Luján, in a brief study of tamarisk invasion in 
the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District, found that average ages of Tamarisk 
were generally less than 10 years, and were most pronounced in the lower parts 
of the district (Lujan 2004). Some have at least suggested that the Tamarisk 
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“plugs” are a direct result of high levels of sedimentation, themselves produced 
by deforestation (Van Schoik et. al 2006).  
 
In conclusion, precipitation loss led to major changes in the operation of 
Chihuahua’s major dams during the 1990s, including shutting off winter irrigation, 
and the reduction of flood spill events. These changes in turn may have spurred 
further sedimentation and drying up of the rivers in the Río Conchos Basin, while 
the invasion of the Salt Cedar in the lower Río Conchos has led to an aggraded, 
braided river, less able to carry waters into the Río Grande.  
 
Thus, data at least partially supports the U.S. view that at least some of the low 
water inflows to the Río Grande during the 1990s and 2000s can be attributed to 
the impact of the dams and management decisions. The construction of Luis 
Leon helped Chihuahuan farmers as it reduced local flooding and provided 
storage for irrigation, but led to increased evaporation and lowered peak flows to 
the Río Grande compared with those periods prior to its construction.  
 
C. Water Use Changes 
 
When Texas Agricultural Commissioner Susan Combs marched to Washington 
on behalf of South Texas farmers in January of 2004, she came armed with 
recent reports from Texas A & M’s Center for North American Studies that 
claimed that “irrigated water use from surface and groundwater sources in 
Chihuahua more than doubled from 1980 to 1997 (CNAS 2003)” as well as 
reports from U.T.’s Center for Space Research, indicating the availability of 
surface water at Mexico’s northern reservoirs and suggested that Mexico had 
increased its application of irrigation water throughout the 1990s (CSR 2003; 
Rosson III, et al 2003). Mexico, Combs stated, and in particular Chihuahua, were 
stealing Texas’s water to engage in a major expansion of irrigated agriculture at 
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the expense of South Texas’s historically important farming community (U.S. 
Water News Online 2003).  
 
What does the actual Mexican data show over the last 15 years? Agricultural 
activities are by far the most important water resource activity in the basin. Other 
major users include hydroelectric – a non-consumptive use since most of the 
water flows back into the river –domestic use mainly for municipalities, livestock 
and industrial use, while upstream forestry and mining activities may also have 
hydrological implications, both for their direct and indirect use of water, as well as 
because of their impacts upon the geomorphology of the river. Similarly, tourism 
in the upper basin may play a role in increased water use in the basin.  
 
1. Agricultural water use 
 
There is not a single type of agriculture in the basin, but a variety of different 
individuals engaged in agriculture. Some farmers – such as those in the forested 
uplands of the Río Conchos and the high savannah mesas – depend upon 
rainfall, and are thus “temporal” farmers. (see Chapter Four).  
 
The largest farmers in the Río Conchos Basin rely on irrigation. These farmers 
may use individuals with wells, may be part of an Unidad de Riego (Irrigation 
Units), which distribute both groundwater and surface water to farmers, or form 
part of the larger Distritos de Riego (Irrigation Districts), which own and manage 
vast irrigation delivery systems, primarily from the major dams in the state which 
provide surface water for irrigation. Irrigation Districts are more organized and 




In addition, lands have different property regimes. Thus, many farm individual 
plots of land as private property, while others are part of an “ejido,” a product of 
the Mexican revolution. These farmers may have both their individual plot of land 
for farming as well as access to communal lands. Some farmers in the basin are 
part of indigenous “communities” which predate the ejido structure itself. Finally, 
some farmers are part of “colonos” and have individual plots which over time 
have become considered equivalent to private property.  
 
The Comision Nacional de Agua estimates that approximately 450,000 hectares 
in Chihuahua have been irrigated over the last several decades, including about 
230,000 in the Conchos Basin (see Table 3.5). The majority of cropland is found 
in smaller Unidades de Riego, although the three irrigation make up more than 
40 percent of total irrigated land in the watershed.   A small number of individual 
farmers also irrigate within the basin using groundwater.  
 
Table 3.5. Average Number of Irrigated Hectares in Río Conchos River Basin  
























Chihuahua 30,500 None No Irrigation 
District 
30,500 
Delicias 34,500 None 76,000 110,000 





4,900 1,400 10,700 17,000 
Río Florido 44,000 None 8,500 52,500 
San Juanito 250 100 No Irrigation 
District 
350 
Total Hectares 127,650 5,500 95,200 227,850 
Source: CONAGUA 1997: 5.1.22.f-1.  
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CONAGUA reports that there are 12,010 farmers registered as part of the three 
main irrigation districts. In any individual year, of course, some of these farmers 
will choose not to farm, either because they sell or rent their water rights or even 
land  to another farmer, because of sickness, or because they have even given 
up farming in the area for good. Some may have actually migrated from Mexico 
in search of other opportunities in the U.S. (see Chapter Five and Six). 
 
Table 3.6. Number of Farmers in Conchos Basin Irrigation Districts (Distritos de 
Riego) by Type of Property Regime 
 










Delicias Irrigation Distinct 5,009 4,500 9,509 
Bajo Río Conchos Irrigation 
District 
605 553 1,156 
Río Florido Irrigation District 470 875 1,345* 
Totals 5,871 5,745 12,010 
 
Note: * Includes about 300 farmers in the state of Durango.  
Source: CONAGUA, Características Generales del Distrito De Riego, 090 Bajo Río 
Conchos, January 15, 2004, and CONAGUA, Características Generales del Distrito De 
Riego, 005 Delicias, 2004,  and CONAGUA, Programa Hidraulico 1997, 5.1.2.f-1 – f-32. 
 
Between 55 and 60 percent of all surface and groundwater use in the Conchos 
Basin occurs in the three irrigation districts, with the other 40 percent used in 
Unidades de Riego or individual farms or ejidos. About 82 percent of all the water 
used in Distritos de Riego comes from surface water; in Unidades de Riego, on 
the other hand, only about 25 percent comes from surface water. Overall, the 
biggest water users in the agricultural sector are the farmers of the Delicias 
District, using some 50 percent of all water in the Basin.  
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Table 3.7. Historical Annual Water Use in the Distritos de Riego in the Conchos 






Surface Water  
Use 




Delicias 283 1,071 1,354 79% 
Bajo Río 
Conchos 
0 113 113 100% 
Río Florido 0 131 131 100% 
Total 283 1,315 1,598 82% 
Source: CONAGUA 1997: 5.1.2.-3 
 
Table 3.8. Historical Annual Water Use in the Unidades de Riego (Million Cubic 
Meters), 1995 




Surface Water  
Use 





Chihuahua 234 44 276 16% 
Delicias 267 45 312 15% 
Parral 27 94 120 78% 
Río Conchos 11 33 44 74% 
Río Florido 343 54 397 14% 
San Juanito 0 2 2 100% 
Totals 882 272 1,154 24% 
Source: CONAGUA 1997: 5.1.2.-3 
 
Yearly water use data in Chihuahua and the Río Conchos are incomplete. While 
the major irrigation districts keep very detailed statistics on water use and crop 
irrigation within the confines of the irrigation districts themselves, until recent 
changes, statistics only show water use originating from the major dams released 
to their canals and do not include water pumped directly from the river, or water 
from individual shallow or deep wells (Ing. Hernandez, Delicias Irrigation District, 
Personal communication with author, 2005). In addition, while some 40 percent 
of the crops irrigated in the Río Conchos basin do occur within the irrigation 
districts themselves, there has been significant development – both historical and 
recent – of irrigation outside the district in the Unidades de Riego, or 
URDERALES, and there is generally less complete water use information.  
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Moreover, SAGARPA – Mexico’s agricultural ministry – keeps detailed 
agricultural statistics at a different scale of measurement than CONAGUA. Thus, 
before 2001, SAGARPA generally kept statistics for the State of Chihuahua by 
Rural Development Districts, which did not always fall along municipal lines, and 
certainly not along irrigation district boundaries. After 2001, SAGARPA began to 
keep statistics at the Municipal Boundary unit, but again these do not necessarily 
correspond to Irrigation Unit or District boundaries, cutting across municipal 
boundaries. 
 
According to SAGARPA statistics, irrigated agricultural for the whole state 
decreased slightly during the time period from 1990 to 2005, although not as 
much as those highlighting the negative impacts of drought-like conditions have 
cited (see Figure 3.14). Thus, in the 1989-1990 period, the total number of 
hectares irrigated in the state was about 325,000, a total that would rise to 
400,000 hectares in the 1993-94 agricultural year. While the total amount of 
irrigated lands would drop in the 94-96 period, it rose again in 1996-97 to nearly 
390,000 hectares, and then fell slightly over the coming years. In 2003-2004, it 
rose back to about 375,000, certainly a decline from ten years earlier – some 
seven percent -- but an actual increase in irrigated lands from 1990.  
 
Beyond those summary totals, however, are some interesting trends. In general, 
the total number of irrigated lands during the spring and summer hovered around 
200,000, but the real change was found in winter crops and perennials – those 
needing watering the entire year. While total winter crops declined from a high of 
75,000 in the 1993-1994 period, by 2003-2004, the total had fallen by roughly 
half, to 37,000. Perennials, on the other hand, rose from roughly 100,000 in the 
state, to some 130,000 hectares by the  2003-2004 period, a stunning rise during 
a supposed water crisis.  
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Figure 3.14. Total Irrigated Hectares Planted, State of Chihuahua, 1990-2005 
 
Source: SAGARPA, Chihuahua State Office, 2005.  
 
The state totals obviously include substantial areas outside the Río Conchos 
basin, including irrigation districts in the agricultural valleys along the Río Grande 
outside of Ciudad Juarez, as well as areas heavily irrigated by groundwater in the 
Nuevo Casas and Janos Municipalities. A look at four agricultural areas which fall 
nearly entirely within the Río Conchos basin tells a similar story. Figure 3.15 
shows data from Rural Development District 013 (Delicias), Rural Development 
District 09 (Ojinaga, Coyame and Manuel Benavides), Rural Development 
District  06 (Cuauhtémoc) and Rural Development District 014 (Río Florido area). 
The trend is similar. Thus, while the total number of hectares irrigated with waters 
in the 1991-1992 period before the drought stood at 222,208 hectares, by the 
2002-2003 period, the total number of hectares irrigated that agricultural season 
had shrunk to 159,202 hectares, a 28 percent drop.  
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While roughly half the crops irrigated in 1992-93 were during the spring-summer 
season, a quarter in the winter and a quarter for perennial crops like alfalfa, 
pecans and apple trees, by 2003, about 55 percent were during the spring-
summer, about 35 percent for perennial crops and less than 10 percent for winter 
crops.  Thus, in both Chihuahua as a whole and in the four largest agricultural 
districts within the Río Conchos riverbasin, the trend is similar: a slight shrinkage 
of summer crops, a huge decline in winter crops and a substantial increase in 
perennial crops (See Chapters Five and Six).  
 
Figure 3.15. Total Irrigated Hectares in Four Agricultural Areas, Río Conchos 
Basin, 1990-2005  
 
Areas are comprised of the Cuauhtémoc, Delicias, Rio Florido and Ojinaga Agricultural 
Rural Districts.  
Source: SAGARPA, State of Chihuahua Office, Information Provided November, 2004.  
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In Delicias, the total amount of water released from diversion dams for surface 
water irrigation within the District closely followed the reduction in crop irrigation, 
with both reduced some 60 percent when the two time periods are compared. 
This is surprising given the obvious increase previously cited in perennial crops 
such as alfalfa and pecans, which generally require much greater amounts of 
water than do winter crops previously grown in the area. The reason is again that 
the data does not reflect the use of non-traditional forms of irrigation, like 
individual and communal well water. Additionally, the data may reflect some 
increase in efficiency in irrigation as irrigators made use with less water by 
irrigating more carefully than they did in pre-drought conditions and in some 
cases installing new technology. Similarly, in Ojinaga, when comparing the two 
periods, average cropland irrigated was reduced by 28 percent, while average 
water use declined 25 percent, indicating a slightly higher amount of water used 
per hectare. This again may reflect the growth in perennials – and in particular of 
alfalfa --  in Ojinaga (see Chapter Six).  
 
Table 3.9. Irrigation District Surface (Dam) Water Use and Irrigated Cropland in the 
Río Conchos Watershed in Pre-Drought and post-Drought Periods 
Irrigation 
District 





















7,300 145 3,800 80 










maize, winter wheat 
4,600 77 3,300 55 
Totals  96,900 1,657 39,400 655 
Source: CONAGUA 2000, Anexo 38 and CONAGUA, Information provided to Author, 
October 2005.  
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Surface water data from the irrigation districts is even clearer. The shrinkage of 
the Lower Conchos Irrigation – Ojinaga -- district over the last fifteen years has 
been substantial, while the Delicias Irrigation District – again only considering 
surface water – has endured an even more stunning contraction in total hectares 
irrigated (Figure 3.16 and Figure 3.17). These figures, however, present a much 
more dire experience than the reality. Thus, for the Delicias Irrigation District, it 
does not include a whole series of deep-well dams built by irrigation user 
association and individual farmers, nor does it include emergency shallow-wells 
built in the 1995 period when the dams were closed. It does not include water 
pumped directly from the Río Conchos, water diverted from the Río Conchos and 
even from the Río Grande in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District with small 
dams, nor the reuse of municipal wastewater. It is an incomplete picture. 
Figure 3.16. Total Irrigated Lands and Water Released to Lower Rio Conchos 
Irrigation District and Unidades de Riego Below Luis León Dam, 1990-2005 
 
Source: CONAGUA, Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District, information provided to 
author, 2005. 
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Figure 3.17. Total Irrigated Croplands with Dam Water and Total Water Releases 




Source: CONAGUA, Delicias Irrigation District, information provided to author, 2005.  
 
Water use figures on individual cropland from surface water also show that less 
water is being used per hectare compared to the early 1990s, but not at a rate as 
might be expected given the lack of access to water for individual farmers. In 
fact, water use per hectare actually increased  in the late 1990s as farmers chose 
to reduce total surface area but irrigate more for more productive crops like 
alfalfa, chile and pecans, but then declined in more recent years in part due to 




Just how many wells are currently in use in the Delicias District? In 2005, there 
were 144 “official” deepwells which are owned by the irrigation user associations, 
meaning they actually are used to deliver water to a number of farmers within the 
Modules making up the Irrigation Districts. These wells extract approximately 120 
million cubic meters of water per year. However, in addition to these “official” 
wells, CONAGUA reports another 755 individual wells, the vast majority of which 
have been dug in the last 10 years. In addition, there are 49 wells built for 
industrial or municipal use within the district boundary – most notably the City of 
Delicias – and some 16 private wells used mainly for rural domestic waters or for 
livestock (CONAGUA, Information provided to author, 2005). Not surprisingly, 
with the exception of some well data kept by the individual user associations, 
there is little overall data on water use from wells in the District.  
 
Because of the increasing use of groundwater to serve irrigation needs, some of 
the aquifers are being mined, leading to problems with salinity, arsenic and even 
in some cases heavy metals (see Table 3.10). The sudden increase in 
groundwater use in the mid-1990s led CONAGUA to declare “zonas de veda” or 
“prohibition zones” in four aquifers throughout the Río Conchos Basin in 2005, 
including those near Delicias, Camargo, Cuauhtémoc, and Jiménez (Vergara 
Gonzalez 2005: 5A). The prohibition means that new wells can not be dug in 
these agricultural areas, unless the producer purchases a water right from a 
preexisting well.  
 
In addition to the trends – greater use of groundwater and a change in crop 
production – between 2002 and 2005,  CONAGUA implemented two new efforts 
in its irrigation districts designed to reduce overall water use. First of all, 
CONAGUA has been implementing in all three Chihuahuan Irrigation Districts the 
water conservation measures outlined the project certified by the Border 
Environment Cooperation Commission in October of 2002, and codified in Minute 
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309, signed by both governments in 2003 (IBWC 2003; BECC 2002). These 
projects have led to millions of dollars being spent over the last three years in all 
three irrigation districts, with the expressed intent of saving water (see Table 
3.11).  Chapters Five or Six provide more detail on these programs, their 
effectiveness and farmers’ perspectives.  
Table 3.10. Major Aquifers of the Río Conchos Basin and Estimated Use 
Aquifer Total Average  
Annual Pumping  
in Mm3 
%Over-Exploitation 
(Above  Estimated 
Recharge) 
Bajo Río Conchos 8.9 Under-Exploited 
Los Lamentos 0.3 Under-Exploited 
Alto Río San Pedro 15 Under-Exploited 
Alto Río Florido 22 46% 
Chihuahua-Sacramento 125 127% 
Jimenez-Camargo 580 88% 
Parral-Valle de Verano 32 21% 
Tapaloapa-Aldama 66 19% 
Delicias-Meoqui 460 11% 
Source: CONAGUA, 1997 and CONAGUA, Caracteristicas Generales del Distrito de 
Riego 005, 2004).  
 
Table 3.11. Investments, Expected Volumes of Water Saved and Achieved in 








































$65 $42 91 28 NA 
Total $1,535 $962 1,044 396 NA 
Sources: IBWC, Minute 309, July 3, 2003; Comision Nacional del Agua, Gerencia 
Estatal Chihuahua, Residencia General Delicias and Residencia General Ojinaga, 2005.  
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The other program is known as PADUA – the  Programa de Adquisicion de 
Derechos de Uso de Agua (Water Rights Acquisition Program). First 
implemented in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District in 2003 as the 
“Desincorporation, Compaction and Tecnification of Areas en the Bajo Río 
Conchos Irrigation District 090” , the program has now become a national 
program in Mexico and its intent is, in the words of Lower Río Conchos Irrigation 
District manager Elías Calderón “to shrink the districts (Elias Calderon, Personal 
communication with author, 2005)” Under the program, CONAGUA negotiates 
with the farmers both individually and collectively to definitively sell their water 
rights back to the government in areas where economic, environmental and 
geographic realities have made irrigation of lands unviable 
 
In the first year of the program, over 640 water rights holder sold their rights to 
4,500 hectares – including 2,500 in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District 
alone, which is about 20 percent of its total area – thus losing any chance to 
irrigate those lands in the future. In return, they gained about $87 million pesos, 
or about $12,400 dollars per water right. (See Chapters Five and Six for more 
details).  
 
Table 3.12. Farmers, Hectares, Water Rights and Monies Expended under Water 
Rights Acquisition Program, 2004 
 
























394 2,222.22 26.3 5.28 $65.10 
2004, 
Ojinaga 
250 2,515 19.7 0 $32.2 
 




Source: CONAGUA, Irrigation District 090 and Irrigation District 005, Information 
provided to Author, 2005.  
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The data for agricultural water use are incomplete and at times contradictory. As 
Chapters Five and Six will show, it is apparent that while overall water use 
declined during the period – particularly from the dams themselves – there was 
likely a substantial increase in groundwater use as well as direct pumping of the 
river, which may have impacted baseflow. While water use likely increased on a 
per-hectare unit as farmers turned to higher water-demand crops, recent efforts 
aimed at water conservation and buy-back of water rights eventually led to 
overall reduction in both the total volume of water used and the per-hectare water 
use. Thus, the complexity of agricultural water use and crops irrigated in the 
Conchos River Basin belie a simplistic notion of either rapid expansion or severe 
curtailment, as were the common discourses from the two sides seeking a 
settlement to the U.S.-Mexico water dispute.  
 
2. Municipal/Domestic Use 
 
The other major water resource activity in the Río Conchos Basin that might 
directly impact river flows is the domestic use of water. Although precise annual 
data is lacking – due to huge water losses in domestic water systems and the 
lack of individual metering– CONAGUA estimates that domestic water use rates 
in the Conchos River Basin total between 260 to 300 liters per capita per day 
(about 70 or 80 gallons per day). Nonetheless, there is significant variation 
between social class, ethnicity and location in terms of water use.  
 
While municipal water use only makes up a relatively small percentage of total 
water use, over the last 10 years population in the basin has increased by some 
25 percent, and CONAGUA is conservatively assuming that it will continue to 
increase even more. Assuming a reduction in water loss from 30 to 25 percent, 
and significant water conservation efforts, for example, CONAGUA estimates 
that water demand in Chihuahua City will increase to 119 million cubic meters by 
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2020. Other cities with lower population growth will actually witness a decrease 
as conservation measures are adopted.  
 
Table 3.13. Water Demand in Major Cities in the Conchos Basin in Million Cubic 
Meters, 1995-2020 
City 1995 Demand 2020 Demand 
Chihuahua 95.7 119.0 
Hidalgo de Parral 11.4 14.2 
Delicias 19.2 17.3 
Camargo 7.3 6.6 
Jimenez 6.1 5.3 
Ojinaga 9.0 4.8 
Saucillo 2.3 1.9 
Source: CONAGUA 1997: 6.2.4 
 
These figures – the expansion of population and water use within the basin – as 
well as the use of groundwater by both municipalities and agricultural users, point 
to a potential conflict between the Conchos’s two main water user groups. Of 
most direct concern to farmers is the threat that the thirst of Chihuahua City 
might lead state and federal officials to convert Chihuahua’s irrigation dams into 
municipal supplies. During 2003, press reports began to surface that Governor 
Patricio Martinez wanted to feed Chihuahua’s burgeoning population and 
industrial sectors with a pipeline from Luis León Dam. When an initial study of the 
project indicated the cost of pumping water over two mountain ranges would be 
gigantic, the plans were quickly shelved. By 2005, as concerns about the sinking 
Chihuahua-Sacramento aquifer levels rose, a new project had emerged: piping 
water from the Boquilla or Francisco Madero Dams to the big city in the desert 
(Escobedo 2005: 4B).  
 
In fact, the agreements reached between CONAGUA, state officials, and farmers 
in the Irrigation Districts in 2003 about the modernization of the Irrigation Districts 
are helping pave the way for the possible transfer of water to the Capital City. 
The agreements state that 25 percent of the savings from water conservation will 
 161 
be used by CONAGUA “for the national interest.” (CONAGUA 2002; IBWC 2003) 
Clearly, the attempt to conserve water in the irrigation districts – while intended to 
increase flows to the Río Conchos and Río Grande as laid out in Minute 308 – 
was also intended to free up water for municipal uses. Thus, as in many 
watersheds throughout the world, the need for domestic supplies in the Río 
Conchos is causing both the government and others to figure out how to lower 
agricultural water use. Within the period of study, when no major reservoirs or 
major domestic supply projects occurred, and when cities continued to depend 
overwhelmingly on groundwater resources, it is unlikely that municipal water use 
impacted the Conchos’ flow to the degree that agricultural water use can and did. 
As a future issue, however, the increasing thirst of Chihuahua’s cities and 
industrial bases is very real.  
 
D. A Change in the Land? Land Management as the Cause of the Loss of 
River Water 
 
If water use changes during the last 10 to 15 years in the Río Conchos Basin 
witnessed some dramatic trends, many have posited that there have been similar 
changes in the use of land – which in turn influences water use through run-off, 
erosion and infiltration. In fact, a thesis began to emerge over the period that the 
cause of lowflows in the Río Conchos was due not only to an extended drought, 
but land use changes, including soil erosion, deforestation and desertification, 
leading to sedimentation in the dams and reduced flow in the river. Essentially, 
this thesis says, baseflow of the rivers has dried up as vegetation and porous 
soils have failed to capture rain. Instead, reduced rainfall has flown overland, but 
been filled with sediment from the vegetative-lessened soils.  
 
The twin culprits of these land use impacts are overgrazing by cattle and other 
livestock and deforestation. “We are causing desertification by overgrazing with 
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the resulting water and air erosion that carry millions of tons of sediment into the 
dams, lakes, and watering holes,” explained Genaro Sanchez Huerta, who works 
for the Chihuahua state delegation of FIRCO, a federal lending, grant and 
technology transfer agricultural agency. “Our lands are ending up in the dams, 
160 tons of earth lost every year on every hectare, taking away the useful life of 
our dams and lakes.” (Sanchez Huerta, personal communication with author,  
2005).  
 
In their introduction to a recent book on transboundary ecosystem management, 
Van Schoike, Lelea and Conner suggest that it was the deforestation in the upper 
basin that led to sedimentation of streams, creating an ideal habitat for invasive 
species – in this case a tamarisk plug in the Río Conchos -- and inhibiting the 
delivery of water to the U.S., a clearly subjective interpretation of the cause of the 
dispute (Van Schoik, Lelea and Conner 2006: xix). To be fair to the authors, the 
example is merely illustrative of how events in one watershed may have greater 
impacts on another and they are not attempting to “prove” this causality. But it is 
illustrative of the discourse that has emerged that deforestation is part and parcel 
of the cause of the Conchos’s low-flows. 
 
1. Ranching and Cattle  
 
Ranching and livestock have a long history in the State of Chihuahua, and were 
one of the principal drivers of the economy –along with mining -- from the time 
the Spaniards arrived in the late 1500s (Jordan 1957). Livestock raising, primarily 
on natural pasture in the central valleys and northwest regions of the state, was 
estimated to take place on 13.6 million hectares in 1995, about 55 percent of the 
total land area of Chihuahua. According to 2004 statistics from SAGARPA, today 
milk production from cattle ranks the State of Chihuahua 74h among all Mexican 
states, while meat production ranks sixth (SIAP 2005). In terms of total cattle, 
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however, the state only ranked 12th, however, well  behind states like Chiapas 
and Veracruz (IBID).  
 
There were large losses of cattle during the mid-1990s, as many ranchers 
slaughtered cows with the advent of the drought. The total amount of cattle in 
Chihuahua went from roughly 2.1 to 1.1 million between 1994 and 1996 
according to the agricultural ministry. Between 1996 and 2004, the number of 
cattle has risen slightly. In general, while the number of cattle for meat production 
has remained relatively steady since the mid-1990s – hovering around one 
million – the number of cows for milk production – as well as milk production itself 
-- has soared (see Figure 3.18).  
 
Figure 3.18. Meat and Milk Production and Number of Head of Cattle in Chihuahua, 
1990-2003 
 




The majority of cattle grazing do occur within the Río Conchos Basin, mainly in 
the central valleys in Camargo, Saucillo and Delicias, as well as around the 
capital city of Chihuahua. The Cuauhtémoc region is also an important region for 
meat production, and grazing is common in the high plains west of Cuauhtémoc 
and in the oak-juniper savannahs near Carichi and Cusihuiriachi (see Table 
3.14).  
 
Most cattle in the Delicias/Camargo area are associated with milk production, as 
major dairy operations such as Lecheros  Zaragoza  and Ganaderos Productores 
de Leche Pura (ALPURA), a national cooperative of milk producers, are found in 
the region. Data provided by the local Rural Development District shows a 
marked increase between 2001 and 2004 in the number of head of milk cattle 
and production as the region became one of Mexico’s major milk production 
centers, eclipsing to some degree the area found near Torreón (See Chapter 
Five).  
 
Table 3.14. Milk and Meat Production by Rural District, State of Chihuahua, 2004 
DDR 
 (Rural  
Development District) 
Total Meat Production 
(Tons) 
Total Milk Production 
(1000 Liters) 
Chihuahua Total 71,779 803,728 
Chihuahua 4,378 55,208 
Delicias 14,796 325,208 
Cuauhtémoc 31,859 207,574 
Ojinaga 896 664 
Río Florido  
(Jimenez) 
2,744 52,665 
San Juanito 1,275 353 
Source: Servicio de Información Agroalimentaria y Pesquera SIAP 2005. 
 
Moreover, Chihuahua has become specialized in exporting young cattle to the 
U.S., where they are fattened in U.S. pastures and cattle feeding lots.  Thus, in 
the 2004-2005 period, Chihuahua exported 28 percent of all head of cattle in 
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Mexico, including 66 percent of all female cattle and 25 percent of all male cattle 
(see Table 3.15). Ojinaga is an important chain in the production of meat, since 
the “Unidad Sanitaria de la Union Ganadera Regional de Chihuahua”  -- the 
stockyard from which cattle are inspected and exported to the U.S. – is located 
just a few kilometers east of the City. Thus, many of the cattle raised throughout 
the basin are trucked to the Unidad Sanitaria, where they are inspected by both 
Mexican and U.S. authorities before export (see Figure and Photo 26). Market 
forces, regulatory changes and the mad cow disease scare in Canada have led 
to ebbs and flows in the export trade (Dr. Vaca, Unidad Sanitaria, Personal 
communication with author, 2005). As a state, Chihuahua has continued to 
specialize in the production of young cattle and subsequent export to the United 
States. The increase in exported cattle has in part fed the expansion of alfalfa 
and sorghum raised by local producers in Ojinaga (see Chapter Six).  
 
Table 3.15. Total Number of Cattle Exported from Chihuahua, 2004 
 Number of Head Percentage of National 
Total 
Male Cattle 291,907 25 
Female Cattle 66,809 66 
Total 358,716 28.5 
Source: Servicio de Información Agroalimentaria y Pesquera (SIAP) 2005.  
 
While the data suggest there has been an increase in cattle production both for 
milk and meat in recent years, it is more difficult to draw the conclusion that 
erosion from cattle ranching has increased. For one, overall there has been a 
decrease in the total number of cattle, both within the state and within the basin, 
compared with 1994. For another, the increases that have occurred in the last 
few years have mainly been in the central valleys in large dairy operations, not 
along riverbanks or in hilly slopes where erosion might be more prevalent. More 
importantly, an increase in cows does not necessarily correspond to an increase 
in erosion and sedimentation of local rivers. In fact, many of the cattle produced 
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in Chihuahua are young and remain only short times on the land, before they are 
sent to the U.S. for fattening in feedlots.  
 
 


















Figure 3.19. Cattle Exported from Ojinaga Export Center, 2000-2005 
 
Source: La Estación Cattle Export Center, information provided to author, 2005.  
 
However, given that there is significant cattle grazing in the hills in the 
municipality of Cuauhtémoc, Carichí and Cusiriachi near the headwaters of the 
Río Conchos – some of it associated with deforestation --  as well as in the 
central valleys, grazing and destruction of native grasslands likely has impacts on 
local flow and sedimentation of the rivers and of the downstream dams, resulting 
in less water for agricultural use. Farmers living in the Municipality of Carichi, in 
the upper Río Conchos Basin, complain that overgrazing and subsequent 
erosion is common in the oak-juniper savannah hills that typify the region. 
Anyone visiting the area can see the erosional gullies along the dirt roads, 
creeping up into both cattle ranches and cropland. The question, however, is did 
this noted erosion increase substantially over the previous decades or is it part of 
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a common problem that has occurred over a longer period of time (see Photo 
3.11).   
 
In the more arid environment of Central Chihuahua and Ojinaga, cattle are found 
on the banks of the Conchos itself. There, cattle appear to prefer the riparian 
zones, leading to a more pronounced and localized impact. However, again it is 
important to note there appears to be a threshold at which grazing in riparian 
zones has a significant impact on bank sliding, erosion, loss of vegetative cover 
and channel morphology changes. Light or moderate grazing may have little 
discernible impact, depending upon the type of soils and vegetative covers 
(Trimble and Mendel 1995:  246).  
 
 
Photo 3.11. Erosional Gullies outside Carichi, Río Conchos Basin 
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“There is no regulation of overgrazing in Mexico,” noted “Pepe” Treviño, the 
Federal Delegate to Chihuahua for SEMARNAT, the federal environmental 
agency. “You can’t restrict or fine if ranchers go over the grazing coefficients that 
have been recommended, you can only try and raise the consciousness of the 
farmers.” (José Treviño, Personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
FIRCO’s Genaro Sanchez Huerta says the problem lies in the land tenure 
system itself, since most land is held by communal ejidos, not private property 
owners. In essence, the small indigenous farmers are in part to blame for the 
high levels of erosion.  
 
“The private property owner respects his land, but the ejido does not follow their 
own rules,” explained Sanchez simply (Sanchez Huerta, Personal 
communication with author, 2005). Reflected in this statement is a belief that 
“Common” areas such as those contained in most Mexican ejidos – where 
members are given a grazing right without specific individual borders --- will 
invariably lead to overexploitation over time. The “Tragedy of the Commons” 
thesis was developed and refined by Biologist Garret Hardin, who was concerned 
with the progressive ecological destruction of “common” property as population 
and institutional pressures cause humans to exploit and destroy nature (Hardin 
1968). As Chapter Four will show, however, the reality of what is occurring in the 
ejidos of the upper Río Conchos is considerably more complex than a simple 
case of “Tragedy of the Commons.”  
 
Nonetheless, whatever the reality, or despite the lack of regional studies, 
Chihuahua officials, environmentalists and others have begun promoting the 
notion that overgrazing – particularly in the highlands -- is the cause of oversilting 
of the dams and thus of reduced water flows to the United States.  
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As Chapters Five and Six will attest, however, a much more direct impact on 
water use in the Río Conchos basin has been the need to feed these cattle, 
necessitating a change in crop production toward corn (for feed as opposed to 
grain), alfalfa, rye grass and sorghum, with impacts on the total volume and per-




As with cattle grazing in the hills in the Municipality of Cuauhtémoc and Carichí, 
there is widespread concern that deforestation may be impacting downstream 
flow patterns in the Río Conchos. While no specific studies have been conducted 
region wide within the Río Conchos Basin on deforestation rates, a number of 
estimates suggest that significant areas of the Sierra Tarahumara have been 
deforested over decades. Studies suggest that while once nearly six million 
hectares covered Chihuahua with pine-oak forests, today only four million 
hectares remain. Thus, S.R. Felger and M. Wilson estimate that only 2 percent of 
the old conifer forests remain in the central region of the Sierra Tarahumara, 
while another study found that only 19 areas – about 0.61 percent of the Sierra’s 
original pine-oak forests – remained intact (Felger and Wilson 1995; J.M. 
Lammertink, Rojas-Tome et al 1997; Turner 2001). A more recent study using 
landsat images found a loss of 6.3 percent in forest cover over the last eight 
years in one area of Sierra Tarahumara, although another 1.7 percent of the total 
cover had been reforested (Turner 2001). While the three studies mentioned cite 
virtually the same causes of this deforestation -- demands for wood products, 
illegal cutting, conversion to agricultural and grazing lands and disputes over land 
titles -- the emphasis each author places on each factor is distinct. 
 
The deforestation thesis being spouted off by officials, and environmental 
organizations is similar to the thesis that cattle ranchers have increased erosion, 
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filling up Chihuahua’s dams. Deforestation – the cutting down of trees – in the 
upper Río Conchos, combined with frequent forest fires during the drought years, 
has denuded the landscape. With less trees, the vegetation is no longer 
capturing the rains–and releasing it back into the hydrological cycle through 
transpiration. Thus, reduced rainfall coupled with deforestation leads to further 
reductions in precipitation. Secondly, because there are no trees, rains are 
splashing off the denuded landscape, carrying soils, aggrading channels and 
generally stopping good flows. Finally, because the rains are running off, rather 
than infiltrating the earth, tributary baseflows have disappeared, and streams 
which once ran continually today are intermittent (Gadsden et al. 2003).  
 
There is of course a significant literature which suggests that deforestation can 
have serious impacts upon watersheds. By removing natural vegetative covers – 
through the agency of cutting, burning and grazing – deforestation accelerates 
erosion and sedimentation (Goudie 1982: 188). The higher supply of sediment 
supply generally leads to channel bed aggradations, which in turn leads to an 
increase in overbank flows. The increase in sediment load also has been 
generally associated with wider, shallower and less sinuous rivers (Knighton  
1988: 319).  
 
When President Vicente Fox entered office in 2001 as Mexico’s first president 
from an opposition party, one of his first major environmental program was the 
“National Crusade for Forests and Water,” (Cruzada Nacional por los Bosques y 
el Agua) a concentrated educational and programmatic effort to protect forested 
areas, reforest and reduce deforestation since most Mexican rivers begin in 
heavily forested mountains. In the press announcement announcing the program 
in March of 2001, the government cited the loss of 600,000 hectares per year of 
forested areas in Mexico, and deforestation was listed as a chief cause of 
reduced inflows to Mexican dams (Fox 2001).  
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While there was no citation given, the 600,000 hectare figure appears to be 
related to an annual 1997 study by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) (FAO  1997), which estimated deforestation rates between 
1990 and 1995 9 Changes in the 1997 Forestry Law led to a variety of new 
federal programs designed both to help forestry producers but also to increase 
funding for soil conservation and reforestation efforts throughout Mexico (see 
Table 27). In addition, in 2000, the government formed CONAFOR, the National 
Forestry Commission as a semi-autonomous agency to help set forest policy and 
implement programs in Mexico.  
 
Table 3.16. Major Forestry Programs in Chihuahua 
Name of Program Main Agency Responsible 
Program for Forest Development 
(PRODEFOR) 
CONAFOR – Comisión Nacional 
Forestal (National Forestry Commission) 
Program for Plantation Development 
(PRODEPLAN) 
CONAFOR  
Soil Conservation Projects CONAFOR 
Environmental Service Payments CONAFOR 
Hydrological Service Payments CONAFOR 
Mini-Watershed Planning FIRCO 
Source: CONAFOR, information provided to author, 2005.  
 
The focus on deforestation as a root cause of the Chihuahuan drought is not 
new. In the post-Second World War period, logging in the Sierra Tarahumara 
expanded due to demand from the U.S. for wood products, and new sawmills, 
permits for cutting and other facilities connected to the wood industry began to 
sprout up throughout the Sierra. A new forestry law was passed to try and control 
                                                
9 A more recent estimate by the FAO said that Mexico lost an estimated amount of 
395,000 hectares per year between 2000 and 2005 of primary forests and jungles (FAO, 
2005 Forest Resources Assessment). The 1997 FAO study said Mexico lost an average 
of 510,000 hectares per year, while a government document in 1995 gave 13 different 
deforestation rates ranging from 370,000 to 1.5 million hectares per year (Anon. 1995; 
Programa Forestal y de Suelo 1995-2000, Secretaría de Medio Ambiente, Recursos 
Naturales y Pesca, Mexico, pp.10-12 
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the sudden growth, but according to some, bribes and exceptions to the more 
stringent rules were frequent.  
 
Afterwards, according to Historian Fernando Jordan, politicians began to push for 
and enacted a prohibition against cutting, and even an end to the sawmill 
industry in the name of the forest. “Politically the measure was a great solution; 
economically, it was a crime,” he writes (Jordan 1956: 406; Author translation). 
Jordan continued: 
 
Along with the law came the great trick: they gave the press the 
scandalous and irresponsible news that Mexico was almost to the 
point of having no trees. Theories were invented and it was stated 
that the long drought was caused by, principally, the cutting down 
of trees” (Jordan: 406. Translation by author).  
 
With more than 7.5 million hectares of forests and jungles, Chihuahua has more 
forested lands than any other state and is second in total wood production from 
its forests, second only to its neighbor of Durango (Secretaría de Desarrollo 
Rural, Estado de Chihuahua 2004). Forests are harvested both by individuals, 
ejidos and – through contracts with individual land owners – by companies. Most 
forestry production – about 90 percent -- occurs on ejidal forestry lands in the 
State of Chihuahua (Guerrero et al, 2002: 7).  
 
Virtually all  of this production occurs in the Sierra Tarahumara. For example, in 
2003, 827 permits were issued in Chihuahua, authorizing the harvesting of a 
maximum of 2.5 million cubic meters of wood. The vast majority – some 700 -– 
and virtually all of the wood --  were authorized for ejidos and communities 
located in the 20 municipalities making up the Sierra Tarahumara (Secretaria de 
Desarrollo Rural, Estado de Chihuahua 2004). Within the four municipalities with 
significant forest resources in the Río Conchos River Basin, however, there were 
relatively few permits for forestry. Thus, in 1999, there were two communities in 
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Carichi, two in Nonoava and 56 in Bocoyna with forestry permits. In addition, 
since part of the Municipality of Balleza is within the Conchos River Basin, it is 
likely that some portion were within the basin as well (see Table 3.17). Thus, 
relatively little – legal – production has occurred in the actual rivershed itself, at 
least in the 1990s (Figure 3.20).  
 
 
Figure 3.20. Forestry Permits and Volume Authorized in State and Upper Conchos 
Watershed, 1993-1999 
 
Source: INEGI, Anuario Estadístico Forestal.  
 
In fact, beginning in the mid-1990s forest production in the pine-oak forests of the 
Sierra Tarahumara declined due to the peso crisis, weak domestic demand for 
wood and products, imports and inefficient forestry production methods 
(Guerrero, Kelly et al. 2002). Production picked up again in the late 1990s, 
reaching a peak in 2000, although recent years have seen a decline in total wood 
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production. Similarly, the number of “permits” to cut trees also increased in the 
late 1990s as did citizen complaints about the illegal cutting of wood throughout 
the Sierra. (Guerrero et al. 2002).  
 









No. of Fires Hectares  
Burned  
Balleza 104521 30 142529 57 2647 
Bocoyna 40261 50 125200 123 2093 
Carichi 65 2 577 NA NA 
Total Upper 
Conchos 144847 82 268306 180 4740 
Chihuahua 1,156,592 759 2,517,870 360  9,480 
 
Source: INEGI, Anuario Estadistico del Estado de Chihuahua, 1999, Seccion 
Silvicultura.  
 
For their part, CEISS, the drought research institute, spends much of its time 
examining the impacts of and the efforts to mitigate forest fires in the Sierra 
Tarahumara.  As previously mentioned, in their examination of the drought, they 
have argued that the biggest reduction in rainfall has been in the forested 
southwestern portion of the state, and that deforestation – whether from forest 
fires or logging -- may be one cause of the reduced rainfall (Gadsden 2003: 107).  
 
Similarly a number of high profile groups have made preservation of the Sierra 
Tarahumara and deforestation a major focus and cited it as a principle cause of 
reduced rainfall and flows. In the late 1980s, the Latin American arm of the World 
Bank in fact supported a major expansion of the forestry sector in Chihuahua and 
Durango, a loan that was actively opposed by local indigenous groups, many 
political leaders and environmental organizations from both Mexico and the U.S. 
(Randall Gingrich, Personal communication with author, 2005). From the Texas 
Center for Policy Studies in Austin, Texas, to the Chihuahuan-based Human 
Rights Commission (COSYDDHAC) to international groups like the Sustainable 
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Forestry Council, the coalition put international attention on resource use in the 
Sierra Tarahumara and on forestry policy. Their efforts eventually led to the 
cancellation of the bank loans in 1993 and the large-scale roads and sawmills 
supported by the project never occurred.  
 
“The World Bank loan, and the coalition of groups fighting it, led me to fall in love 
with the Sierra Tarahumara,” noted red-bearded US expatriate Randy Gingrich 
from his office in Chihuahua City. Once an Arizona native organizing conferences 
about the Sierra Tarahumara, Gingrich has gone on to become an active, and 
sometimes controversial figure in the effort to preserve the Tarahumara forests. 
Gingrich has been working with federal officials from the Comision Nacional de 
Areas Protegidas (National Protected Area Commission) to have portions of the 
Tarahumara forest declared a Biosphere Reserve, a controversial proposition 
which split communities and organizations fighting for land rights and better 
resource management in the Sierra in the period of study (Maria Teresa 
Guerrero, Personal communication with author, 2006). (See Chapter Four).  
 
Another group, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) opened an office in Chihuahua City in 
2001. WWF had actually begun work in Chihuahua in 1998 as part of the 
Chihuahuan Desert Program, but operating out of offices in Monterrey, according 
to current director Dr. Hector Arias.  
 
“But you can’t focus on the Chihuahuan Desert and the Río Conchos without 
looking at its headwaters and the forested areas,” he notes, and the group began 
to document factors leading to riverflow loss through a series of workshops, 
documents and programmatic work, such as its “Integrated Management Plan for 
the Río Conchos Basin.” The document was released to the public in a workshop 
in 2004, Arias said, and puts an emphasis on the need to reforest the 
headwaters to preserve flow (WWF 2004). He says that the focus must be on 
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creating livelihoods for ejidos that do not involve cutting down more forests, 
which has become a focus of WWF in Mexico for many years.  
 
Yet another group active in resource use issues in the Upper Río Conchos is led 
by Chihuahuan sociologist Maria Teresa Guerrero. Guerrero worked for years 
with COSYDDHAC, a human rights organization in Chihuahua City which has a 
history of working on land rights issues with the Sierra’s indigenous people. 
Guerrero also helped lead the fight over the World Bank loan, and says that 
deforestation is real, but is related to poor enforcement of forestry laws rather 
than an increase in actual production, and is not the root cause of the drought.  In 
June of 2000, in fact, on behalf of several indigenous communities, Guerrero 
helped COSYDDHAC file an Article 14 submission to the Montreal-based 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) arguing that in the Sierra 
Tarahumara, Mexican environmental authorities were not enforcing 
environmental and forestry laws designed to keep deforestation rates low. In 
January of 2006, the CEC released a factual record on Mexico's alleged failure to 
effectively enforce its environmental law by denying access to environmental 
justice to indigenous peoples of the Sierra Tarahumara, in the state of 
Chihuahua. 
 
The lawyer in Chihuahua responsible for putting the document together for the 
Article 14 submission was Agustin Bravo, who in 2005 was running his own 
organization called Fuerza Ambiental (Environmental Force). Fuerza Ambiental 
is one of the local organizations which have contracted with WWF to enact 
participatory natural resource use plans in the Upper Río Conchos (see Chapter 
Four). Bravo supports the view that enforcement problems and illegal logging are 
the main causes of deforestation, and not the traditional indigenous producers. 
(Agustín Bravo, Personal communication with author, 2005).  
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Thus, local producers, communities, ranchers, ejidos, environmental 
organizations and governmental agencies have put forward the argument that 
deforestation has been both a cause and a consequence of the low rainfall 
during the 1990s and subsequent hydrological drought. Figures from 
SEMARNAT suggest that after wood production fell in the mid-1990s, production, 
permits for logging and the total amount of volume authorized for logging has 
increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s, both in Chihuahua as a whole and 
within the four municipalities with some forestry activities. In addition, a large 
number of complaints involving natural resource use in forested ejidos in the 
Sierra Tarahumara were filed with environmental authorities during the 1990s, 
indicating conflicts over the legality and use of forested lands.  
 
In some sense, whether or not  the thesis that deforestation and soil erosion 
were major causes of low flows in the Conchos during the 1990s and 2000s is 
difficult to prove and it may not even be important. The discourses on nature and 
its destruction create their own truths in Chihuahua (Castree and Braun 2001, 
Ellis 1996). The concerns about deforestation and soil erosion as a cause and 
consequence of the Chihuahuan drought has led to increased federal and state 
funding for reforestation and soil conservation efforts, as well as increased 
attention from organization, communities and grass-roots organizing. These 
efforts range from efforts to declare the Sierra Tarahumara as a biosphere 
reserve to individual participatory projects to decrease soil erosion and increase 
water retention. These issues will be further discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
IV. Policy Changes: Resource Use goes to the Market? 
  
A final factor in Chihuahua’s Río Conchos Watershed during the 1990s was 
changes in natural resource management policies. Since the early 1990s, there 
has been a concerted effort to devolve power – both from the central state to the 
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state and local governmental structures – and also to replace public with private 
management and ownership of natural resources (Wilder 2006). This is apparent 
in major changes in land ownership, forestry and water rights policy.  
 
A. Land Tenure Policy 
 
One major change over the last fifteen years was the decision in 1992 for Mexico 
to fundamentally change its policy regarding land tenure. Mexico’s social 
ownership of land is contained in Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, which 
sets out both very specific limits to land ownership as well as recognition of 
communal lands embodies in agricultural communities known as Ejidos. In 1992, 
Mexico changed its long-standing rules for ejidos by reforming Article 27 of the 
Mexican Constitution as well as making changes to the Rural Development Law. 
The modifications to Article 27 allow ejido land to be rented or sold to individuals 
or to foreign or domestic corporations. If they chose and followed certain 
procedures, ejidatarios could sell their private forest holdings to whomever they 
chose, or be able to offer their land rights as collateral for loans (Guerrero et al. 
2002: 7). In addition, the changes allowed ejidos to set up associations open for 
investment by outsiders, and within forested areas, allowed private ownership of 
up to 20,000 hectares for development of forest management areas or forestry 
plantations, a large increase from the previous limit of 100 hectares (Guerrero et 
al. 2002: 7).  
 
In making these fundamental changes, the Carlos Salinas administration (1986-
1992) was seeking to both increase productivity on ejido lands, as well as attract 
direct investment from domestic and foreign corporations, in anticipation of 
signing a major free trade agreement with the United States (Cornelius & Myhre 
1998). To critics, however, these changes represented a betrayal of the 
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principles of the revolution and a naked land grab by the country’s wealthiest 
citizens, and potentially by foreign corporations as well.  
 
Despite dire warnings, in Chihuahua at least through 2005, Article 27 did not 
result in a giant privatization of ejido lands, but a lengthy process whereby ejidos 
could choose to participate in changing land management. In Chihuahua, the 
state has been held up to the rest of the nation as exemplary in the 
implementation of the land reforms embodied in the 1992 change. Under 
PROCEDE – literally El Programa de Certificacion de Derechos Ejidales y 
Titulacion de Solares (Program of Certification of Ejidal Rights and Titling of 
Household Lots) -- every agricultural community and ejido with social property 
has been given the opportunity to measure their lands, title them, and if they 
wish, privatize them. The efforts by the various state and federal agencies to 
“modernize” ejidos through the PROCEDE process has led to the fear among 
some that small farmers and livestock raisers have been hoodwinked to privatize 
lands, making them more susceptible to selling to larger farmers or other 
interests (Maria Teresa Guerrero, CONTEC, personal communication with 
author, 2005).  
 
“We did not object to determining the boundaries of ejidos, or even titling 
individual household lots, but to put subsistence indigenous farmers in the land 
speculation business is a recipe for disaster,” noted Guerrero. “It may be an 
appropriate process for urbanized ejidos near Chihuahua City, but in the Sierra it 
can tear communities apart.” (Guerrero, personal communication with author, 
2005).  
 
Initial figures from the Chihuahua office of the Federal Agrarian Reform show that 
PROCEDE has led to titling of individual homes and crop areas, but for the most 
part not communal lands. For example, out of 983 communities with “social 
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lands” in the State of Chihuahua, including 907 ejidos and 76 agrarian 
communities, 854 entered the PROCEDE process in some form or another by 
September of 2005 (Reforma Agraria 2005).  However, there was a wide 
variation among these 854 communities about how “far” they went toward 
privatization. Thus, only a handful chose what is called  “dominio pleno” – where 
the individual household lots, plots of cropland and communal lands are all 
certified, measured and titled, and thus available for direct sales to others, 
including “outsiders.” Out of those 854 communities that had entered PROCEDE, 
only 36 sought and had received “dominio pleno” as of September of 2005, 
although several more were somewhere in the process. Virtually all of those 
seeking “dominio pleno” were located near major city centers like Delicias, 
Chihuahua and Ciudad Juarez and thus facing pressure for land speculation and 
urbanization.  
 
Indeed, the attempt to “modernize” the ejido structure in some cases has actually 
led indigenous ejidos to cement their support of the ejido structure. Many ejidos 
and agricultural communities in the Sierra have chosen not to participate, while 
others have chosen only to measure their physical boundaries, and perhaps their 
individual household lots, but not to divvy up either their agricultural or communal 
lands among individual plot owners and thus more easily transferred to outside 
forces (Father “Nacho,” personal communication with author, 2005). Still, as the 
case studies will show, it is also apparent that many small farmers with social 
lands have legally or otherwise sold both their individual plots and  communal 
land rights in response to  economic difficulties, including access to water and 
lack of rainfall. Rather than a case of the land use changes tied to Article 27  
directly impacting drought or low-flows, this slight tendency toward break-up of 
ejido land and privatization can be seen as more of a consequence of 
urbanization, changing policies, poor farming conditions and low access to water.  
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B. Water Law 
 
In addition to land reform changes, Mexico’s water law has also seen 
fundamental changes over the last 15 years. While both surface and 
groundwater are state property, the system for granting individual water rights to 
farmers, cities and other interests has in general increased the power of water 
right holders over the central authority. For example, Mexican municipalities have 
been charged with providing water supply to its citizens since a 1983 change to 
the Mexican Constitution. The change has meant individual municipalities have 
been involved in planning, building and operating municipal water supply. 
Following changes to the National Water Law in 1992, in fact, some 
municipalities have also privatized municipal service to contract their water 
management responsibilities to subsidiaries of transnational corporations, 
although this had not occurred in the municipalities of the Rio Conchos Basin 
(Wilder 2006).  
 
On the agricultural front, CONAGUA began to cede control of irrigation use to the 
irrigation districts themselves through long-term water right concessions. While 
farmers had participated previously in the control of water through an association 
known as a Sociedad Rural Limitada – Limited Rural Society -- the new law led 
to the formation of much smaller associations known as Módulos, or Modules. 
Rather than one large concession covering an entire canal, each “Módulo” was 
given part of the water right concession, and the Módulo User Association given 
significant control over how to distribute the resource to its users by hiring staff,  
holding elections, distributing water and collecting payments. All of the Módulos 
together now help form the SRL, which ensures that no one geographic region of 
the irrigation district controls the SRL itself. In the Río Conchos Basin, these 
changes were swift, with the Delicias Irrigation District the second district in the 
country to cede control to the Water User Association in 1993, only a year after 
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the National Water Law changes were made, while the Lower Río Conchos 
Irrigation District made the transition in 1995 to separate water user associations. 
(CONAGUA 2004a, 2004b).  
 
Since the federal government has ownership and jurisdiction over virtually all 
surface water and groundwater, CONAGUA is charged with issuing permits – 
including both concessions to private interests and assignments to governmental 
entities – for water use. However, in many areas the hydrological and current 
water use data needed to determine water availability may not exist, be 
insufficient or unreliable (Kelly 2001: 21). Mexico’s water rights registry is still 
incomplete and inconsistent, although it has been greatly improved with funding 
from a World Bank loan. The World Bank gave the loan to help Mexico have an 
accurate water rights registry, which could presumably help with the development 
of a water rights market.  
 
Thus, recent legal and policy changes led to a more privatized system of water 
use permits, and decentralization of water management, with the potential 
opportunity for buying and selling of these permits and concessions.  As 
Chapters Five and Six will demonstrate, in part because drought conditions made 
water availability that much more important, these changes helped to concentrate 
control over these resources in the hands of larger farmers with better access to 
credit and markets and potentially to grow crops such as alfalfa and pecans that 
require more water. Still, the major change in the Delicias Irrigation District in 
terms of water use was the switch to groundwater usage after 1995 for many 
farmers, which likely did impact river baseflows through the use and exploitation 
of alluvial aquifers.  
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C. Forestry Law 
 
Mexico began regulating its forested lands and forestry sector in 1884 during the 
reign of Porfirio Diaz (Weaver 2000: 2). During this period, major concessions 
were given to large U.S. interests to cut old-growth timber in the forests of 
Chihuahua and Durango (World Bank 1995: 31). In 1960, new reforms 
decentralized services and agencies to a regional level and relied on better 
trained foresters. The 1986 Forestry Law replaced the parastatal companies with 
private groups known as UCODEFOs – Unidades de Conservacion y Desarollo 
Forestal – while strengthening regulation of the forestry sector and attempting to 
protect the environment from its potential impacts (Environmental Law Institute 
1998: 43). Despite these efforts, and in keeping with the times, the forestry sector 
complained the law was overly burdensome and actually put Mexico at a 
competitive disadvantage. Indeed, forestry production diminished by 22.7 percent 
between 1986 and 1991, while  imports of cellulose and other forest products 
increased exponentially (Guerrero et. al 2002).  
 
In 1992, a new Forestry Law deregulated many of the controls and permits of the 
1986 Law, leaving the “Forestry Management Plans” as the main mechanism  for 
most forest projects. For example, the 1992 Law deregulated the transportation 
of forest goods, and the activity was no longer controlled by documentation 
known as “Guias Forestales.” Mexican authorities blame these changes – 
specifically the loss of documentation of the Guías Forestales – as making 
documentation of wood production virtually impossible and potentially increasing 
illegal logging during the 1990s (PROFEPA 1998).  
 
In 1997, Mexico again reformed its Forestry Law, reestablishing documentation 
and control of activities such as harvesting, transport, storage and processing. 
Still, many of these rules to implement these changes were not adopted by 
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individual states until 2000, as is the case in the State of Chihuahua, and critics 
contend that until then, illegal logging was widespread in the Sierra Tarahumara 
(Guerrero et al 2002: 10). In addition to these changes, the 1997 plan also 
created the new Program for Forest Development (PRODEFOR) – for social 
forestry -- and the Program for Plantation Development (PRODEPLAN) – for 
larger scale private timber crops --  which provided government subsidies for the 
production of wood from natural forests and commercial plantations. While 
PRODEFOR is active throughout Chihuahua, only a few companies have 
attempted to use PRODEPLAN start large-scale plantations, such as Christmas 
tree or eucalyptus plantations, most of which have had limited success.  
 
Thus, changes to the Forestry Laws has emphasized increased private 
ownership and management of forestry resources through increasing the amount 
of land individuals can own and through the creation of plantations. Still, the law 
also continued to emphasize the social ownership of forested lands, using the 
“Forestry Management Plans” as a means to develop “sustainable” harvesting, 
and creating a new government agency – CONAFOR – and new government 
programs to support both harvesting and reforestation efforts. Chapter Four will 
look at some of the efforts of local communities to use these tools to improve 
land management practices in the upper catchment area of the Río Conchos 
watershed.  
 
VI. The New Internationalism: NAFTA and Beyond 
 
Someone once said that no man is an island, and it stands to reason that neither 
is any place. Any study of space and place must consider the connection to 
outside economic forces (Massey 1993). Chihuahua – located just south of 
Texas and New Mexico – is of course inextricably connected to its neighbors to 
the North. Even before “Pancho” Villa used the border in a cat and mouse game 
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with Porfirio Diaz federales at the beginning of the 20th century, goods, services 
and people crossed the Texas - Chihuahua border. Indeed, leading U.S. 
industrialists owned ranches and forested lands in Chihuahua, helped build the 
first railroads which crisscrossed the state and invested in new gold and other 
metal mines. Following the Mexican revolution, thousands of Chihuahuan 
farmers came legally to the U.S. to work in the Braceros program and indeed 
many of the first farmers of the Delicias Irrigation District were ex-braceros sent 
packing following the Great Depression.  
 
Still, perhaps no change has been as dramatic as the opening of the Mexican 
economy to imports and investment from the U.S. and the world over the last 20 
years. Beginning with Mexico’s incorporation into GATT – the Generalized 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – in 1986, their admittance to the World Trade 
Organization, and generally the leading role internationally the last three 
administrations have taken in calling for a “neoliberal” free market economy, has 
led Mexico to “integrate” their economy with the U.S. and the world. Indeed, 
Mexico has often served as a poster child for other developing nations to open 
up their economies and reduce government subsidies of productive activities 
(Gallagher 2004).  
 
A final piece of the puzzle of the changes over the last 15 years has been 
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, approved by 
Mexico, Canada and the U.S. in 1994. A managed trade agreement more than a 
truly free trade agreement, most analysts agree that the agreement has led to 
both winners and losers for major agricultural sectors of Mexico and the United 
States (Gallagher 2004) 
 
NAFTA was the centerpiece of President Carlos Gortari’s (1988-1994) efforts to 
open up the Mexican economy to investment and lower tariffs among the U.S., 
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Canada and Mexico. The early years of NAFTA were not well received by many 
Mexicans. Citing NAFTA as the final straw, on January 1, 1994 – the day that 
NAFTA went into effect -- masked gunmen in Chiapas appropriated the name of 
Emilio Zapata, calling themselves Zapatistas, and led a brief battle with the 
Mexican army. Of more immediate impact, however, was a major financial crisis 
which caused incoming President Ernesto Zedilllo (1994-2000) to devalue the 
peso as he stepped into office. Overnight, millions of small and large farmers, 
businesses and residents were left holding loans they could not repay, thousands 
of businesses went under, and a movement of farmers, household owners and 
small businesses in debt arose as part of the  “El Barzon” movement, which has 
sought forgiveness or reduction of large debts owed to both state and private 
banks. The lack of credit for agriculture is cited continually as an obstacle to 
continued investment in fields, according to farmers in Chihuahua (Reed, 
Chihuahua Land & Water Use Surveys, 2005).  
 
The agricultural sectors of both countries have been especially sensitive to 
changes related to NAFTA according to recent reports (Martinez Rodriguez and 
Reed 2002; Nadal 1999). The Agreement has meant a gradual opening of 
Mexican grain markets to North American exports and an opening of United 
States markets to Mexican fruit and vegetable exports. While the ultimate 
impacts of NAFTA might not be felt until the tariff elimination process ends in 
2009, evidence points to a growing disparity between Mexican and U.S. farmers 
in the production of wheat and corn, and a growing dependency on U.S. markets 
for Mexican export crops. 
 
At the national level, NAFTA gradually reduced tariffs and quotas on imports of 
corn into Mexico, allowing more corn from the United States to enter Mexico 
without tariff duties. In fact, following the peso devaluation, and reductions in 
production, Mexico actually sped up the imports of corn in 1996. While Mexican 
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policy toward corn imports has gone through several phases, under NAFTA, by 
the year 2008, corn quotas and tariffs are to be eliminated.       
 
An analysis of Mexican corn production shows that in terms of grain production 
for human consumption there was a significant decrease in the number of 
hectares planted and total production between 1994 and 2000, suggesting that 
some growers could not survive the new open market. Yet by 2004, production 
had actually increased significantly even as the number of hectares in production 
stayed relatively stable. In addition, production for feed – for animals – actually 
increased substantially between 1994 and 2004. In essence, domestic corn 
production levels increased slightly for both grain and feed, but not nearly as 
much as total demand for consumption. Imports have risen to react to the 
demand, growing from 3.1 million metric tons in 1994 to 5.6 million metric tons in 
2004 (Table 3.19).  
 
Table 3.18. Corn Import Quotas and Actual Tons Imported from the United States 
without Tariffs and with Gradual  Tariff Reduction, 1994 – 2008     
Year Tons from U.S. With No 
Tariffs 
Tariff Ad-Valorem after 
Quota 
Actual Imports  
from U.S. to 
Mexico  
1994 2,500,000 206.4 3,058,148 
1995 2,575,000 197.8 2,853,699 
1996 2,652,250 189.2 6,314,387 
1997 2,731,817 180.6 2,566,264 
1998 2,813,772 172.2 5.247,763 
1999 2,898,185 163.4 5,068,619 
2000 2,985,131 145.2 5,146,666 
2001 3,074,685 127.1 5,592,398 
2002 3,166,925 108.9 5,326,755 
2003 3,261,933 90.8 5,589,645 
2004 3,359,791 72.6 5,613,794 
2005 3,460,584 54.5 5,841,835 
2006 3,564,402 36.3  
2007 3,671,334 18.2  
2008 Free 0  
Source: FIRA, Development Opportunities for Mexican Corn; Informative Bulletin 
Number 309;  Mexico, October 1998; and FATUS, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the 
United States. Foreign  Agricultural Trade of the United States Database. Available at 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/ustrade/.     
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26.2% 18.93% 106.50% 35.75% -8.61% 87.16% -6.83% 83.57% 
Source: Sistema de Información Agropecuaria de Consulta (SIACON); FATUS, Foreign 
Agricultural Trade of the  United States. Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States 
Database. Available at  http://www.fas.usda.gov/ustrade/ 
 
Analysis shows that economic liberalization has had the greatest impact on corn  
production in northern Mexican states (Nadal 1999; Gallagher 2004; Martinez 
Rodriguez and Reed 2002). While the traditional grain production states like  
Oaxaca and Chiapas have continued and even increased corn production, 
Chihuahua, Sonora and  Sinaloa have seen a strong shift away from corn and 
sorghum and toward the  production of new crops. Given the low prices paid for 
basic grains, the high cost of irrigation to grow corn and  other grains in the arid 
North and the increased competition with nearby subsidized United States 
producers, this shift is not surprising. Essentially, larger farmers who depend 
upon water inputs through irrigation have switched to other crops, or chosen to 
grown corn only for feed, rather than to sell corn to local tortilla factories (Nadal 
1999). 
 
In fact, while corn production has remained relatively resilient – in part because 
of a switch to corn for feed – other basic grains have seen much greater 
reductions in production and areas planted. Thus, between 1990 and 2004, 
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unmilled wheat imports rose from approximately 360,000 to more than 2.8 million 
metric tons, while soybeans rose from 830,000 thousand tons to 2.8 million 
metric tons over the same 14 year period. Sorghum has, on the other hand, seen 
much more varied imports, and current level imports are actually lower than pre-
NAFTA levels. (U.S. Department of Agriculture, FATUS Database, 2005).  
 
NAFTA itself is of course only one factor in the increase in imports of basic grains 
and feeds from the U.S. to Mexico, but there is little doubt that at least in the 
years following enaction of NAFTA, Mexican production of corn, wheat, soybeans 
and other beans fell, and Mexican farming associations were quick to blame 
NAFTA. In Chihuahua, new farmer associations like the Frente Campesino 
Democrático believes NAFTA is one of the principle causes of the loss of farming 
in Chihuahua and throughout Mexico (Mario Lerma, Frente Campesino 
Democrático, personal communication with author, 2004).  
 
“NAFTA was intended to gut the Mexican campesino, to move the bean and corn 
producer off the land,” explained the Frente’s Mario Lerma. “Local corn 
production was replaced with corn imports at lower, subsidized prices which has 
helped the tortilla maker but not the farmer.” (Lerma, personal communication 
with author, 2004).  
 
While overall the number of hectares of corn has declined slightly over the 
period, the largest declines have been in irrigated hectares for corn grain, even 
as corn feed actually rose in the number of hectares planted (see Figure 2.23). 
Similarly, while bean hectares did decline substantially, the biggest declines are 
in irrigated lands, while winter wheat has nearly disappeared from the state. 
Thus, the fundamental shift in Chihuahua away from winter crops like wheat may 
be due both to the decision to close the irrigation dams in the winter months, but 
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also to the difficult competitive environment faced by wheat farmers with the 
sudden importation of vast quantities of low-cost wheat. 
 
As the case study chapters shall show in more detail, one of the factors in the 
increased use of high-water crops in Chihuahua was the loss in market power of 
some lower water use crops like corn, sorghum and winter wheat.  
 
Figure 3.21. Total Hectares Planted in Corn, Beans and Wheat, Chihuahua, 1990-
2004 
 





This chapter examined changes that had occurred over the last fifteen years in 
terms of flow, rainfall, dam management, water use and land use, based both on 
data and perception by various interested parties to the dispute over the low 
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flows of the Río Conchos. The chapter found that data from both the Conchos’ 
outflow at the Río Grande, as well as several hydrological stations along the 
mainstem, support the view that flow in the Conchos witnessed huge decreases 
in riverflow, as well as reductions in inflows into Chihuahua’s major dams. These 
declines were particularly pronounced in winter months. Mexican academics and 
institutions support the view that the hydrological drought was due primarily to a 
climactic drought. A look at rainfall data found that reduced rainfall  was a major 
factor in these reduced flows,  yet the lowflows over the past ten years are much 
reduced compared to other historical periods when drought impacted the Río 
Conchos. 
 
The brief analysis also found that dam management – and the specific decision 
to only provide water to farmers in Delicias during the spring and summer 
irrigation seasons and not the winter – has also been an important factor in the 
change in river flows. Thus, the climactic drought led to political decisions that in 
turn helped cement a hydrological drought. The decision has changed flow rates 
and curves in various areas of the Conchos itself, leading to reduced flows, peak 
flows, and even changes in timing of flows. At the same time, on at least three 
occasions, Mexico did release waters to help comply with the 1944 Water Treaty 
from the Luis León Dam. Thus, when examining drought and hydrological flows, 
it is of course necessary to examine management decisions made by natural 
resource managers.  
 
Furthermore, a look at water use and irrigated crops within the Río Conchos 
River basin’s major users – farmers – reveals a much more complex picture than 
either side presented during the discourse over water use in Chihuahua and the 
U.S. –Mexico water dispute. For example, U.S. farmers and officials – armed 
with reports by Texas universities and academic institutes – argued that 
Chihuahua increased their irrigation of lands with “their” water, while Chihuahua 
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officials and CONAGUA, the national water commission, showed quite different 
data, showing a sharp decline in irrigated acreage. Nonetheless, data from both 
CONAGUA and SAGARPA reveal that while there was a slight decrease in 
irrigated agriculture over the last fifteen years in Chihuahua as a whole, there 
was a substantial decrease in acreage irrigated by Chihuahua’s major dams 
confirming the view that Mexican farmers were impacted by drought. However, 
by looking at only surface water use coming directly from the dams, the giant 
shrinkage in water use and irrigated cropland between the pre-“drought” and 
post-“drought” period was exaggerated. Data from SAGARPA in four agricultural 
areas within the Río Conchos Basin – including the three main irrigation districts -
- revealed a more complex trend, with a spiked decline in winter crops, a 
substantial decline in summer crops and a substantial increase in perennials. 
Thus, both the Mexican contention of reduced water use and the U.S. contention 
that green areas – i.e. perennial crops like alfalfa and pecans -- within Chihuahua 
were increasing --  are supported by the data. The missing data piece appears to 
be the large-scale shift from surface water to groundwater which occurred over 
the period of study, a view that is supported and explained more thoroughly in 
the case study chapters.  
 
In addition, the chapter outlined arguments being made by Mexican and U.S. 
environmental organizations and some officials that erosion from livestock and 
deforestation were major factors in the reduced flow. Both the number of cattle 
as well as wood production fell in Chihuahua and the upper Río Conchos Basin 
in the mid-1990s, but has risen slightly since, in partial support of these 
arguments. However, the discourse about sedimentation and deforestation has 
taken on a life of its own, as there has been a concentrated effort by 
organizations, communities and governmental agencies to work with 
communities to “improve” agricultural and livestock management practices, as 
well as reforestation projects.  Thus, whether or not the evidence supports the 
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view that deforestation and expansion of cattle farming and ranching in the upper 
catchment of the basin impacted flows downstream, this view has been seized 
upon by a variety of interests to push more “sustainable” land management 
practices at a variety of scales. This is not dissimilar as what has occurred 
throughout the world, with upstream farmers and loggers in part blamed for the 
problems downstream (Blaikie and Muldavin 2004). 
 
Finally, the chapter outlined some of the legal, political and economic changes 
over the last 15 years which may also have impacted natural resource 
management issues and thus the flow of the Río Conchos. Thus, changes to 
Mexico’s Article 27 of the Constitution and corresponding changes to the Land 
Reform Law has led to the possibility of privatization of Mexican communal and 
agricultural lands through a process called PROCEDE, though initial analysis 
does not suggest a whole scale change in natural resource use.  
 
Similarly, changes to both the forestry and water laws have led to a more market-
oriented focus for forestry production and water rights within the irrigation 
districts. Specifically, the 1992 National Water Law decentralized water 
management from CONAGUA to individual geographically-linked Water User 
Associations within irrigation districts. Finally, the chapter noted that the drought 
and lower flows to the Río Grande occurred within the context of major economic 
changes in the agricultural sector in part related to changes in tariffs, quotas and 
investment as part of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and that these 
economic and policy changes were perhaps the major reasons for changes in 
crop production, not the changes in access to water resulting from drought-like 
conditions.   
 
Thus, the analysis of low-flows contained in this chapter reveals a complex tale 
of a myriad of causes that contributed to the conditions, as well as how differing 
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interest groups chose to emphasize those causes differentially and how they 
communicated that through discourse. The case studies that follow better explain 
the actual practices of local farmers in Chihuahua in three distinct areas as they 
reacted – and perhaps contributed to – the drought-like conditions and changed 
economic circumstances of the study period.  
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Chapter Four:  Mountain Voices 
 
The Tarahumar of Chihuahua, Mexico, constitute perhaps the most 
important remnant of the semiagricultural people who inhabited the 
northern portion of the Sierra Madre Occidental and its eastward 
plains in Chihuahua when Tarahumar number approximately 
50,000, and most of the Indians have not been integrated into the 
mainstream of Mexican cultural life. Hence, these Indians are 
worthy of serious study, not only because their way of life must 
inevitably be altered by completion of the railway from Chihuahua 
to the west coast through the Tarahumar habitat, but also because 
of present efforts of the Mexican government to bring the Indians 
into the mainstream of Mexican cultural development (Pennington 
1963:  preface).  
 
“Where there is forest, there is rain; where there is no forest, there 
is no rain”  -- Farmer in El Consuelo, Municipality of Carichí, 
Survey, 2005.  
 
Romúrachi desciende hacia todos lados. Es el “techo” de la Sierra 
Madre de Chihuahua… Romúrachi, situado a medio longitud, es la 
major atalaya para ver, a ojo de pájaro, el reino de las coníferas y 




Everyone these days, it seems, wants a piece of the Sierra Tarahumara. The 
pine-oak forest and oak-juniper savannah mainly situated in the State of 
Chihuahua is home to endemic trout, bird and vegetative species, which peaks 
the interest of  “conservationists” – Mexican and international alike (Alcalá 2002; 
Arriaga et al 2000; Felger and Wilson 1995; CEC 2001; WWF 2002; Guerrero et 
al. 2002). The presence of differing cultures, mainly represented by the 
Tarahumara – or raramuri – indigenous peoples, sparks the interest of human 
and indigenous rights groups (Pennington 1963; Guerrero 2002; LaRochelle 
2003).  And it is also serves as the headwaters – the birth – of six different rivers, 
including the Rio Conchos,  which become important sources of water for 
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agricultural interests in Chihuahua, Sonora, Sinaloa and Texas (Jordan 1956; 
Schmandt 1993; WWF 2004). Finally, as a region still looking for the next great 
bonanza, government and development interest in tourism –including communal  
and ecological tourism -- has been part of a major effort over the last fifteen 
years (Secretaría de Desarrollo Rural 2004).  All of these different interests – 
sometimes at odds sometimes in congruity – involve a discussion of natural 
resource use in the forests, agricultural lands and cattle pastures making up the 
region. The chapter reveals that this discussion was sharpened by the dispute 
between the U.S. and Mexico over reduced flows into the Rio Grande as different 
interests search for the causes and solutions to the water payment crisis.  
 
This chapter examines natural resource use – both discourse and practice -- 
among agricultural farmers in several communities in the Municipalities of 
Bocoyna and Carichí which serve as the headwaters to the Rio Conchos 
watershed in the context of these new identified needs of the Sierra – as 
biological reserve, tourism enclave, preserver of culture and catcher of water for 
the entire Rio Conchos watershed, and its thirsty neighbors to the north.   
 
Following a brief description of the methodology utilized, the chapter begins with 
descriptions of some of the communities in Bocoyna where the Rio Conchos 
begins and the attempt by some organizations to influence natural resource use 
and management, as well as the responses by the local communities. After a 
brief discussion of the larger attempt to create a “Biosphere Reserve” in both 
Bocoyna and Carichí and several other municipalities, the chapter than turns to 
communities within Carichí, the implementation of soil conservation and other 
projects, and survey results among local farmers about resource use. Finally the 






Field research for this chapter occurred during 2003, 2004 and 2005. 
Methodological techniques included open-ended interviews with farmers and 
ranchers, local political leaders, ejido leaders and Indigenous governors, 
governmental agency workers, church leaders and non-governmental 
organization representatives working in Bocoyna and Carichí on natural resource 
management issues. In addition to these interviews, on-site visits to agricultural 
fields, soil conservation projects, water projects and other walks through woods, 
mesas and pasture land occurred. In addition, in September and October of  
2005, 38 surveys were conducted in three ejidos in the Municipality of Carichí in 
El Consuelo, Arroyo del Agua and Bacabureachi. A brief focus group discussion 
was also held in 2004 with about 20 residents from Arroyo del Agua and El 
Consuelo in the local ejido meeting house in the area as well (Morgan 1988). 
Finally, the author cut oats in Panalachi, picked apples in Bacabureachi and 
husked corn in several fields in El Consuelo and Bacabureachi. Appendix B has 
a copy of the Spanish-language survey conducted in 2005. While the present 
chapter presents an overall summary of the survey results, more detailed survey 
results are available from the author upon request.  
 
III. Bocoyna: Where The Rio Conchos Begins 
 
A. Voices of the Sierra under the Shadows of Mt. Romúrachi  
 
Under the shadows of Mt. Romúrachi on its east side sits an ejido known as 
Arroyo de la Cabeza (literally Stream of the Head, or Headstream), a vast 
expanse of pine forests, agricultural lands, sparsely populated communities and 
livestock (Photo 4.1). As the land incorporating the headwaters of the Río 
Conchos, there is currently substantial interest among governmental agencies, 
 199 
local leaders and non-governmental organizations in the peoples and lands 
making up the ejido. The dominating presence of Mt. Romúrachi also provides a 
unique mountain habitat for various important biological species, including the 
Pinabete trees (Picea chihuahuana), various endangered species of  owls, 
hawks, black bears, snakes and the endangered cotorra serrana, or thick-billed 
parrot (Rhynchopsita pachyrhyncha). (Alcalá 2002).  
 
At some 9,500 hectares, the medium-sized ejido is located approximately 15 
kilometers north-east of San Juanito in the Municipality of Bocoyna. At 2,950 
meters, Romúrachi is omnipresent  to the residents of Arroyo de la Cabeza, as 
well as to a large swath of private property in the middle of the ejido. The 
residents are clustered in five towns – Agujas, Naqueachi, Arroyo de la Cabeza, 
Tucheachi and San Miguel – whose 636 residents inhabit 133 wood and 31 
adobe shacks among the valleys and hills of the pine forests (Fuerza Ambiental 
2005:  10). About 47 percent of the population is less than 20 years old, while 
only eight percent is over 60.  Most homes are built with the same pines that dot 
the valleys and line the hillsides, though government aid in recent years has seen 
many deteriorating pine roofs replaced with zinc “lamina” roofing. The roofs 
themselves often serve as storage places for locally-grown crops, which are 
thrown up on top, both to dry them out in the sun and keep them safe from local 
livestock (see Photo 4.2). About 75 percent of the homes have “mangueras” – 
rubber hoses – that bring them water from local springs and aguajes – water 










Source: Miguel Pavón, Borderlands Information Center, Texas Natural Resource 






Photo 4.1. View of Mt. Romúrachi, Arroyo de la Cabeza Ejido, 2005.  
 
Almost all the residents – about 99 percent – self-identify themselves as  
Rarámuri – sometimes translated as “the men of light feet" – more commonly 
known in Spanish as the Tarahumara indigenous celebrated in Pennington’s 
opening words. They are agriculturalists, living off the land. Wherever their home 
in the five communities, they are part of the Arroyo de la Cabeza ejido, 
established back in 1934. There are currently 142 members. They are served by 
ejido officials– the Comisariado himself, the secretary and treasurer – and a 
Consejo de Vigilancia – an advisory-like committee. Ejido officials normally serve 




Photo 4.2. Home in Naqueachi, Arroyo de la Cabeza, 2005.  
 
In addition to the ejidal structure, there is a traditional indigenous governing 
structure, with an Indigenous Governor serving the Tucheachi – Bahureachi area 
and another serving in Las Agujas (Fuerza Ambiental 2005). There were not 
governors serving the other two towns.   
 
While the ejido structure deals with the everyday issues of land, crops and 
livestock, as well as decisions about timber extraction, the indigenous governors 
are charged with both overseeing traditional customs and celebrations, and 
coordinating aid from both religious organizations, non-profit organizations and 
the government (Fuerza Ambiental 2005). Not surprisingly, at times there are 
conflicts between ejido and indigenous leaders, and the differing visions they 
may have for the community (Gina Uribe, Fuerza Ambiental, Personal 
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communication with author, 2005). Traditionally, indigenous governors and other 
elders resolve land and other conflicts, preserve oral traditions and give advice 
on agricultural and other techniques, but those roles have been eviscerated by 
the ejido structure itself, recognized as the arbitrators of land tenure issues by 
the Mexican government (Fuerza Ambiental 2005: 15). 
 
As in most of the Sierra, virtually everything that is and has been grown is for 
personal or livestock consumption. Major crops grown in recent years include 
corn, oats, various types of beans, including cabra, chicharro and haba, and 
potatoes. Corn was by far the most prevalent crop.  
 
Roughly half of the  livestock – generally the cattle -- roam free within the ejido, 
while goats and sheep tend to be placed in pens or fenced in lands at night. 
While a few farmers reported building areas for livestock to drink water, most let 
them roam in or near riverbeds, springs, or aguajes (Fuerza Ambiental 2005: 36).  
In general, there has been no or little effort by local leaders to attempt to refrain 
the free ranging of animals (Photo 4.3). Instead, to protect their crops, ejiditarios 
have built both wood and wire fences around their crops to keep animals out. 
(Felipe Ontiveros, Ejido Arroyo de la Cabeza, Personal communication with 
author, 2005). Both local ejidatarios, non-governmental observers, indigenous 
leaders and others believe that roaming animals, and the lack of effort at keeping 
livestock away from river beds has led to erosional features on the landscape 




Photo 4.3. Erosional gullies near stream in Naqueachi, 2005.  
 
In 2004, led by Ejido President Ontiveros, Arroyo de la Cabeza obtained a new 
Forestry Management Plan (Plan de Manejo Forestal) to continue cutting down 
the pine forests it calls home. The ten year plan – which was approved by 
SEMARNAT – the federal environmental authoriy –divides the ejido into roughly 
10 areas, each of which is marked for cutting for a different year. Under the plan, 
the community is legally able to cut a yearly average of 6901 cubic meters of 
pine, 947 cubic meters of oak and 56 of táscate (juniper). In 2005, the cutting of 
wood earned each ejidatario $1,200 pesos, roughly $100 dollars (Ontiveros, 
Personal communication with author, 2005).  
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Map 6. “Areas of Cutting” (Forest Management Plan) of Arroyo de la Cabeza Ejido 
Source: Fuerza Ambiental 2005: 38.  
 
It was to Arroyo de la Cabeza that two young recent graduates from a local 
Chihuahuan forestry school  arrived as representatives of Fuerza Ambiental. 
Young and energetic, they worked under a subcontract with World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) to perform both a diagnostic of the community and in concert with the 
community put together a Community Action Plan to “help increase productivity 
and live more sustainably with the natural resources.” (Agustín Bravo, Fuerza 
Ambiental, personal communication with author, 2005).   
 
B. Arrival of “The Panda”  
 
World Wildlife Fund’s interest in Arroyo de la Cabeza was based on its location 
as the “start of it all,” the beginning of a river that forms the major input into the 
Rio Grande from the Mexican side (Dr. Hector Arias, WWF, Personal 
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communication with author, 2005). WWF picked the area based on its location 
and not on any existing relations within the community or even stated biological 
criteria, although clearly the near “virgin” conditions of some of the slopes of Mt. 
Romurachi peaked their interest (Arias, 2005; WWF 2002; WWF 2004).  
 
Current Chihuahua WWF director Dr. Arias began his work in government, first 
working with the federal agricultural agency, and later became an academic, as a 
soil and watershed management expert at an academic research center. Among 
his accomplishments, he worked with the SALSA program – The Semi-Arid  
Land-Surface-Atmosphere ("SALSA")  Program -- a multi-university and agency 
research effort that “seeks to evaluate the consequences of natural and  human-
induced changes in semi-arid environments” and which was focused on the Rio 
San Pedro between Arizona and Sonora. (Arizona State University, Website).  
 
He said the roots of the work in Chihuahua are not the drought or debate over 
water between the U.S. and Mexico, but its location as the “lifeblood” of the 
Chihuahuan Desert. WWF-USA had begun pushing the international organization 
to focus its efforts on “ecoregions” rather than piecemeal programs or areas, and 
WWF began a Chihuahuan Desert program in 1997, opening offices in Las 
Cruces, New Mexico and later in Monterrey, Nuevo León. WWF had incorporated 
in Mexico City in 1992, but had focused mainly on southern Mexican jungles and 
central volcanoes. While an early focus of the program was Big Bend on the U.S. 
side and newly formed protected areas in Chihuahua and Coahuila along the 
border, the work began to evolve toward freshwater management and 
restoration, especially as a link between the pine-oak forests of the Sierra – 
already an identified “ecoregion” – and the Chihuahuan desert (Arias, Personal 
Communication, 2005).  
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“The International Union of Conservation Networks (IUCN) was pushing the 
Living Planet Index which indicated that there was no habitat more threatened 
than rivers and freshwater habitats,” explained Arias. The focus on freshwaters 
later became incorporated as part of World Wildlife Fund, Inc.’s “Living Waters” 
program. As a WWF consultant, Arias advised WWF’s Latin American office and 
others within the organization that a focus on watershed and specifically on the 
Rio Conchos should be a major part of the Chihuahuan Desert program, and it 
later was added as one of the priority eco-regions (Arias, 2005).  
 
In 2002, Arias became the director of the Mexican side of the Chihuahuan Desert 
program and established an office in Chihuahua City. At that time, he was the 
only full-time staff and the budget was limited, most of it  used to contract a water 
economics expert to study water pricing, crops and water use in the Delicias 
Irrigation District, a report released in 2002 (Puente Gonzalez 2002).  
 
“It was obvious that if we were to focus on water use and the Conchos, we had to 
get a handle on Delicias Irrigation District,” Arias explained.  
 
Arias said the international discussions between Mexico and the U.S. over more 
efficient use of water in the Delicias Irrigation District – and more specifically the 
proposed certification of a water conservation project through the Border 
Environment Cooperation Commission – gave their work immediate relevancy 
but was not its cause.  
 
In fact, the information actually helped officials at BECC – the Border 
Environment Cooperation Commission – prepare the documents needed for its 
certification of the Delicias Irrigation District conservation project partially funded 
by the North American Development Bank (Puente González 2002; BECC 2002).  
 
 208 
In February 2002, the British bank HSBC announced a $50 million “Investing in 
Nature” program, which included a $18.4 million grant to WWF to restore 2 
million hectares of river basin habitats in the Amazon in Brazil, the Yangtze in 
China and the Rio Grande in the US, “returning the natural flow of rivers, 
protecting fish and other freshwater species, and securing fresh drinking water 
for millions” (HSBC 2002).  
 
While Arias said the amount of money has often been exaggerated and 
misreported in press reports and by government officials, the HSBC agreement 
in 2002 included approximately $7 million stretched over seven years for the Rio 
Grande work. The money is split evenly between the Las Cruces and Chihuahua 
offices. Still, the funding from HSBC, as well as significant amounts from Ricoh 
Corporation in Japan has allowed the international organization to significantly 
increase its presence in Chihuahua, bolstering its staff from one to eight, move 
into a much more spacious office in the heart of Chihuahua’s governmental and 
arts district – complete with the Panda Logo outside --  and paved the way for the 
increased attention on the Rio Conchos and water management in general.  
 
In 2003, WWF began to contract with local organizations to work toward better 
resource management in the upper Rio Conchos. “It was very difficult to be here 
in lobbying and political work and also there in the Sierra,” Arias explained.  “So 
my strategy was to find local organizations with experience working with 
communities, designed by the community itself.”  
 
WWF awarded contracts to begin working in four ejidos in Bocoyna and Carichí 
(see Table 4.1). The first year’s goal was to come up with a diagnostic of the 
communities, and the second year’s was to come up with more of a technical 
guidance document for implementing the community’s action plan.  
 
 209 
Table 4.1. Communities in which WWF had contracts with local organizations for 
participatory natural resource management planning, 2004-2005 
Name of Ejido/Community  Local Chihuahua Organization with WWF 
Contract 
Arroyo de la Cabeza, Bocoyna Fuerza Ambiental 
La Laguna, Bocoyna  Fuerza Ambiental 
Panalachi, Bocoyna GAIA 
Sisoguichi, Carichí  ALDECO 
Source: WWF 2004.  
 
Arias said it is a participative program with the community that is similar to that 
developed by FIRCO’s “micro-watershed” program. FIRCO – literally Fideicomiso 
de Riesgo Compartido (The Shared Risk Fund) – is a decentralized federal 
government program that began in the 1970s as a lending and technical aid 
program to farmers, but has at least partially morphed into a participatory 
planning exercise to help restore Mexico’s dilapidated rivers and streams 
(Gerardo Saenz, FIRCO-Chihuahua, personal communication with author, 2005). 
In fact, some of the money to conduct the work contracted by WWF has been 
funded by FIRCO.  
 
“The reality of the Sierra is that the agricultural capacity is minimal,” noted Arias. 
“Few hectares, uneven farming lands, hail, freezes, droughts, and really lands 
that are not apt for farming,” he stated.  
 
Arias said the purpose of the program – “Integrated Watershed Management” -- 
is to both preserve the lands while providing some economic sustainability for the 
community, “without forestry exploitation, or overgrazing.” 
 
Toward this end, WWF has been promoting the idea of  “environmental services” 
payments, where communities that took care of their lands would be paid for their 
management by downstream interests, much as they are currently paid by the 
forestry industry to cut down their forests.  
 210 
 
“If they have to cut down the forest to survive, then if we could instead set up a 
mechanism of cooperation so that those that need the water would pay them for 
providing water,” he noted.  
 
In May of 2005, WWF signed an “inter-institutional” agreement with the State 
Government of Chihuahua focused on restoring and protecting the Rio Conchos 
Watershed. While Arias freely admits the agreement has no “teeth”, he said it 
has led to an inter-institutional working group which meets regularly to review 
funding opportunities for communities.  
 
The multi-million dollar donations with HSBC, the further donations from the 
Japanese Ricoh Corporation, the agreement with the Chihuahuan government 
and the regular meetings between a high-profile NGO like WWF and key federal 
and state governmental ministers, however, is a long way from the dirt roads and 
corn fields of the Sierra’s indigenous ejidos and communities. Local leaders and 
NGOs contracted by WWF say there is often a disconnect between the official 
rhetoric and press releases and the reality transpiring on the ground (Agustín 
Bravo, Fuerza Ambiental, personal communication with author, 2005) 
 
“We basically threw them in there,” noted Fuerza Ambiental director Agustín 
Bravo from his Chihuahua office about the young college graduates they sent to 
work with the community in Arroyo de la Cabeza. Bravo said that without the 
support of the European-based Christensen Fund it would have been impossible 
to complete both the diagnostic and community action plan required by WWF 
through its short-term contract.  
 
“It’s a maquila model,” explained the no-nonsense Bravo. Large foundations like 
Hewlett Packard, or corporations like HSBC, as well as the U.S. government 
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through U.S. AID give contracts to groups like WWF and Conservation 
International, who in turn give contracts to more “local” groups like Fuerza 
Ambiental. Fuerza Ambiental then contracts workers and particular community 
members to get the product produced in a certain amount of time to satisfy both 
the BINGO – Big NGOs – who in turn must satisfy their own funders. In fact, 
recently U.S. AID announced funding for a watershed restoration project in 
forested areas, which focuses on three rivers in Southern Mexico and the 
headwaters of the Conchos Watershed in the Sierra Tarahumara (U.S. Agency 
for International Development 2005). The recipients of the monies to help 
implement this restoration are limited to major international environmental 
organizations:  WWF, Conservation International and The Nature Conservancy.10 
 
A lawyer by training from Guadalajara, Bravo first became involved in the Sierra 
while representing indigenous communities on legal cases with the human rights 
organization COSYDDHAC, but his focus changed to “social capital” and 
development.  
 
“You could stop illegal logging through legal action, but logging might continue in 
another place in the community, either legal through forestry permit or from 
outsiders,” Bravo noted. He said they began to work on community-level 
organization through new tools like “Ordenamiento Ecologicos (Ecological 
                                                
10 “The Government of Mexico has identified water and forests as critical to Mexico's 
national security. USAID is cooperating with a range of U.S. and Mexican organizations 
to introduce new technologies that improve watershed management, and promote 
sustainable enterprises that conserve Mexico's biodiversity. 
USAID is partnering with three internationally recognized conservation organizations: 
The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Conservation International (CI), and the World Wildlife 
Foundation (WWF). These environmental organizations in turn work closely with 
Mexican public and private institutions.” (US Agency for International Development, 




Planning), Forestry Management Plans” and other tools having to do with social 
organization and natural resource decision-making. 
 
Fuerza Ambiental formed an alliance with Sierra Madre Alliance, led by American 
ex-patriate Randy Gingrich. Working in the lower Sierra Tarahumara in the 
conflictive ejidos of Pino Gordo and Colorado de las Virgenes brought 
international press attention to the conflicts over logging and gave both Fuerza 
Ambiental and the associated Sierra Madre Alliance considerable attention and 
access to funding. While the alliance worked for a time, Bravo said 
mismanagement, personal and professional conflicts and a particular fight over 
whether to promote the “candidacy” of Tarahumara forestry activist Isidro 
Valdenegro for the prestigious Goldman Prize led to a split-up a short time later. 
(Bravo, 2005; Gingrich 2005).  
 
Gingrich, for his part, says the “divorce” was unfortunate given the groups similar 
goals, and made similar accusations of misconduct. He said he was particularly 
incensed when Fuerza Ambiental began “secretly” negotiating with a group out of 
Boston called Ecological Development Fund, and the United National 
Development Program and Global Environmental Facility about investing money 
in the Rio Conchos watershed to help set up a kind of payment program for 
protection of the Conchos watershed.  
 
“I was absolutely furious since we had just spent over $400,000 in Guadalupe 
and Calvo (in the lower Sierra Tarahumara canyon areas) and had been talking 
to the same financial sources – UNDP and GEF – about supporting protection 
work in the canyon lands.”  
 
Fuerza Ambiental turned to the contracts with WWF to work in Arroyo de la 
Cabeza and Comunidad La Laguna. Bravo says Fuerza Ambiental saw the WWF 
 213 
contracts as a way to work with new communities and further the goals of 
environmental justice and sustainability. Bravo said WWF has been very 
respectful in the process and does not interfere with any results, though the 
success of the projects have been limited.  
 
“They are short-term contracts as if you were contracted a business for providing 
services, where you pay part after the contract has been completed,” he noted. 
“We understood it would be a four or six year contract, but in reality we have to 
compete for another contract every eight months or so, and only for some 
$16,000 dollars for the whole year.” 
 
Bravo’s co-worker at Fuerza Ambiental, Gina Uribe, is a veteran of work in the 
Sierra. Originally working with the State of Chihuahua’s first Environmental 
Agency in the late 1980s, Uribe began work in the Sierra for the “failed” Bosque 
Modelo (Model Forest) project supported by the Canadian Government, a good 
project that was “hijacked by the same clique of forestry engineers, corruption 
and mismanagement.” The work in Arroyo de la Cabeza, according to Uribe, was 
“even more difficult.” 
 
“It was picked by WWF because of its strategic importance at head of the 
Conchos, but no one had any links there,” noted Uribe. Throughout 2004 and 
2005, they developed the community diagnostic and community action plan. 
Initially they approached the head of the ejido, who put them in touch with one of 
the local indigenous governors (Gina Uribe, Personal communication with author, 
2005).  
 
The relations between WWF’s program in Chihuahua City, the smaller NGOs 
they hired to implement them, and the indigenous people on whose land WWF 
wished to change practices is obviously complex and not strictly one-sided. In 
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other words, the indigenous peoples not only react to the “participatory” efforts of 
the NGOs, but impose their own understanding of participation and action on the 
relationships. As a recent article by Walker, Jones III et al make clear in 
discussing a similar but more established WWF program in the state of Oaxaca, 
Mexico, the proposed participation model developed by WWF and other major 
NGOs to include indigenous peoples in a more sustainable development path 
often conflicts with a more geographically-based local vision of “empowerment” 
of local communities (Walker, Jones III et. al. 2007; Chapin 2004). Thus, these 
local leaders begin to ask who should be in charge of the meetings and agendas. 
To their credit, says Bravo, WWF attempted to allow Fuerza Ambiental to work 
with the needs and vision of the community, but the short time-frame and the 
needs of the funders often caused a conflict between a homegrown territorial 
based vision of the community and the wider attempt at habitat restoration.  
 
The Arroyo de la Cabeza community identified three main issues:  protection of 
water sources in Tucheachi;  the monitoring of a reforestation projects; and a 
discussion about sustainable livestock management practices.  
 
Uribe explained that forestry officials at SEMARNAT had provided the ejido with 
funds to reforest some lands with trees grown at a nursery near Delicias, but in 
their excitement to plant, the community had failed to plant the trees at the 
required spacing, and much of the project appeared to be failing.  
 
Uribe said goals  developed in 2005 for Arroyo de Cabeza and La Laguna were 
modest, because taking on issues like the forestry permit itself held by the 
community would create dissension in the community. They have had workshops 
and talks about the possibility of preserving some lands within the ejido as 
“hands off,” including Mt. Ramurichic itself, with its high number of endemic 
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species and its prime importance as the source of several mountain streams 
which help form the Rio Conchos.  
 
Bravo said that the high-profile announcement by WWF of its agreement with the 
Chihuahuan government – and its efforts to focus institutional aid in the 
communities of the Sierra in which it has contracts – had sewn “ridiculous 
expectations among community leaders that major aid was arriving.”  
 
“The big problem is that the community is ready to act, but we don’t know about 
money from WWF or the government,” Bravo reiterated.  
 
For his part, Gingrich said he has avoided having the Mexican organizations with 
which he coordinates joint campaigns apply for WWF funds. “I was very weary to 
work with them because of their past relationships with Profauna, which they 
gave $60 or $80 thousand to for a study of the Conchos,” Gingrich said. Gingrich 
says that study was limited in scope, and focused on the environment, but not 
people.  He said he would only work directly in the Conchos if the support were 
to go directly to the communities and not to the NGOs “for more studies.” In 
essence, he says, he is wary of working with organizations like Profuana or WWF 
which have little history working directly with communities.  
 
Interviews with leaders in the communities confirmed some of these concerns, 
but also that leaders welcomed the sudden interest in their ejidos. Indigenous 
governor Efrén Villalobos sits quietly on a fence of a pigpen outside his house, 
which overlooks a tiny apple orchard owned by his mother just outside of the 
center of Tucheachi. Finding his house involves crossing a stream and walking 
past a corn field. Villalobos tells the story of his involvement with Fuerza 
Ambiental and WWF (Villalobos, Efrén, Tucheachi, Personal communication with 
author, 2005).  
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“They told us they wanted to work on soil conservation and also help find roof 
tiles, solar plates, the necessities identified in the Action Plan,” Villalobos 
explained. “We want retention of the soil within our fields, within our mountains 
and within our streams as the water carries it all away.”  
 
Villalobos said their first priority has been protection of the “aguajes,” the 
mountain springs which provide water to the community and which have often 
dried up in modern times (see Photo 4.4).  
 
“Our animals and pigs have been using these, bathing in them, digging at them, 
ruining them,” he explained. Villalobos said his only contact with WWF had been 
at a retreat in Creel with other indigenous leaders, and they had yet to see any 
positive results from the community diagnostics.  
 
For his part, ejido Comisariado Ontiveros said organization and lack of training 
were the main problems facing the local communities. Standing just outside his 
field of golden-colored oats, he is reaping his harvest using a modern scythe 
bought several hours away in Cuauhtémoc, with the oats intended for his eight 
cattle (Photo 4.5). Ontiveros says he did not participate much in the meetings 
held by Fuerza Ambiental. “They spoke to us about the microwatershed and the 
rivers and a way to keep more forest and more soils, but up to now there haven’t 
been any actual projects,” he said. “But it might be positive if we can become 




Photo 4.4. Aguaje in Tucheachi is covered by boards to protect it from animals 
 
Ontiveros said it was likely they could make changes in the ejido in terms of 
where and when they graze cattle, but felt it was very unlikely there would be any 
changes to the forestry permit itself.  
 
“We will always cut the forest because it not only provides us with a rent – but 
also work for those cutting, carrying and driving the wood to San Juanito to a 









Based on both visits to the communities and interviews with leaders, a document 
prepared by Fuerza Ambiental has this to say about the problem of the lack of 
water in a community which averages over 500 mm of rain per year: 
 
The problems associated with “water scarcity” as they are identified 
by the inhabitants, are intimately related to the processes of 
logging, fires and other natural disasters, and the high grade of 
over-grazing and erosion that exist in the lands of the ejido, 
especially near the population centers.  
 
Fuerza Ambiental 2005 
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For their part, Fuerza Ambiental said it applied for funding from both SEDESOL 
and SEMARNAT to implement the projects identified in the Community Action 
Plan. Despite the working of the interinstitutional group led by WWF, and the 
inclusion of the projects in a community-adopted action plan, no funds were 
forthcoming from government entities as of late 2005 (Bravo, 2005) 
 
Still, indigenous governor Villalobos’ tone about changing practices in the Sierra 
is hopeful. He said everyone recognized that it was problematic to destroy the 
very forest that helped provide your home. 
 
“We have our permit to destroy the forest and that’s what the ejidatarios live on, 
but we already are getting less then we used to because there is less wood and 
the government is more strict about what areas you can cut,” Villalobos noted. 
“They – Fuerza Ambiental – came to speak to us about this idea they have that 
we will create a conservation area, that we could come to an agreement to get as 
much money as we get now for preserving the forest without cutting it down, but 
it’s just an idea.”  
 
C. Paying to Preserve: Ecological Service Payments 
 
The idea Villalobos is referring to is the idea of “”Payments for Environmental 
Services” or Pagos de Servicio Ambiental. An idea that is has become popular 
throughout the world, PES pays communities to take action through “a voluntary, 
conditional agreement between at least one "seller" and one "buyer" over a well-
defined environmental service-or a land use presumed to produce that service 
(Wunder 2007: 48).” In Mexico, the program was just getting off the ground, 
according to the Comision Nacional Forestal, or National Forestry Commission, 
in 2005 (Roberto Velasco, Chihuahua Office, CONAFOR,  personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
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Currently, CONAFOR has two programs which could loosely be called PES. The 
first, called PPSAH (Programa de Pago por Servicio Ambientales Hidrológicos) – 
Hydrological Payments for Environmental Services Program – rewards forested 
communities that agree to limit logging their land as long as certain hydrological 
criteria are met (Velasco 2005). Most of the Conchos headwaters are not 
considered eligible because they do not meet the current criteria – such as 80 
percent of their lands being forested.  
 
The second program – Carbon Capture, Biodiversity and Agro-forestry Payments 
for Environmental Services or PSA- CABSA (Programa de Servicio Ambientales 
– Captura de Carbón, Agrofestal y Biodiversidad) – grows out of Mexico’s 
signatory to the Kyoto Protocol and is a two-step process also incorporated into 
the 2003 law. Its goal is to mitigate climatic change caused by global warming by 
paying for “environmental“ services. It includes a variety of programs related to 
carbon capture, biodiversity retention and non-traditional agro-forestry programs 
(see Table 4.2). 
 
Currently, nine ejidos within the Sierra have applied for the new program, which 
began in 2004, although none of them are within the Conchos Watershed. In 
2005, two of these ejidos received their first payments of 400,000 pesos each, 




Table 4.2 Types of Programs under CONAFOR’s Payments for Environmental 
Services Programs 
 
Name of Program Elaboration of Program Implementation of 
Program 




 $300 per hectare for pine 
forests; $400 per hectare 
for jungles for 5 years 
Carbon Capture Up to $400,000 per Project $50 per ton of Carbon 
Dioxide Equivalent plus 
additional points 
Biodiversity Protection Up to $400,000 per Project Up to $500,000 Per Year 
for Five Years 
Reconversion of 
Agricultural Lands to Agro-
Forestry Lands 
Up to $400,000 per Project Up to $1,000/hectare per 
year for five years 
Improvement of Existing 
Shade-Grown Crops 
Up to $400,000 per Project Up to $500/hectare for 
Organic Certified Shade-
Grown Products; or 
$400/hectare for non-
organic products 
Source: CONAFOR, SEMARNAT, 2005, information from website.  
 
Finally, according to both the Kyoto Protocol and the 2003 Law, a company or 
foreign investors could invest money directly in an ejido to elaborate a plan for 
“environmental carbon bonds” and implement the plan to be used to meet Kyoto 
targets. In fact, Fuerza Ambiental’s Bravo believes that interest by companies 
such as Japanese manufacturer Rico in supporting WWF as well as interest by 
U.S. AID is predicated on finding “deals” to help companies meet carbon dioxide 
targets by investing in social forestry and conservation programs (Bravo, 2005).  
 
Despite the very limited budgets and goals of these programs, they have already 
sparked some controversy. On the one hand, ecologist Jose Luis Montes, who 
directs GAIA, a Chihuahua-based NGO also working in the Conchos Watershed 
through a contract with WWF, says “you can’t start a conservation program 
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without a budget.” In addition, he said the selection of programs had been 
arbitrary, with municipalities selected for political reasons.  
 
A larger criticism, however, is that the projects are viewed as attempts by 
outsiders to pay traditional communities to give up their collective rights over 
land. CONTEC, a local group out of Chihuahua which also works with 
communities in the Sierra, has been vocal in its opposition to larger carbon 
“bonds” where ejido lands would be in essence sold off to foreign investors in 
return for limits on ejido land practices.  
 
“Servicios Ambientales is another concept that became satanized,” noted Fuerza 
Ambiental’s Gina Uribe. “There was a reaction against it here from the Catholic 
Church and some groups. Basically you pay someone for doing nothing and the 
indigenous and their supporters against it are correct – you give up control of 
your resources.”  (Uribe, personal communication with author, 2005). 
 
For her part, CONTEC director Maria Teresa Guerrero said they have never 
been opposed to payments in return for assuring better land management and 
water, but are opposed to ceding control to outside organizations. She has held a 
number of local workshops and paid for local leaders to attend conferences in 
Mexico City to expose indigenous leaders to the idea of the environment, 
environmental services and environmental bonds. (Guerrero, CONTEC, Personal 
communication with author, 2006).  
 
 “What worries us that since Kyoto was approved as a way to mitigate climate 
change, they are opening a great market of titles and environmental bonds which 
represent the beginning of privatizing life and the wild areas – the forested areas 
– which is where the indigenous people live and which could lead to an ethical 
problem.”   
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D. Dams on the Mind: The New Water Supply Boom 
 
San Juanito – largest of Bocoyna’s towns with a population of 10,000– had a 
problem in 2002. There was no water. Drought-like conditions and increasing 
water use had caused streams and springs to dry up. There were protests in the 
streets and frantic calls to Chihuahua City for help (Presidente Seccional, 
Personal communication with author, 2004). The town relied in large part on a 
dilapidated pump in a stream in an agricultural valley a few kilometers west of the 
burgeoning capital. A visit to the pump revealed that at least on this day, as much 
water appeared to be filtering out of the pump itself as was being pumped from 
the valley over the mountain toward San Juanito  (Photo 4.6). 
 
The lack of available water for town residents led to meetings with state and 
federal officials and the decision to pursue construction of the Situriachi Dam just 
southwest of San Juanito. It was there, in 2004, that Mexican President Vicente 
Fox and his political opponent Patricio Martinez would jointly announce the 
opening of the dam as a response to the lack of water in the Sierra, while further 
announcing that none of this water would find its way to the United States 
(Topete 2004).  
 
The road to Situriachi leads through lands owned by the Ejido of San Juanito. As 
owners both of forested lands and a local sawmill, it is a relatively wealthy ejido. 
It is also an area that has been rapidly deforested, at least based on recent 







Photo 4.6. Water from this pump served the burgeoning town of San Juanito in 
2003 before the San Juanito Dam was built.  
 
According to officials at the state JCAS, the dam will provide water for San 
Juanito, as well as for Bocoyna and Creel, a major tourist center for both 
Mexican, U.S. and even European tourists, and even for several towns in the 
Municipality of Urique down the road into Copper Canyon (JCAS 2005).  In 2005 
and 2006, private companies bid on contracts to complete the extension of the 
water from the Situriachi Dam to these outlying cities. The development of 
tourism has in fact spurred a variety of water projects in the area due to the high 




Photo 4.7. Denuded landscape in Ejido of San Juanito, 2005. 
 
While the dam has been continually cited by local officials as a successful 
project, it is not the only project in the area. Near an area referred to as “El 
Huerfano” – the Orphan  -- funding from CONAFOR helped local ejidatarios with 
a variety of soil conservation programs. The Conservation and Forest Ecosystem 
Restoration Program (PROCOREF) is designed to provide money for 
infrastructure in ejido forested communities for soil retention and conservation.  
 
According to PROCOREF local director Nestor Chavez, despite a small budget, 
the program – along with PET – a temporal work number -- and CONAFOR’s 
Reforestation Program– has helped restore soils, forests and agricultural areas. 
In 2005, Chavez says, 33 soil conservation projects were implemented – 
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covering almost 3,000 hectares -- along with 164 reforestation projects in 
Chihuahua and Coahuila (Nestor Chavez, Personal Communication, 2005).  
 
“El Huerfano” has become one of those preferred pilot projects shown off to 
visiting dignitaries and held up as an example of an environmental restoration 
project that will improve livelihoods, at least based on its inclusion in local 
conferences on forestry. The building of the filtration dam itself – a rock and wire 
structure that is built along an existing intermittent stream – is supposed to lead 
to local rainfall infiltrating the soils,  retaining sediment on-site and leading to 
baseflow downstream. Because the local hills have been largely deforested, the 
building of the dam was accompanied by the reforestation of approximately 100 
hectares surrounding the filtration dam.  
 
While technically a success, the dam has become in its few years a local 
watering hole for cattle and horses, meaning that some of its success has been 
compromised by the practice of using it as watering source. The livestock are 
impacting vegetation on the slopes, according to local NGO representatives.  
 
 “With check and infiltration dams the people will take advantage of resulting 
vegetation to put their cattle there and the check dam will create a widening of 
the river banks and it will fail,” Fuerza Ambiental’s Uribe noted. She says she has 
seen many examples of “successful” filtration and check dam projects which 










Photo 4.8. “El Huerfano” Infiltration Dam Designed to Recharge Local Streams, 
2004 
 
E. Comunidad Indígina La Laguna 
 
Downstream of the Municipal Capital of Bocoyna, the Bocoyna River makes its 
way through La Laguna, a gigantic piece of land owned by indigenous 
communities. Unlike Arroyo de la Cabeza, La Laguna is not an ejido, but an 
indigenous community which predates the legal entity known as the ejido. 
Organizationally, it is quite similar. Individuals work plots of land, but the 
community owns the land, and members have rights to those communal lands – 
rights for grazing and rights for mining its sands and gravel along the river.  
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The increasing tourism in the area has not only spurred the need for water 
development but also for roads, and the President of Communal Goods 
(presidente de bienes comunes) – somewhat akin to the Ejido Comisariado – has 
been selling off sand and gravel along the banks of the river for several years to 
local companies, and the state,  with each member receiving a share of the 
profits.  
 
“It has been a disaster without control,” notes a middle-aged man tending sheep 
along the banks of the river, near the town of Gupitare, which now resembles a 
denuded moonscape (Photo 4.9). The sheep herder says that while the 
extractors of material do pay 12 pesos per cubic meter of sand and gravel, 
benefiting the community, there appears to be no oversight of the process and 
“the river has changed course and eaten the land below.”  
 
In 2004,  Fuerza Ambiental won the WWF contract to help local leaders identify 
their priorities and think about how to better manage and restore their natural 
resources. Uribe said they began in the La Laguna community by building on an 
existing “Micro-Cuenca” (micro-watershed) project, which Uribe called somewhat 
dismissively “the flavor of the month-type project (Uribe 2005).”  
 
They first began to meet with the members of the “watershed committee” set up 
through FIRCO and discuss with them the meaning of a watershed management 
plan. 
 
“They really had no concept of the geographic, hydrological idea of a watershed 
as something that transcended political boundaries” despite their participation as 
a member of the watershed committee, Uribe explained (Uribe, personal 





Photo 4.9. The Bocoyna River – which further downstream is named the Conchos 
– serves as a mining center for sand and gravel needed for local roads and 
construction in Comunidad La Laguna.  
 
Still, Fuerza Ambiental chose to continue with the existing committee structure. 
Two overall goals were identified which transcended individual communities: 
protection of the water sources on which they depend; and protection of stream 
beds and banks through improvement of livestock management practices.  
 
Named for a large water body long since dried up, La Laguna’s roots date from 
some 300 years before when it is believed the raramuri indigenous first inhabited 
the area (Fuerza Ambiental 2005b). While the community was recognized and 
inhabitants had both local planting and communal land rights since 1905, over 
the last 20 to 30 years a series of land invasions had caused a “loss” of 
communal rights. Approximately 25 years ago, they turned to the Mexican 
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communist party, later to become PSUM, to provide assistance to community 
leaders in their efforts to have their lands recognized and have their boundaries 
more properly determined. According to local residents, the process was slow, in 
part because of the “caciques” – local groups of leaders interested in maintaining 
their power – illegal logging of the forests, and an Agrarian Reform Agency most 
interested in maintaining the status quo than in recognizing the true historic 
boundaries (Fuerza Ambiental 2005b).  Following a mass take-over of the plaza 
in Cd. Chihuahua, and a series of legal battles, 167 members of the communities 
making up La Laguna were recognized as the true owners of the land. 
 
Based on its current boundaries, Comunidad La Laguna spans 9,300 hectares, 
and is a huge pentagon that begins on the road between Bocoyna and 
Sisoguichi. The community is crossed by both the Rio Conchos, known locally as 
the Rio Bocoyna, the Rio Sisoguichi – the river’s other main branch  – as well as 
other important tributaries such as the Gorachi, Nerochachi and San Antonio.  
Typified by high mesas and alluvial valleys, with slopes from 20 to 50 percent in 
some areas, and altitudes ranging from 2,200 meters to 2,500 meters, 
predominant vegetation includes pine forests, pine-oaks forest, and quaking 
aspen. Some 772 indigenous and mestizo inhabitants can be found in six 
populated areas, about 75 percent of which are self-identified as indigenous 
(Fuerza Ambiental 2005b).  
 
At a bank in Los Aguatos along a local  stream – a tributary to the Rio Bocoyna -- 
stands Lorenzo Gonzalez with two cattle that he is herding along the banks of the 
river. While upstream the river has been impacted by the extraction of materials, 
here the stream runs freely on this September day, albeit meekly (Photo 4.10).  
 
“The river no longer has soil,” Gonzalez observes sadly. “its bottom is pure rock.” 
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Gonzalez blamed the denuded riverbed both on a variety of problems, including 
soil erosion, deforestation from fires, cattle management practices and the town 
of Creel, which placed a straw in Aguatos’s local river approximately 10 years 
before. (Gonzalez, Lorenzo, personal communication with author, 2005).  The 




Photo 4.10. Pump draws water from the town of La Aguatos for Creel in the La 
Laguna Community.  
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Gonzalez is President of the “Microcuencas del Conchos” Committee, a 
committee composed of other farmers and local leaders concerned about the 
loss in functioning and flows of the dozens of streams which feed the Rio 
Bocoyna.  
 
When Fuerza Ambiental arrived, he admits he had little technical understanding 
of the watershed concept, but did have a profound knowledge of local rivers. He 
said the community spoke with one voice in identifying the main problems, 
including the loss of water at local springs, watering holes and streams; the 
increase in erosion and loss of soils from their lands; and fires which impacted 
the woods surrounding the valley.  
 
Limited steps -- such as putting fences around the watering holes – have resulted 
from the Action Plan developed by the community and Fuerza Ambiental both in 
Aguatos and other communities. However, major plans to enact soil erosion 
mitigation measures, reforestation projects and further protection of water 
sources has yet to occur.  
 
“There has not been any money for the community,” Gonzalez said. “I agree that 
I should not be paid directly for my organizing activities, or to come to a meeting, 
but to do the actual work to protect our community people must be paid. 
Otherwise, people emigrate to find work in Creel or other communities so they 
don’t lose work and they don’t remain without nutrition.” 
 
The work in changing natural resource use within the community has been 
hampered both by the lack of funding but also by the dichotomous leadership 
structure within the community. While all of the communities within La Laguna 
have indigenous governors who were relatively active in Fuerza Ambiental’s 
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development of a community diagnostic and action plan, the elected “Communal 
Lands” president, secretary and other leadership were not.  
 
Explains one Fuerza Ambiental document:  
With the Action Plan, the attempt was to reinforce the traditional 
authority of indigenous governors, and while the strategy has 
worked well, traditional authority does not involve itself in the 
decision-making about the policies involving the use of resources, 
which makes it difficult to take the decisive steps toward a land use 
plan.” (Fuerza Ambiental 2005b, author’s translation).  
 
Thus, the action plan acknowledges that the forestry management plan being 
pursued by the community’s leadership, the existence of a sawmill in one 
community, and the extraction of materials from riverbeds are important issues, 
but does not directly address them. On the other hand, notes Fuerza Ambiental’s 
Uribe, it is precisely because they do not directly advocate immediate change of 
the use of resources which provide direct financial benefits to the community that 
the action plan has largely been accepted by the communities as a good first 
step  toward more careful use of the resources upon which they depend.  
 
Fuerza Ambiental’s record of their meetings indicated that in Aguatos, the 
inhabitants concluded that “the most severe problem was the loss of the forests 
and the lack of training.” 
   
Thus, part of the challenge for the community was simply to identify existing 
government programs – such as the Temporary Employment Programs, 
reforestation and soil conservation programs supported by the National Forestry 
Commission and the related federal agency SEMARNAT – that could be used to 
help reforest their lands. But the lack of any discernible action was clearly 
frustrating to the community.  
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On the road from Bocoyna to Sisoguichi lies a fork in the road, and a drive down 
that road along the San Antonio Stream takes one into a river valley that is dotted 
with corn, bean and oat fields. At times the road is the stream, at others it snakes 
through the forested hills and reemerges in the stream. Here and there a young 
indigenous boy herds goats. Some five kilometers along the stream, a bundle of 
pine wooden homes surround a white adobe church. At the top of the hill lies the 
modest home of Miguel Angel Saenz, president of the Local Micro-Watershed 
Committee of Nararachi, a community of approximately 60 families.  
 
Eating a tortilla made from traditional blue corn, Saenz says that water is the 
main concern of the local residents. While a system of hoses and a check dam 
brought water to many of the homes some 12 years earlier, years of neglect, 
wandering livestock and trucks and the inclement weather has destroyed many 
of the structures (see Photo 4.11). But beyond the physical infrastructure 
problems, the sources of water have also been impacted both by low rainfall and 
recent fires which destroyed some 200 hectares of forest upstream of the 
community. Saenz says the community, working with Fuerza Ambiental and “with 
the help of WWF talking with the government” has received some three to 4 
thousand pine trees to begin a small-scale reforestation process and have put 
fences around some of the springs upon which they depend (Saenz, Miguel 
Angel, Nararachi, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Still, these small-scale projects – financed both by government and funds 
received by Fuerza Ambiental from the Christensen Fund – are only a small part 
of the larger projects envisioned in the community’s action plan.  
 
“We want to put fences along some parts of the streams, and change the cattle 
grazing to other parts so that nature can return,” Saenz says. “So we need to 
work and talk with the owners of the cattle.” 
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Photo 4.11. Two mules bathe in the San Antonio Stream downstream of 
Narurachi.  
 
Saenz says they are well aware that outside aide does not always work. As an 
example, he cites the corn often sent to local communities by the local 
municipality since yields have been scarce during the years of drought.  
 
“The seeds they send don’t work in these climates, it’s a very weak variety,” he 
notes. He said he has heard of criticism of WWF – that they are trying to create a 
biosphere reserve or take the water – but says he knows nothing of the 
particulars, nor does it seem to concern him. His concern is focused on local 
issues such as getting local resource users to change the way they raise and 
graze cattle and goats. 
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Says Fuerza Ambiental’s Uribe “the idea is range management – to work one 
field or one part of a river area and then change to another and let the earth 
recover. The idea is not to prohibit cattle, but change the amount and timing of 
where they graze.” 
 
But as of 2005, the WWF-led contracted effort to change resource use in the 
Sierra Tarahumara – as a potential solution to low-flows in the Conchos – was 
incremental and haphazard, as the glossy brochures in Chihuahua City 
contrasted with the on-the-ground difficulty of working within indigenous 
communities own needs, and the limited government funding available.  
 
IV. The Sierra Tarahumara Biosphere Reserve 
 
One controversial effort in the Sierra Tarahumara related to natural resource use 
has been the effort to have the mountains and canyons declared a “biosphere” or 
“biocultural” reserve, an UNESCO designation that would open the area to some 
international oversight and funding (UNESCO 2002; Comisión Nacional de Areas 
Protegidas 2005). The roots of this efforts go back several years, and in fact to 
the early 1990s, when a World Bank backed-loan would have opened up 
significant logging opportunities in the area and some environmental groups 
instead called for a biosphere reserve (Lowerre 1994).  In 2004, the idea became 
a formal proposal within the Mexican Government.  
 
In November of 2004, Mexico’s SEMARNAT announced the availability of the 
studies:  
 
performed to justify the Decree in which it is intended to declare as 
a naturally protected area with the character of a “Biosphere 
Reserve,” the zone known as the “Sierra Tarahumara,” with a 
surface area of 848,333 hectares, located in the Municipalities of 
San Francisco de Borja, Carichíc, Bocoyna, Nonoava, Urique, 
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Batopilas, Guachochi, Guadalupe y Calvo, Balleza y Morelos, in the 
State of  Chihuahua. (Cárdenas Jiménez 2004; Author translation)  
 
What emerged following the announcement was a growing opposition among 
miners, foresters, the Catholic Church, some indigenous groups and, perhaps, 
surprisingly, many “environmental” groups. Thus, an umbrella organization that 
includes many of Mexico’s major forestry experts and academics with an interest 
in social forestry – the Consejo Civil Mexicano para la Silvicultura Sostenible, 
A.C, stated in a newsletter: 
 
In the Civil Council, an analysis of the study justifying the Decree 
(of the Reserve) showed that it is a document that does not provide 
concrete details to justify the creation of such a large indigenous 
Biosphere Reserve. The study does not offer information about the 
social, economic or environmental impacts of the creation of such a 
reserve. The Civil Council will demand that before an actual reserve 
is declared, that they have clear and overwhelming justification and 
evidence, as well as local community approval (CCMSS 2005:3).  
 
Rumors began to circulate about who was behind the effort – was it an attempt 
for environmentalists to control the Sierra’s resources or could it be a U.S. 
government effort to assure the water from the Conchos flows to the U.S.? WWF 
– and its panda bear emblem – were often linked – at least in rumors -- to the 
biosphere concept, an idea that Chihuahua director Dr. Hector Arias categorized 
as “entirely false.” (Arias, WWF, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Alter the “preproject” was made public, Chihuahuan groups and officials working 
in the Sierra Tarahumara began to discuss the issue publicly during monthly 




“It became very obvious that none of the groups working there had promoted this 
idea and that the main promoter was Randy,” explained Fuerza Ambiental’s Gina 
Uribe referring to Randy Gingrich. Fuerza Ambiental immediately issued 
statements to the press and letters to board members to make it abundantly clear 
that they were not behind the idea of a Biosphere Reserve, since they had 
worked so closely with Gingrich’s Sierra Madre Alliance on other projects.  
 
Gingrich said the controversy that emerged about the Biosphere Reserve 
throughout 2005 grew out of misunderstandings about what the reserve entailed. 
Gingrich said the original concept was to limit the biosphere to the area of 
canyon lands in the lower – not the upper Tarahumara through which the 
Conchos flows--  but that CONANP and the State Government and governor had 
wanted to make it a bigger project and had consulted with him in coming up with 
appropriate boundaries. Gingrich’s group was contracted in 2004 to consult with 
communities and come up with a plan. An original proposal that was even larger 
– almost 1.2 million hectares – was scaled down, but still included the lands of 
the Río Conchos watershed, which had become newsworthy and part of the 
dialogue (Gingrich, personal communication with author, 2005). 
 
“Whether or not the Conchos watershed is included, I could care less,” he states 
matter-of-factly.  
 
The “backlash,” he said, didn’t occur until after the original studies and 
boundaries were made public, even though he and others through a CONANP 
contract had been consulting with municipal and indigenous leaders for months. 
“The Jesuits – and some of the NGOs – went berserk on a total disinformation 
campaign that you wouldn’t be able to burn wood or harvest medicinal plants 




In an effort to “add to the discussion” WWF, SMA and others decided to sponsor 
a forum on the Biosphere Reserve Idea called “Indigenas, Campesinos y 
Recursos Naturales (Indigenous, Campesinos and Natural Resources) in June of 
2005 and brought in experts to discuss the positive and negative experiences of 
other biosphere reserves.  
 
“The idea was not to present the Sierra Tarahumara as a possible reserve, but 
just discuss in detail what the experience had actually been of other reserves,” 
explained WWF’s Arias (Arias, personal communication with author, 2005). 
“What we showed is that there was no example of reserves actually forcing 
indigenous off their land – as many were claiming – but at the same time they 
had not lived up to their potential.”  
 
If Arias’s gamble to enter the discussion sought to allay fears, it appears that the 
forum cemented the view that WWF was actually a closet supporter of the idea, 
and that there were continual problems with biosphere reserves in Mexico 
affecting indigenous rights.  
 
“WWF organized the big conference on the Biosphere Reserve in part in 
response to the criticism and it was informative, but what was alarming is that 
there were no indigenous peoples,” remembered Fuerza Ambiental’s Gina Uribe. 
“It showed that the Biosphere Reserve hadn’t really benefited anyone.” 
 
Officials in Carichí – one of the proposed municipalities inside the proposed 
boundaries – were clearly opposed to any discussion of the idea in 2005. 
 
“We have told WWF and everyone else that we have no interest in a Biosphere 
Reserve,” noted Carichí’s Rural Development Director, Leopaldo Calzadillas. 
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“There have been successful and not so successful cases, but we don’t want 
anything that could take the indigenous off their land. Everyone here – the ejidos, 
the police, the municipality, the church, the private landowner – is against this 
idea.” (Calzadillas, Leopoldo, Personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Padre “Nacho” is one of three priests who runs the Catholic Church in the 
Municipal Capital of Carichíc. A member of the “Congregation of the Most Holy 
Redeemer” – a Roman Catholic missionary order dedicated to providing 
“dignity for the poor” founded in 1732 by Saint Alphonsus Liguori – Padre 
“Nacho” had been working in the area for nine years. (Padre Nacho, Personal 
Communication, 2005).  
 
“They are offensive expressions when groups like WWF talk about the natural 
“riches” of the area and … they say shamelessly what interests them is not the 
land but the water,” he explained. “They don’t give any information about their 
true goals and they just decide where they will work.” 
 
He contrasted this fly-by-night approach with CONTEC and COSYDDHAC, which 
he said had worked cooperatively for years with local communities. 
 
“No one disagrees with the need to protect mother earth, that’s not the point of 
the debate, but what do the terms of a reserve really mean,” he explained. “What 
happens to people and their culture when suddenly you say in the name of a 
reserve they must use natural gas not wood?”  
 
Maria Teresa Guerrero, fiery leader of CONTEC, a community-based non-
governmental organization with some 15 years experience working in the Sierra, 
is decided in her approach to the reserve idea.  
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“I am opposed for three reasons. First, the reserve should have been the 
culmination of a public process, not the beginning. Second, the care of natural 
resources can only come from the local community not from a decree and third, a 
reserve area does not guarantee its care, what it does lead to is a privatization of 
land.”  
 
In September of 2005, nearly a year after the announcement was made, and 
after several attempts in the national congress failed to advance the project, 
CONANP announced it was looking to hire a group or consultant to “advice and 
develop the previous study justifying the decree and fix the limits of the Sierra 
Tarahumara Biosphere Reserve.” The contract would pay about $1,500 per 
month and would operate out of CONANP offices in Cuauhtémoc. (Comisión 
Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas 2005)  
 
Writing in a journal article in 2005 before major opposition to the Reserve 
emerged, Gingrich advocated a bottom-up decentralized planning process to put 
teeth into the reserve concept, which would build on the work that the Sierra 
Madre Alliance, its Mexican counterpart organization – the Consejo EcoRegional 
-- and groups like CONTEC have performed with local communities. Gingrich 
writes: 
 
The results to date and potential for watershed restoration and 
regional conservation are impressive: a 3 million acre “Sierra 
Tarahumara” Biosphere Reserve has been proposed by the 
National Commission of Protected Areas (CONANP), the State of 
Chihuahua, and the Consejo EcoRegional. This large scale reserve 
will integrate a number of community proposed protected areas, as 
well as regional watershed and riparian area restoration initiatives 
planned in the Conchos, Fuerte, and Papigochic watersheds. Nine 
municipios, once dependent upon timber, have joined with over 50 
indigenous governors to date to support the Biosphere Reserve 
proposal. They are beginning to embrace conservation as an 
 242 
integral part of rural development. These accomplishments are 
being made by listening to and supporting the most difficult local 
priorities such as resolution of land conflicts. In the future, 
international and multilateral funded programs must respect the 
growing strength of NGO and citizen participation. CONANP and 
the Consejo EcoRegional are setting new standards of grassroots 
participation, a process that needs to be nurtured with greater 
international and national support. (Gingrich 2005: 364.) 
 
Still, by 2007, the wider biosphere reserve idea was officially dead, and instead a 
series of smaller “cultural” reserves in specific locations were being advocated by 
Gingrich, CONANP and others. In explaining the death of the larger biosphere 
project, while acknowledging that part of the problem was the government’s fast-
tracking of the proposal without first seeking community input, Gingrich wrote in 
the Sierra Madre Alliance website:  
 
Despite the clear indication of positive benefits for indigenous 
groups and other residents, opposition from the Jesuits and 
CONTEC continued to mount in 2005. International mining 
companies and some of the most corrupt logging interests in the 
state continued to aggressively attacked the proposal……SMA 
and CONANP for a time were ludicrously labeled the biggest 
threat to the economic security and culture of the Sierra 
Tarahumara by this coalition of hysterical clergy and industry 
leaders. (Gingrich 2007). 
 
Instead, Gingrich, the SMA and others went back to working in individual 
communities to build up support for a “grassroots” Biosphere Reserve ejido by 
ejido: 
 
Eventually, this network of certified community reserves will form 
the grassroots basis for recognizing the Sierra as a natural 
Biosphere Reserve.  The groups which stalled the Biosphere 
Reserve planning process do not represent either the ejidos or the 
indigenous pueblos who own the lands, or the municipios who will 
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benefit from economic diversification and promotion of the region. 
(Gingrich 2007) 
 
The often bitter fight over the designation of the biosphere reserve – while 
outside the more narrow bounds of the dispute over low-flows from the Río 
Conchos – was part of the larger battle over who is invited to participate in 
decision-making over natural resource use, and how that participation is 
perceived by various interests. What is interesting is how perception of larger 
NGOs like WWF – culled through investigations of other experiences in other 
parts of Mexico – was seized upon by local clergy, NGOs and indigenous leaders 
to counter a proposal that was not even being advocated by WWF. Local 
communities are reacting to  
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V. Jesús de Carichíc: Cattle and Conservation 
 
A. Municipal Festivities 
 
The mood is festive in the Municipal Capital of Carichí – officially known as Jesús 
de Carichíc --  on October 8th, 2005. It is the new mayor’s (municipal president) 
first Government Report – el Primer Informe de Gobierno –a requirement in all of 
Mexico’s municipalities.  
 
Pick-up trucks filled with indigenous farmers and mestizo ranchers flow through 
the few streets of Carichí, the municipal capital toward the town Gymnasium, 
built under the previous three-year administration (Photo 4.12). School buses bus 
whole communities in from more distant lands. Others arrive from outlying 
communities by horse or even by foot.  
 
Filling up the rows inside the gymnasium are representative of the two main 
cultural groups making up Carichí’s population of approximately 10,000. 
Indigenous women in traditional, bright skirts and frilly shirts occupy entire rows, 
while their husbands, most in more modern dress, but with their traditional 
sandals and worn feet, sit behind, white hats squarely on their heads.  More 
traditional Raramuri men wear instead a brightly-colored headband and 
traditional loose shirts. The next rows are occupied by Carichí’s mestizo business 
class, women in dresses and high heels, ranchers in tan-colored sombreros and 
leather cowboy boots with tight jeans. Mexican flags adorn the podium. A large 
banner declares the theme of the governor’s first year in office: United in Effort.  
 




New President Santiago Martínez Gutierrez is a local rancher from El Álamo de 
Ojos Azules, down the hill from Carichí itself, and a relative newcomer to politics. 
His 30-minute presentation, accompanied at times by power-point slides with 
digital photographs, is largely a litany of projects that his administration has 
brought to both the municipal capital, and outlying communities -- utilizing 
municipal, state and federal funds. If there is a theme to the evening, it is that this 
administration will not favor one group over another, but listen to all Carichí 
residents and look for solutions “united by effort.”  (Martinez  2005: 48.) 
 
Surprisingly – or not – missing from Martinez’s pronouncements are any mention 
of the main difficulties that local farmers and ranchers often cite: a drought of 
some 15 years, the loss of fertile soils and vegetation for cattle, and the 
deforestation which is blamed as a partial cause of these other problems as well 
as the lowflows of the tributaries to the Conchos.  
 
B. Carichí Revealed  
 
Located 160 km west of Chihuahua City, and 60 kilometers west of Ciudad 
Cuauhtémoc,  the Municipality of Carichí spans 2,780 square kilometers with 
altitudes ranging from 2,100 to 2,400 meters above sea level. While the road 
from Cd. Cuauhtémoc to Carichí is paved, virtually all others roads within the 
Municipality are not. Traveling from Cd. Cuauhtémoc, one passes the well-
ordered homes of the agricultural communities of the Mennonites, to the mestizo 
ranches of Ojos Azules and other communities, typified by grassy high plains 
spotted with boulders, which themselves slowly give way to an oak-juniper 
savannah. It is the dividing line between the high plains and grasslands of the 
center of the state and the Sierra Madre Occidental to the west.  
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The vegetation corresponds closely with altitudes, with higher altitudes typified by 
pine-oaks forests (2400 meters and above), medium elevations typified by oak-
piñón, and oak-juniper forests and the lowest elevations by grasslands. However, 
because grasslands are generally in those areas used for agriculture and cattle 
raising, few of the original grasslands which typified the area are still present 
(Guerrero 2002: Schmidt 1992: 93).  
 
Precipitation averages 400 to 500 mm per year, with a dry period of 
approximately seven or eight months, and a wet period of four or five (Figure 
4.1). Nonetheless, although a climactic station was operated by State 
Government from 1977 to 1994, there has been no meteorological station run in 
the Municipality since, complicating analysis of drought and rains in the area 
(CONAGUA, Information Provided to Author, 2004). Temperatures taken at that 
station ranged from a high average of 20.2 grades centigrade in June to 6.1 
grades centigrade in December and January, with an annual average 
temperature of 13.3 grades centigrade. (Portillo Terrazas 2005).  
 
Given its rural nature, land use is typified by temporal and irrigation farming, fruit 
orchards, pasture lands for cattle, and forested lands. Like much of Mexico’s 
forested lands, the majority of the lands – some 77 percent – are held by 
agricultural communities called ejidos, rather than private hands (Table 4.3). 
There are 22 ejidos in Carichí. Among agricultural fields, only a handful of 
hectares are irrigated – either by surface water through gravity or by pumped 
groundwater – all of which are on private lands, most of which is for apple 
orchards. However, in recent years, irrigation of both orchards and hybridized 
corn has increased, in part due to government support and the continued 
persistence of drought-like conditions (Salvador “Chava” Vargas, SAGARPA 










Figure 4.1. Average Monthly Rainfall, Carichí 
 
Source: Servicio Meteorológico, Gobierno del Estado de Chihuahua 
 
When compared to the 1990 Census, there has been a marked decrease in 
population. According to local officials, these changes are due to out-migration 
from the area – principally to Cuauhtémoc and Chihuahua City – and the 
challenges faced by agriculture and cattle raising in recent years (Leopoldo 
Trujillo, Personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Almost all crops in Carichí are grown in the summer and early fall, when 
temperatures and rainfalls make production possible. Local officials say that 
since 1990, the number of hectares planted has shrunk in Carichí, although there 
has been a slight increase in individual crops, notably oats, corn grown for cattle, 
and in the lower regions, apples (Salvador Vargas, Personal Communication, 
2006). In essence, agricultural production in Carichí has shifted partially to feed 
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cattle, a more profitable “crop.” As mentioned, here has also been a slight 
increase in irrigation of apples as drought-like conditions have forced some 
farmers to search for alternative sources of water and to increase yields. In the 
ejidos, on the other hand, traditional crops – beans, corn, oats, and potatoes – 
have continued to be grown as sustenance crops, albeit in reduced yields and 
acreage due to drought-like conditions over the last several years (Figure 4.2). 
Table 4.3. Land Use and Property Type, Carichí Municipality, 2000 
 
Land Use Private  Ejido  Total 
 Hectares % Hectares %  
Irrigation by Gravity 1 <1 0 0 1 
Irrigation by Pump 11 <1 0 0 11 
Orchards in 
Development 
5 <1 0 0 5 
Orchards in 
Production 
14 <1 0 0 14 
Rain-fed 
Agricultural Fields 
3,513 7.1 4,555 1.9 8,068 
Pasture land 45,617 92.8 86,718 36.3 132,335 
Forested/Not 
Identified 
0 0 147,347 61.7 147,347 
Other, Not 
Identified 
0 0 0 0 21,099 
TOTAL 49,161 15.9 238,620 77.2 308,936 
Source: Portillo Terrazas 2005.  
 
While most of the farmers on the eastern slopes on the road toward Cuauhtémoc 
use “hybridized” and improved seeds for corn and oats, most ejido growers use 
locally-grown seeds for corn and beans, although they may use “improved” 











Figure 4.2. Major Crops Grown by Hectares in Carichí, 2000-2005 
 
Source: SAGARPA, State Office, Information provided to Author, 2005.  
 
The other major economic activity in Carichí centers around cattle. Carichí has 
been no exception to the statewide trend to breed young cattle for export. 
According to the Municipality, there are about 45,000 heads of livestock in the 
municipality, including some 10,000 cows. While the largest cattle populations lie 
in ejidos and private lands east of the municipal capital, ejidos in the forested 
mountains also have significant populations of livestock. Most ejidatarios have a 
few mules or horses to help with transportation and tilling fields, and others have 
small populations of cows or goats to provide milk, meat and the occasional calf, 
for sale to middle-men, who then export the young cows to the U.S. for fattening. 
According to Carichí Municipal authorities, during FY 2005, some 7,293 cattle 
left the Municipality in 1,164 trips – paying duties to the Municipality – as well as 
344 smaller livestock such as goats or sheep (Martinez 2005: 26).  
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A recent diagnostic prepared by Municipality listed the following problems in the 
indigenous mountainous regions of Carichí:  
 
 Self-subsistence agriculture 
 They are not open to applying appropriate technological packages to their 
lands 
 They are mainly indigenous producers 
 There are linguistic barriers 
 They are very traditional 
 Most governmental dependencies have programs that are not used or do 
not have the right regulations to reach the population. (Portillo Terrazas 2005, 
author translation) 
 
Thus, according to the diagnostic, the very traditional nature of the ejidos in the 
mountains present barriers to development and progress, while in the hills, the 
lack of technology, overgrazing and some poor soils are the causes of low yields. 
Thus, the problems listed are a combination of farmer ignorance and 
mismanagement and faulty government programs which have not lived up to 
their potential. (Portillo Terrazas 2005).  
 
According to the author of the Diagnostic, the municipality has enacted a number 
of rural development plans designed to foster change in the traditional forms of 
government to farmer relationships, a change reflective in recent policy changes 
in Mexico to move toward greater decentralization of government decision-
making. Portillo Terrazas writes:  
 
From the traditional model of Campesino Organization linked to a 
governmental protectionism and structure toward a new form of 
autonomous organization founded in consensus and open 
mechanisms of participation; from an organization centered only 
around production to one which looked at all the public interests 
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and positions and different levels of government.  The economic 
crisis and the deterioration of natural resources demands 
overcoming the centralism and the politics of a one-size fits all 
approach. Toward the recognition of the diverse natural resources 
and the heterogenous methods of products of producers. A greater 
decentralization of the Nacional and State Institutions and a greater 
protoganism of the local social and municipal groups.  (Portillo 
Terrazas 2005). 
 
Decentralization has been promoted heavily by the Fox Administration, with 
significant support from the World Bank’s Latin American arm (Wilder 2002). This 
effort toward decentralization would  help “solve” issues of mismanagement and 
equity and promote more sustainable use of natural resources. In Carichí, the 
decentralization is occurring, albeit slowly. The main agricultural support 
programs are supported by the federal government through a program called 
“Alianza para el Campo,” Alliance for the Country.” In 2005, after years of being 
run out of the local SAGARPA offices in Cuauhtémoc, it was “municipalized,” 
being turned over to the Municipal Rural Development Department. The program 
provides approximately $2 million pesos (about $200,000) per year, according to 
Rural Development director Leopoldo Calzadillas.  (Calzadillas, personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
 
The Municipality also helps coordinate various federal programs that bring 
money for rural development projects. Thus, between 2003 and 2005, the 
Municipality worked with SEMARNAT to bring $10,000 to four communities – 
Consuelo, Molinares, Bacabureachi and Arroyo del Agua – for soil conservation 
projects through PET program – Temporary Employment Program.  
 
Portillo said a previous program which paid 500 pesos per hectare– aimed at 
mitigating the high number of “carcavos” – literally eroded holes in the ground -- 
through soil erosion controls – largely failed, because once the projects were 
implemented, no special measures were taken to limit cattle or other livestock 
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from the area and no follow-up occurred. There was, said Portillo, “no 
supervision.” 
 
The two other main government projects are still in the hands of SAGARPA, the 
federal agricultural ministry. In 1993, in anticipation of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, Mexico established a program paying farmers growing certain 
crops a direct subsidy to help them compete with internationally-grown crops or 
transition to other crops. PROCAMPO – literally El Programa de Apoyos Directos 
al Campo (Direct Payment Programs to the Farms) – has been dolling out 
millions of dollars to hundreds of thousands of farmers ever since.  
 
While the program was approved initially for only a few basic grains, it was 
expanded in 1996 and now includes rice, corns, beans, cotton, soybeans, 
sorghum, cartámo (safflower), barley and wheat (Salvador Vargas, personal 
communication with author, 2005). Payments are given so long as farmers 
continue to work the lands – even if for example their lands have been turned 
into apple orchards  or even cattle ranches or even an “ecological” project. Thus, 
if you were growing one of the crops covered by the 1996 expansion in 1993, 
and continue to work the land, you will receive the subsidy, intended to keep 
farmers on their land.  
 
About 13,000 hectares in the municipality are covered by the program. Taking 
the call for “decentralization” more seriously, the last few years, SAGARPA 
representative Salvador “Chava” Vargas has taken his government truck directly 
to the ejidos to hand out payments, rather than waiting for ejidatarios to make the 
often long and costly trek to Carichí. At some point, the program is supposed to 
be taken over by the municipal Rural Development offices, but “things move 
more slowly in Carichí” according to Vargas.  
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The program is often criticized by local farmers who say that because it is based 
on surface area, those farmers having the most surface area – the largest and 
wealthiest – receive the most benefit, which is certainly reflected in the statistics. 
Thus, in the case of Carichí, the 92 farmers in the program with 10 hectares or 
more received 26 percent of all the payments in 2005. Still, at approximately 
$1000 pesos per hectare, these “poverty” payments have been one of the keys 
to the continued survival of farming in the Sierra.  
 
Table 4.4. Payments to Farmers under PROCAMPO, Municipality of Carichí, 2005 











1,573 93% 9,218 73% 10,341,045 73% 
10 hectares 
or more 




Note: Total do not add up, because payments to approximately 20 farmers covering 
approximately 150 hectares were still being resolved as of November, 2005. 
Source: Salvador Vargas, SAGARPA, Delegation to Carichí, Cuauhtémoc Rural 
Development District, State of Chihuahua, 2005.  
 
The second major agricultural program was begun in  2003, and was designed to 
bolster cattle production, and in particular, production of young cattle which are 
prized for export to the U.S. market. The program paid 350 pesos per fertile 
“womb” to eligible cattle raisers in 2003, a total that was raised to 500 pesos in 
2005. Not all cattle raisers applied in time to qualify however. In Carichí in 2004, 
for example, only 27 families and 2,130 “wombs” – about 25% of the cattle that 
might be eligible --  applied in time to take advantage of the program.  
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The program is supposed to come with a catch – to be eligible, ranchers must 
prove that they are grazing at less than the recommended five hectare per cow 
grazing intensity coefficient established for the region. Nonetheless, SAGARPA 
officials admit that inspections have been rare, and thus far, no payments have 
been taken away for failure to meet these guidelines. Supposedly, in 2006, 
SAGARPA will crack down on those not meeting cattle ranging guidelines.  
 
“Farmers usually just underreport the number of cattle they have so they will be 
eligible for PROGAN,” admits Vargas. “But we certainly don’t want to be 
subsidizing soil erosion.”  
 
C. Molinares and El Consuelo 
 
1. Fishing for Pesos 
 
In the town of Molinares, Municipality of Carichí,  there is an ejido meeting set for 
10 am on a sunny Friday morning in October of 2005. Members of the ejido 
arrive slowly, meeting initially outside the local DICONSA – a state-supported but 
individually run local rural store with basic foods and goods. The ejidatario 
member who runs the store sells chips and sodas to the arriving farmers. Soon, 
the ejido comisariado – akin to the president -- his brother and father arrive in 
pick-up trucks from the nearby town of Arroyo del Agua and sit on the porch 
steps. Even getting enough ejidatarios to make a quorum can be problematic. 
But then this meeting holds some promise – the Municipal President from Carichí 
has promised to bring subsidized corn seed and the Ejido president has told 
those meeting that there is approximately $50,000 – about $5,000 U.S. – from 
SEMARNAT for some soil conservation projects within the ejido. Free corn seed 
and potential employment has a way of attracting participants.  
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By 12 p.m, about 35 ejidatarios move from outside the DICONSA store and file 
into the Ejido meeting hall. Although Municipal President Santiago Martinez has 
yet to arrive, the ejido’s comisariado, Reginaldo Mendoza,  decides to start the 
meeting. Speakingly haltingly, the 40 year-old Mendoza announces that “help 
has arrived” in the form of $50,000 pesos from the federal environmental agency 
SEMARNAT for soil conservation. The idea, he says, is to make filtration dams 
and trenches on the slope of a mountain overlooking the town of Molinares. 
Some two years previous, a fire had taken out dozens of hectares of pine forests, 
and slides of mud and swift run-offs of rains has been common since, affecting 
downslope agricultural fields and pasture land (Photo 4.13). 
 
 
Photo 4.13. Farmers discuss denuded hill above agricultural fields and cattle 
pastures of Molinares, Carichí. Truck in foreground is from municipality and has 
subsidized corn seeds.  
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The community members agree that they will all meet the following Sunday at 10 
am on the hillside and begin work. Those that work will be paid. Several ejido 
members discuss how they will let those who work in Cuauhtémoc know so they 
can “benefit” from the soil conservation program.  
 
Municipal President Martinez arrives in his pick-up, followed by a large flatbed 
truck, which rolls down the mountain side, carrying 50-kilo sacks of yellow corn 
wrapped with rope. Martinez, after signing the ejido ledger, reiterates his desire 
to run a “unified” government where all communities benefit, says that he is here 
to discuss municipal programs, listen to their ideas, and distribute the “corn feed.” 
The community decides that each ejidatario will receive 100 kilos for free, while 
each “neighbor” that does not have land will receive one fifty-kilo bag.  
 
Martinez then launches into a discussion of the other programs and projects 
being considered by the Municipality. Alianza del Campo (alliance for the fields) 
he announces, is available for applications. “Much of the help from Alianza 
comes only to the municipal capital,” Martinez laments. “But I would like to see 
the ejidos apply….”  
 
An ejidatario stands up and tells Martinez that he wants to apply “but we lose our 
enthusiasm when we have applied for many years and there are always 
commitments with the politicians. These programs are raffled off at the top.” 
 
Another says, referring to a program to partially support the purchase of cows or 
“improved” bulls, “how are we going to buy anything, if we have no bills with 
which to pay?” 
 
Martinez agrees that improvements are needed, and that he is overseeing the 
Rural Development Committee to make sure the wealth is spread throughout the 
Municipality. The farmers stream out of the hall and begin to load up their horses 
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or pick-up trucks with the sacks of corn and begin the long treks back to their 
homes, fields and pens.  
 
2. Molinares: Just the Facts 
 
Molinares was first recognized as an ejido in 1938, when then President Lopez 
Portillo made the official declaration. At 4,800 hectares, it is a small ejido, and the 
majority of families live in Molinares itself, a ramshackle town in an alluvial valley 
surrounded by pine forest hills, although the deforestation of the hills above and 
the gully formations in the valleys below are obvious. Traveling from Maguillachi , 
on passes Molinares itself on a dirt road, which continues over a mountain pass 
and descends into another town, Arroyo del Agua, where other ejidatarios live. A 
river runs through the community, with homes mainly in the hills above the river 
valley itself. Finally, if you continue along the same road – and again pass over a 
mountain -- you arrive at El Consuelo, a newer community, whose residents may 
have lands in the ejido of Molinares or the newly christened ejido of El Consuelo.  
 
There are 48 ejido members in Molinares, and interestingly, it is one of the few 
ejidos in Carichí that is a “mixed” ejido, with 18 “mestizo” ejidatarios and 30 
“tarahumara” indigenous ejidatarios. According to current Ejido Comisariado 
Mendoza, the ejido was actually founded by the “mestizos,” even though there 
are more indigenous, but generally relations are good “between the two races.” 
Mendoza, speaking from his home in Arroyo del Agua, some 100 meters from 
the local stream itself, should know, the product of a Tarahumara mother and a 
father who emigrated here from the State of Coahuila many years ago to “find 
land.” 
 
Mendoza says recent years have been difficult for the ejido. Rains have arrived 
too late and too infrequently for corn yields to be sufficient to feed families and 
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cattle, and the previous source of income – a forestry permit to allow for logging 
– was canceled in 2003. 
 
Table 4.5. Some Basic Information about Molinares Ejido  
Category Number 
Official Date of Founding of Ejido 1938 
Number of Ejidatarios 48 
Total Hectares in Ejido 4,800 
Total “agricultural” lands available for 
farming 
307.25 
Average/Maximum/Minimum Hectares per 
Farmer 
6.4/21/2.5 
Communal Land “Pasture” Right per Farmer 150 hectares 
Total Number of Livestock  876 
Total Number of Cattle 494 
Average/Maximum/Minimum 3.85/30/0 
Total Number of Tractors 3 
Last year ejido had Forestry Management 
Plan for logging 
2003 
Source: Portillo Terrazas 2005: Appendix A.  
 
“We asked for another permit, but they did a study, and said we no longer had 
enough forest,” he notes. Mendoza said part of the problem was due to illegal 
logging from “outsiders,” as well as some corruption with a previous 
“administration,” meaning the ejido was being fined “for something that wasn’t 
our fault.” He notes that even gathering dead wood for heating homes and 
cooking “is now controlled by the Municipality.” 
 
In 2004, Mendoza took the community through PROCEDE – the program 
instituted by Mexico as part of its 1992 reform of Article 27 of the Constitution. 
Under the program, ejidos can voluntarily have the boundaries of their ejidos 
properly measured and certified, as well as their household plots, agricultural 
lands – and if the ejido chooses – their “common lands,” the lands used mainly 
for either forestry activities or grazing of animals.  
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In Molinares, the Assembly decided to have both their household lots and 
agricultural lands titled, and have their common property certified, but not 
measured off as private property. “It means that any ejidatario can sell his land or 
his common property right to another ejidatario without getting permission,” 
Mendoza explained, “but not to someone outside the community.”  
 
While Mendoza is in many ways the public face of the ejido before government 
officials, other government aid and “spiritual” issues – traditional dances and 
festivals, church-related activity and indigenous issues – is coordinated with the 
Indigenous Governor, “Nacho,” who lives up the hill from Mendoza, among pine 
trees overlooking the alluvial valley (Photo 4.14).  
 
 




As a leader in Arroyo del Agua, Nacho is the “indigenous governor” for both 
Arroyo del Agua and Consuelo, working with ejidatarios and neighbors from both 
El Consuelo and Molinares. He is an “indigenous” bridge between two 
communities and has been serving in that post for five years. (Gobernador 
Nacho, Arroyo del Agua, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
“You make a request and you direct the support when it arrives, which is very 
rare,” he stated. He said the most positive change in the community was the long 
struggle to bring potable water to homes after streams and previous shallow 
wells and springs seemed to dry up. “It’s a community good that we had to fight 
for.”  
 
3. El Consuelo: the “new” ejido 
 
 
The roots of Arroyo del Agua and El Consuelo date back some fifty years,  when 
the children of the original residents of Molinares began to settle in the alluvial 
valleys in El Consuelo and Arroyo del Agua to be closer to the land they were 
farming. However, as that land was distributed among members of the Molinares 
Ejido, their children began to open up new farming lands in “bajiíos” – lowlands 
with fertile alluvial soils outside the boundaries of the Molinares ejido itself. They 
did so peacefully, without incident, before a land dispute erupted.   
 
According to an elderly Tarahumara ejidatario who lives in the town of El 
Consuelo, the residents began to seek legal rights to the land in the mid-1960s. 
Nevertheless, when they sought rights to the land they had been farming, two 
families claimed the land was theirs, and even began putting up a fence to raise 
cattle (Gumercindo Torres, personal communication with author, October 2005). 
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“I was the local police representative for the community, and they began to put a 
fence up, but we took it down,” Torres, walking among his oat fields, remembers. 
“The guy who helped me was Governor Fernando Baeza, who gave me an order 
allowing me to take the fence down. Then the rich sent the “Federales (federal 
police)” there but I showed them the order to stop the fence construction. The 
“outside” families continued the court battle over the land. But we told the court in 
Chihuahua….. go to our land, their homes do not exist. The lawyer was very 
angry because the poor people – us – won that case.” 
 
While they won that particular fight, the land dispute was far from over. While 
Torres himself stopped going to Chihuahua, a new group of leaders from Arroyo 
del Agua and El Consuelo took up the legal fight and in 1992 asked for 2,600 
hectares of land to benefit 41 families. Finally, in 1996, in a partial victory, a 
Presidential Resolution granted 1,805 hectares to the 41 families. In 2000, the 
PROCEDE process determined that only 29 families remained in the area. 
 
In 2005, El Consuelo continued to fight for an additional 800 hectares that is still 
the subject of a dispute with another private landowner, but have left the case 
largely in the hands of CONTEC, a non-governmental organization which is 
continuing to pursue the case (María Teresa (“Peti”) Guerrero, personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
 
Today, El Consuelo is home to 29 ejidatarios split between Arroyo de Agua and 
El Consuelo. The town of El Consuelo is home to 14 families and 83 people, 
although several of the families have ejidal rights to farming land within the 
boundaries of Molinares.  About 70 percent of the population is less than 30 
years old. Among the 29 ejidatarios, on the other hand, only five of the 29 were 
less than 30 years old in 2004, indicating a potential future problem of land for 
the their sons and daughters (CONTEC 2004).  
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Like Molinares, residents depend on subsistence farming and livestock to eke out 
a living among the hills and valleys, and many have a family vegetable garden to 
supplement their diet (Photo 3.15). Residents and farmers interviewed by the 
NGO CONTEC reported that following the drought years of the 1950s – when 
many animals died and crops were scarce – the 1960s were typified by high 
rains and high corn yields, and low production costs, since most fertilizers 
consisted of animal wastes and seeds were grown locally. By the 1990s, 
however, rains and yields were low, and the use of “artificial” fertilizers and costs 
were now high, since farmers often had to purchase seeds from outside the 
community. (CONTEC 2004).  
 
Photo 4.15. Home in El Consuelo with Family Garden and Greenhouse.  
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Table 4.6. Some Basic Information about El Consuelo Ejido 
Category Number 
Official Date of Founding of Ejido 1999 
Number of Ejidatarios 29 
Total Hectares in Ejido 1,805 
Total “agricultural” plots available for 
farming 
113 
Average/Maximum/Minimum Hectares 3.9/10/1.0 
Communal Land “Pasture” Right Informal right, no specific amount 
earmarked 
Total Number of Livestock  245 
Total Number of Cattle 101 
Average/Maximum/Minimum Number of 
Cattle 
3.5/21/0 
Total Number of Tractors 3 
Last year ejido had Forestry Management 
Plan for logging 
------ 
Source: Portillo Terrazas, 2005, Diagnóstico Carichí, Appendix A and Interviews with 
Community Leaders, 2005. 
 
Despite the continued unease about the differing land claims in the area, the new 
ejido of El Consuelo is a success, say its residents. In 1999, they elected their 
first ejido comisariado, Juan Jose Sinaloa, a middle-aged tarahumara who lives 
in Arroyo del Agua. Sinaloa, who served as both the first comisariado (1999-
2002), and its most recent (2005-2008), is energetic, optimistic and generally 
appears be well-liked in the community.  
 
Sinaloa said the community has resisted calls to divvy up their land or give up the 
fight for the 800 hectares which lies to the north of the ejido’s present 
boundaries. “We prefer not to proceed with PROCEDE to divide up our lands,” he 
noted from his front porch. “It is better to give your land to a son, then to divide 
up the ejido.” (Juan José Sinaloa, Comisariado, Ejido El Consuelo, Carichí, 
personal communication with author, 2005. ) 
 
Unlike Molinares, there are not many suitable places for cattle grazing, and while 
there are approximately 100 cattle in the ejido, the majority are kept in pens at 
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night and grazed in certain locations during the day, although it is not uncommon 
to see a pair of cows grazing at the top of a hillside (Photo 4.16).   
 
 
Photo 4.16. Cows Forage in the Pine and Oak Hills Above El Consuelo 
 
Most members of the community wish to preserve the forest and land they have, 
Sinaloa believed. While they have a Plan de Manejo Forestal – a Forestry 
Management Plan – it is designed to help them reforest the area, not cut down 
trees, and there is an agreement among the farmers not to change the terms of 
the plan to allow logging, at least until the forests return (Sinaloa, personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
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Between 1999 and 2005, the community worked on a variety of projects 
designed to make better use of their lands and resources. In addition to 
developing a non-logging Forestry Management Plan, the community began a 
land use identification and planning effort knows as an “Ordenamiento 
Ecológico.”.11 
 
Walking hand and step with them was CONTEC, the small NGO headquartered 
in Chihuahua City that has clashed so publicly with the Sierra Madre Alliance 
over the biosphere reserve project. Director Maria Teresa Guerrero, a sociologist 
by training, had been working for COSYDDHAC, the human rights advocacy 
group, since 1990 and had been focusing on both indigenous rights and 
environmental issues like deforestation, toxic wastes and garbage disposal. 
Nevertheless, she started CONTEC with substantial international support when it 
became clear to her that the key was not only legal victories over land use, but 
“better organization” within the community.  
 
In 2005, CONTEC was working with eight communities in the Municipality of 
Carichí, as well as others throughout the Sierra Tarahumara. The roots to the 
work in El Consuelo started both with CONTEC’s involvement in the decision 
before the Agrarian Tribunal as well as their “Winter Schools,” workshops with 
indigenous leaders in the nearby ejido of Maguillachi. The workshops were 
generally focused on natural resource use and communal organization. Guerrero 
said they are careful to work within existing structures of the community – but 
avoiding those who would use the process for political gain --  and allow the 
community to be the ones who do the inviting to avoid the type of “participation” 
for which so many larger NGOs working in rural environments have been 
criticized (Walker et. al 2007).  
                                                
11 Ecological Ordering  is a land use planning tool established in the Mexican general federal 
environmental law. INE, Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y Protección al Ambiente, Titulo 
Primero, Art.3 fracción XXIII 
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Several of the residents of Consuelo attended these workshops, which included, 
among other projects, efforts to impart a new technology – known as Estufa 
Lorenas (Lorena Ovens)– wood-burning stoves to cook and heat the wood and 
adobe homes. The stoves cook more efficiently and require less wood than 
traditional tarahumara stoves, an example of “appropriate technology” according 
to Guerrero. 
 
Another major effort were the soil conservation projects, which CONTEC calls 
“agroecological” practices. These projects attempted to use tried and true 
campesino land management techniques – including Tarahumaran “trincheras” 
which can be used as a kind of check dam to catch fertile soils --to lower the 
erosional forces of wind and water common in the area (Doolittle 2000). Rather 
than seeding and plowing in straight lines using horse drawn plows, the winter 
“school” taught farmers to follow the contour of the lands through the use of 
topographical  “curvas de nivel” when seeding – rather than using straight lines 
so that the corn and beans could take advantage of the natural contours of the 
land. In addition, depending on the slopes of the land, trenches were added 
every ten yards or so – wider ditches called zanjas de filtración with a trinchera 
mound on either side to provide an area for water and soil to run off into – a 
place for any gullies forming to be stopped in their track. Finally, at the end of 
agricultural fields – particularly in areas close to streams – muros de contención 
– contention walls – of stone and wood were added as a final resting place for 
eroding lands.  
 
The experiments with fields began in Maguillachi, where COSYDDHAC had 
already been working. Then, in the winter of 1999 and 2000, as part of their 
“winter schools”, farmers began to perfect the techniques. The work was 
supported both by the Municipal Presidency and SEMARNAT over a three-year 
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period in a variety of ejidos in Carichí. A similar project also began in the town of 
Bacabureachi, closer to the Municipal Capital. Between Maguillachi, El Consuelo 
and Bacabureachi, farmers working with CONTEC made changes to 65 
agricultural fields covering approximately 50 hectares with the intention of 
maintaining soils, decreasing erosion, helping to restore riparian areas and 
keeping soils humid (Table 4.7) In Consuelo, approximately 15 farmers 
implemented soil conservation projects on at least one of their fields between 
2003 and 2005, and a handful in the neighboring ejido of Molinares have done 
the same (Sinaloa, personal communication with author, 2005). Experiments to 
measure the amount of soil retained in 2003 revealed that over 180 tons of soils 
were being “retained” in agricultural fields that might otherwise have washed into 
local streams.  
 
Table 4.7. Soil Conservation Projects enacted by farmers in three communities in 
Carichí in coordination with CONTEC, 2003 















Consuelo 29 24 21 5388 92.1 
Maguillachi 74 20 9 1685 28.8 
Bacabureachi 94 21 12 3664 62.6 
Total  197 65 42 10737 183.5 
Source: CONTEC, information provided to author, 2005.  
 
Still, while generally positive about the “soil erosion” projects, local leaders say 
the lack of support since 2003 has kept the projects from being extended ejido-
wide. In addition, because of low rains in recent years, the advertised positive 
benefits have not all materialized – there is no rain to catch and therefore no soil 
run-off to maintain or of more concern, no crops even being grown in some 
areas. Finally, the projects have not been universally successful, depending upon 
the type of soils, slope of the land, and care with which they have been 
implemented (Reed, Water and Land Use Survey, Carichí, 2005).  
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“There hasn’t been such a positive result because it hasn’t rained,” explained 
Sinaloa. “We had planned on evaluating their success again this year, but 
because the rains were late, very few people have actually planted their fields 
this year, and there is nothing to evaluate.”  
 
 
Photo 4.17. Field in El Consuelo owned by Ejido Comisariado Sinaloa which 
participated in soil conservation projects.  
 
Another major effort encapsulating several of CONTEC’s programs is 
reforestation efforts. Frustrated by the experience of reforesting part of the El 
Consuelo ejido that had been affected by fires using trees that did not acclimate 
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well to the particular area, Guerrero and the local ejidos begged, borrowed and 
worked to create their own nursery. Today, the nursery sits behind the 
community store in Maguillachi and it is hoped that it will provide the seedling to 




Photo 4.18. The new nursery in Maguillachi, supported by community and local 
NGO, CONTEC.  
 
One of the major efforts of CONTEC is to use the “watershed” as an organizing 
principle, as a way to get the community to think about its resources.  
 
“Our unit of work is really the boundaries of the ejido, not the watershed itself, but 
the watershed – which is a technical term – helps bridge the connection between 
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the political boundaries and the natural boundaries, “ Guerrero said. Through a 
series of winter workshops, some 15 ejido and non-ejido members of the 
communities of Consuelo and Arroyo del Agua participated in the winter 
workshop and began to study the hydrology of their lands as a precursor to full-
scale Ecological Planning. They traversed fields, studied soils and vegetations, 
found the origins of springs and streams and generally mapped their ejido in a 
participatory manner.  
 
They also spoke about the problems facing their communities – the drought, 
erosion of soils, the impacts of some kinds of fertilizers, the loss of the forest, the 
dependence on monoculture of corn, the loss of native seeds, fires, and the lack 
of access to agricultural land, among other challenges cited (CONTEC 2004). 
Another more specific problem mentioned was the “invasion” by a species of 
shrub which often appears following logging or forest fire: Manzanilla.  
Scientifically known as Arctostaphylos Pungens (Manzanilla or Mexican 
Manzanita), the smooth red-barked shrub with dusty green leaves grows well in 
dry climates, tolerates alkaline soils and crowds out and often prevents 
reforestation of pines and oaks (Photo 4.19). According to the community 
diagnostic, CONTEC found that manzanilla and other “secondary” succession 
plants dominated about 20 percent of the landscape, with conifer forests, mixed 
woods, fire denuded landscape and cropland making up the rest (Figure 4.3).  
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Figure 4.3. Land use type in El Consuelo Ejido 
 
Source: CONTEC 2004. 
In an agricultural survey conducted in 2003, CONTEC found that farmers were 
using approximately half their farmland to grow corn, only eight percent to grow 
beans, five percent for oats and the rest of the land – 36 percent --  was resting 
in fallow (CONTEC 2004).  
 
It was against this backdrop that the community began both the soil conservation 
programs and the reforestation of 20 hectares of a hillside, which had been 
burned to a crisp in 2000. Using both pinus engelman y arizonica, the ejido 
received trees from a nursery in Ciudad Juarez and planted them with assistance 
from CONTEC in 2002 and 2003. The reforestation effort, according to Sinaloa, 
has been “mediocre” as many of the trees have not responded to the particular 
climate of El Consuelo as well as to continued relatively dry years.  
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Photo 4.19. Manzanilla dots this fire-affected landscape, Ejido of El 
Consuelo, 2004 
 
“This side of the mountain does not receive much rain,” Sinaloa remarked after 
traversing up the side of the mountain with the author. On the other side, 
vegetation of all types – oaks, pines, ferns and flowering plants -- had returned 
with a vengeance, without the aid of replanting.  
 
The hydrological study conducted by the Ejido with assistance from CONTEC is 
detailed and reveals a ejido, that while in the Rio Conchos (and Rio 
Grande/Bravo) watershed, is home to dozens of micro-watersheds. Using both 
modern techniques – GIS and GPS – and participatory mapping techniques, the 
experiment allowed the residents to gain an understanding of how their land and 
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rivers are connected to their neighbors, regionally to the City of Delicias and 
eventually to  the U.S.   
 
 
Photo 4.20. Reforestation project, El Consuelo, on hill above agricultural fields. 
 
“We had heard something about the Conchos watershed, but we didn’t know that 
we were part of it. Now we know that we are part of the discussion with the 
United States,” said Fidencio Garcia, the former comisariado of the ejido (2002-
2005).  
 
Local residents say the workshops help them understand what they already 
instinctively knew – that both climate and land vegetation and use played a role 
in the availability of water for their crops, cattle and homes.  It also led to 
decisions about protecting certain areas within the ejido.  
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“In 2002, there was no water in the streams,” Fidencio García explained. “We 
learned to take care of the springs, give them maintenance, protect them, take 
care of the vegetation of the recharge zone, prevent logging and animals in the 
areas near the springs.” (Fidencio García, personal communication with author, 
2005).  
 
“In the past we would make our trenches and crops as straight as possible with 
oxen and horses because it was easier and we did not think about how it cut 
across the natural slope of the land,” García remarked. “Over time, though, we 
began to see how the currents of water from rain were cutting through the 
zurcos, carrying the soil into the streams.”  
 
4. Surveying the Community: Voices of Consuelo and Molinares 
 
During September and October of 2005, 20 surveys were conducted with 
residents of El Consuelo and Arroyo del Agua (see Appendix A). The surveys, 
which were anonymous, were conducted with those residents who had 
agricultural land – either owned or rented. The survey generally took  
approximately 30 to 45 minutes to administer. A sheet of informational material in 
Spanish was also provided to the respondent explaining the purpose of the 
survey, information about the author, as well as the fact that it would be collected 
and analyzed anonymously (see Appendix B). The information contained on the 
paper was summarized verbally by the surveyor and the respondent was asked if 
it were acceptable to proceed.  
 
Respondents were sought in their homes in both El Consuelo and Arroyo del 
Agua. It is important to note that all who were approached did express a 
willingness to participate in the survey, although in some cases it was necessary 
to return at a more convenient time.  
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The survey is divided into nine sections: Demographic Information, Land 
Property, Land Use, Water Use, Drought Severity and Impacts, Conservation 
Projects, Free Trade Impact and Organizational Support and Opinions (see 
Appendix A). All surveys were coded and entered into a basic statistical program 
called SPSS 11.0. In all, there were 10 respondents from El Consuelo, 9 from 
Molinares and one from Maguillachi. The average amount of hectares that was 
owned was 5.13 hectares, with totals ranging from a single hectare to 13, but the 
average number of hectares that were planted in 2005 was slightly less at 4.07, 
because half of the respondents left some of their land fallow. Thus, while 10 
reported planting all of their land that year, the other nine owning land planted 
between 38 and 75 percent of their land with crops.  
 
Table 4.8. Property and Livestock Owned. Survey, 2005, El Consuelo and Arroyo 
del Agua 
Category N with Valid 
Response 















16 2.00 20.00 8.06 6.21 
Source: Reed, 2005. Survey.  
 
This brief section will highlight some of the major findings, related to agricultural 
change, the drought, soil conservation projects and organizational support. While 
the present chapter presents an overall summary of the survey results, more 
detailed survey results are available from the author upon request. 
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Respondents were asked a series of questions about changes that had occurred 
in their lands over the last 10 years and asked to rate to what degree there had 
been changes in that particular factor (see Figure 4.4). There was also an 
opportunity for respondents to add other factors that might have changes over 
the last 10 years that were not part of the standardized answers.  
 
Figure 4.4. Number of Affirmative Respondents and Points for “Changes” 
identified on their fields over last 15 years (N=20, Maximum Number of Points =60)  
 
 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “large” change, two points for a medium change 
and one for a small changed, based on the opinion of the surveyed.  
Source: Reed, 2005 Chihuahua Land and Water Survey.  
 
Farmers said they were planting less hectares of crop, using less fertilizer, 
conserving more native seeds and were involved in reforestation projects. They 
also mentioned the increased use of organic fertilizers and soil conservation 
projects outside of the standardized survey results when asked to expand on 
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their answers. There were three main reasons why they were farming less and 
attempting to conserve more: the drought, the increased cost of fertilizers and the 
lack of government support (see Figure 4.5). Other factors – including NAFTA, 
market prices and costs – were barely mentioned for these non-market-based 
farmers, while physical changes such as tired soils, late rains and invasion by 
secondary species such as Manzanilla were mentioned when farmers were 
asked for more detailed information than the structured survey provided.  
 
Figure 4.5. Number of Affirmative Respondents and Points for Major “Factors” 
identified as contributing to their fields over last 15 years (N=20, Maximum Points 
=60)  
Note: Three points were assigned for a “large” change, two points for a medium change 
and one for a small changed, based on the opinion of the surveyed.  
Source: Reed, 2005 Chihuahua Land and Water Survey.  
 
When asked why there was less humidity in their soils, by far the biggest 
response was climactic. All farmers recognized the existence of a drought, and 
16 of the 20 said it was the worst they had ever experienced. While the majority 
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cited the drought itself as the major factor causing the loss of humidity, others 
mentioned “climate change” – a change in the timing of rain – soil erosion, 
deforestation and invasion by secondary species as impacting the humidity of 
their soils (Figure 4.6). Thus, whether young or old, from Consuelo or Molinares, 
the farmers surveyed had fairly similar explanations of changes in rains and 
humidity losses in their soils. The primary cause was climate -- it rained less, the 
rains were later, it froze less, the earth was hotter – which itself led to secondary 
causes -- there were more forest fires leading to more erosion, and invasive 
secondary species were further drying up the earth.  Thus, although they may 
have played a role through poor land management practices in previous 
decades, the problem was the climate. They also recognized that they would 
need to reforest, conserve soils and fertilize organically.  
 
As a result of the drought, a number of the farmers surveyed had implemented 
conservation projects in their soils, although there were differences in opinions 
about what the best way to conserve soil was. In all, 10 of the 20 farmers 
surveyed participated in the CONTEC-led soil conservation projects. The farmers 
were then asked a series of questions about conservation, and whether they felt 
the projects were imposed by outsiders or were benefiting only some and not all. 
The main finding was that farmers who actually participated had generally 
positive feelings about the projects, and those with negative feelings were those 
that had not participated.  
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Figure 4.6. Number of Affirmative Respondents and Points for Major Factors 
Related to Drought and Lack of Humidity in Soils in El Consuelo and Molinares 
(N=20, Maximum Points =60)  
 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “large” change, two points for a medium change and one 
for a small changed, based on the opinion of the surveyed.  
Source: Reed, 2005 Chihuahua Land and Water Survey.  
 
Farmers were then asked more specifically if they had made any physical 
changes to their lands or the way they farmed in order to increase humidity to the 
soils. Here, the answers depended to a significant degree on whether they had 
been part of the soil conservation projects guided by CONTEC. Those who had 
generally spoke of the curvos de nivel, zurcos and muros de contención. While it 
is difficult to characterize the answers about how they farmed some common 
themes emerged.  For one, they were often tilling their soils later to try and take 
advantage of later rains, and sometimes tilling twice – including after a frost – to 
try and increase humidity in their soils. In terms of soil conservation, most had 
added a trench at the beginning of their field to prevent rains from washing them 
away, as well as a wall at the end, but those involved with the CONTEC-led 
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projects had added ditches and raised mounds throughout their fields and 
attempted to follow the topographical contours of the land when planting. Several 
of the older members of the community disagreed with this approach, since they 
said it took a part of the land out of production to build mounds and trenches.  
 
In fact, CONTEC had one of the highest positive ratings among organizations 
that farmers stated had helped them, along with the Agricultural Ministry, the 
ejido, SEMARNAT – which provided the reforestry and soil conservation grants -- 
the municipal president, the church and the Tarahumara Coordinator (see Figure 
4.7). Most of these positive comments were related to direct projects – such as 
the Procampo payments from SAGARPA – or organizational help, such as that 
provided by CONTEC and the ejido itself. When a cross-tab calculation was 
performed to compare the ejidatarios surveyed from Molinares versus those from 
El Consuelo, it was apparent that El Consuelo respondents were much more 
likely to be positive about their ejido and the role CONTEC has played, indicating 
that the participatory techniques and organizational meetings to improve the ejido 
management had had an impact on residents’ opinions. In essence, these 
respondents felt that their active participation in projects like land use planning 
produced positive feelings about their ejido – and CONTEC. 
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Figure 4.7 Who Helped Them? Affirmative responses (N=20) to organizational help 
and total number of points (N=60) in Molinares and El Consuelo 
 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “large” help, two points for a medium help and one for a 
small help, based on the opinion of the surveyed.  
Source: Reed, 2005 Chihuahua Land and Water Survey.  
 
5. Conclusions: Molinares and El Consuelo 
 
The communities of El Consuelo and Arroyo del Agua have been faced with 
climactic and land use policy changes over the last 10 years. Since the mid-
1990s in particular, the new Ejido of El Consuelo worked with Chihuahuan-based 
organizations to legalize their status as an ejido and begin a land use planning 
experiment, which included significant investments in soil and land conservation. 
This relationship appeared to engender good feelings among participants that 
they were actively improving their futures, but climactic change and challenges – 
including forest fires, deforestation, invasion of succession plants and the 
continued drought – put a damper on these initial successes. Farmers in both 
communities clearly believed that climactic changes –including changes in the 
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timing of rain -- had been the major factors affecting their yields, though the lack 
of government support, soil erosion and deforestation were also important 
factors. Many farmers did turn to soil erosion control projects, reforestation, the 
increased use of native seeds, a decrease in commercial fertilizers which 
“burned” their land and an increase in organic fertilizers. There also appeared to 
be a much more positive feeling for soil conservation projects, their own ejido 
and CONTEC from members of the El Consuelo ejido more actively participating 
in these projects than in the neighboring ejido of Molinares.  
 
E. Hot Springs and Valleys: Bacabureachi 
 
1. Introduction to the Hot Waters 
The scene is a familiar one throughout the Sierra on a sunny day in October. 
Some 12 tarahumara farmers – both men and women, some old, some young – 
are engaged in the yearly ritual of the “cosecha,” the picking of the corn husks off 
the stalks at the end of the agricultural season. With bags around their shoulders 
and necks, and wearing the familiar rustic sandals, they travel down rows of corn, 
snapping off cornhusks, husking and inspecting their ware, and in most cases 
throwing the corn into the bag. In some cases, they pick off bad parts, or remove 
caterpillars. Both blue and white corn are in abundance.  A few dogs run among 
the legs of the farmers, barking happily.  
 
One of the men carry a bottle with some milky-yellow mixture inside, a traditional 
alcoholic drink made from – of course – corn kernels and unrefined sugar called 
tesgüino or Batari. They pass it among themselves all morning and into the 
afternoon. The smell is pungent, the effect immediate, but none refuse it. It is 
hard work, hands are numb, and backs are tired. They talk among themselves as 
they pick. In this case, the land belongs to a farmer who lives above the field who 
has broken his leg. The community – most are relatives – are lending an extra 
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hand. There is a reason for their speed. With the corn ready for picking, every 
day that passes might provide the chance that free-roaming cattle jump over or 
barrel through the makeshift fence and eat the year’s crop in a matter of hours. 
After they are done picking, cattle will be allowed to roam here, eating the 
discarded husks and stalks and leaving behind fertilizer for next year’s crop.  
 
Apples are ready for harvest and Juan Rascón and family meet at his  hectare 
apple orchard, locating just 100 meters from his home at the banks of the river. 
Recent years of low rainfalls have been unkind to apples,  Rascón explains (Juan 
Rascón, personal communication with author, 2005). It is the only product he 
sells on the market, but because he does not have access to the market directly, 
he most rely upon a local merchant from Carichí to bring him the ladders and 
crates and carry the apples off to a truck in Carichí, from which they will be 
shipped. The local middleman says this year he is paying 15 pesos per crate and 
selling them for 25 pesos. While 15 pesos per crate might seem like robbery, 
Rascón says it is better than nothing, given the low yields in corn and beans.  
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Photo 4.21. Tarahumara indigenous in the “transitional” community of 
Bacabureachi pick corn in October, 2005. 
 
Another farmer makes his way slowly up the rocky hill to the Mesa of the 
Duraznito – the Little Peach Mesa – where his agricultural fields lie. On the way, 
he asks whether I can help him find his “colorados” – his cattle which often 
traverse up the mountain in search of greener vegetation. His eyesight is not 
what it once was. They are there, sitting beneath an oak tree, about halfway up 
the mountainside. We circle behind them and scare them down, until they find 
the path going back toward the valley below. He will gather them that evening he 
says.  
 
Along the way we pass the farmer with the broken leg whose corn field was 
being harvested, who is making his way using a cane up the mountain to “inspect 
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his beans.” Above, his corn and bean fields are doing relatively well, but yields 
this year are low. One of his fields is cut across diagonally by a ditch – a canal 
formed from a recent rain which tore out the white corn stalks by their roots. 
Mesa farming is tough – it is cooler than the valley below and more susceptible to 
freezes, but it is also more protected from hungry livestock (Photo 4.22). 
 
Bacabureachi lies at the bottom of a valley some 25 kilometers west of the 
Municipal Capital of Carichí. At about 2050 meters above sea level, it is 
considerably warmer than the ejidos to the west and is typified by oak, junipers 
and pine tree savannah. The town is named after the raramuri word for the reeds 
that once lined the river in the canyons just upstream, although the reeds 
themselves have largely disappeared (Nacho Rascón, Bacabureachi, personal 
communication, 2005). The “town” is a cluster of homes which dot the valley and 
hills around the Bacabureachi river.   
 
It is also home to Carichí’s only Ejido-run tourism project, the “Baths of 
Bacabureachi,” stone, mortar and wood cabins that emerge from a hill 
overlooking the town, canyon and the river just upstream of the residents. They 
are there because the area is home to a number of hot springs which provide 
bath water year round before entering the river itself. The Bacabureachi River, 
also known as Rio Agua Caliente, or “Hot Water River,” eventually empties into 




Photo 4.22. Corn field on the Mesita del Duraznito, Ejido of Bacabureachi . A ditch 




As such, hundreds of tourists from throughout Mexico arrive here in the spring, 
summer and fall, providing an extra income to the ejido residents who collect the 
entrance fee and rent out the cabins. Some 30 years old, the tourist project 
should be the type of “eco-tourist” project that allows a community to both make 
a living while holding on to their land. Instead, while the project has provided 
more options to local residents, management issues, as well as wider 
unemployment, soil erosion, overgrazing and a conflict between those farmers 
who would like to “privatize” grazing rights and those who want to keep the land 




Photo 4.23. Part of an eco-tourism project: the Bacabureachi Hotwater Baths.  
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2. Bacabureachi: Just the facts 
 
With 64 initial members, Bacabureachi was granted its ejido status in 1921. In 
1952 it was expanded to a full 10,758 hectares and included 30 more ejidatarios 
(INEGI, Carpeta Básica, Bacabureachi). It is bordered by private lands to the 
East, Panalachic to the West, Churachic to the South and Las Juntas to the 
North. While the majority of the ejidatarios live in or near the town of 
Bacabureachi itself, other residents can be found on the top of mesas 
overlooking the valley of the hot springs, in other communities such as  Pachera, 
Las Juntas and Babuchique, or in the municipal capital of Carichí. Largely 
tarahumaran, but with several “mestizo” members as well, it is a transitional 
community, where most younger residents no longer speak the native language, 
none of the males wear traditional clothes – except for special festivals – and 
even most women no longer wear traditional skirts and headscarves.  
 
Table 4.9. Some Basic Information about the Ejido Bacabureachi 
Category Number 
Granting of Land 1921 
Establishment of Ejido 1926 
Original Size 4,960 
Original Number of Ejido Members 64 
Year of Expansion 1952 
Present size of Ejido 10,758 
Current Ejido Members 94 
Source: INEGI, Carpeta Básica, Bacabureachi.  
 
According to residents, the ecotourism project came about almost by accident. It 
started when the community built a makeshift pool around one of the hot springs 
and those outside the community –as well as locals – swam in the pools. In 
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1978, the community built their first two cabins using a grant of cement and 
materials from INI  -- the Instituto Nacional Indiginista, or National Indigenous 
Institute. Later, in 1990, the community received a loan of $1,200,000 pesos from 
INI – today called the CDI  -- and added another dozen cabins above the original 
cabins, all complete with solar panels for electricity.  
 
In 2005, the Municipality of Carichí brought electrical lines to the tourist cabins at 
a cost of  $850,000 pesos  “since sometimes the solar panels don’t work on 
cloudy days,” a move which some of the locals don’t believe was really needed 
(Pedro González Dominguez, Tourism Committee Secretary, Bacabureachi, 
personal communication with author, 2005). Each year, an assembly of ejido 
members elects a committee to run the cabins. The Tourism Committee decides 
who will provide maintenance, clean the rooms, pools, those who stand guard at 
the entrance gate, etc. They also in essence decide whether or not any “profits” 
will be distributed to the community or invested into paying back the loan or 
improving the product. 
 
“Generally those who are in charge don’t really want to listen to any opinions 
about how to make the center better,” said González, the current Tourism 
Committee secretary. “Each group runs it as they see best.” González said that 
when he is part of the leadership, he prefers to put profits back into the project or 
in paying back the loan, rather than giving out a token amount to the community.  
 
“If I give profits to the community, they will just expect more,” he said. “Better to 
not give the profits, until we are running a clean operation that brings in enough 
tourists.”  
 
Despite bringing in some 10,000 tourists per year, González said the original 
loan has never been paid off and in fact no one is quite sure how much is owed 
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because of disagreements between the government and community. Despite the 
problems, González says the center has been the lifeblood of the community as 
it has prevented more farmers from leaving and provides an outlet for selling 
kindling, beans, tortillas, sodas and other goods.  
 
Agriculture, on the other hand, has witnessed a downward spiral over the last 10 
years, according to residents, a combination of late rains, erosional soils and 
significant conflicts over grazing practices and rights (Reed, Land and Water 
Resource Use Survey 2005). At 10,780 hectares, each of the 94 ejidatarios has a 
grazing right of over 100 hectares, but the how, what and where of those 
communal rights are not specified. The roots of the grazing crisis, say residents, 
actually began decades earlier as some wealthier ejidatarios began to bring in 
more cows than had been seen previously.  
 
“One of our members was the mayor of Carichí,” noted present Ejido 
Comisariado “Fernando”. “He told us they were going to let “state” cattle graze in 
our valley and they put in 100s of head of cattle here and they finished off the 
grasslands in the entire valley.” (‘Fernando’, Comisariado Ejido Bacabureachi,  
Personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
The ejido does have a “reglamento interno” – internal regulations which state that 
each ejidatario has the right to graze up to 20 cattle. If an ejidatario has more 
than 20 cows, he is required to pay an extra fee or rent for each cow to the ejido. 
Nonetheless, residents say that no one has been keeping close tabs on such 
activities – or collecting the extra fee.  It is common for ejidatarios to “rent” their 
grazing right to private landowners or other ejidatarios living outside the 
community without seeking permission. 
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“There are some that say they have no cattle, but they might have 20, and other 
who say they have fifty but maybe they have 100,” added González. “It is going 
to be difficult to change these practices.” 
 
“Nacha” a middle-aged woman and wife of an ejidatario is one of the more vocal 
members of the community. She said the grazing rights issue has always caused 
conflicts in the community.  
 
“Some are from outside the ejidatario and they look for an ejidatario without cattle 
to take care of their cattle,” she said. “People used to pay the grazing right if they 
had more cattle, but the money just stayed in the pockets of whoever was the 
Comisariado and we never saw any benefit.” (“Nacha,” Ejido Bacabureachi, 
Personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
In addition, several of the wealthier ejiditarios have slowly begun fencing off 
areas to graze their cattle. On the dirt and gravel road which descends from 
Carichí to the Bacabureachi valley, one passes several open oat fields, followed 
suddenly by a fenced in area that extends for hundreds of meters. The land is 
“owned” by David Aranda, a mestizo member of the ejido who says his 
grandmother was a “tarahumara.” Aranda is a well-known local merchant in 
Carichí, owner of a grocery store, restaurant, private land complete with trout 
fishing and cabins, and the beer distributor. He served as the Municipality’s 
mayor in the early 1990s and it was his father who began introducing cattle into 
Bacabureachi in the 1950s when he was Presidente Municipal. Aranda explains 
that over the last 10 years his family has bought four or five grazing rights from 
other ejiditarios and to prevent his cattle from impacting agricultural lands has put 
up a fence. He estimated the fenced off land as being about 250 hectares, even 
though he has the rights to raise cattle on some 500 hectares.  (David Aranda, 
Carichí, personal communication with author, 2005).  
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“The son has fenced off all the land above the ejido and he has said that others 
can share it by putting their cattle there, but he acts as if it is his, not the ejidos,” 
noted Fernando.  
 
Far on the other side of Bacabureachi, by walking above the canyons in which 
the tourist cabins rides, an hour-walk up to a mesa – known as the Mesa del 
Durazno – the mesa of the peach tree --  one arrives suddenly at a fence (Photo . 
At about 2,200 meters, the mesa is home to oak, piñon pines and larger pines, 
as well as pastureland. In the middle of the fenced off area is a wide swath of 
pastureland, but the land is heavily eroded, with huge gullies. Intermittent stream 
banks have failed, creating a hole which runs through the land. The mesa was 
fenced off nearly a decade ago – in clear violation of local ejido rules – but no 
action has been taken by the ejido itself. If you walk for approximately two 
kilometers along a stone wall, over a field, through another gate, follow a 
makeshift road along a stream, you suddenly emerge out of another gate into a 
small community of homes, one of which is built not in the tarahumara style, but 
as a modern Mexican home. There is a small check dam and reservoir on the 
stream, and several Tarahumara adobe structures, long abandoned.  
 
The issue of the “illegal” fenced off areas became even more controversial when 
Aranda and others led an effort to “privatize” grazing rights through the 
PROCEDE process. Bacabureachi had already been through PROCEDE, and 
opted to have both their individual agricultural lands and household lands titled. 
Then, in 2005, the federal Reforma Agraria – Agrarian Reform – announced that 




According to Bacabureachi’s Juan Rascón, the “second” indigenous governor 
from the ejido, “no one understood what “dominio pleno” (outright domain) – 
was.” (Juan Rascón, Indigenous Governor, Bacabureachi, personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
 
“Nacha” remembers the meeting well. “A group of us began to talk about how 
dominio pleno would fraction the ejido and it wasn’t positive – and the ejido 
rejected it.”  
 
 
Photo 4.24. Traditional Fence – in violation of ejido rules – on Mesa del Durazno, 
Ejido of Bacabureachi. 
 
Nacha said the main promoter was David Aranda “who argued he wasn’t using 
all the land he was entitled to because he had bought 4 rights to the common 
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area, he wanted everyone to fence off their own areas, but the problem is some 
lands are better than others.”  (Nacha, Ejido Bacababureachi, Personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
 
Others interviewed on the PROCEDE process said the process had reenergized 
the community to defend the concept of “common” land. González said in the 
end he feels PROCEDE has been a negative experience for the ejido, other than 
having the overall boundaries of the ejido set.  
 
“As soon as they started to measure and title individual lands, the sales started,” 
González noted. “You can’t sell your common use rights, at least not without an 
ejido assembly, but we now learn that all these common rights have been sold 
off. The Agrarian authorities know about it, but here in the ejido we don’t know 
about it.” 
 
“Bacabureachi is your classic class war,” noted CONTEC director Maria Teresa 
Guerrero, who led a series of workshops to help prepare the community for the 
meetings on PROCEDE. “Those with private lands already wanted to privatize 
the ejido, but the people were trained and organized and they said no. They said 
no because this has always been land that belonged to everyone.” (Guerrero, 
2005).  
 
Another organization working in the community has been the Catholic Church, 
through the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, which is currently in 
charge of Carichí’s main church. Padre Nacho, a thirty-something missionary 
priest, says the Redemptorist’s main goals are to work with poor people 
throughout the world, bring them the good news, and improve their lives, while 
maintaining their cultural rights and dignity. The church has focused mainly on 
smaller projects like home gardens, preservation of medicinal knowledge and 
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education, though they have also hosted larger meetings on organizational 




Photo 4.25. Church of the Redemptorist in Carichí is often a center for community 
trainings for ejidos.  
 
“At is base what PROCEDE is really looking for is putting land on the sales 
market,” Padre Nacho explained. “What is so serious about Bacabureachi is that 
if they are given “dominio pleno” – they will be more likely to sell their parcel and 
common lands. There really is no reason to force people to measure their 
household lot, parcel, common area, other than to force them to sell it.” 
 
CONTEC began working with some individual farmers on soil conservation 
programs. Despite some success, Guerrero and local leaders said the problem of 
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cattle grazing onto lands has made widespread application of the projects 
problematic. Instead, in 2005, CONTEC began – slowly – working toward 
development of internal rules about grazing and other natural resource use 
issues and began with a survey of cattle and other livestock. Eventually, as in 
Consuelo, the idea is to come up with an “Ordenamiento Ecologico” as well as 
internal regulations that will bring order and understanding to the community.  
 
González, who also serves as President of the Soil Conservation Committee, 
says while the soil conservation projects have been impacted by a lack of funds, 
the larger benefit has been more attention to taking care of the land. The land is 
impacted by a series of “creatures”, from “longostas” –a type of grasshopper -- to 
red spiders and a variety of caterpillars, making protection of crops difficult 
(González 2005). González said that the workshops have helped the community 
gain exposure to alternatives to traditional fertilizers and pesticides, such as a 
communal pesticide which uses “chile de arból,” onion, garlic and soap to create 
a liquid pesticide.  
 
Ignacio Rascón, who served as Comisariado  from 2001 to 2004, has been one 
of the most energetic proponents of the soil conservation projects. He pointed out 
to several areas where the projects had allowed land to recover. Walls of stones 
at the downslope side of cropland next to the banks of rocky rivers have sprouted 
“verdelonga” – used by farmers for salads – while land at the edges of 
agricultural fields – the humidity slowly filtering rather than running off – had 
sprouted grasses (Photo 4.26).  
 
“Those outside the lands with soil conservation are benefiting from this 
vegetation since the livestock eats it.’ Rascón explained. Still, in an ejido 
spanning 10,000 hectares, the “12 or 15” fields with improved soil conservation 
 298 
have made only a “slight” difference. (Ignacio Rascón, Ejido Bacabureachi, 
personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
 
Photo 4.26. Verdelonga lines the “Muro de Contención” – retention wall – as part 
of the soil conservation projects implemented in Bacabureachi. 
 
3.  Survey Results 
 
As in El Consuelo, a number of more formal questionnaires were administered to 
those owning or using land for agriculture in Bacabureachi. With the exception of 
one farmer living in Carichí, all of the other 17 surveys were conducted in 
Bacabureachi itself. Care should be taken when interpreting these surveys, since 
they only represent 18 of the 94 ejidatarios and only those working in one portion 
of the ejido – those located near the town of Bacabureachi. Still, the survey 
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provides important information about the ejido, their practices and opinions. In 
addition, the survey shows that while there are similarities with the ejidatarios in 
El Consuelo and Molinares, there are also substantial differences in the 
challenges.  The following section summarizes the results related to key aspects 
to the present study. Detailed survey results are available upon request.  
 
a. Land Use and Agricultural Changes 
 
All 18 respondents reported using ejido lands for agricultural use, while one 
respondent also owned private land outside the ejido. While the average size of 
the ejido plot of the 18 respondents was 6 hectares, the maximum was 23 
hectares and the minimum was one hectare. Some 14 of the ejidatarios reported 
owning livestock which they grazed on the communal land, from a low of two to a 
high of 200, and seven of those reported actually fencing off an area for 
livestock, from a low of one to 200 hectares (see Table 4.10).  
 
Table 4.10. Some Basic Demographic and Land Use Data from Surveys 





















14 328 2 200 23.42 51.63 
Source: Reed 2005, Survey.  
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An average of half the agricultural lands owned by ejidatarios was planted in 
2005. By far the most widely grown crop among the respondents was corn, with 
16 respondents. Most reported growing a variety of white corn, although blue and 
yellow varieties were also mentioned. Beans, apples, oats and rye grass were 
the other crops mentioned, although the rye grass was actually grown on private 
land outside of the ejido itself. Seven respondents reported “calves” as a crop.  
 
When asked about changes in their land use, the change receiving the most 
responses was reduction in the amount of land dedicated to agricultural 
production. The other major changes cited by farmers were reduction in 
fertilizers, a slight reduction in pesticide use, increased in conservation of native 
seeds and an increase in the amount of land converted to use by livestock. (See 
Figure 4.8). Other non-structured comments were related to poor soils, the 


























Figure 4.8. Agricultural Changes in Bacabureachi by Number of Responses (N=18) 
and Total Points (Maximum=54) 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “large” change, two points for a medium change 
and one for a small changed, based on the opinion of the surveyed.  
Source: Reed 2005.  
 
What caused these changes? The drought, the increased cost of agricultural 
inputs – notably fertilizers – and the lack of government support. Only one 
respondent mentioned policy changes – the land reform changes to Article 27 – 
as impacting their lands, and in this case, because of improper measurements of 




Figure 4.9. Factors Causing Agricultural Changes in Bacabureachi by Number of 
Positive Responses (N=18) and Total Points (Maximum=54) 
 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “large” factor, two points for a medium factor and 
one for a small factor, based on the opinion of the surveyed.  
Source: Reed 2005. 
 
b. Drought, Causes and Consequences 
 
Some 13 of the 18 farmers felt the drought had been the worst they had ever 
experienced, caused – quite obviously – by a lack of rain, but also by erosion of 
soils, deforestation and logging and climate change. Given an opportunity to 
mention other factors responsible for the lack of water in their community, nearly 
all of them related to changes in the climate and overgrazing.  
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As a consequence of the drought and soil erosion, farmers in Bacabureachi 
initiated a number of changes.  Seven in all  said they were now plowing in winter 
time to try and get humidity and dead vegetation into the soils, while three others 
mentioned plowing the land right after the fall harvest. Other respondents 
mentioned the “trincheras” – the built stone, wood and earthen mounds spaced 
particularly uphill and downhill of croplands to help water filter into the agricultural 
fields but not run off the fields. Seven respondents who had implemented soil 
conservation projects had added infiltration ditches, curvas de nivel and mounds 
of rocks to their lands, either on their own or with the assistance of CONTEC. Of 
the seven participants, three rated the projects as “regular,” three as “good” and 
one as “bad.”   Another mentioned the rotating of lands and leaving more land 
fallow. Another respondent mentioned adding organic fertilizers – pine needles – 
while another mentioned fencing off their land to prevent the invasion of cattle. 
The responses indicate that farmers did not sit idly by while changing climactic 
conditions impacted their lands, but were active participants in shaping their local 
environment as a response.  
 
The soil conservation projects were viewed on the whole positively. Responses 
indicated that participants and non-participants – with one exception – felt that 
soil conservation projects were a good idea and did raise crop productivity. The 
participants did not feel the soil conservation projects were imposed upon them, 
but indeed they had implemented them voluntarily, while two of the non-
participants believed they had been imposed upon the community. A final 
statement – that the soil conservation projects benefited some more than others 
– received agreement from both the participants and non-participants, though 
non-participants had more positive responses. Thus, there was some feeling that 




Figure 4.10. Causes of the Low Humidity and Lack of Water for Crops in 
Bacabureachi by Positive Responses (N=18) and Total Points (Max=54) 
 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “large” factor, two points for a “medium” factor 
and one for a “small” factor, based on the opinion of the surveyed.  
Source: Reed 2005. 
 
c. Organizational Help 
The final section of the Survey asked about opinions and help from government, 
private and non-governmental organizations. The organizations which were cited 
the most included the Ejido itself (Bacabureachi) – mainly for the ecotourism 
project -- SAGARPA – the federal agriculture ministry – CONTEC, the 
Tarahumaran Coordinator -- SEMARNAT – the federal environmental ministry – 
and the Municipality, including both the Presidency and Rural Development, and 
the Church. None of the respondents mentioned any aid from banks, credit 
unions or private companies, although one respondent noted that he had credit 
from BanRural – a government run bank – before the fall of the peso in 1994 
eliminated credit for farmers. 
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There were only two negative comments related to the ejido. One farmer said 
there was no benefit to remaining an ejido because it was too disorganized and 
just stole rights. “I don’t see any benefit to the communal lands,” noted the main 
detractor. “There is no organization, no one makes improvements to feed their 
cattle well, and because it is communal you can’t make improvements yourself.”  
 
The vast majority of the comments about the ejido made the opposite argument: 
the communal and agricultural lands gave livelihood and that the organization of 
the ejido provided a buffer against those who would seize their land.  
 
Figure 4.11. Organizational Help in Bacabureachi to Farmers by Positive 
Responses (N=18) and Total Points (Max=54) 
 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “large” help, two points for a “medium” help and 
one for a “small” help, based on the opinion of the surveyed.  
Source: Reed 2005. 
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4. Conclusions: Bacabureachi 
 
Surveys and visits to the hot valleys and oak and juniper mesas of Bacabureachi 
revealed a unique community with important communal resources, including 
significant grazing lands, alluvial valleys filled with tiny apple orchards, and an 
eco-tourism project run by the community. It also revealed significant community 
tension caused by the lack of formal rules and enforcement of rules on cattle 
grazing and use of communal lands as well as by low rainfall and agricultural 
yields in recent years. With the aid of the NGO organization CONTEC the 
community has been discussing and working toward the development of more 
formal rules and land use planning to deal with these challenges. An attempt by 
some community members to privatize the communal lands in the interest of 
better management had led to the community embracing its communal traditions.  
 
Survey results showed that all respondents believed a significant drought – 
changing the amount and timing of rain – had impacted the community over the 
previous decade, and that deforestation and invasions of cattle had impacted 
humidity in the soils. Some farmers had turned their farming land over to the 
cattle themselves. Opinions were favorable toward the soil conservation projects 
being implemented with CONTEC, although significant challenges – the lack of  
tired soils and free-ranging cattle – remained toward making them truly effective. 
Farmers had turned away from the use of commercial fertilizers in recent years 
because of the cost and effect on hot soils and begun to use organic fertilizers. 
High costs, the lack of government support and the lack of rain were all major 
challenges for farmers.  
 
Most farmers relied on government support payments – PROCAMPO – from 
SAGARPA, as well as some soil conservation work from SEMARNAT, but cited 
their biggest helper as being the ejido itself, through which, for example, they had 
access to communal lands and ran the eco-tourism project. The surveys thus 
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revealed that – guided in part by CONTEC workshops – the community had 
largely embraced its communal organization even as wealthier members sought 
privatization and the challenge of invading cattle remained unresolved.  
 
VI. Summary of Major Findings 
 
During 2003, 2004 and 2005, interviews, visits and surveys were conducted in 
several primarily agricultural communities in the Municipalities of Bocoyna and 
Carichí. In addition, interviews were held with government institutions and non-
governmental organizations working in the area.  
 
This research revealed a land being contested between different interests and 
visions of the future of the Sierra Tarahumara. Yet many of the opinions and 
discourse was the same: deforestation, overgrazing and climate change had 
resulted in low, untimely rains, loss of crop productivity and denuded landscapes. 
Differences emerged, however, in solutions of these problems.  
 
In Bocoyna, a number of communities began in 2004 to work with organizations 
contracted by WWF – the World Willdlife Fund – which had only begun to work in 
Chihuahua in the late 1990s. As part of an overall project focused on the 
Chihuahuan Desert Ecoregion and the Conchos Watershed, WWF has a vision 
of changing natural resource use practices in these communities in the upper Rio 
Conchos to help increase water resources in the area. This work was being 
funded by large foundations and corporations including HSBC, the U.S. Agency 
for International Development and the Ricoh Corporation. Nonetheless, the short-
term contracts, limited community participation and instability of the funding 
concerned both residents and NGOs contracted to do the work.  
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At the same time, controversy emerged among NGOs and the communities 
about various government programs – including environmental service payments 
and a proposed 830,000 hectare Biosphere Reserve. These discussions created 
confusion among communities about the true goals of the WWF’s involvement in 
the area and other projects.  There was some “demonizing” of the interests 
involved and a mistaken belief that WWF was actually behind the biosphere 
reserve proposed. The group actually promoting the Biosphere – the Sierra 
Madre Alliance – believed that those opposed were purposefully 
mischaracterizing the biosphere for their own purposes. Even as these larger 
scale projects were being discussed, smaller scale projects were implemented 
with government support to help improve soil conservation, reforest areas or 
“filter” water, with mixed success.  
 
In Carichíc, on the other hand, CONTEC, the main non-governmental 
organization working in agricultural communities there, began working in the area 
in the late 1990s with a focus on organizational support of the indigenous ejidos. 
In the new ejido of Consuelo, CONTEC worked both for the ejido’s official legal 
recognition, while also beginning basic workshops on ejido rules, organizations 
and an “Ordenamiento Ecologico,” or land use plan. The longer-term 
commitment in the community by CONTEC appears to have created a better 
working relationship. Still, many of the projects implemented – such as the soil 
conservation projects – have had only modest successes in part due to 
continued drought-like conditions as well as limited resources.  
 
Farmers surveyed who participated in the projects viewed them as beneficial and 
felt that they were participating alongside the NGO in their development – rather 
than having a vision imposed upon them -- although some felt that the projects 
did not work properly. The community as a whole – which includes ejidatarios 
from Molinares and El Consuelo – is facing many challenges, most notable of 
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which has been the lack of rain and resulting forest fires which have impacted 
their lands. Farmers surveyed indicated that they have met these challenges by 
in some sense returning to more “traditional” ways – such as using organic 
fertilizers, increasing their use of native seeds and implementing soil 
conservation by following the contours of the land – with the help of CONTEC.  
 
In Bacabureachí, a community with a unique eco-tourism project, on the other 
hand, farmers have not only been faced with the problem of drought and “late 
rains,” but a dispute over what to do about grazing rights and practices on 
communal lands. While a traditional narrative might suggest that farmers were to 
blame for overgrazing the free “communal” lands, the reality is a much more 
complex story of sold communal lands, a lack of organization and enforcement of 
internal rules and a new climate regime which has reduced pasturelands. For 
example, through the years, a handful of ejidatarios have taken their communal 
rights and privatized them by fencing in large sections of land – which has been 
met largely by indifference. Then, as part of the reforms of Article 27 of the 
Mexican Constitution, some of these same ejidatarios proposed actually 
privatizing all land in the ejido by seeking “dominio pleno” – or plain dominion – to 
be able to buy and sell grazing land and fence it off. This effort was rejected by 
the community.  
 
Thus, efforts to both “internationalize” the Sierra Tarahumara – through a 
biosphere reserve – or “privatize” lands through the Article 17 PROCEDE 
process have been proposed as ways to improve land management and thus 
help assure a better climate and Conchos river by some interest groups, but 
others – including the communities themselves – have rejected these 
approaches as counter to their interests.  
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As an alternative, CONTEC has been working with these communities to improve 
their internal regulations and regulations and promote alternative livelihoods.  
 
The research shows how a crisis narrative – the drought in Chihuahua and loss 
of the river – led to increased attention on the upper watershed and land 
management practices, and a number of high profile efforts to improve them, but 
also how local communities have adapted their practices to this discussion 
through organization, conservation of native seeds and protection of soils. Thus, 
local communities are active participants in their development and impose their 
own practices and narratives.  
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Chapter Five: The Delicious Valley 
Los fundadores de Delicias, como sus antepasados españoles, la ubicaron en el 
lugar preciso, no lejos del supremo milagro del agua. Delicias, obra del agua y 
trabajo, es hoy todo un ejemplo. (The founders of Delicias, like their spanish 
ancestors located it in the precise location, not far from the supreme miracle of 
water. Delicias, result of water and work, is today a complete example.) 
 
--Jose Fuentes Mares, Prologue, Delicias: 50 Años (Delicias: Club Rotario, 
1983). 
 
“Before 1995, water was used politically, as demagoguery to secure votes in 
return for water and land.”  
 
-- Martin Echaanic Chavez, medium-sized pecan farmer near Saucillo, Delicias 
Irrigation District 
 
“Las gallinas de arriba surren a las gallinas de abajo,…”  
(The chickens above dirty the chickens below”) 
 
--Marciel Marquez, former Water User Association President, Module IV, Delicias 





Delicias – i.e. “delicious” – was founded on both the wonders of work and water. 
The water was courtesy of the Rio Conchos – which winds down the mountains 
of the Sierra Tarahumara toward the Valle de Zaragoza in Central-South 
Chihuahua and deposits its water in the immense La Boquilla Dam. Later, it is 
joined by the Rio San Pedro, which takes a more northerly course before 
depositing millions of cubic meters into the Francisco Madero Dam near Rosales 
and then meeting up with the Conchos near Julimes. With official boundaries of 
nearly 85,000 hectares, it is the second largest irrigation district in Mexico as well 
as the second district formed. Delicias, or Irrigation District 005, began 
operations in 1932, and was officially recognized in 1941 (Comision Nacional de 
Agua 2004A.) 
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The early years were built on wine and cotton, which through the 1950s was the 
area’s bumper crop, and led to large-scale agricultural intensification in the area 
(Gándara Samaniego 2004: 79). When the second dam – known as both 
Francisco Madera and Las Virgenes – was completed in 1949, the total amount 
of land irrigated hovered between 40,000 and 60,000 – well below the 250,000 
hectares of irrigated lands envisioned by Delicias founders of Carlos Guillermo 
Blake and General Ignacio Enriquéz– but still one of the country’s major irrigation 
districts (Gándara Samaniego 2004: 25).  
 
After drought, reduced worldwide prices, taxes and a cotton blight led to large-
scale lay-offs in agricultural workers, profits and irrigated hectares in the cotton 
industry in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the district turned largely to  wheat 
and corn, and the beginning of investment in pecans, and by the 1970s, to other 
crops such as alfalfa, sorghum and peanuts (Gándara Samaniego 2004: 79). The 
1970s and 80s were an expansive time for the district, as high wheat prices, 
access to federal government credit and locally-supported credit unions, and the 
expansion of the district into new lands to the west – toward Chihuahua City – 
brought the total amount of land irrigated to more than 80,000 hectares 
(CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego 005, Information Provided to Author, August 30, 
2005). While new, non-native pecan orchards began to show up along the Rio 
Conchos banks in the 1950s – led by local grower Mario Lopez Velarde – it was 
in the late 1970s that U.S. buyers began to convince growers from the Camargo, 
Saucillo and Delicias area to begin the southern expansion of pecans at larger 
scales. (Martin Echaanic Chavez, Pecan Grower, Saucillo, personal 
communication with author, September 2005). 
 
By the high-rainfall 1992-1993 agricultural year, CONAGUA reports that some 
82,956 hectares of land were irrigated by dam water within the confines of the 
district and many farmers were growing up to three crops in a year, with spring 
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corn, summer/fall sorghum and then winter wheat being a common practice 
among farmers who had the land and resources. (CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego 
005, Information provided to author, August 30, 2005) 
 
Over approximately 15 years, fundamental changes in irrigation district 
management, land tenure, market forces and tariffs, water availability and access 
to monies for conservation has occurred. What has emerged has been a 
renewed emphasis on water conservation among farmers, a devolution of power 
from the state – i.e. the federal government and CONAGUA – to local user 
associations, and a gradual “shrinking” of the district – both through a specific 
program to buy back water rights from farmers as well as market and other 
forces which have promoted the sale of land and water rights, often from poorer 
to richer farmers.  At the same time, the opening up of permits for groundwater 
drilling and other “alternative” sources actually has led to a fundamental shift 
away from “dam” water, leading to a more complex water management structure 
with user associations and ejidos taking a more prominent role over water 
management. These changes, in fact, support the notion that the Delicias 
Irrigation District – rather than a geographic space negotiated with the state – 
has become a “glocalized” community mediated between local farmers, their user 
association and market forces, influenced by world market prices, as well as 
investment by U.S. firms – and their representatives -- in the purchase of goods 
such as pecans and chiles intended for export (Swyngedouw 1997).  
 
This chapter reviews district-level information on land tenure, water management 
and water use, crop irrigation, water conservation and other issues in the Delicias 
Irrigation District over the last 15 years, before providing further analysis of two of 
the 10 “Modules” – specific geographically-bound areas within the district where 
differing strategies have been made by the association, its users and 




The author traveled to the Delicias Irrigation District on three occasions. In July of 
2003, for approximately two weeks, the author visited the central offices of 
Irrigation District 005 and then toured the district’s main dams and physical 
infrastructures with officials from the Comisión Nacional de Agua, also known as 
CONAGUA. In addition, the author toured two Modules with the respective 
presidents of the Users Association – Module IV and V. In July of 2004, the 
author returned to the Delicias Irrigation District, interviewed the General 
Manager and Operations Manager of the Irrigation District in Delicias, and toured 
three Modules with the General Mangers of Modules II, V and XII, as well as 
conducting interviews with other officials from both the National Water 
Commission, Agricultural Ministry (SAGARPA), and Rural Development offices.  
 
Finally, in 2005, the author lived in the Community of Ortíz, near Rosales, within 
the geographic confines of Module VI, during August and September of 2005, 
renting a house from a family that is usually used by migrant labor (Photo 5.1.). 
Over a period of six weeks, the author conducted 35 surveys with farmers in 
Module VI (Rosales) and 37 surveys with farmers in the nearby Module XII 
(Saucillo) on a variety of topics, including water use, drought, land inputs and 
organizational help. Farmers were located either in their homes or fields. In 
conducting the surveys, the author attempted to conduct approximately 10 
surveys in each general area of the Module to obtain geographic variability. 
Thus, the surveys are in essence a cluster sample of farmers within the Module. 
While the present chapter presents an overall summary of the survey results, 
more detailed survey results are available from the author upon request. While 
not a statistical dissertation, the answers were illuminating to the general trends 
in the district, and helped the author compare and contrast issues between 
smaller and larger farmers and with the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District. 
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In addition, the author conducted individual in-depth interviews with some 
farmers – particularly those with large land holdings --  as well as with the 
Presidents and General Managers of Module XII and VI. The author also 
conducted interviews with the presidents of several local agricultural communities 
known as ejidos.  Moreover, interviews were conducted with government officials 
of the National Water Commission (CONAGUA or Comision Nacional de Agua) 
working at the Delicias Irrigation District 005, with officials from both the state 
Agricultural Ministry, and municipal Rural Development officials in Saucillo and 
Rosales, and a variety of others. In addition, representatives of three companies 
that have contracts to modernize canal and irrigation technology within the 
district, as well as representatives of companies that buy and sell agricultural 
products were interviewed (see Table 5.1). 
 
Photo 5.1. “My” House in Congregación Ortíz, 2005. 
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Table 5.1. Surveys and Interviews Conducted for Present Study in Delicias, 2005 
Category Number Type Location 
Farmers 37 Structured Survey 
with some open-
ended questions 
Module 12 (Canal 
de Saucillo) 
Farmers 35 Structured Survey 
with some open-
ended questions 
Module 6 (Rosales) 




















Module 12, Module 



































Bank Officials 2 Open-ended 
interviews 
Rosales 
Total 126  Various 
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II. Pre – 1992: A brief history of Delicias Irrigation District 
 
The genesis of the Delicias Irrigation District lay not in irrigation but in electricity. 
Between 1910 and 1916 – during the height of the Mexican revolution --  CIA 
Agricola y Fuerza Electrica del Rio Conchos, a Mexican subsidiary of the 
Canadian company Bond and Sher constructed a mammoth reservoir for the 
expressed purpose of generating electricity for Mexico’s growing northern 
populace. How mammoth is La Boquilla, more commonly known as Lago 
Toronto? With a total capacity of 2,903.4 million cubic meters and a sustainable 
capacity of 2,744.2 million cubic meters, it continues to be Mexico’s second 
largest dam (CONAGUA 2004A).  
 
When Chihuahua’s revolutionary general Ignacio Enriquez stepped into power as 
the state’s first post-revolutionary governor in 1916 – with demands by former 
agricultural workers for their own land high on his political plate-- visions of a 
large-scale agricultural revolution danced in his head, and the availability of water 
from the large dam presented an obvious solution (Gandara Samaniego 2004: 
33). After stepping down in 1920, he asked the following governor – Abel 
Rodríguez-- to request a license for water from the Boquilla Dam (Lago Toronto) 
as well as the building of another dam on the Rio San Pedro to irrigate some 
250,000 hectares of valleys in Central Chihuahua. When the Secretaría de 
Agricultura initially rejected the request, and after some back and forth with 
Mexican authorities over the district and negotiations with the electric company, 
the Chihuahuans hired the White Engineering Company – led by Mexican 
national Carlos Blake – to redesign the proposed district in 1927, and by 1929, 




In 1930, construction of the first 32 kilometers of the Conchos Canal were 
finished, and operations began in 1932, with Carlos Blake as the first manager of 
the Delicias Irrigation District, only the second irrigation district in Mexico. From 
his offices in the vacant central desert valleys, Blake also began “engineering” 
the streets and wide avenues of the city of Delicias which is today Chihuahua’s 
fourth largest, and a civil engineer  – not a farmer – is recognized as the father of 
Delicias (Gandara Samaniego 2004: 36).  
 
By 1936, all 104 kilometers of the Conchos Irrigation Canal had been finished – 
and approximately 48,000 hectares were in theory open for irrigation along the 
canal itself. These farmers were organized into a Sociedad Rural Limitada – a 
user association tied to the use of the canal itself and run by regional farmers – 
to whom the water concession was granted. By 1941, the final approval from the 
Mexican government arrived, which not only cemented the existence of the 
Conchos Canal, but confirmed a second concession to a second user 
association based upon water from a not-yet constructed second dam 
(CONAGUA 2004A).  
 
With negotiations being cemented in 1943 between Mexico and the United 
States over the Colorado River and the tributaries from both sides to the Rio 
Grande, the Mexican government limited the size of the district from the two 
dams to  approximately 80,000 hectares (CONAGUA 2004A). Mexico in fact had 
committed itself to a more limited irrigation district than leaders like Enriquez and 
Blake had originally envisioned when a much larger dam of 1,230 Million Cubic 
Meters was planned at Villalba, upstream of Francisco Madero. Blake himself 
was part of the Mexican negotiation team which negotiated the 1944 Water 
Treaty and was well versed in the needs and ultimate size of Irrigation District 
005, now committed to the much smaller dam at Las Virgenes, some 10 
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kilometers northwest of Rosales itself. Construction began in 1942 and was 
finished in 1949.  (Gandara Samaniego 2004: 23 -34).  
 
When inaugurated, Las Virgenes was intended to provide a sustainable yield of 
some 425 million cubic meters over 80 years, though by 2003, CONAGUA was 
estimating its useful capacity at 320 million cubic meters due to sediment build-
up (CONAGUA 2004A).  In fact, in the late 1990s, CONAGUA authorized the 
construction of the “rubber dam” addition on the Dam – to increase its capacity 
by roughly 100 million cubic meters, an effort that was seized upon by some U.S. 
farmers and politicians as proof of Mexico’s intent to “steal” international waters. 
In Mexico, on the other hand, it was lauded,  and the district was recognized by 
President Vicente Fox in a 2003 award ceremony because of the construction of 
the rubber dam. More recently, after considerable rains in 2006, the dam flowed 
over the rubber dam and there was concern about its safety (Fuentes 2006: A1.)  
 
Table 5.2. Major Storage Dams Making up Delicias Irrigation District 
Storage Dam Construction 
Period 











1942-1949 Río San Pedro 348.0  322.7  
TOTAL   3,251.0  3,066.9  
Note: The Francisco Madero dam’s  capacity was expanded in 2003 with the addition of 
the “rubber dam” to 454.6 Million Cubic Meters. 
Source: CONAGUA 2004A.  
 
Then came 1952. In a year when rains were nearly non-existent in both the 
upper and middle sections of the watershed, farmers were told they would only 
be able count on 80 million cubic meters – a fraction of the sustainable yield of 
Boquilla – for the 1952-1953 irrigation season. Blake, city and district founder, 
was appointed along with a committee of district experts, to figure out what to do. 
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The solution was a “toma baja,” a lower perforation of the dam curtain so that 
water at a lower depth could flow to the catchment dam below and to the 
Conchos Canal itself (Fuentes Mares 1983).  
 
Cited as a major political victory over the Energy Company – which opposed the 
new structure on the dam-- the decision among the user associations making up 
the district was “a long and stormy extraordinary assembly which ended in 
unanimous consent.” Ultimately these actions would help cement irrigation as 
king, as Blake requested and received a change in water concessions which put 
the needs of irrigation above those of electricity (Fuentes Mares 1983). 
 
The 1980s were good to the farmers of the district. In 1982, another major 
infrastructure effort occurred – the raising and relining of the main Conchos 
irrigation canal – after years of neglect. It was also a time of physical expansion. 
Many of the lands which form Module 8 and portions of Module 7 were created 
through the Bachimba Ejido, established in the late 1970s. (Ramón Hernández 
Hernández, Ejido Bachimba, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
A number of local credit unions also emerged to lend money to farmers. One 
such bank was the Union Progreso de Delicias. Founded in 1976 by some of the 
largest wheat and cotton producers, the credit union used their huge yields as 
collateral to secure a $40 million credit from a private bank, which then could be 
used to lend out to other farmers. Because the credit union did all of the 
individual paperwork for individual loans, but only had a single line of credit with 
the private bank, the interest rates were significantly below what the private 
banks were landing to individual farmers (Enrique Verges, Farmer, personal 
communication with author, 2005). According to one of its founders, what began 
as an experiment of 32 farmers grew to more than 300 from all over the district. 
“Among us, we were producing 200,000 tons of grain,” noted founder Enrique 
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Verges. “We sold to the mills at a guaranteed price and our water was 
guaranteed as well in those years – there really was no risk for us or the bank.” 
(Verges, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
In fact, some farmers in the 1980s used the high profits to transition to pecan 
orchards. In addition to these “private” banks and credit unions – which tended to 
support farmers with private land -- the Mexican government – through Banco 
Rural – supported ejido farmers through collective projects during the 1970s and 
1980s within the district. Of equal importance, many of the major crops were 
supported by price controls, even as imports were limited through quotas and 
tariffs (Manuel Guerrero, Distrito 013 Delicias, SAGARPA (agricultural ministry), 
personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
III. Post-1992 to the Present 
 
Beginning in 1992, the Delicias Irrigation District began to change, both through a 
major re-organization and then through climate and market forces.   
 
A. Water Management and Use  
 
In an experiment in self-governance and privatization pushed by then-President 
Carlos Salinas and the World Bank, Delicias became the first district to “benefit” 
from the decision to turn the physical infrastructure of the district itself from the 
Comision Nacional de Agua over to a series of user associations in 1992.  
 
Based largely upon both water delivery points, geography and ejido boundaries, 
the two larger user associations of the Rio San Pedro Canal and Rio Conchos 
Canal which operated the main canals were transformed at that time into nine 
individual “Modulos”  (Modules), each of which was a separate user association 
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with its own elected-president, vice-president, and treasurer among other 
positions. Each elected board then hired its own staff led by a general manager.  
 
By 1995 each Module had its own separate water concession based on size and 
historical use (Map . Moderating between the individual modules and the 
Irrigation District itself, were two Sociedad Rural Limitadas – the old user 
association transformed into a kind of Supra-Module.  They themselves were 
charged with assuring maintenance, improvement and management of the 
delivery system infrastructure – the main San Pedro and Conchos canals --  and 
the actual delivery of water to the individual Modules, even as the dams 
themselves, including release points – continued to be in the hands of the federal 
government, through CONAGUA, and its irrigation district offices.  
 
Making up the Rio Conchos SRL were Module 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 – covering roughly 
the Municipalities of Saucillo and Delicias while the Rio San Pedro SRL was 
made up of Modules 6, 7, 8 and 9, corresponding more or less to the 
municipalities of Rosales, Meoqui and Julimes. In 1999, a “new” Module – the 
Saucillo Canal Water User Association – or Module 12 an old style association 
with roots back to the 1880s– was added to the District Boundaries (see Section 
IV for more information). According to its first president as part of the Irrigation 
District, the inclusion of the Saucillo Canal area within the Irrigation District itself 
was a direct result of the lack of water available in the Rio Conchos itself 
following the 1995 agricultural season, and the desire of the more traditional user 
association to gain access to water conservation monies (Martin Echaanic 
Chavez, personal communication with author, 2005). In contrast, farmers from 
the other “labores viejas” – the “old works” canals in Camargo and San Francisco 
de Conchos which branch off from the Rio Conchos river also formalized their 
water rights from the Rio Conchos, but at least as of 2006 had not officially joined 
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the district itself despite official encouragement (Ezequiel Bravo, Operations 
Manager, Distrito 005, CONAGUA, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
 
Map 7. Delicias Irrigation District, 1995 
 
Note: Module 12 is not shown in the map as it became part of the Irrigation District later, 
but would be located next to Module 1 and Module 2. 
Source: CONAGUA, Delicias, Distrito de Riego 005, information provided to author. 
 
 
Working the district’s 80,000 hectares of irrigable lands were more than 9,500 
“users,” which included private property, ejidal and colono farmers (see Table 
5.3). The 10 Modules have a wide variation in total and average size of farms 
and types of users, as well as average water deliveries (see Table 5.4). Average 
farm size is most directly related to the number of “private” farmers. Thus, those 
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Modules with high numbers of ejido farmers – such as Modules 12, 8, and 6 – 
tend to have smaller farm sizes than those with large numbers of “private”  and 
“colono” farmers such as in Modules 2, 3,4 and 7.  
 
Table 5.3. Number of “Users” by Property Regime Type and Size of Farms, 










 (HAS)    (HAS) 
Ejido  24,076 30.3 4,500 47.3 5.4 
Private 
Property  
21,618 30.5 2,966 31.2 7.3 
Colono 31,279 39.2 2,043 21.5 15.3 
TOTAL 79,553 100.0 9,509 100.0 8.4 
Source: CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego 005, Delicias “Caracteristicas Generales del 
Distrito,”  2004.  
 
Table 5.4. Number of Irrigable Hectares, Users, Average Farm Size and Total Water 




















1 4,850 801 230 6.05 120,740 26,350 
2 6,272 585 140 10.72 158,282 25,054 
3 5,959 416 74 14.32 132,261 25,437 
4 8,014 684 227 11.72 171,061 34,033 
5 11,336 1,234 531 9.19 200,761 45,765 
12 3,932 588 212 6.69 NA 13,985 
Rio 
Conchos 
Section 40,363 4,308 
 
 
1,414 9.37 783,105 170,624 
6 4,962 692 418 7.17 152,629 12,197 
7 22,773 2,240 1,207 10.17 389,546 86,262 
8 6,678 1,,393 1,383 4.79 68,217 23,945 
9 5,327 1,024 78 5.20 69,541 22,400 
San 
Pedro 
Section 39,740 5,349 
 
 
3,086 7.43 679,933 144,804 
District 
Total 80,103 9,657 
 
4,500 8.29 1,463,038 315,428 
 
Source: CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego, 005, Information provided to author, 2005.  
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Accompanying the new change in management was wholesale changes in the 
price of water, which rose significantly between 1988 and 1991. Previously, 
irrigators were required to pay CONAGUA a single payment for the entire 
irrigation season (Mendoza 1988: 75). Starting in 1988, CONAGUA began to 
charge by irrigation per hectare. The single largest jump in price was in 1994, 
when CONAGUA essentially quadrupled the price – due in part to the 
devaluation of the peso but also to the incredibly dry year in which for all intents 
and purposes the dams were closed. By the following year, the price again 
plummeted to approximately $33 per 1,000 cubic meters, only slightly above its 
1993 price in real terms. The price – expressed in Mexico’s Nuevos Pesos per 
1,000 cubic meters of water – continued to rise through 2005, tripling between 
the 1995-1996 irrigation season and the 2004-2005 irrigation season, although 
compared to the value of the dollar, it only doubled. Thus, a farmer averaging 
seven irrigations of a single hectare of peanuts for two-and-a-half hours would 
have seen his water costs expressed in U.S. dollars rise from $27 dollars in 1995 
to $54 dollars in 2005 (see Table 5.5). Still, from the perspective of local farmers, 
the increase in the price of water is cited as excessive and an important factor in 




Table 5.5. Water Pricing in the Delicias Irrigation District.  
Agricultural Year Price Type Price in Year Estimated Price 
per 1,000 Cubic 
Meters 
Expressed in 











1987-1988 Per Irrigation per 
Hectare Irrigated 
$1,800 $2 $5.41 
1988-1989 Per Irrigation per 
Hectare Irrigated 
$3,000 $3.3 $8.70 
1989-1990 Per Irrigation per 
Hectare Irrigated 
$4,500 $5 $11.37 
1990-1991 Per Hectare 
Irrigated (Medium 
Demand Crop of 
7 Irrigation 
Cycles) 
$77,000 $12.2 $25.70 




$133,000 $21.2 $42.74 




$133,000 $21.1 $41.36 




$150,000 $23.8 $44.63 
1994-1995 Millar $90 $90.0 $83.38 
1995-1996 Millar $33 $33.0 $27.53 
1996-1997 Millar $32.28 $32.28 $25.48 
1997-1998 Millar $45.00  $45.00 $32.97 
1998-1999 Millar $80.00 $80.0 $52.23 
1999-2000 Millar $75.00  $75.0 $50.27 
2000-2001 Millar $80.00 $80.0 $52.50 
2001-2002 Millar $80.00 $80.0 $55.45 
2002-2003 Millar $85.00 $85.0 $49.04 
2003-2004 Millar $90.00  $90.0 $50.27 
2004-2005 Millar $95.00 $95.0 $52.96 
(1) Because water pricing was based on irrigated hectares before 1994 and not volume, an 
estimate of 6.3 thousand cubic meters per hectare – based on seven irrigations of 2.5 
hours per hectare for an average peanut field – was used to convert the price per 
hectare to the price per 1,000 cubic meters. In addition, the Mexican government 
converted Mexican pesos to Nuevos Pesos in 1993 by dividing by 1,000.  
(2) Because the peso has been devalued several times since 1989, average exchange 
rates for the beginning of the irrigation season (March) were used to convert the totals to 
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the average cost of water to irrigate one hectare of peanuts in U.S. dollars for that year. 
The numbers have not been adjusted for inflation, however.  
Sources: CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego 005, Delicias, “Cuota por Concepto de Servicio 
de Riego,”  September 2005 and Author Calculations. Exchange rates derived from 
information from Banco de México. Indicadores económicos. Tipo de Cambio del Peso 
Respecto al Dolar, accessed from website Banco de Datos Economicos 
 
The rationale for the increase in water prices was to provide an income source 
for the Modules to run their operations and pay the machine operators, canal 
operators, valve turners and other employees, while also making the price of 
water service more reflective of its true cost. At the same time, after years of 
collecting monies based upon the number of hectares irrigated, the Modules 
began to collect the money based on the volume of water used, a significant 
change in culture and a precursor toward water conservation efforts. Under an 
agreement with CONAGUA, the modules collect the money, and then distribute 
the revenues among the Module, the governing Sociedad Rural Limitada and 
CONAGUA, with the split roughly 75/15/10 % of the revenues. It is important to 
note that while the water price is set by CONAGUA, individual modules do 
increase the price slightly to pay for special projects and also may sell non-
district waters – whether from wells or from the river itself – at different prices 
than the official price (“Beto” Serrano, Module VI, personal communication with 
author, 2006).  
 
As highlighted in Chapter Three, after several years of above-average water 
availability and use in the early 1990s, low rains in 1993 and 1994 drove 
CONAGUA to take the decision to seriously curtail – and in fact close the 
Boquilla Dam during the 1994-1995 irrigation season. That decision was soon 
followed by the decision to operate the two main dams only during the summer 
irrigation season (March to September), essentially eliminating dam water 
irrigation of winter crops. Thus, farmers only were using the main canals during 
the winter for distribution of local rains, not dam waters.  
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Now that power had been devolved to the Modules, many chose to augment their 
curtailed water rights from CONAGUA with communal water wells, while 
wealthier farmers within the district dug their own wells. In addition, hundreds of 
shallow wells – known as norias – as well as holes dug in shallow aquifers –
known as tajos – were dug by individual farmers in an effort to save their crops in 
1995 and assure future irrigation in the years following (see Sections IV and V). 
While many of the individual wells, norias and tajos were in some sense “illegal” 
when dug, most of them have been since regularized, and others in unauthorized 
areas shut down by CONAGUA (Ing. Hernandez, personal communication with 
author, 2005).  In addition to these water sources, some farmers simply hooked 
up their tractor to the Rio Conchos itself, augmenting their individual water right 
with river water, again at times legal at times not.  
 
Table 5.6 shows the “official” count of wells in the district, but interviews, surveys 
and personal observation make it clear that these numbers probably undercount 
the number of these alternative sources of water.  Water accounting has also 
suffered as a result. Ten years after the Modules began drilling their communal 
wells to augment surface water supply, CONAGUA finally began collecting data 
on the amount of water used and crops grown using this alternative natural 
resource in the 2004-2005 growing season (Barrientos, CONAGUA, 2005). In 
fact, the Modules now keep more accurate records of water use than does 
CONAGUA itself. Even then, such data does not include “individual” water 
decisions, such as personal wells, tractors pumping river water or the poor man 
version of wells – tajos and norias – that now dot the fields within the district.  
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Table 5.6. Number of Wells in the Delicias Irrigation District by Module, 2005 





1 0 10 10 
2 0 54 54 
3 5 59 64 
4 11 40 51 
5 2 86 88 
6 13 6 19 
7 59 31 90 
8 25 3 28 
9 25 6 31 
12 0 7 7 
Total 140 302 442 
 
Source: Comision Nacional del Agua, Distrito de Riego 005, “Numero de Pozos Oficiales 
y Particulares,” 2005.  
 
B. Market Changes: NAFTA and Agricultural Prices 
 
The loss of water availability of the dams coincided with the ushering in of 1994’s 
North American Free Trade Agreement and the devaluation of the Mexican peso 
in January of 1995, which caused serious hardship for those farmers producing 
for the domestic market.  
 
 
1. Basic Grains 
 
“Our farms were producing 300,000 tons a year of corn and wheat that doesn’t 
exist anymore,” noted long-time Delicias farmer and political leader Enrique 
Verges. “The Free Trade Agreement helped industries like tortilla or corn oil 
makers but not the farmers – the prices fell out on us” (Enrique Verges, personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
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Between 1995 and 2005 the economics of price inputs and outputs caused a 
fundamental shift in the types of crops grown. Thus, Empresas Longoria, based 
in Mexico City, but with significant investments in the State of Chihuahua, was 
one of the main purchasers of wheat in the area. In the 1970s and 80s, the 
agricultural giant bought and sold wheat, peanuts, sorghum and soybeans as 
well as cotton and operated wheat mills in Ojinaga, Delicias and Camargo among 
other locations, but post-NAFTA, all wheat purchases and virtually every other 
crop, with the exception of cotton, stopped (Ing. Bolivar, Empresas Langoria, 
personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
2. Cotton surviving?  
 
Instead of wheat, Empresas Langoria has concentrated entirely on their cotton 
gyn production. Even then, in 2005, only two cotton gyns were running in Delicias 
and Meoqui, as other plants – such as their Ojinaga plant – shut down (Bolivar, 
Empresas Langoria, personal communication with author, August 2005). Helping 
the slight revival in cotton has been a government support program which makes 
up the difference in price if cotton does not reach the price of  $65 per quintal.  
 
“Even with the guaranteed price for growers, we have big disadvantages 
compared to U.S. growers,” noted local manager Bolívar. “They always have 
guaranteed prices – paid promptly – they have economies of scale; they have 
much better interest rates for commercialization. Finally, because cotton is 
different in each area, those buying cotton don’t want to change their mills for the 
specific cotton grown in Delicias.”  
 
In 2003, Chihuahua joined southern U.S. status in a common front against the 
boll weevil and pink bollworm. Known as the Programa Binacional de 
Erradicación y Supresión de Picudo y Gusano Rosado, the program grew out of 
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U.S. concerns that the Boll Weevil and Pink Bollworm would not be eliminated 
from U.S. fields as long as there was not a southern front (EL-Lissy and 
Grefenstette 2006). Under the program, Mexican farmers are required to pay a 
fee to the Junta Local de Sanidad Vegetal, which oversees inspections and 
pesticide applications. Because most farmers can not afford to pay these fees, 
they often turn to private companies like Empresas Langoria to provide the 
money upfront. In return, Empresas Langoria keeps part of the cotton provided to 
their gyn or takes part of the government guaranteed price controls.  However, 
Bolivar said the program had been difficult to manage and they chose not to offer 
credits to farmers during the 2005 growing season.  
 
 




Still, cotton – once king in Delicias – has returned to some areas in the middle 
section of the district and to Chihuahua itself. In 2005, over 6,000 hectares of 
cotton were grown in the district and adjacent municipalities. The vast majority is 
now “transgénico” -- a genetically modified crop -- which in some crops Mexico 
has embraced even as it resists other transgenic products like corn (Nadal 2002). 
In 2005, some 90 percent of cotton grown in Central Chihuahua was genetically 
modified and an increasing number of hectares changed their production pattern 
and packed the crop rows of their cotton closer together – a change intended to 
decrease the use of water overall (see Table 5.7).  
 
Table 5.7. Hectares of Cotton Planted in 2005 by Municipality and Type of Seed 














Camargo 2 1.2 1.1 2.3 0 
Julimes 10 11.1 51.2 62.3 22 
Meoqui 153 26.5 1269.1 1296.1 43.6 
Rosales 237 126.7 1409.4 1536.1 504.1 
Delicias 179 77.5 2001.5 2079 4.4 
Saucillo 75 3.1 499.6 502.7 72.3 
La Cruz 1 0 2.3 2.3 0 
Conchos 2 0 2.8 2.8 0 
Jimenez 37 77.2 332.8 410 323 
Valle de 
Ahumada 
9 0 229.7 229.7 203.4 
Villa Lopez 6 0 39.5 39.5 39.5 
Aldama 20 0 164.2 164.2 0 
Total 731 323.3 6003.7 6327 1212.3 
Source: Comité Estatal de Sanidad Vegetal, Programa Binacional de Erradicación y 
Supresion de Picudo y Gusano Rosado, 2005. 
 
Eliseo Nuñez is the Technical Advisor to the Local Sanitary Agricultural Board in 
Meoqui, Chihuahua, which oversees inspections, permits and pesticide 
applications on many of the district’s most important crops. While farmers are 
required to pay the Board a nominal fee to support Board budget and staff, “most 
farmers do not pay the crop permit and pecan and alfalfa producers have never 
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paid.” (Eliseo Nuñez, Junta Local de Sanidad Vegetal, Meoqui office, personal 
communication with author, 2005.) 
 
Under the binational erradication program, farmers are required to pay $1800 
nuevos pesos per hectare of cotton planted – about $150 – to cover the costs of 
inspections, insect traps – which are placed every two hectares apart -- 
pheromones and when necessary – aerial spraying – usually of “Ultra-Low 
Volume” Malathion. Some 70 percent of the farmers are covered by credit from 
the cotton gyns, private banks or credit unions, while 30 percent pay their own 
way (Nuñez, personal communication with author, 2005). Nonetheless, says 
Nuñez, “the number who have actually paid are very low and the subsidies from 
the government are often late.”  The problem of payments has incensed the eight 
companies charged with providing aerial spraying, since they are often forced to 
eat costs as they wait for  payments to trickle in.  
 
3. Corn Hybrids 
Corn – often cited as a symbol of Mexico – is an interesting example of the shifts 
in production. While wheat, sorghum and soybeans – once staples of the district 
– have largely disappeared, farmers in the district continued to grow corn in 
2005.  However,  corn production has shifted from human consumption to 
growing corn for cattle. Today,  farmers own or rent huge machines to “ensilar” – 
turn the plant – stalks and all -- into ground up feed, which is then mixed with 
other crops, such as oats, alfalfa, sorghum and other feeds depending on the 
livestock (see Photo 5.3).  
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Photo 5.3. Huge machines chop up corn -- stalks and ears -- for cattle feed. 
 
SAGARPA data from the Delicias region and in nearby municipalities like 
Camargo and San Francisco de Conchos clearly indicates that corn production 
for feed has increased even as “ear” production has declined (see Table 5.8).  
Over time, the production per hectare has increased for both types of production, 
as has the value per hectare. While the value per ton is certainly more for corn 
for grain than for feed, the shear volume that can be generated by corn feed 
appears to make it much more economical for farmers.  
 
Drive along any road in the district and you are likely to see signs with the 
number and code name for the latest hybrid yellow and white corn “species,” 
such as “Pantera” “Macanudo” and “Jaguar” (see Photo). Asgrow, a subsidiary of 
Monsanto, and Pioneer, a subsidiary of DuPont, have gone fully into the 
production of  hybrid or “improved” seeds, which  is the product of a cross among 
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two or more families of the same plant (Nemecio Ramirez, Monsanto, personal 
communication with author, September 2005). While companies like Cargill, 
Asgrow and Pioneer have been in the Mexican market since the 1970s, sales of 
these improved seeds skyrocketed in the 1990s due to their higher yields, 
drought-resistance and the lack of available water. With less water came the 
need to concentrate yields in smaller plots of land. (Carlos Trejo-Pech 2003). 
 
On a sunny day in August, 2005, there is music playing and beer flowing under a 
tarp on one private farmer’s land. Sponsored by TreAgro – a local seed 
distribution company – and Monsanto’s Mexican subsidiary, the event brings 
farmers to an up-close-and personal view of an experimental farm in which some 
ten different varieties of Monsanto-produced corn has been grown with careful 
supervision by Treagro within the confines of Modulo IV – on the outskirts of 
Delicias. Augmented with semi-treated wastewater from Delicias itself, each row 
of corn is fronted  by a bright yellow “Asgrow” signs accompanied by the brand 
names  – Macanudo, Puma, Jaguar, Oso, Bengala, Tigre and Pantera – while a 
second smaller sign advertises Solución Faena – the herbicide Roundup.  
 
Table 5.8. Corn for Feed and Corn for Grain in Central Chihuahua, 1990, 1995, 2000 
and 2005 
Category Corn for Feed Corn for Grain 
Hectares Irrigated, 1991 2,374 13,453 
Hectares Irrigated, 1995 3,676 2,309 
Hectares Irrigated, 2001 7,940 688 
Hectares Irrigated, 2004 6,734 502 
Tons/Hectare, 1991 39.2 3.1 
Tons/Hectare, 1995 29.6 3.5 
Tons/Hectare, 2001 35.36 5 
Tons/Hectare, 2004 35.61 5.52 
Value/Ton, 1991 48 713 
Value/Ton, 1995 143 1100 
Value/Ton, 2001 265.4 1336.4 
Value/Ton, 2004 300.4 1488.8 
Note: Price not adjusted for changing value of peso.  
Source: SAGARPA, District 13 Delicias Office, 2005.  
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In 1996, Monsanto genetically engineered their soybeans to be resistant to their 
herbicide Roundup (glyphosate) and they have also developed genetically-
modified cotton that is roundup ready. They have not, however, been authorized 
to sell genetically-modified corn in Mexico, either of the round-up or Bt variety 








Holding up one of the “semi-erect” corn husks, local Treagro manager Jaime 
Treviño strips the Macanudo husk and tosses it to one of the farmers watching. 
“Pretty immense,” he laughs as the mazorca flies through the air. “One hectare 
could  stand 120,000 plants –- they can tolerate such high densities with only 10 
or 15 percent loss,” he notes. “This field is only at 75,000 plants per hectare, but 
we are trying to raise the average here in Delicias to 80,000 per hectare.” 
 
Bengala  is perfect “if you want volume” since it can produce 63 tons per hectare, 
while Pantera is “exceptional” and is being used in Durango to make tortillas, 
fetching “$1,300 pesos a sack.”  
 
“Tigre, Pantera and Macanudo tolerate the drought better,” Ramirez adds.  
 
Many in 2005 believed it is only a matter of time before Round-up Ready corn 
joins Round-up Ready Cotton and Round-up Ready Soybeans already sold in 
Mexico. In 2005, Monsanto’s genetically modified Roundup Ready alfalfa was 
approved for commercial sale by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
Nemecio Ramírez said it is likely the product will be sold and distributed in 
Mexico by 2006 by Monsanto’s subsidiaries (Ramírez, personal communication 
with author, 2005).  
 
After the demonstration, it is party time under the tarp in the hot August sun. 
There is food, plenty of beer, a bingo-type contest for prizes from Treagro, and 
even an entertainer who does impressions of Vicente Fernandez and Juan 




4. Green fields ……of alfalfa 
 
The increase of feed corn production – as explored in Chapter Two – is in part 
related to the emergence of the Delicias area as a major milk production center. 
Much of the corn grown in the Municipalities of Delicias, Meoqui and Suacillo is 
earmarked for the Zaragoza Milk Production center, as is the huge amount of 
hectares which continue to be dedicated to alfalfa even in the face of less access 
to water. While the total amount of land dedicated to alfalfa production has 
dropped – at least compared to the late 1980s – the drop is less related to its 
productivity or value and more with the reduction in water rights. To compensate, 
farmers have been irrigating less.  
 
In fact, the District has required special “permits” to grow alfalfa, since it is such a 
high water-demand crops and no one can increase alfalfa production unless 
another farmer agrees to stop growing it (Ezequiel Bueno, Operations Manager, 
Delicias Irrigation District, personal communication with author, 2004). At the 
same time, because of the limits and restrictions, some farmers have switched to 
other sources of water to grow alfalfa. For example, according to CONAGUA, 
communal wells run by the Modulos irrigated 1,875 hectares of alfalfa in the 
2004-2005 agricultural season, the first year for which they had groundwater 
information for irrigation, meaning that the total amount of hectares irrigated 
between the two water sources – at 11,624 hectares – was only slightly less than 
the 1991 total of 12,059 hectares irrigated. Given that some farmers also have 
private wells, or pumped water directly from rivers, it is likely that the total amount 





5. Overall Crop Trends and Water Use 
 
The crop production shift discussed in Chapter Two -- an increase in perennials, 
a virtual elimination of winter crops, and a slight decrease in summer crops – 
seem to reflect decisions based largely on the profits per unit of water consumed. 
(see Table 5.9). Basic data on hectares irrigated within the district USING 
WATER DELIVERED from the dams, the amount of water delivered, total 
production and the actual monetary gain from crops per 1,000 cubic meters in 
1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 clearly indicate that some crops have done better 
than others. Farmers have spent more water resources on  products with higher 
profits – like pecans, peanuts, chile and alfalfa.  
Table 5.9. Hectares of Crop Irrigated, Total Production, Water Used and Average 
Value-Added per 1,000 Cubic Meters for Selected Years, Delicias Irrigation District, 
Dam Water Only 


























557,988,438 107,673,208.2 600,203,009 1,098,006,005.6 
Production 




441.13 798.24 1,349.29 3,125.1 
Source: CONAGUA, information provided to author, 2005.  
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Table 5.10. Hectares of Crops Irrigated by Type, 1991 and 2005 
Year Spring 
Onions 



















































3,407.10 5,214.96 1,696.46 912.12 3,090.57 0 374.94 
Source: CONAGUA, information provided to author, 2005.  
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Overall the amount of water used per hectare increased over the period, 
although by 2004-2005 there was a decrease in the amount of water used per 
hectare as water conservation projects initiated in 2003 continued to be 
implemented throughout the district. Again, however, it is important to note, that 
the data only reflects the use of dam surface water, a fact that seriously 
undercounts, for example, the growth in pecan orchards, which in Delicias have 
overwhelmingly switched to groundwater use. Even with this data limitation, 
detailed information about irrigated hectares, water use and production value for  
several of the major crops grown for the four years, including chile, cotton, 
onions, alfalfa, wheat, soybeans and sorghum, indicate significant changes within 
the district. 
 
C. Land Tenure and Policy 
 
Because individual water user association membership lists – the members who 
make up the Modulos – were put together in 1992 in preparation for the transfer 
– and were still being updated in 2005 – it is difficult to surmise what changes 
have occurred in land ownership over the past 15 years. Nonetheless, the 
change in Mexico’s Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution did begin a process 
which has impacted land tenure. Under Article 56 of the new Agrarian Law, 
ejidos can choose to measure and regularize their lands – through certificates or 
actual titles -- with Reforma Agraria, the Procuradoria Agraria and INEGI. 
 
As highlighted in Chapter Three and Four, the Chihuahua version of PROCEDE 
– the above-mentioned process for regularizing ejido and communal lands – has 
been held up as example for the rest of the nation (David Cerecedes Fierro, 
Reforma Agraria, Chihuahua office, personal communication with author, 2005).  
Overall, the vast majority of ejidos and agrarian communities in Chihuahua have 
entered the PROCEDE process. (see Table 5.11).  
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Most ejidos in Chihuahua have gone the middle route – entering PROCEDE – 
but not seeking “dominio pleno” – plain dominion where every owner can buy and 
sell land to whomever they want without seeking the permission of the wider 
community (David Cerecedes Fierro, Reforma Agraria, Chihuahua office, 
Personal Communication, October 2005).  Several communities have sought 
“dominio pleno parcial” – where some members of the ejido are “let go” to 
privatization while the rest of the community remains part of an ejido structure. 
This option is particularly relevant where some land in the ejido has already been 
sold off to non-ejido members, fractioning the ejido.  Thus, in Chihuahua, each 
ejido has collectively been making decisions about to what extent they want to 
privatize their lands – including both individual parcels and farming land --  and 
make them available for full selling and buying.  
 
Table 5.11. Results of PROCEDE in Chihuahua, October 2005 





Entered and Completed 
PROCEDE process 
9,255,667 904 
Still Completing PROCEDE 
process 
688,109 57 
Rejected PROCEDE 208,205 12 
Legal Dispute that Prevents 
Application of PROCEDE 
247,503 33 
Total Social Property in 
Chihuahua 
10,637,995 991 
Source: Diario Oficial del Estado De Chihuahua, October 14, 2005, pages 29-34. 
 
Within the Delicias Irrigation District, only one agricultural community – San Jose 
del Carrizo in Julimes – had a legal dispute that prevented the community from 
proceeding with PROCEDE. Most ejidos and agricultural communities have 
measured their lands, sought private household lots and agrarian certificates, 
rather than private titles through the process known as Dominio Pleno. Within the 
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Delicias Irrigation District itself, there were only three communities on the 
outskirts of the City of Delicias which chose at least partial privatization, three 
farmers from the Meoqui Ejido, and the Ejido Community of Las Varas, near 
Saucillo. There, some 23 farmers representing 29 titles privatized about 430 
hectares of land.  
 
Still, despite the relatively small amount of outright privatization in Chihuahua and 
the Delicias Irrigation District – most connected to urbanization --  there are 
several factors which suggest this data undercounts privatization. For example, 
while Table 5.12 shows that 23 former ejidatarios have sought “dominio pleno” in 
Ejido Las Varas– taking themselves  and their land out of the ejido structure – 
2005 ejido comisariado Rodolfo Parras says the total is actually higher. He 
estimates that out of 83 ejidatarios making up the ejido, between 30 and 35 have 
left by seeking dominio pleno. In addition, out of those remaining, approximately 
10 have sold off their ejido rights to other outsiders, but without seeking “dominio 
pleno,” meaning the ejido has essentially lost half its membership (Rodolfo 
Parras, Comisariado, Ejido Las Varas, Saucillo, personal communication with 
author, 2005).  
 
For those that remain, the tendency is to “rent to the chile producers” since most 
ejidatarios do not have access to the capital needed to invest in chile farms, by 
far the most profitable crop in the area. In addition, because the ejido also has 
communal lands, several of those that have remained within the ejido have 
sought investors to mine the communal land as a quarry, or develop the land for 
urban housing. Thus, even though most ejidatarios have chosen to remain as an 
ejido, market forces are contributing to slowly fraction off the remaining ejido 
lands (Rodolfo Parras, Ejido Las Varas, 2005).  
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In the Ejido and agricultural community of Ortíz, near Rosales, farmers have 
decided to privatize all titles, but a bureaucratic hold-up in Mexico City had 
prevented final resolution of their collective decision. Here, there is little fear that 
the privatization of their land will lead to concentration of lands in large land 
holdings because the community has access to groundwater, making their land 
very profitable to rent to wealthier farmers for chile or onions. Instead, most 
farmers want the improved access to credit that comes with private land and to 
be able to legally split their lands between different offspring so that some will 
continue to farm as others choose to rent or leave the area (“Beto” Serrano, 
personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
In addition, surveys and interviews with ejido leaders show that buying and 
selling of land has often occurred outside of the PROCEDE process and even 
outside of the ejido’s own rules. Thus, the “Comisariada” of the Valle de Saucillo 
Ejido – whose boundaries can be found in Modulo 1, 2 and 12 -- said that she 
believes that up to 10 members in the past 10 years have sold their land to 
“outsiders” although they have not sought permission from the ejido. She said 
that there were 214 ejidatarios when the ejido came into existence in 1935, by 
1996 there were only 192 registered ejidatarios, and today, “we don’t have an 
accurate count.” (Comisariada of Valle de Saucillo, personal communication with 
author, 2005).  
 
Thus, the combination of the changes in Article 27 – which increased the 
likelihood of transfer of social to private lands – the lack of available water which 
accompanied the drought, and the rising costs of water and other land inputs – 
particularly for the most profitable crops like pecans, chile and onions --  have 
been a factor in this process since some farmers have preferred to sell their 
lands rather than pay the high costs of production. However as the case studies 
demonstrate, decisions about buying and selling ejido land are also influenced by 
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a community’s resources – including access to alternative water -- and according 
to survey respondents and interviews the vast majority of ejidatarios have opted 
to rent their land and water rights to wealthier farmers rather than a wholesale, 
more permanent sell-off.  
 













Chihuahua 13 370 1,144 11,200 
Delicias 2 64 140 624 
Santa Isabel 1 1 2 15 
Hidalgo del 
Parral 
2 62 76 370 
Jiménez 3 32 32 573 
Juarez 5 400 1,098 6,254 
Matachi 1 1 2 6 
Meoqui 1 3 3 17 
Ojinaga 2 87 92 838 
Guerrero 1 1 1 7 
Rosales 1 9 9 51 
San Francisco 
de Conchos 
1 65 142 1,234 
Santa Barbara 2 10 17 167 
Saucillo 1 23 27 432 
Total 35  3575 39,566 
 
Source: Reforma Agraria Nacional, Chihuahua City Office, September 2005.  
Note: Does not include communities in the process of seeking Dominio Pleno not yet granted by 
Mexico City.  
 
 
D. Water Conservation 
 
The availability of $40 U.S. million in grants from the North American 
Development Bank and $96 million from the Mexican federal government to 
make water delivery more “efficient” and water conservation more common on 
the fields making up the Delicias Irrigation District was a major change and issue 
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between 2002 and 2006. While plans for a more concentrated investment had 
already been in the works, the crisis of limited inflows to the dams during the 
1990s and the specific transboundary dispute with the U.S. over the lack of 
inflows into the Rio Grande was the catalyst which sent bureaucrats and 
politicians scurrying for some positive actions to relieve the crisis. Working 
feverishly, Chihuahuan state officials, CONAGUA and the staff of the Border 
Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) put together a plan in 2002 that 
called for over 343 million cubic water savings in District 005 through the lining of 
canals, advanced irrigation technologies, leveling of lands and other delivery 
improvement (BECC 2002;  IBWC 2003). Under the project certified by BECC, 
water deliveries would be reduced to farmers – and eventually water rights would 
also be reduced – thus freeing up water for other needs, including the need to 
comply with the 1944 Treaty with the U.S.  
 
It is, of course, one thing to say there are 343 million cubic meters of water 
demand to be saved, and quite another to make it happen, but between 2003 
and 2005, significant investments were made throughout the district, although not 
in the exact manner presented for certification before the Border Environment 
Cooperation Commission. Rather than a single district to invest in – and manage 
--  CONAGUA was faced now with 10 separate Modulos and two overarching 
main canal user associations that all wanted to determine how and where the 
money was spent.  
According to the Irrigation District’s “residencia” chief – Engineer Lauro 
Fernandez – akin to a public works and finance section – the presidents of the 
Modules, general managers and CONAGUA collectively made the decision to 
base the amount of money invested on the amount of land planted in each of the 
10 Modules over the previous five years. Complicating the decision was that 
three of the Modules served by San Pedro’s Las Virgenes Dam– Modulos 7, 8 
and 9 --  initially decided they did not want to participate at all, which meant that 
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some Modulos got more of a jumpstart on water savings than others. At issue? 
Each Module was required to sign a document stating that after the water 
conservation projects were implemented – and the water savings realized – their 
water rights would be reduced correspondingly. By late 2003, however, the 
Modules rejecting the agreement reversed course and signed the documents, 
giving them access to the project money (Manuel Carnero Valles, President, 
Modulo VIII, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Over the first three years of the project,  more than $820 million pesos – around 
$75 million dollars – was spent to reline some 395 kilometers of canals, level 
9,846 hectares of agricultural lands to make them more efficient for irrigation, 
install low-pressure irrigation systems in 7,446 hectares of land and high-
pressure “spray” systems in  5,716 hectares of land, while also rehabilitating 
seven wells (see Table 5.13). Between 2002 and 2004, certain Modules favored 
a more “technical” approach – low and high pressure irrigation systems – while 
other favored more low-tech approach, such as relining canals with cement (see 
Table  5.14). In general, those Modulos with a high number of private land 
owners with pecan farms tended to invest money in high pressure systems, while 
those with more ejido land tended to favor projects of a wider benefit, like low-
pressure gated pipes and cement lining of canals. In fact, say Module managers, 
the first year they felt pressured by CONAGUA and some of the larger farmers to 
spend money on high-pressure spray systems – mainly for pecan producers.   
Once they observed that it only benefited individual farmers and cost more they 
began to look at simple relining of canals and low-pressure systems (Jose 
García, manager, Modulo 12, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
For the first two years of the project, Mexico’s “experts” on water management – 
the Instituto Mexicano para la Tecnología del Agua – an autonomous, university-
linked government agency --  were hired to measure the actual volumes of water 
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being saved through these water conservation projects. While the volumes of 
water saved were less than had been anticipated – in part because of the failure 
of Modules 7, 8 and 9 to participate – they were still significant – about 54 million 
cubic meters in water savings in two years--  indicating the basic credibility of the 
investment. When upstream users in the Camargo and San Francisco de 
Conchos user associations outside the district but dependent on releases from 
La Boquilla Dam are included,  the water savings re even more impressive. 
 
Table 5.13. Investments made by type and amount in Sustainable Water Use 
Program, Delicias Irrigation District.  

























Km 146 128.2 118 140.3 131.3 136.8 395 405.3 










Ha 2,500 62.4 2,060 52.4 1,156 32.0 5,716 148.6 
Well 
Rehabilitation 




Km 175 3.4 226 4.2 107.5 1.3 509 8.9 
Supervision  
of Projects 
  14.6  15.8  15.8  46.2 
Measuring 
Gauges 
Num     94 7.6 94 7.6 
Contracts  54  43  39  136  
TOTAL $s   255.8  329.6  237.0  822.4 
Source: Gerencia Regional Rio Bravo, Residencia General Proyecto Delicias, Distrito de 
Riego 005, 2005.  
 
In mid-2005, however, plans for the 2005-2006 fiscal year began to go array. A 
series of devastating hurricanes in September in southern Mexico caused the 
Federal Government to reduce the overall budget for the water conservation 
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projects from $538 million pesos to $280 million pesos, meaning budgets had to 
be reduced by some 60 percent (Lauro Fernandez, Distrito de Riego 005, 
personal communication with author, 2005). In addition, costs for both cement – 
to line canals – and PVC pipes – which in some cases are replacing canals in the 
district – skyrocketed meaning 280 million pesos in 2005 wasn’t buying what it 
was in 2004. “Basically with the price of oil doubling, the price of PVC pipes also 
doubled,” noted Fernandez.  
 
Table 5.14. Low and High Water Pressure Systems Implemented by Module, 2002-
2004 
Module No.  Low Pressure 
Systems 
(Multicompuertas 
– Gated Pipes) 






 No. of Systems Surface Area 
(Hectares)  
No. of Systems Surface Area 
(Hectares) 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 20 375 
3 20 807 30 604 
4 12 740 27 950 
5 7 86 43 682 
6 4 1995 23 475 
7 12 1227 18 587 
8 8 691 15 90 
9 1 416 0 0 
San Francisco 
De Conchos 
8 237 53 390 
Camargo 0 0 2 43 
12 (Saucillo 
Canal) 
2 170 18 251 
Total 74 6,366 246 5,419 
Source: CONAGUA, Residencia General Proyecto Delicias, Distrito de Riego 005 Delicias, 
Programa del Uso Sustentable del Agua, Etapa 1 y 11, September 2005.  
 
CONAGUA – in part because of the cost overruns – also made changes in the 
specifications in their contracts to try and reduce the costs, including a decision 
to reduce the width of canal lining from 7 centimeters to 5 centimeters, a decision 
which has been criticized by some of the contractors.  
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“I don’t know why they approved this change to reduce the thickness,” noted 
Pedro Mata, a civil engineer who runs a local irrigation canal design and 
construction contract company. “There is no actual paperwork stating why they 
made this change and it means that canals will only last five or ten years instead 
of 15 or 20.” (Pedro Mata, Obra Roma Civil, personal communication with author, 
2005).  
 
Table 5.15. Water Savings through Sustainable Water Use Project, Delicias 
Irrigation District, Millions of Cubic Meters 
Modulo 1st Phase 2nd Phase Total 
1 6.195 6.557 12.754 
2 1.834 3.737 5.571 
3 0.233 0.408 0.642 
4 0.148 4.515 4.663 
5 4.142 9.746 13.887 
12 0.077 2.984 3.062 
Conchos River SRL 12.631 27.949 40.580 
6 3.067 5.958 9.025 
7 0 3.774 3.774 
8 0 0.106 0.106 
9 0 0.351 0.351 
San Pedro SRL 3.067 10.189 13.256 
Upstream  “Old 
Works” in Camargo 
and San Francisco 
de Conchos 
Irrigation Units 
3.984 4.229 8.213 
Total 19.682 42.367 62.049 
Source: Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua, “Volumenes Rescatados con el PUSASC en 
Distrito de Riego 005 Delicias,” 2005.  
 
Fernandez’ staff also oversees the bidding and contract process. On a sunny day 
in September, about 15 male engineers mill about the district offices in downtown 
Delicias, waiting for the paperwork to be released to prepare the contracts. For 
any given contract, Fernandez says they will get 10 to 15 bids, ranging from 
smaller local companies to large companies based in other states, and at times, 
even international companies with subsidiaries in Mexico. The monies 
NADBANK monies undergo a more rigorous oversight and analysis.  
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“The NADBANK contracts require actual proof of liability insurance, financial 
accounting and even resumes” notes Hugo Candelaria, who runs the local 
Delicias offices of Plasticos Rex, one of the leading providers of irrigation 
equipment in the area. (Hugo Candelaria, Plasticos Rex, personal 
communication with author, 2005) 
 
Fernandez rates the water conservation projects a success, since energy, water 
consumption and the number of irrigations per crop has been substantially 
reduced over the past few years.  The negative factors, he states, have more to 
do with the expectation of users that such “subsidies” of basic irrigation 
equipment will continue and that some irrigation equipment has not been well-
maintained or used correctly.  
 
“The hoses (cintillas) that we have contracted for drip irrigation have not been 
used adequately, with farmers sometimes putting the drip away from the roots 
rather than toward the roots,” Fernandez notes. “And they may not realize that in 
a few years they will have to replace these systems or they won’t work properly.”  
 
One of the firms benefiting from the water conservation monies – Obra Roma 
Civil based in Delicias – expresses the concern that too much money has gone 
into new technology. Ing. Pedro Mata says the eagerness within the district to 
replace canals with PVC pipes might be a mistake.  
 
“They’re replacing canals with tubes all over the district, but after three or four 
years, the pipes will fail and replacing them will be very costly, because there will 
no federal program to support the farmer,” Ing. Pedro Mata stated from his 
simple office on the outskirts of Delicias. “We should be returning to more basic 
maintenance and operation rather than throwing up all this new technology.”  
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A similar concern is echoed by Plastico Rex’s Candelaria, who says farmers 
have yet not adjusted to using the new technology properly, in part because of a 
lack of “culture of water.” “They want to flood their fields with five liters of water 
per hectare instead of only needing two liters of water per hectare,” he stated. 
“It’s part of a change in the culture of water.”  
 
Both Candelaria and also Mata put some of the blame on CONAGUA itself, 
which they felt had not overseen all the projects properly. “They have hired these 
out-of-state contractors who come in, do a poor job in construction and leave, 
and those same companies keep getting the contracts,” Mata stated.  
 
Finally, while nearly everyone interviewed felt that the conservation projects have 
been a huge boon for the district, many felt the projects had been undercut by a 
lack of oversight. When the program was first implemented, an oversight 
committee composed of CONAGUA, the SRLs and the Modules was formed to 
report back on the project themselves. Nonetheless, in 2005, the committee had 
not been meeting regularly and instead during the normal “Comites Hidraulicos” 
project implementation issues are discussed. A 2004 report on the Delicias water 
conservation projects and BECC certification process noted the failure of the 
oversight committee to have regular meetings and follow-up (Kelly and Luján 
2004).  
 
Thus, while the water conservation projects have represented an important 
change within the district, in general improving efficiency,  a number of 
challenges have impacted their implementation. These problems range from  
farmers implementing the new technologies correctly, a significant amount of the 
technology being used on “alternative” sources of water --  reducing the amount 
of savings of “district” water --  less-than-stellar work by contractors, cost over-
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runs, budget cuts and in some cases, fights within Modules over how and where 
to spend the money, as is discussed further within the specific Module case 
studies.  
 
E. Water Rights Sales  
 
In addition to the water conservation projects – using water more efficiently -- 
CONAGUA began a project to actually buy back water rights from farmers in the 
two Modulos furthest away from the Las Virgenes dam – Modulo 7 and 8. In 
2004, using federal monies, they began negotiating with the farmers – virtually all 
of them from the Ejido of Bachimba – and offered to buy back water rights of 
those lands that were poor in quality, far from the water source, rapidly 
urbanizing, and/or difficult to modernize through new irrigation systems (Ezequiel 
Bueno, CONAGUA,  Distrito de Riego 005, personal communication with author, 
2005).  
 
“This was the first time we had ever considered actually changing the district 
boundaries to unincorporate part of the district and reflect the reality of a district 
with less surface, but without reducing the amount of water by concentrating the 
water where it made sense,” Bueno explained.  
 
Interestingly, these same farmers were from the Modulos who only a short time 
before – in September of 2002 – had rejected participating in the water 
conservation projects, concerned that the projects were really more about 
stealing their water rights rather than using water more efficiently (Manuel 
Carnero Valles, Modulo 8 President, personal communication with author, 2005).  
According to Manuel Carnero Valles, who became Modulo 8 president in January 
of 2005, at the beginning there was no established price for the “definitive” sale 
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of water rights, but then a price of $29,600 pesos per hectare was published in 
the Federal Register, based on “some kind of study.”  
 
The Modulo advertised the potential sale of water rights and received over 230 
members of the Modulo who wanted to sell water rights back to the government.  
 
“They were all ejidatarios in the areas where water delivery has always been 
difficult,” Valles explained from his office in Lazaro Cardenas. Valles said the first 
year, based upon the amount of money CONAGUA had been assigned, 121 
members of the ejido with 745 hectares of land within Modulo 8 were able to sell 
off surface water rights, and in some cases, groundwater rights back to the state. 
Another 104 members – with 688 hectares – were approved for water rights but 
had yet to receive payments, a situation that led to protests in 2005 (Fuentes 
2005).  Approximately 100 more farmers had expressed some interest in 
participating in future sales, although they had yet to be accepted by CONAGUA 
and SAGARPA. 
 
Ramon Hernandez Hernandez, an Bachimba ejido said “the only thing that we 
can do on the land is pasture animals or grow mesquite trees for barbecues.” 
(Hernandez Hernandez, personal communication with author,  2005).  
 
He said the sell-off was to be expected. “The ejido boundaries were always a 
political question,” Hernandez explained. “They gave us land in return for votes. 
When the rains stopped and they began growing chile, vegetables and pecan 
trees by the rivers, the dam levels went down with the change in crops and the 
dams have never recovered. The only solution is really to shrink the district.”  




In all, some 31 million cubic meters of water were “saved” through water right 
sales, reducing the district by some 400 hectares, although of course it was 
water largely “on paper” anyway since many of the lands had not been irrigated 
for the better part of a decade.  A similar amount was expected in the 2005-2006 
season (see Table 5.16).  
 
Table 5.16. Definitive Water Rights Sales, Users, Volume of Water, Hectares and 
























VII 273 17,503 35,006 3,518 8,796 21,021 43,802 
VIII 121 8,801 17,601 1,763 4,408 10,564 22,009 
Total 394 26,304 52,607 5,281 13,204 31,585 65,811 
Source: CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego 005 Delicias, “PADUA: Primera Etapa,” 2005.  
 
“Every water user has a water right, but we are concentrating the rights 
geographically,” explained District Operation Manager Ezequiel Bueno. “The 
farmer who had two water rights for two different pieces of land is using the two 
rights in only one land so he has sufficient water and in this way we are 
concentrating the use of water…through the program.” (Bueno, Distrito de Riego 
005, CONAGUA, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
IV. Scaling In: The Old Saucillo Canal 
 
A. A Little History 
 
It doesn’t look like much, the beginning of the ol’ Suacillo Canal. The Río 
Conchos moves in a northerly direction and is suddenly interrupted by a small 
cement check dam, known locally as the Presa Tortuga – Turtle Dam. To the 
west, a small canal diverts water to one side of the check dam, and begins a 43 
kilometer journey through a number of ejidos, downtown Saucillo, through a 
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series of small rural communities on the old road to Delicias, and eventually back 
to the Rio Conchos itself (see Photo 5.5).  
 
The users of the Saucillo Canal occupy some 3,725 hectares of land squeezed 
between the Rio Conchos and the Saucillo Canal itself. It is a thin slice of land 
that occupies the flood plain of the river, and some of the best alluvial soils, 
particularly well-liked by pecan trees. The roots of the Saucillo Canal Water 
Users Association goes back to 1717 – with the establishment of the Hacienda 
de San Marcos de Saucillo, a 125,918 hectare land tract – or “Mercedes” granted 
by Spain to Juan Antonio de Traviña y Retes, that would later become the heart 
of the municipalities of Delicias, Rosales, Meoqui and Saucillo. After the death of 
de Traviña y Retes in 1724, the land was passed onto his widow, and then his 
son-in-law, before being administered by “La Compañía de Jesús” – the Jesuits. 
While the first activities under de Traviña y Retes were related to mining, under 
the Jesuits, cattle and agriculture – through the renting of land to local inhabitants 
– became the dominant activities (Alvarado et al. 2003: 28). 
 
After the Jesuits were thrown out by the Spanish regime in 1767, the Hacienda 
was turned over to the state, and constant attacks by the apaches and other 
indigenous tribes from the north placed the Hacienda in severe decay and semi-
abandonment. Following the war of independence with Spain, Don Jose Antonio 
Uribe and his wife arrived from San Pablo (today known as Meoqui) and began 
farming a large portion of the land. The couple are considered founders of the 
City of Saucillo. In 1830, the Hacienda de San Marcos itself was sold to Esteban 
Courcier, a French investor, and agriculture reemerged along the banks of the 
Rio Conchos, as cotton, watermelon, wheat, oats and corn were grown in part to 
feed workers who were mining the nearby hills (Alvarado, et al. 2003: 31).  In 
1850, the population of Saucillo was officially recognized by the federal 




Photo 5.5. Presa “La Tortuga” on the Río Conchos. The beginning of the Saucillo 
Canal is to the right on the photo.  
 
In 1878, Porfirio Armendariz, a wealthy agriculturist and merchant from nearby 
Rosales, purchased the Hacienda, and began to subdivide it and sell off each 
small track for 500 pesos. Small towns like Las Varas, La Cuadra, and El 
Orranteño -- which line the Rio Conchos between Saucillo and Delicias – known 
as the “Cordillera de Saucillo” -- originated in this period as new families came to 
grow crops and mine the hills to the east. These same families from Saucillo and 
nearby towns began construction of the Tortuga Dam and Saucillo Canal, which  
were begun in this period by “pico y palo” only to be destroyed by a series of 
floods in the late 1800s, leading the town of Saucillo to be relocated slightly down 
the river. The canal itself was rebuilt in the late 1880s (Alvarado et al. 2003:33). 
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Following the Mexican revolution, new lands were subdivided along the 
Cordillera de Suacillo and given to families and ejidos.  
 
 
Photo 5.6. Downtown Saucillo, 2005 
 
 
Martin Echaanic Chavez is a second generation farmer whose father arrived from 
the Basque country in Spain to Saucillo in the post-WW II era. Chavez served as 
president of the User Association from both 1979 to 1981 and 1991 to 1995. In 
the late 1970s, he said, pecan production was just beginning to take off, but the 
“entire 3725” hectares was continually planted and replanted by grains, 
vegetables and cotton. The canal – dilapidated and sinewy – was continually 
cleaned and maintained by local users and the diversion dam continuously 
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diverted river water. (Martín Echaanic Chavez, Modulo XII farmer, personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
 
“The drought arrived and it affected all the “labores viejas” – the old works – all of 
us who relied on canals connected to the river itself,” the middle-aged 
charismatic farmer remembered. “It was the downstream farmers against the 
upstream farmers and all the farmers against the government.”  
 
Echaanic Chavez said that when he became president the second time he was 
concerned that his water user association did not have an actual piece of paper 
saying they could use the water. After finally securing an official concession from 
the river, he began to ask for even more water in late 1994.  
 
“They announced they would close the dam, which meant none of the folks in the 
irrigation district would be watering and no releases from the dam down the 
river,” he noted. “I knew that we couldn’t just rely on the river concession.”  
Chavez said that he paid visits to “Dr. Zedillo,” referring to the former Mexican 
president, and a number of political leaders. At first they proposed dividing the 
Old Saucillo Canal Water User Assocation into three sections, “split evenly 
between Modulos 1, 2, and 3.”  
 
“We told them we would not be divided and that we needed both the river 
concession and a dam concession,” Chavez remembered. In the meantime, 
Chavez also began assuring that more water would get to the Saucillo Canal 
itself through “updating” the diversion dam (See Photo 5.5). The check dam’s 
stone “wall” – dating from the 1870s -- was replaced in 1994 with “cement, rather 
than the traditional stones which line the river.” (Chavez, personal 
communication with author, 2005). 
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“I didn’t ask for permission, I didn’t warn anyone, I just did it,” the proud Chavez 
stated matter-a-factly, who estimates he raised the wall about 20 centimeters.  
 
His decision – while supported by most farmers in Modulo XII – did not sit well 
with other farmers who rely on “Federal” rights  -- Derechos Federales -- from the 
government to use river water downstream from the diversion dam itself. For 
example, in the ejidal town of Parritas – the beginning of the Old Saucillo Canal – 
a number of the ejidatarios depend upon pumping the river water itself to irrigate 
their cropland.  
 
Hector Talamantes, an older farmer in Parritas, is the current president of the 
Ejido. He said that when Parritas was first recognized in 1935 by the federal 
government, several of the ejido members who did not irrigate from the Saucillo 
Canal itself were granted a federal right to pump out river water. (Hector 





While the ejido currently has 37 members with 2,856 hectares of farmland and 
2,500 hectares of “common use” – basically scrub brush in the steep hills beyond 
the riverplain -- some 14 of those have relied on the federal rights to pump water 
from the river and send it into a small canal.  
 
 “We all used to grow six hectares of wheat and corn and now we grow nothing,” 
Talamantes states, holding up his ejido’s federal concesión outside his humble 
home in Parritas. “I wish the river would flow again so we would benefit and the 
pools would fill up again and the fish would come back.”  
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In 1999, after sever years of negotiation, and several years in which the Saucillo 
Canal farmers had to pay other Modulos to release water down drainage dams 
as the Rio Conchos ran dry, the old Saucillo Canal joined up with their brethren 
in the Irrigation District and became Modulo XII.  
 
B. The Old Saucillo Canal Today 
 
Today, the Saucillo Canal User Association, known as Modulo XII, gets its water 
from both sources – the river and the dam. “Section 1” of Modulo XII still gets all 
of its water from the river itself, using the river water concession from the Federal 
Government. Depending upon the amount of river water available, Sections II 
and III get water from the much larger Conchos Canal, passed through Modulo II 
down four drainage ditches, according to Modulo’s XII general manager,  Jose 
García (see Map 8 and Photo 5.7). A slight man from Orranteño with an 
engineering degree and a young family, García can quote numbers of thousand 
cubic meters of brute and net water used by section from memory – even if it 






























Photo 5.7. The Conchos Canal, near Estacion Conchos, provides water to the Old 
Saucillo Canal through four drainage canals.  
 
 
“We only had about 200 liters per second of water out of the river, and it would 
run a little ways and then there would just be nothing in the (Saucillo) canal,” 
García noted. (José García, Modulo XII, personal communication with author, 
2005; see Photo 5.8).  
 
Every October, the Modulo XII president and general manager meet with 
CONAGUA to determine how much water they will be granted from the dam in 
March. Based on the amount from the dam, they divide the amount of water in 
Sections II and III by the number of water rights users to tell farmers how much 
water will be available. In February that number is adjusted slightly based on 
rains accumulated over the period.  In 2004, for example, García was given 
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13,390,000 thousand cubic meters of water, enough for each of the 535 users in 
Section Ii and III to get 25 “millares” or 25,000 cubic meters per user right.  
 
 
Photo 5.8. The Suacillo Canal as it approaches the town of Saucillo.  
 
“But our farmers don’t think in terms of millares – which is a term common in the 
wider district – but in terms of the number of hectares,” he explained. “So we told 
them that’s a little over 3 hectares of cotton, about 1.75 hectares of alfalfa or 1.25  
hectares of jalapeños.”  
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Whatever the farmers in Section II and III get, García grants a similar amount 
from the river to the farmers in Section I, God willing. The Modulo charges the 
water user per millar used, although again, most farmers in the district express it 
in terms of hectare irrigated. “We put a hectare of corn at 800 pesos, a hectare of 
chile at 2000 pesos and hectare of alfalfa at 1400,” García notes.  
 
There are 712 “users” of the Old Saucillo Canal, covering some 3,979 hectares, 
or an average of five hectares per user (see Table 5.17). It is important to note 
that the number of “users” does not necessarily equal the number of farmers 
since one farmer may have several water rights. Thus, CONAGUA reports a total 
of 588 users in Modulo XII, with 212 users being part of an ejido – and covering 
about 830 hectares -- and 376 “private” users utilizing 3102 hectares (see Table 
5.18). García says the difference between their number of users and 
CONAGUA’s may be due to differences in Section 1, which relies on river water, 
shallow wells and direct pumping from the river, as well as the “fractionalization” 
of the ejidos, which has led to “new” users not recorded by CONAGUA.  
 
Table 5.17. Number of Users of Saucillo Canal Water Association (Modulo XII)  
Section Number of “Users” (1) Hectares 
I 179 1227 
2 297 1291 
3 236 1461 
Total 712 3979 
Source: Jose García, Modulo XII, 2004.  
Notes: (1) User signifies a distinct user right. Some farmers have more than one water right.  
 
Table 5.18. Land Ownership in Saucillo Modulo XII 
Category Ejido  Private Owner Total 
Water Users 212 376 588 
Amount of Land 830 3102 3932 
Average Size Plot 3.91 8.25 6.68 
Source: CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego 005, “Cuadro de Superficie Fisica y Riego 
General del Distrito,” 2004.  
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In addition to the river water from the Canal Saucillo in Section 1 and the dam 
water from the Conchos Canal which is “passed through” to Sections 2 and 3, 
there are a number of private wells, two communal wells and a number of 
farmers who have dug their own “norias” – shallow wells near the river itself. 
Finally, there are a number of farmers who pump directly from the river, legally or 
not. One such legal example is the already cited 14 ejidatarios in Parritas, who 
have a paper right to 420,000 cubic meters per year to irrigate 70 hectares, 
though they have not been able to use those rights since 1995 (Tribunal Superior 
Agrario 1996; Talamantes, personal communication with author, 2005). 
 
Running the show for the Modulo is Rodolfo Parras, who  became its president in 
January of 2005 (Rodolfo Parras, Modulo XII President, personal communication 
with author, 2005). He said the “Old Works” association decided to join the 
district because of access to water and to money that would be available for 
water efficiency efforts.  
 
“Everything is costly now,” the burly, mustached farmer and local politico 
explained. “The machinery to clean out the canals, the diesel, the sediment, lime 
and other costs all keep increasing since we have to clean out the canal twice a 
year at least.”  
 
To compensate, the Module has had to increase the price of water, from 100 
pesos per hectare to about 1400 pesos to irrigate one hectare of alfalfa. 
Information provided by CONAGUA and Modulo XII since 2000 show that less 
than half of irrigable land in Sections II and III have been irrigated as water 
deliveries have been limited (See Table  5.19). The water delivered differs from 
the water programmed because Modulo XII is able to replace some of the dam 




Table 5.19. Water Use, Cost and Delivery within Modulo XII, Sections II and III only 





















1,518 1,222 878 1,427 1,207 1,078 
Alfalfa 457 422 360 505 294 230 
Pecan 532 472 325 475 533 480 
Corn 457 275 163 328 220 252 
Cotton 0 0 0 25 93 23 










Irrigated  13.21 12.97 15.84 15.82 11.59 12.19 
Note: (1) Does not include nearly 6,000,000 cubic meters transferred to other districts due to 
lining of Saucillo Canal which prevented some farmers from using irrigation water right.  
 
Source: For 2000-2002, CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego 005 Delicias, 2005; for 2003-2005, Jose 
García, Manager, Modulo XII, 2005.  
 
The information does not include land irrigated by the river itself – mainly in 
Section 1 – as well as by the individual and community wells and is thus 
incomplete. Still, the amount of hectares irrigated has closely followed the 
amount of water delivered to the Modulo over the last six years. It is clear that 
while the types of crops have not changed – typified by pecans, alfalfa, corn and 
a smattering of other crops – the amounts have, particularly with a slight rise in 
the growth of chile farms and a slight reduction in alfalfa, related again to the lack 
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of available water. Overall, farmers in Saucillo appear to be using the dam water 
more “efficiently” over the last two years, which is related both to the reduction in 
hectares of alfalfa – a high water use crop – as well as efficiencies gained  due to 
the cement lining of the Saucillo Canal. While the table suggests a slight 
reduction in hectares of pecans irrigated, it is related to the transfer of some 
pecan orchards to groundwater and even river water, rather than an actual 
physical reduction in pecan groves. If anything, observational evidence suggests 
that pecan orchards are increasing locally.  
 






































Alfalfa 131 1834 307 4298 438 6132 
Pecan 245 3185 414 5382 659 8567 
Corn 63 567 279 2511 342 3078 
Chile 61 1220 28 560 89 1780 
Cotton 12 108 0 387 12 495 
Various 55 495 43 0 98 495 
Total 567 7409 1071 13138 1638 20547 
Source: Jose García, Manager, Modulo XII, 2005.  
 
A much more complete picture of total irrigation in the Modulo includes 
information from Section 1, irrigated by the river water (See Table 5.20). The 
table shows that Section 1 –relying on river water – is heavily invested in pecan 
orchards, alfalfa, corn and chile.  These four crops make up more than 90 
percent of the lands irrigated and more than 98 percent of the water used overall. 
In particular, in recent years farmers have invested in new production in pecans 
and chile peppers, while corn and alfalfa have emerged as crops for the milk and 
cheese industries which operate in the area. Thus, trends in Modulo XII closely 
mirror trends within the district as a whole, with high water-demand cash crops 
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like pecans and chile expanding, alfalfa fairly stable, even as the overall amount 
of hectares irrigated has declined (Photo 5.9).  
 
 
Photo 5.9. A high water demand-crop, pecans, are slowly replacing crops like 
cotton.  
 
C. Managing their Water More Wisely?  
 
In 2002, Modulo XII signed the same “Convenio” as did most other Modulos 
pledging to reduce their water rights if and when water conservation projects 
were implemented and verified.  
 
“We weren’t really in agreement with the Convenio – to give up our water rights 
but it was the only way to bring money and technology,” Parras explained.  
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The water conservation projects themselves have been a mixed blessing, 
according to García, Parras and the farmers of Saucillo. When the Sustainable 
Water Use program began in the 2002-2003 hydrological year, CONAGUA 
encouraged the Modulos to try all the new technologies available – from low 
pressure to high pressure irrigation systems to more traditional “lining” of canals.  
 
“The problem is that at the beginning CONAGUA obligated that we had to do 
these other works,” Parras explained. “They told us, “put it all in” so that the 
(former) president took it as a green light. A year later we realized that there 
wasn’t much money and the benefits weren’t going to reach many farmers, so we 
put it all into relining the (Saucillo) canal.” (Rodolfo Parras, personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
 
Information provided by CONAGUA on how Modulo XII has spent its allotment of 
the monies granted under the Sustainable Use Program reinforces Parras’ 
assertion (See Table 5.21). Thus, in the 2002-2003 period, there were three 
wells that were connected to a system of tubes, hydrants and “tuberia de 
multicompuertas” in an attempt to improve efficiency and in essence lessen the 
demand on the Saucillo Canal itself. Wells were dug and connected in El Indio, 
Bawanca and for one individual, potentially benefiting 180 hectares and 38 
individuals.  
 
Interviews with some of those benefiting from the system confirm, however, that 
not all of these beneficiaries were using the system in 2005. In El Indio, for 
example, a 130-meter deep well was dug and 20 members of the community – 
all members of Ejido Saucillo -- were switched to groundwater use (Photo 5.10 
and 5.11). The wells were actually dug in 1995 according to current well manager 
José Esteban Lara Pino. In 2002 and 2003, as part of the conservation projects, 
each of the 20 farmers were provided with gated irrigation tubes to irrigate their 
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lands using the well water and had a hydrant installed on the corner of their land. 
In 2005, only half of the beneficiaries were using the hydrants and gated pipes 
together. Some prefer to simply run the hydrants into the existing earthen canals 
on their land, while others are not using the well water at all, in part because the 
cost of the water is greater. Residents must pay for the electricity operating the 
pump (José Esteban Lara Pino,  Los Indios, personal communication with author, 
2005). 
 
Table 5.21. Works Performed under Sustainable Water Use Program, 2002-2005, 
Module XII  
 
 
(1) The 2005-2006 is the estimate of the work that will be performed in Modulo XII 
based upon the amount of money earmarked and the cost of lining the main 
Saucillo Canal.  
(2) Total capacity of the system. In some cases, not all hectares and beneficiaries 
are using the low-pressure irrigation system.  
(3) Total capacity of the system. Not all systems are in operation and not all hectares 
are being irrigated using these high-pressure irrigation systems.  
 
Source: Jose García, General Manager, Modulo XII, 2005 and CONAGUA, Residencia 

























































8 kms 3 180 38 16 208 9 
2003-
2004 
8 kms 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004-
2005 
14 kms 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005-
2006 (1) 
5 kms 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 35 kms 0 180 38 16 208 9 
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Photo 5.10. Community Well, Los Indios is opened for business by manager José 
Esteban Lar Pino of Los Indios. 
 
 
The high-pressure systems also enacted under the high-profile program in 
Modulo XII have been slightly more successful, and are all being used to irrigate 
pecan fields. According to García, six of the nine systems are operating, although 






Photo 5.11. Hydrant in Los Indios. Note that the hydrant has not been connected to 
multi-gated pipes.    
 
The lining of the Saucillo Canal itself has been an amazing undertaking. In the 
2004-2005 period, two different contractors were busy relining some 14 
kilometers of the 43-kilometer canal (see Photo 5.12). According to Parras, the 
result has been mixed. On the one hand, the water has come more quickly down 
the canal, and is more efficiently delivered. On the other, a series of delays in 
construction and the simple fact that as the canal is lined some users do not 
have access to water for irrigations, has been problematic.  
 
Parras said that there have been two types of reactions to the change. Those 
who are already efficient water users “can irrigate twice with the same amount of 
water,” while those that irrigate more don’t like it because there is physically less 
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volume being released from the main canal, or “they have soils that are too 
sandy.”  
 
Pedro Mata, who oversees the construction firm Roma Obra Civil, runs one of 
the companies lining the old Suacillo Canal and says they lined 3.5 kilometers of 
the canal in 2005.  
 
“The folks from the Modulo want me to finish the whole canal because they know 
I have experience, but I have to compete against about 18 firms just to get the 
contract, and CONAGUA does it by points and cost,” Mata explained. He 
complained that the other firm currently doing work on the canal – DEUSA – from 
a neighboring state “uses people to do their work with no experience in cement.”  
 
Photo 5.12. The lining of the Suacillo Canal turns an earthen canal into a modern 
irrigation canal.  
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“In the end constructing a canal is easy, simple,” Roma remarked. “The real test 
for these Modulos will be in preventative and maintenance work to make sure the 
works last more than a few years.”  
 
 
Photo 5.13. Lining of the Saucillo Canal. Some have complained of shoddy work and 




The interruptions in service and the high price of water have also led to a new 
market in water rights that didn’t exist before Saucillo’s entrance into the District. 
Those unable to irrigate due to the relining have often temporarily sold their water 
right to others for a sizable sum. Thus, in 2004, according to García, farmers in 
Saucillo were selling their 25,000 cubic meter water right for some 6,000 pesos, 
or more than twice what they were being charged by the Modulo. In 2005, García 
said that nearly 6 million cubic meters of water were transferred from users in 
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Modulo XII to users in neighboring Modulos when the lining of the canal in the 
middle section of the Modulo prevented them from irrigating. 
 
 ‘It’s really simple economics,” explained García. “When water is scarce and the 
price is high, there is a market to sell water rights. When water is more plentiful, 
there is less incentive for farmers to sell.”  
 
D. The Farmers  
 
During September of 2005, 35 surveys were conducted with farmers in the 
Modulo XII region. In three cases the farmers were not official “users” of Modulo 
XII.  Two were farmers who rented property in the Modulo but owned property in 
another area, while another had his land on the other side of the river outside the 
Modulo altogether, and was relying on pumping river water and local 
groundwater to irrigate a pecan field, corn and alfalfa.  The first two cases were 
included in the survey because the farmers were using Modulo resources, while 
the final case was not. In some cases, the surveys were conducted on farms and 
at other times in residences. All of those interviewed were male, which is not 
surprising, given that the vast majority of both private land owners and ejido 
members are male. Appendix A contains a copy of the survey instrument used. 
This section will highlight several of the major factors related to the drought and 
its impacts, changing factors in agricultural production, the water conservation 
projects, and the organizations that assist the farmers. While the present chapter 
presents an overall summary of the survey results, more detailed survey results 







1. Land Use  
 
Overall, most farmers surveyed  -- 22 out of 34 – planted on 10 hectares or less 
of land rented or owned in 2005. The information from the surveys indicate that 
ejidal land owners tended to be small with the hectares more or less normally 
distributed,  with most private farmers also fairly small with a few outliers. (See 
Figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1. Distribution of Total Amount of Land Planted that is Owned or Rented 











Total Amount of Land Owned or Rented in Agricultural Production

















Source: Reed,  Saucillo Survey, Respondents 1-34, 2005.  
 
Based on these responses, the farmers were divided into different categories: 
ejidal farmers (n=13), small private farmers (n=9) and large farmers (n=12). 
While different respondents grew different crops, in general the larger farmers 
were more likely to grow pecans, alfalfa and corn, while smaller farmers whether 
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ejidal or private tended to grow corn and alfalfa as inputs to dairy cows, as well 
as to a lesser extent pecans, peanuts and chile peppers. In general, larger 
farmers tended to have more established contracts for their products – be it 
growing pecans for Bimbo – or corn or alfalfa for large dairy operations, while 
smaller farmers either used the crops as inputs to their own cattle or sold their 
chile peppers, peanuts or pecans to the highest bidder, often waiting till the last 
minute, at least according to local observation.  
 
A recent trend in the pecan industry has been the use of biological controls, itself 
partly influenced by the U.S. market (Herbert Gutierrez, Nueces Chihuahua 
personal communication with author, 2005). Part of this effort has been promoted 
by the local Junta Local de Sanidad Vegetal, which sells biological controls and 
even added a beneficial insect to its logo to emphasize biological control (Photo 
5.14). While many of the smaller farms use “native” criollo pecan nuts –wild 
pecans which line the sides of the Conchos River – the larger farmers tend to be 
more mechanized and have larger, shinier “Western” or “Wichita” nuts, which 
fetch a higher price on the local and world market, not only because they are 
preferred but because they have more “meat.” (see Photo 5.15). 
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Photo 5.14. Logo of local agricultural extension agency, Saucillo, 2005. The 
beneficial wasp was added in 2005 to the logo to emphasize biological control.  
 
A recent entry into the local chile market is Rex Internacional, a U.S.-based 
company which built a chile processing and package center in 1992 in 
Chihuahua. In 1997, they moved the plant to Saucillo (see Photo 5.16). In 2005, 
the plant had over 80 contracts with growers in the Delicias area, many of them 
with private growers with access to well water. They also buy from local growers 
without guaranteed contracts. All of the chiles are turned into chipotle sauce or 
dried and exported to the U.S. for use in food, dyes or cosmetics (Javier Grajeda, 




Photo 5.15. Farmers use a traditional way to shake the pecans down, 2005. Modern 
pecan mechanized tools have increased yields, and decreased labor costs, but are only 





Photo 5.16. Trucks wait outside of Rex Internacional, one of the leading 
purchasers of chile peppers, Saucillo, Delicias Irrigation District, 2005.  
 
2. Agricultural Change 
 
Both large and small farmers were asked through the survey instrument the 
major changes that occurred on their farms since 1995 and why. Among the 
major changes cited by Saucillo farmers were the loss of winter crops like wheat, 
rye grass and oats; shifts in water source – from river water to alternative 
sources like “tajos” – holes dug near the river --  communal wells, district water 
and individual wells and in some cases, direct pumping of the river;  the switch to 
perennial crops –virtually all related to pecan production --  the reduced amounts 
of hectares irrigated; the increased use of technology – both for pecans and chile 
peppers; the corresponding decreased use of labor;  and the increased use of 
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fertilizers (see Figure 5.2). A handful of farmers reported growing more hectares 
than previously, related to the buying or renting of other lands or use of new 
water sources. A few farmers reported using more pesticides – mainly those 
growing chile pepper and corn --- while some pecan farmers reported using less 
pesticides as they switched to biological controls.  
 
Figure 5.2. Agricultural Changes reported by Saucillo Farmers in Total Responses 
(N=34) and Total Points (Maximum = 102) 
 
Note: One point was assigned for a “small” change, two points were assigned for a 
“medium” change and three points were assigned for a “large” change.  
Source: Reed, Surveys 1-34, Saucillo 2005.  
 
There were differences between large and small farmers. Thus, while all farmers 
cited the elimination of winter crops as a major factor, large farmers were much 
more likely to cite a change in water source and the increased use of machinery 
than smaller private or ejido farmers, and small farmers and ejido farmers were 
much more likely to say they had reduced the total amount of hectares irrigated 
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than large farmers. Finally, of the six respondents who said they had increased 
the total number of hectares irrigated, five were “large” private farmers. 
 
What caused farmers to make these changes? Again, not surprisingly, the major 
factors were both natural – the drought and lack of access to waters of the 
Saucillo Canal – and market-based – the change in the price of inputs and the 
profitability of some crops like corn, winter wheat, pecans and chile peppers. The 
first two had declined their profitability – though corn was still used as a dairy 
input -- while the last two had increased their market price in recent years. 
Unfortunately, these last two were also the biggest water users and tended to 
favor larger rather than smaller farmers. (See Figure 5.3). Other factors cited by 
respondents included access to funds or loans – the drying up of credit 
principally related to the government-backed Banco Rural – and competition with 
international producers, mainly related to corn and wheat production.  
Figure 5.3. Factors Related to Agricultural Changes, Saucillo Farmers in Total 





Note: One point was assigned for a “small” change, two points were assigned for a “medium” 
change and three points were assigned for a “large” change.  
Source: Reed, Surveys 1-34, Saucillo 2005.  
 
3. Water source and drought 
 
Actual water use in the fields of Modulo XII is a complex, variable mosaic, as 
farmers use, buy and sell their “normal” water rights from the Saucillo Canal (and 
Conchos Canal), and augment that water with water from other sources. (see 
Figure 5.4). Thus, one ejido farmer said that he primarily uses the water from the 
Saucillo Canal, but at times he will augment it by pumping water from the river. A 
small private farmer said that he has water rights but often sells them for money, 
and then makes use of  his tractor to pump water from the river directly to a 
drainage ditch surrounding his alfalfa field, which he then connects to gated 
pipes (see Photo 5.17). Some farmers also use “Tajos” a hole dug in the ground 
to collect rainwater, groundwater and runoff which is then pumped. In fact, 19 out 
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of the 34 surveyed reported having made changes in their water source between 
1995 and 2005, a stunning number. 
 
Figure 5.4. Sources of Irrigation Water Used by Saucillo Farmers (N=32) by 
Category of Farmer in 2005 
 




Photo 5.17. This field was irrigated by pumping water directly from Rio Conchos 
using a tractor and then irrigating his alfalfa field, using a combination of old and 
new technology, such as gated pipes. 
 
 
The change is related to the sudden lack of access to river water in 1995, access 
to funds for water well drilling and more recently, water conservation projects, 
and the decentralization of water management which has allowed for more 
“creativity.” All but one of the farmers surveyed in Saucillo agreed that there had 
been a severe drought. In terms of its causes, other than the obvious lack of rain 
and drought itself, farmers also cited the increased competition with other 
traditional farmers upstream which relied on old-style canals to pump the river 
water, the expansion of the irrigation district in the 1980s and lack of investment 
in the Saucillo area, poor water management and inefficient water use, and the 
expansion of high-demand water crops. Secondary factors included 
sedimentation of the rivers, canals and dams and the U.S. demand for water. 
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Thus, farmers in Modulo XII blamed nature – the drought – their government – 
for expanding the district and then not investing properly – the market – favoring 
high demand water crops -- and themselves – for wasting, stealing and pumping 
water – for the water management problems. Such responses belie a simple 
explanation and show that unlike U.S. and Mexican politicians – focused on a 
single explanation of declining flows – farmers recognized that the lack of flows 
involved economics, water management and natural causes.  
 
Figure 5.5. Factors cited by Saucillo farmers related to the lack of available water 
since 1995 in total responses (N=34) and total maximum points (N=102) 
 
Note: One point was assigned for a “small” factor, two points were assigned for a 
“medium” factor and three points were assigned for a large factor.  
 
Source: Reed, Surveys 1-34, Saucillo 2005.  
 
The water conservation projects were generally well received. Thus of the 26 
respondents who chose to answer the question, 20 rated the conservation 
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projects as good or very good, another 2 said they were “normal,” three said the 
conservation projects were poor and one ejido member said the project had been 
“very bad.” Virtually all farmers felt it made sense to conserve water, although 
most assumed that they could both use less water for the same amount of crops 
but also expand production. They generally believed the projects were benefiting 
all farmers in the region, with some exception for smaller farmers who felt they 
had been left out of its benefits, and virtually none felt the projects had been 
imposed upon them. Most – 21 out of 34 – agreed or strongly agreed that the 
projects were related to the dispute with the U.S., and that some of the benefits 
would flow to the U.S. They did not necessarily like this, or feel it was fair that 
Chihuahua was paying back the debt and not other states, but recognized the 
reality of the treaty.  
 
4. Organizational Issues  
 
Just who helps the farmers of the Saucillo canals? Unlike the relatively 
abandoned farmers of the upper Conchos watershed, there is a surprising 
number of government, cooperatives, associational and private organizations 
assisting farmers. Topping the list are the municipal and federal agricultural 
ministries, which provide the ProCampo subsidy payments, access to loans and 
grants for agricultural technology, and special projects, such as roofing, corrals 
and fences. CONAGUA – the water ministry – also received praise, most of it 
related to the new water conservation projects. Other support came from banks – 
including Credit Unions – the ejidos themselves, the water user association and 
private companies with contracts for farmers. These included Rex, the chile 
purchaser, and Bimbo, which purchases pecans.  While there were some 
individual complaints about some of these organizations – such as private 
companies or banks had abused the terms of contracts or loans– there was also 
many success stories, such as a Saucillo Cooperative to buy inputs cheaply and 
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a government-led milk processing center which purchased milk from small 
farmers at favorable prices (see Photo 5.18).  
 
Figure 5.6. Who helps the Saucillo Canal farmers? Positive and negative 
responses (N=32) and Points (Maximum = 96) 
 
 
Note: One point was assigned for a “small” help, two points were assigned for a 
“medium” help and three points were assigned for a “large” help. Negative points were 
assigned for organizations that “hurt” farmers.  
Source: Reed, Surveys 1-34, Saucillo 2005.  
 
 
Finally, farmers were asked questions about the water management association 
itself, and the transfer to the Delicias Irrigation District which occurred. Most – 22 
out of 34 – felt the transfer had been of benefit, with eight saying it had been a 
disadvantage. The primary benefit was of course the access to dam water, as 
well as the increased access to water conservation monies. The big 
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disadvantage was not surprisingly the increased cost of water as the Module 
began charging district-level prices.  
 
Noted one unhappy ejido farmer “they charge double the price for water and 
there is no difference in the service. Before they charged less and if we needed 
something fixed we did it ourselves, now we have to pay them to do it.” 
 
 
Photo 5.18. The Saucillo Cooperative was cited by 11 farmers has having assisted 
them by lowering input costs.  Other cooperatives cited included the LICONSA milk 
cooperative. 
 
E. Concluding Thoughts: Saucillo 
 
In a 10 year period, the farmers dependent upon the Saucillo Canal witnessed a 
sudden transformation. An historic drought – coupled with hundreds of straws 
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along the Rio Conchos itself – dried up their river to the point that they needed 
emergency “loans” of water from the Delicias Irrigation Districts as they pursued 
an actual water concession from the La Boquilla Dam. By the 1998-99 irrigation 
season, the small historic water user association had joined the District Itself, and 
rather than relying exclusively on their river water from the Tortuga Dam, they 
combined it with water from both the dam and larger Conchos Canal. In the 
meantime, farmers had found every way imaginable to get water when they 
needed, from wealthier pecan farmers using government, bank and their own 
resources to dig deepwater wells, to ejido and smaller farmers pumping water 
from the rivers, initiating “community” wells or digging shallow “noria” wells or 
“tajos” – holes in the ground -- along the banks of the Rio Conchos. In 2002-
2003, the Rio Saucillo User Assocation signed the documents to participate in 
the “Sustainable Water Use” projects and began granting monies to pecan 
farmers to install sprinkler systems, while finally beginning to line most of the 100 
year-old Saucillo Canal with cement. By the following year, when they observed 
how little monies were actually available, they abandoned the individual on-farm 
conservation project in favor of attempting to reline the entire 43 kilometer 
Saucillo Canal itself, a job which had fallen short of expectations due to budget 
cuts, the rising cost of cement and some problems with contractors hired to do 
the job.  
 
Farmers blamed the lack of river water – and the need to turn to additional water 
sources and water conservation– on natural factors – the drought – along with 
management issues, which ranged from competition with upstream farmers for 
water, overextension of the Irrigation District in the 1980s, and water waste. In 
addition, farmers reported that economic conditions had led them to concentrate 
their water resources in higher water-demand crops like alfalfa, chile and pecans.  
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Thus, along with these changes in water use and conservation came changes in 
crop production. The winter crop – wheat – was abandoned in favor of basic 
grains and grasses – alfalfa and corn – for dairy cows, and more remunerative 
crops like chile and pecans. In general, wealthier farmers concentrated their 
efforts on pecan production, while land-poor farmers concentrated on inputs to 
their small dairy farms for domestic production. Inputs to the farm itself – 
pesticides, fertilizers and machinery – generally increased, although interestingly 
many farmers did turn to “organic” controls for pests or organic fertilizer for crops 
in an effort to meet consumer demands and reduce costs. The changes in crops 
and inputs were themselves related not only to changes in water availability, but 
also to larger changes related to markets and the entrance of Mexico into the 
North American Free Trade Agreement. The farm along the Saucillo Canal had 
become a “glocalized” community as farmers negotiated relationships locally, but 
with an eye on the larger economy. In these relations, local cooperatives, 
including government-supported efforts like the Milk Collection Centers, played 
an important role, even as the ejido structure itself appeared to weaken with land 
and water rights becoming more concentrated in the hands of wealthier farmers.  
 
Farmers generally supported the need to join the larger Irrigation District, which 
gave them access to more water concessions and conservation projects, even as 
it increased the cost of water itself.  
 
V. Nuts: The Peanut Fields and Pecan Orchards of San Pedro 
 
A. History and Geography.  
 
Franciscan missionaries settled the area of Rosales in 1649 to convert the 
Tapacolme Indigenous and take advantage of waters from the San Pedro river, 
and in 1714 “ Nuevo Vizcaya” general Juan Antonio Tresviña y Retes donated 
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the lands to the Franciscans to found what was then called the Santa Cruz, 
Tapacolmes Mission on the banks of the Rio San Pedro (Esparza Terrazas 2004: 
52; Photo 5.19). In 1753, the mission and town moved to its present location, and 
it was named after Mexican insurgent leader Victor Rosales in 1831 (see Photo 
5.20). Some 17 years later it would be the site of a major embarrassment for the 
Mexican Army, when Chihuahuan governor Angel Trías was seized by the forces 
of Sterling Price, just days after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo had been 
signed in 1848.  
 
The roots of the present large-scale irrigation go back to the 1850s when wheat, 
corn and cotton were grown through make-shift diversion dams, earthen canals 
and river water flooding of the Río San Pedro. Most of this farming served the 
needs of the four large Haciendas in the area: Delicias, San Lucas, Casa Blanca 
and San Pablo (Meoqui). In 1882, the other major town in the area – 
Congregación Ortíz – began as a train station on the Chihuahuan Railroad and at 
the time was known as “Estación Ortíz.” Ortíz was the family name of the owners 
of the Hacienda Casa Blanca and one of the wealthiest families of the area.  As 
workers of the Hacienda and outsiders drawn by commerce from the train station 
began to locate there, the locals began to organize and following the Mexican 
revolution, asked to be recognized as an ejido. They demanded approximately 
1,000 hectares of farming land – taken directly from the Ortíz hacienda – which 
was granted officially in 1924 by the Governor (Esparza Terrazas 2004: 355).  
 
The other large ejido in the area – Ejido Rosales – emerged in the early 1920s, 
as workers of the large Haciendas – Delicias, San Lucas and Casa Blanca -- and 
residents of Rosales itself began to demand their own land to irrigate, as well as 
land for ranching and cattle raising. In 1930, their demand was initially approved 
by the Chihuahuan Governor, although without the associated water rights. After 
six years of legal battles, in 1936, a presidential resolution created the Ejido 
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Rosales, granting 540 ejido members nearly 6,000 hectares, about 2,300 
hectares of which was “susceptible” to irrigation (Esparza Terrazas 2004: 358). 
Today, ejido members live in Rosales or some of the smaller communities like 
Orinda. 
 
A similar story is a much smaller ejido called Casa Blanca, which also formed as 
a result of the break up of the Casa Blanca Hacienda. The Ejido Casa Blanca 
was formed in 1936 and began with 27 ejidatarios, 100 hectares of farmland and 
500 hectares of “common use” land, basically quarries and rangeland for cattle. 
By 1948 – with the arrival of the dam and San Pedro Canal, the ejido was 
expanded to 63 members – each with rights to four hectares of land, and for the 
most part there have been few changes in the 915 hectares of irrigable and 
communal lands. By 1968, the town of Loma Linda which still is “not on a map” 
had become a reality and electrical lights and a rudimentary water system were 
installed. (Ejido Casa Blanca Comisariado, personal communication with author, 
2005).  
 
“Here was just wilderness, and they decided to form a population center,” the 
ejido Comisariado explained. “At first they called it “La Morita” after a little place 
that sold food and goods – they say it was named after the lover of one of the 





Photo 5.19. Photo Municipal Palace, Rosales shows mural of Tapacolmes 
Indigenous along the San Pedro River. 
 
With the completion of the Conchos Canal in 1932, which connected the waters 
from the La Boquilla Dam to the Rio San Pedro about 8 kilometers to the west of 
Rosales, “Conchos” water became available to the Rosales/Meoqui area, and 
some 20,000 hectares of irrigated land were added between 1932 and 1935 
(Esparza Terrazas 2004: 322). This irrigation was thus the direct result of land 
tenure decisions – breaking up the three large Haciendas in the area – as well as 




Photo 5.20. Old Aqueduct marks the spot where water was carried and used in an 
old wheat mill in the 1700s just outside of Rosales near the former mission. 
 
Irrigation expanded considerably in the area with the completion of the dam. 
Begun in 1941, but completed in 1949, the De Las Virgenes Dam, or more 
officially Francisco Madero Dam,  lies about 15 kilometers to the southwest of 
Congregación Ortíz and 8 kilometers to the west of Rosales. Some 2,000 
Mexican workers helped construct the immense structure, and for many years a 
town called “Las Virgenes” was located there and included stores, bars, schools 
and homes. It was at that time larger than Rosales itself. (Esparza Terrazas 
2004: 324). The name “De Las Virgenes” refers to two rocks that supposedly 
resembled women that now lie beneath the water of the dam itself. Two giant 
statues of heroic looking women line either side of the dam’s wall at the exit to 
the San Pedro River itself. Today, families from Rosales, Delicias and nearby 
towns flock to the reservoir. Mariachi musicians also congregate there, hoping for 
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tips in return for songs. At the dam’s outlet, other families and small children 




Photo 5.21. San Pedro River downstream of Madero Dam.  
 
About a kilometer down, however, lies the real economic engine of Rosales and 
nearby communities: the San Pedro Canal, which diverts hundreds of millions of 
cubic meters from the San Pedro itself, and makes its way, snakelike, along the 
base of the local mountain range (Photo 5.22). Crops are varied, but near the 
canal, you are likely to spot peanuts, corn, chile, alfalfa and, more obviously, 
pecan orchards, young and old. About eight kilometers along the Canal, down in 
the valley below lies the town of Rosales, with its church steeples and adobe and 
concrete homes. Continue along agricultural fields, and you will pass a series of 
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“ejido” towns, including Orinda, Loma Linda and in the distance, about 3 
kilometers below, Congregacion Ortíz.  
 
Photo 5.22. The San Pedro Canal runs below local mountain range above the 
valley of Rosales.  
 
A very different perspective is gained by following the river. The San Pedro still 
flowed mightily after the dam was built, but between 1995 and 2005 lost much of 
its pizzazz. The river itself essentially dies after a few kilometers, becoming a 
trickle among a huge river bed, which is overgrown with grasses, lilies and 
cattails (Photo 5.23). Some agricultural land along its banks has been 
abandoned as farmers who relied on “federal rights” to pump river water were 
forced out of business, unless they had access to well or dam water. Pecan and 
pistachios trees long abandoned wilt in the summer heat.  Huge pockmarks in 
the alluvial soils and sands just downstream of Rosales itself, toward Ortíz and 
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along the highway near Delicias. Along the highway which runs from Rosales to 
Delicias are dozens of family pool areas so that families can escape the 
afternoon sun under umbrellas, or slide down a water slide into cool waters. By 
the time the “river” reaches Julimes, the official meeting of the Conchos and San 
Pedro, it is nonexistent, unless local rains have turned it into a river once again.  
 
These are the lands of the Asociacion de Usuarios de Rosales, known more 
technically as Modulo VI, a  small “module” which depends upon the San Pedro 
River waters, associated canals and some communal wells to irrigate its sloping, 
rocky terrains, and alluvial valley. Like the Suacillo Canal area, this geographic 
region has its own story, individually and communally, of what has happened 
since the availability of water was reduced in the mid-1990s.  
 
Photo 5.23. The Denuded Rio San Pedro near Rosales is often used as a mining 
source for local roads. 
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B. Module VI (Rosales) 2005 
 
Just outside Congregación Ortíz, on an early September morning, a group of 
farmers gather along the entrance road which connects to the larger country road 
going either to Rosales to the right, Meoqui to the left, or Delicias straight ahead. 
About 15 of them mill around the decaying stump of an old cottonwood tree. 
They say that before drought socked the area in the 1990s, this tree was alive 
and gave much needed shade. They are waiting for “El Canalero,” the canal 
operator for this section of Modulo VI. A young and energetic sort, Jacinto pulls 
up in his Modulo-issued pick-up – complete with the User Association’s emblem 
– representing an Indian, a Spaniard, crops and water – goes to the front and 
pulls out “the book of accounts,” which is full of figures for each plot of land and 
farmer that has land in this section. This is the last month of the 2004-2005 
irrigation season, and farmers are anxious to settle accounts.  
 
Pedro, a middle-aged ejido farmer who lives in Ortíz, approaches him with a 
questioning gesture and Jacinto, leafing through the book, says “You have 
exactly 481 pesos of irrigation left – two irrigations from wells or four irrigations 
from the dam. How many more times are you going to irrigate?”  
 
“Just once… Ok maybe twice, but I am going to see if it rains first,” responds 
Pedro.  
 
“Go to Chiapas or Veracruz, because it’s not going to rain here,” laughs Jacinto.  
 
Irrigation in Modulo VI is a complex task in an a region which has been held up 
as the poster child for efficient irrigation and a region that has made the transition 
from water “overuse” to conjunctive use of well and dam water without – for the 
most part –losing productivity or abandoning agriculture. In fact, the reality is   
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more varied, with some smaller ejido farmers abandoning agricultural, some 
outside wealthier farmers paying a premium to utilize the land and water 
abundant here, and many middle farmers doing both: using their land in the 
summer with their water rights and renting their land in the winter for use by 
“outside” onion and other winter crop farmers using the communal water wells 
(“Beto” Serrano, Modulo VI President (2001-2004), personal communication with 




Photo 5.24. Dead tree stump outside Congregación Ortíz is the designated place 
to meet the “Canalero” to ask for water from communal wells or the dam and 
settle accounts.  
 
At 5,062.58 hectares – virtually all of which are irrigable – Modulo VI is one of the 
smaller Modulos and is the first in line to get its water from the Francisco Madero 
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Dam (see Map 9). This irrigable land is divided nearly equally between “private” 
land and land owned by members of one of the three ejidos. A small portion of 
the land is “federal” lands, where 37 individual farmers have gained access to 
water rights outside of the water provided by the Irrigation District, either based 
on river water or other sources. This also includes approximately 70 hectares in 
the “Casa Blanca” ejido that does not have access to dam water – or for that 
matter any water – unless other needs are met first. In all, there are 692 “users” 
of water, including the 37 with federal water rights, 237 private farmers and 418 
farmers who are members of ejidos. However, plots of land are often under 
various the names of various members of a single family, and in reality, the 
number of individuals who actually use the land is much lower than 692 (Beto 
Serrano, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Not including the main San Pedro Canal itself – which is operated by the 
Sociedad Rural Limitada San Pedro --  there are some 77 kilometers of canals, 
approximately half of which had been relined with cement in 2004. In addition to 
the series of canals connected to surface water from Las Vírgenes, Modulo VI is 
also home to 21 deep wells, including 12 in the eastern half of the Modulo run by 
the Ejido Ortíz, three dug for the benefit of the Ejido Rosales – only one of which 
was operating in 2005 – and six individual wells, used to irrigate pecan orchards. 
Finally, over the last several years, many of the canals have been augmented or 
replaced with pipes and tubes for efficiency purposes (see Table 5.22). 
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Table 5.22. Basic Information about Modulo VI 
Category Sub-category Amount 
Area Total Area 5,062.58 
 Irrigable Area 4,961.26 
 “Private” Irrigable Land 2,533.12 
 “Ejido” Irrigable Land 2,290.53 
 Federal Lands 137.61 
Users Total 692 
 Private Farmers 237 
 Ejido Farmers 418 
 Federal Zone Farmers 37 
Wells Total Wells 21 
 Private Wells 6 
 “Communal” Wells 15 
Canals Total Kilometers of Secondary 
Canals 
76.75 
 Number of Miles of Canal that 
had been relined, 2004 
31.295 





Map 9. The boundaries of Module VI: Rosales Water Users Association 
 
Source: Modulo VI, 2005 
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C. Crops and Water Use 
 
Data provided by CONAGUA about Modulo VI seriously undercounts the amount 
of water used and crops grown in the Module because it does not include 
information on well use. Data provided by Modulo VI also undercounts the 
amount of water used and crops grown because it does not include information 
on “private” well use  but does provide information on communal well use.  
 
Still, incomplete information provided by Modulo VI shows stunning changes in 
crop choice and water use between 1992 and 2005. In the 1991-1992 year, for 
example, Modulo VI reports that its farmers irrigated 3,578 hectares of crops, 
using 48,941 thousand cubic meters of water in the process. Two years later, 
that total – largely spurred by huge production in winter wheat – topped 5,663 
hectares of irrigated cropland with 68,764 thousand cubic meters utilized. 
Farmers in Modulo VI split their land nearly evenly between perennials, winter 
crops, spring-summer crops and second summer crops, with each category 
having more than a thousand hectares planted.  
 
Then came the drought. With Francisco Madero only releasing small amounts of 
rationed water, both winter and 2nd summer crops were largely eliminated, and 
only 498 hectares of crops were irrigated with 4,962 thousand cubic meters of 
dam water in 1995. While 1997 and 1998 totals matched the pre-1995 period, the 
total amount of cropland irrigated with dam water ranged between 1,185 and 
2,180 hectares, while total dam water utilized hovered between 12,500 and 
30,000 thousand cubic meters. However, while both individual and  communal 
well water had been used in the area since 1995, in 1999, new well construction 
and the interconnection of all 12 Ortíz-owned wells suddenly gave the water 
users association a new source of water that could be managed, controlled and 
priced.   
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Beginning in 2000, the Module carefully measured and delivered this communal 
resource, in essence “replacing” dam water with well water. Thus, when this 
water is included, 2005 levels of irrigated crops, with 3,365 hectares irrigated and 
37,421 thousand cubic meters of water used by Modulo VI farmers – and their 
renters -- was similar to 1992 levels.  
 
Hidden in these overall totals, however, is a remarkable and varied history of 
changing crop patterns. Winter crops have all but disappeared, 2nd summer 
crops like sorghum, soybeans, fall corn and fall peanuts have been eliminated, 
perennial crops have stayed fairly steady and spring-summer crops like chile, 
onions, peanuts and cotton have actually increased. 
 
Winter wheat is a case in point. With the exception of 1997, when winter waters 
were made available from Francisco Madero Dam for wheat producers, wheat 
had all but disappeared from Modulo VI by 2005, except for a few producers who 
use well water to grow a small amount to sell for seed production. Sorghum and 
soy production – which before 1995 were largely late summer/early fall crops – 
were no longer present in 2005, while corn is still prevalent, though considerably 
reduced. Perennials – alfalfa and pecan production – have seen ebbs and flows, 
though they appear to have stabilized between 2000 and 2005. It is important to 
note that while dam and communal wells appear to irrigate about 300 hectares of 
pecan groves, another 100 or so are irrigated by six private wells. In fact, 
information obtained from Modulo VI showed that in 2005, in addition to the 315 
hectares of pecans irrigated by dam or communal well water, another 132 
hectares were irrigated by private wells, meaning that the same number of 
hectares of pecans were being irrigated in 2005 as in 1992, although not 
necessarily the same groves (Modulo VI, Padrón de Cultivos, 2004-2005, 




Photo 5.25. Pecan groves irrigated by “rebombeo” water –water repumped as 
canal water passes in foreground. 
 
Other crops have increased their presence, including spring onions, chile 
peppers, cotton – heavily subsidized in recent years – while peanuts have 
maintained their historical presence. Interestingly, both chile peppers and onions 
are generally high water-demand crops. As the survey results show, there are a 
number of factors for these changes, but several relate to the interconnection of 
communal wells that occurred in the 1999-2000 period, and the subsequent use 
of water conservation funds to move the well water by tube and low-pressurized 
PVC pipes with gates for on-farm irrigation. These changes allowed farmers in 
one geographic region greater and more efficient access to communal well water 
that could be used for their own crops or to rent their lands to wealthier outside 
farmers for chile and onion production (Photo 5.26).  
 407 
 








um Soy Chile Onion Alfalfa Pecan 
Total 
1992 0 8 737 447 640 366 351 0 475 445 3,469 
1993 1148 0 343 933 322 419 225 41 578 470 4,479 
1994 1274 34 956 1028 150 220 207 20 662 476 5,027 
1995 0 46 170 75 0 0 36 6 45 83 461 
1996 20 238 428 261 30 2 108 42 28 375 1,532 
1997 431 381 1551 588 54 95 321 62 377 636 4,496 
1998 6 224 1809 183 38 35 273 13 394 595 3,570 
1999 0 166 1188 166 10 0 77 7 255 313 2,182 
2000 37 108 1645 201 33 5 251 51 352 433 3,116 
2001 38 187 915 219 7 0 264 175 304 431 2,540 
2002 0 26 649 143 17 0 297 274 308 398 2,112 
2003 0 295 523 288 38 6 319 260 361 323 2,413 
2004 23 501 459 90 26 0 242 274 232 275 2,122 
2005 17 230 1105 450 11 0 394 354 393 315 3,269 
Source: Module VI, Information Provided to Author, 2005.  
 
In 2005, Modulo VI was staffed by a total of 14 permanent employees. Every 
three years, elections are held and a President, Vice-President, Treasurer, 
Secretary and a “Vigilance” committee are elected from the wider membership. 
From 2002 to 2005, Humberto “Beto” Serrano, a middle-aged ejido and private 
farmer from Congregación Ortíz served as President. A former government bank 
official charged with making agricultural loans, and currently a sales manager for 
one of the leading tractor manufacturer, Beto is a middle-sized major peanut and 
chile pepper farmer in the region, owning and renting both ejido and private lands 
within Modulo VI.  
 
“I wanted to see if I had what it takes to lead Modulo VI,” Serrano explained. “I 
wanted to guide the association through this change to tecnification and 






Photo 5.26. Winter onions were grown in this rented field outside of Congregación 
Ortiz, utilizing water from the communal wells.  
 
D. Water Conservation 
 
The “tecnificación” he says, actually began several years before, when 
Congregación Ortíz sought funding to interconnect its 12 deep water wells. 
“Rather than each well basically serving one area, we wanted to make it part of 
the actual structure of the Modulo,” he said. He said that in 1999, the work was 
finished and suddenly 960 hectares of land owned by the ejido had the potential 
to use water from the 12 wells, although actual on-field interconnections and 
replacement of canals with pipes, “hydrants” and PVC tubing occurred after 
CONAGUA made the NADBANK and other monies available in the 2002-2005 
period.  
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Even though Serrano recognized that “efficiencies” from water conservation 
projects could lead to reductions in their water rights, he said nearly everyone 
was in favor of the NADBANK and federal monies “as long as they (CONAGUA) 
could document the (water) savings.”  
 
“If they were going to reduce the (water rights) concession, the concession was 
still going to be able to cover our needs, and that (concession) isn’t even real 
because we haven’t ever used it or even had that much water,” Serrano 
explained. “The real vision is how do we maintain agriculture and not lose people 
to migration,” said Serrano, father of two college-aged boys.  
“How do we keep the next  generation?” 
 
 
Photo 5.27. Model of Congregación Ortíz Conjunctive Use Irrigation System Sits 
Inside Module VI Offices  
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The answer, says the engineer, was to make sure there is water and it is well-
distributed, particularly for a region “that needs more water than other areas 
because it is earth with a lot of rocks.” Rosales earth – particularly as you move 
upslope toward the San Pedro Canal -- is rocky (see Photo 5.28). A 1967 soil 
survey conducted by CONAGUA describe the “Rosales” soil thus:      
Suelos de abánicos aluviales al pie de las colinas con perfil 
uniforme de migajón arenoso con abundancia de material gravoso 
y permeable en casi todo su extensión. Subsuelo gravoso y 
arenoso, condiciones de drenaje buenas, color rojizo, situacion 
topografico: Faldas, lomas y pequeños aranico aluviales, mesetas. 
Tiposo Migajo Arenosa F gravosa, Migajón Arenoso abónicos 
pedregosos, Franco.                    CONAGUA 1967 
 
Photo 5.28. View of a typical chile pepper field on Rosales “rocky” soils. 
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The rocks mean that crops are often protected from freezes – the rocks maintain 
heat – and potentially from some evaporation – but it also means sometimes the 
water doesn’t get down in the soil to the roots. Properly watered, crops – 
particularly peanuts and chile plants – appear to fourish in the rocky soils, and 
peanut yields in Rosales are sometimes one and a half to two times yields in the 
Saucillo area.  
 
But that takes water, and Serrano jumped on the conservation monies. If the 
Modulo’s own water accounting methods are correct, the Modulo VI did see a 
stunning transformation in terms of water efficiencies over the last five years as 
Dam Water went from 65 to 84 percent efficiencies and communal well water – 
the water that irrigates approximately 1,000 hectares within the Module  – went 
from 65 percent to 92 percent over those same years (Table 5.24).  
 
Table 5.24. Water Delivery Efficiencies in Modulo VI, AY 2001 – AY 2005 
Agricultural Year % of Surface Water 
Efficiency (Brute Volume 
of Water vs. Net Volume 
of Water) 
% of Communal Well 
Water Efficiency (Brute 
Volume of Water vs. Net 
Volume of Water) 
AY 2001 65.20% 65.00% 
AY 2002 64.00% 78 
AY 2003 66.00% 95 
AY 2004 76.00% 90 
AY 2005 84.00% 92 
Source: Modulo VI, 2005.  
 
To accomplish this transformation, Serrano says they started by insisting that 
every farmer in Ortíz have access to a “hydrant” and “tuberías de 
multicompuertas” (gated pipes) while also concentrating on the “18 pecan 
groves,” to make sure “I benefited them with new technology.” After those water 
users were satisfied, Serrano said the vision was to move upstream toward the 




“It’s like a piece of birthday cake that you get to share each year, and the idea is 
that everyone gets a piece, piece by piece, not all at once,” he explained.  
 
Still, he notes, “you can’t make everyone happy,” and so since the sections of the 
Modulo nearest to the dams did not benefit he also pursued the drilling of 
communal wells near Rosales itself. Using a “loan” from the government-
subsidized  Programa de Desarrollo Parcelario (PRODEP), Serrano says they 
took out more than 5 million pesos of loans for new machinery as well as another 
3.5 million pesos to rehabilitate, drill and electrify three communal wells. “The 
trouble was we drilled five holes and only two provided any water,” he noted, 
somewhat sadly.  
 
Thus, in the 2002-2003 period, there were outlays to 18 pecan farmers to install 
high-pressure sprinkler systems – based either on private wells or “rebombeo” – 
actually pumping surface water from a central water storage area for further 
distribution using spray irrigation– and two other systems including a “Side Roll” 
and drip irrigation system for large alfalfa farmers -- covering 475 hectares of 
land in all -- as well as the leveling and installation of “tuberia de 
multicompuertas” in Ejido Ortíz. Under Serrano’s leadership, the 2003-2004 
period completed the northern section of the Modulo with leveling and tubing, 
“modernizing” another 700 hectares and 104 farmers with low-pressure systems. 
In the 2004-2005 agricultural year, under new leadership, the wealth was spread, 
with an additional nine farmers –mainly pecan groves – receiving high-pressure 
spray systems, another 17 farmers in the southern (Rosales) end with about 287 
hectares of land having their lands “leveled” – in preparation for future systems – 
and about 70 farmers in the “middle” section with approximately 370 hectares of 




Photo 5.29. This secondary canal is replaced by underground tubing emerging at 
a hydrant as Modulo VI attempts to make water delivery more efficient, 2005. 
 
Unlike the farmers in Ortíz, who were hooked up to their communal well water 
systems, the farmers in the middle section would rely on gravity pressure as 
former distributive canals were replaced with tubing just downslope from the San 
Pedro Canal itself (Photo 5.29). Thus, as part of the water distribution 
transformation, the secondary canals were replaced – or at least circumvented – 
with below-ground tubes, emerging at above ground hydrants.  
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Table 5.25. Investments and Benefits of “Sustainable Water Use Program,” 
Delicias Irrigation District, Modulo VI, Rosales, Chihuahua 
Category Sub-
Category 







424  0 70 494 
 Number of 
Users 
Benefiting 







22.8 0 0 22.8 
 Users 
Benefiting 






28 0 0 28 
 Users 
Benefiting 






475 0 70 545 
 Users 
Benefiting 
20 0 9 29 
 Total 
Investment 








313.6 687 359.5 1,360.10 
 Users 
Benefiting 
23 104 70 197 
 Total 
Investment 





320.9 0 283 603.9 
 Users 
Benefiting 
50 0 17 67 
 Total 
Investment 
$1,296,684 0 $1,814,765 $3,111,449 
GRAND 
TOTAL 
 $23,147,316 $18,392,646 $12,160,213 $53,700,175 
Source: CONAGUA, Residencia, Distrito de Riego 005, Information provided to author, 2005.  
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New Modulo VI president Jaime Rodriguez  (2005-2008) says that the decision to 
put most of the conservation funds – as well as the profits from their operations – 
into Ejido Ortíz and larger private farmers, rather than spreading the wealth to 
other areas, was partially necessary because of technical and geographic 
reasons. Still, he said that “Ortíz and the large private farmers” benefited more 
from the money, and he ran specifically on the idea “that everyone should be 
treated equally … and  maybe we need to help the “fregado”12 more.” (Photo 
5.30). Underscoring his theme to help “the fregado,” his opponent in the race was 
one of the area’s most successful private farmers from a family with historical 
roots in the area, dating back to before the Mexican revolution. (Jaime 
Rodriguez, Modulo VI, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Among his charges, he believes, is not to focus so much on “tecnificación” but on 
the day-to-day work of the Modulo, such as maintaining the distributive canals 
and fixing the systems of dirt and cement roads. Still he says “we have to learn 
how to irrigate better – we have leaks, breaks of the tubes, robberies – we are 
still in a process of adaptation – at the farmer level, at the Modulo and in 
CONAGUA.”  
 
                                                
12 Literally the “screwed.” 
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Photo 5.30. Those who benefited the most from the water conservation monies are 
the Ortiz farmers with their hydrants and gated pipes and individual private 
farmers with systems like the Sideroll.  
 
Rodríguez said one change is to make sure the actual beneficiaries of the new 
irrigation technology know how to use it. He will do this, he says, by insisting the 
companies have a meeting at the Modulo offices with all the farmers benefiting 
even before any work is done on their land. “I want the farmers to be present 
when they discuss installing their systems or when they level their land,” he 
explained, noting that in the past, some farmers – particularly the older ones-- 
never communicated with the contracted companies and then never learned how 
to use the equipment properly. This view was confirmed with interviews with local 




Like his counterparts in Saucillo, Rodriguez arrived to his presidential offices with 
some bad news. The original budget of $16 million pesos out of the total $433 
million budget for the fourth year of the water conservation projects would be 
reduced to only $9 or $10 million out of $230 million (Lauro Fernandez, Delicias 
Irrigation District, CONAGUA, personal communication with author, 2005). With 
only 70 percent of the expected budget, their plan to complete the replacing of 
canals with pipes was put on hold. In addition, the price of the PVC tubing itself  
had risen astronomically – due to higher oil prices and transport costs.  
 
E. Water & Land Markets in 2005 
 
The other challenge for the Modulo is their own budget. To run the Modulo, the 
Modulo charges its users one amount for the dam water and another amount for 
the communal well water. Farmers have a right to buy a certain amount of water 
each year based on the concession from CONAGUA. The arrangement and 
pricing of water has changed over time (see Table). Before 1995, when no wells 
had been built, the Module sold water on a per-hectare basis, depending on 
whether a crop was high or low water, and there was no limit to the number of 
irrigations. In 1995, the Modulo switched to a price-per-volume basis, and began 
to impose an allotment on each farmer, depending on the overall concession 
given to them by CONAGUA. At the height of the drought – in 1996 – farmers 
were only given 16,000 cubic meters – enough to irrigate one to two hectares of 
land – while in recent years they have been given approximately 30,000 cubic 
meters – enough to irrigate three to four hectares per water right.  
 
In addition, in 1995, some farmers in Ortíz gained access to well water, although 
at that time well water sales were very limited. With the interconnection of wells 
in 1999, however, the Modulo developed a unique system. While well water is 
officially sold for more than twice the value of dam water, the Modulo allows the 
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farmers near Ortíz to pay the reduced dam rate and use the well water within 
their guaranteed allotment, so that more dam water can be sold to other areas. If 
farmers want to use more well water then they most pay the normal well water 
price. In 2005, well water sold at 220 pesos per 1,000 cubic meters, about double 
the surface water.  
 
In Modulo VI, the availability of communal well water has led to a market in both 
water and land – as farmers from outside the Modulo rent land for alfalfa, chile 
and onion production (see Table 5.27). While the Modulo charges a set price for 
water, farmers are free to negotiate higher prices for their allotments. Before the 
well water became available as a shared management strategy, such transfers 
were rare. Now, when water is scarce, farmers frequently purchase water rights 
for inflated prices with local Ortiz farmers often utilizing well water, but selling 
their dam water allotment to outside farmers.  
 
For example, in the 2002-2003 agricultural year, data provided by the Module 
revealed that out of 938 “lots”, 337 lots were rented at least part of the year. In 
terms of land, out of 5,651 hectares of land irrigated, 2,189 hectares were 
irrigated on rented land. While there were a large number of renters – in fact over 
100 --- several rented multiple lands and were thus major agricultural players in 
the Modulo, even though they themselves did not own land there. Thus, out of 
the 337 lots, for example, one farmer rented 33 lots covering 186 hectares, 
another 19 lots and 105 hectares, and another 26 lots and 126 hectares. In fact, 
among only 10 “renting” farmers, more than 1050 hectares of land – about a fifth 
of the total area -- were rented.  
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1992 145.00 270.00   No Limit  
1993 145.00 270.00   No Limit  
1994 100.00 310.00   No Limit  
1995   36 90 22  
1996   90 135 16  
1997   32 none 54  
1998   55 none 32  
1999   75 160 24  
2000   75 160 60 2,100 
2001   75 160 27 2,390 
2002   80 220 24 4,760 
2003   85 220 29 4,325 
2004   90 220 31 3,150 
2005   105 220 33 2,310 
 
Source: Modulo VI, 2005.  
 
 
Table 5.27. Land Rented in Modulo VI, 2002-2003 Agricultural Year 
 Land Rented Used by 
Owner 
Total % of Total 
Rented 
Number of Lots 337 601 938 35.93% 
Hectares Irrigated 2,189 3,462 5,651 38.73% 
Hectares Irrigated 
with Groundwater 




1,880 1,704 3,584 52.45% 
Number of 
“Owners” (1) 
105  548 653 16.08% 
 
Source: Modulo VI, 2005. Calculations by author.  
 
Notes: (1) For land rented, the number of different names were used to calculate the 
number of individuals renting. For all lands, the number of different names were counted. 
It should be noted, however, that often times land is divided among several brothers, or 
between a husband and wife, but the “practical” owner may be a single individual. Thus, 
the total is probable an over-estimate of the total number of individuals in Modulo VI 
“operating” as farmers or renters of land. The “official” number of owners, according to 




In addition to the sale of water itself – some of which flows back to the SRL and 
CONAGUA – the Modulo also “rents” out its machinery to farmers interested in 
cleaning their canals, leveling their land or performing other maintenance and 
agricultural field work. Between October of 2003 and January of 2005, the 
Modulo showed a profit of $710,062, but Rodriguez feared the debts due on the 
new water wells and expected increases in the cost of oil and energy would 
quickly eat it away.  
 
Still, Rodriguez is generally upbeat about the Modulo’s future, due he said, to 
their ability to change. He pointed to new projects to “grow trees” and plant 
nopales – prickly pears -- as evidence that the Modulo can adapt to changes in 
water management.  
 
“We knocked all the trees down and there is less rain now,” he said. “Now we 
need to grow trees.”  
 
The “growing of trees” he refers to is a project which lies between the tiny towns 
of Orinda and Loma Linda. The project is to use 70 hectares of ejido lands with 
“federal water rights” along the San Pedro Canal to grow “cevite,” a kind of quick-
growing cedar tree that happens to be excellent as a slow-burning wood used in 
cooking “Chipotle,” the specialty sauce that comes from slow-cooking jalapeños, 
which are grown in the region (see Photo).  
 
The ejido lands were once the site of a failed experiment to grow grapes in the 
1970s and 80s, and have lain dormant in the 1990s, since the water “rights” of 
the 14 owners are only guaranteed when there is sufficient water in the De Las 
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Virgenes Dam. Rodriguez said because of the gains in efficiencies, his Modulo 
can guarantee the water to these users for the unique project.  
 
The project is supported by funding from CONASA – the National Arid Zones 
Commission – through the Rosales’  Rural Development Department. According 
to Rosales Rural Development director Dr. Eleazar Torres,  over 40,000 tons a 
year of mesquite, cottonwoods and oaks are used to “cook” jalapeños in modern 
and makeshift chile cookers throughout the region. (Dr. Eleazar Torres, Rural 
Development, Rosales, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
“In one generation, we have eliminated the ecosystem,” Torres noted sadly. The 
project in Loma Linda is being funded with about 500,000 pesos, and will 
produce about 80 tons of wood per year in four to five years.  
 
Table 5.28. Income Sources and Expenses, Modulo VI, October 2003-January 2005 
Income Category Amount Expense Category Amount 
Water Sales, Dam 
Water 
$2,362,994 Operation Expenses $2,172,173 
Water Sales, Well 
Water 





Recovery of Debts 
$1,245,307 Payments for 
Machinery Loan 
$965,866 




Renting of Heavy 
Machinery to 
Farmers 









$10,800 Loan Payments 
(Wells, etc) 
$172,550 
Other $4,478   
Total $7,257,358 Total $6,547,296 
Source: Modulo VI, Estado de Ingresos y Egresos, Asamblea Anual Informativa y Para 
el Cambio de Mesa Directiva y Consejo de Vigilancia, January 2005.  
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Down the slope from Loma Linda, on land owned by an Ortíz farmer sits six 
brand new chipotle ovens. The ovens – built by Meoqui-based chile farmer   
“Chuy” Prieto – use both oak wood – shipped from the Sierra in Madero – and 





Photo 5.31. These “modern” chipotle ovens were built by a local farmer who rents 
land for chile production in Modulo VI, near Congregacion Ortíz.  
 
Another new project is government support for the production of Nopales. Torres 
says the hope is that a market will develop for the desert prickly pear plant, 
especially “since it’s good for those with diabetes.” (Torres, personal 




Photo 5.32. Nopales (Prickly Pear) on this private farm – which sits on one of the 
original missions in the area -- were subsidized by the government in an effort to 
market new low-water crops in the area.  
 
 
G. The Surveys 
 
As part of the case study of Modulo VI, the author conducted 38 surveys in the 
fields and homes of the farmers of Modulo VI. To ascertain the views of both 
smaller and larger farmers, the author made a specific effort to contact some of 
the wealthier farmers who often work and live in Delicias, but operate their pecan 
groves or alfalfa fields through hired managers in the Rosales area. Thus, on two 
occasions, the author conducted surveys in Delicias itself with larger owners of 
land. However, in every other case, during August and September of 2005, the 
author was able to contact owners of land either in their homes or on the field.  
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Again, because it is a relatively small simple – about 38 out of 693 “users” 
registered with the Modulo – about 6 percent --  the surveys were used to run 
simple descriptive statistics and cross-tabulations to compare small and large 
farmer practices– as well as to gather anecdotal information about crop choice 
and water use -- rather than trying to “prove” correlations or run regression 
analyses. Still, the surveys illuminate many of the decisions about natural 
resource use and crop selection faced by the farmers of the Rosales area in the 
post-NAFTA, drought time-period of 95-2005 and some of the key differences 
between larger and smaller farmers confronted by available options. They also 
help confirm many of the statements of Serrano, Rodriguez and other local 
leaders already noted above.  
 
1. Land Use and Crop Choice  
 
Nearly all farmers surveyed – 31 out of 38 --- had some ejidal land, although 
some farmers had both private and ejidal land. The 31 respondents who said 
they owned ejido land had relatively small plots, with 28 reporting having less 
than 10 hectares of land, while the seven land owners with private lands all 
reported owning more than 20 hectares of land. Overall, when adding up ejido, 
private and rented land irrigated in 2005, some 18 farmers reported irrigated 10 
hectares of land or less, 13 between 10 and 50 hectares of land, and  seven over 
50 hectares of land. Thus, while most farmers in the district are “small” farmers, 
the survey suggests that both private and ejido farmers “increase” their 
ownership by renting additional lands from farmers who chose not to farm. Based 
on these sizes, farmers were categorized as small, medium or large farmers 
(See Figure 5.7).  
 
Crop choice was varied, and the size of plots mattered. Thus, in terms of pecan 
production, while four of the 18 small ejido farmers did have small plots of pecan 
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groves, large private farmers dominated this type of production, with seven of the 
eight private farmers possessing large pecan groves, ranging from 30 to 75 
hectares. In terms of chile farming, on the other hand, while the smallest ejido 
farmers did not report growing chiles, medium-sized ejidatarios did, with eight of 
the 12 irrigating 122 hectares of different kinds of chile. Two private farmers also 
reported irrigating 26 hectares of chile peppers. In addition to the pecan and chile 
peppers, private farmers grew other products such as onions (1 farmer), corn (2 
farmers), alfalfa (2 farmers) and peanuts (1 farmer). Small ejido farmers, on the 
other hand, mainly grew alfalfa (6 farmers) and peanuts (7 farmers). Medium-
sized farmers, in addition to their association with chile irrigation, also irrigated 
corn fields (5), alfalfa (4) and especially, peanuts (10 farmers irrigating 98 
hectares).  
 





























Source: Reed,  Rosales Survey, Respondents 36-73, 2005.  
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In the Rosales area, there are several companies that buy peanuts from local 
producers, but one of the most important is Montagro Industries. According to 
owner Ing. Hector Coluga Esparza, the nut buyer began purchasing  both pecans 
and peanuts in 1992 but over time has come to specialize in peanuts. He said 
that because Mexico imports most of its peanuts from the U.S., Argentina, Chile 
and Uruguay, all Mexican production goes to the domestic market and the price 
is  determined by the U.S. price. The seeds themselves are largely imported from 
the U.S. and in most cases, Montagro provides the seeds, fertilizers and 
herbicides to the farmer – but the farmer provides “the land and water.” Montagro 
said the big change in peanut production in the Delicias area has been the 
reduction in hectares, but a recent increase in yield due to “water efficiencies.” 
The big determinant in peanut production is availability of water and for the 
peanut-growing farmers of Ortíz, the availability of communal groundwater has 
allowed them to continue to grow peanuts on the rocky, high-water demand but 
productive soils (see Photo 5.33) 
 
2. Agricultural Changes and Factors  
 
What did those surveyed say had changed over the last 10 years? (see Figure 
5.8) Topping the list with 14 “positive” responses was the elimination of winter 
crops, the winter wheat, rye grass and winter onions that are for the most part no 
longer grown in Modulo VI, while 14 farmers also cited the reduction in the total 
amount of hectares irrigated. Still, seven farmers actually reported increasing the 
amount of land irrigated over the last ten years. Other factors receiving multiple 
responses included a “decreased use of pesticides(11 responses),” “use of 
hybrid seeds (10 responses)”, “change in source of water” (7 responses),” 
“switch to perennial crops (7 responses),” “renting land to others (7 responses),” 
while the decreased use of labor and increased use of machinery each garnered 
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6 positive responses. Thus, the responses were similar to those in Saucillo 
though with perhaps less intensity. 
 
 
Photo 5.33. Tubería de Multicompuertas irrigates a peanut field with well water 
near Ortíz, Modulo VI  
 
There were categorical differences. While all farmers were impacted by the loss 
of winter crops, the smaller ejido farmers were more likely to cite reduction of 
their total land cultivated, of renting their own land or abandoning agricultural 
altogether, while medium and large private farmers were more likely to increase 
hectares, change their water source, switch to perennial crops, and increase the 
use of technology. Rather than perhaps a clear case of winners and losers 
between ejido and private farmers, the survey results actually demonstrate that 
some ejido farmers were able to adapt and become “medium” players through 
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renting of land and access to credit and alternative water, while others 
abandoned or eked out a living, sometimes by relying more on dairy farms and 
less on “pure” agriculture.  
 
Figure 5.8. Post-1995 Changes cited by Rosales farmers in total responses (N=33) 
and total points (Maximum=99) 
 
 
Note: One point was assigned for a “small” change, two points were assigned for a 
“medium” change and three points were assigned for a large change.  
 
Source: Reed, Surveys 35-73, Rosales 2005.  
 
 
What caused these changes? Perhaps of greater importance than the drought 
were changes in the cost of inputs and market prices (see Figure 5.9). This is 
probably related to the fact that many farmers were able to access groundwater 
and thus avoid the most profound impacts of the drought, which was not the case 
in Saucillo, dependent much more heavily on surface water. The responses once 
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again indicate the importance of geography. Secondary factors included credit – 
either its lack or availability -- competition with international producers or 
government support or lack of support.  
 
Figure 5.9. Post-1995 Factors Related to Agricultural Change cited by Rosales 
farmers in total responses (N=33) and total points (Maximum=99)  
 
Note: One point was assigned for a “small” factor, two points were assigned for a 
“medium” factor and three points were assigned for a “large” factor.  
 
Source: Reed, Surveys 35-73, Rosales 2005.  
 
3. Water, water everywhere?  
 
The survey asked additional questions about water practices, their perceptions of 
the “drought” and of water conservation projects which began in the Modulo VI in 
1999 with the interconnection of the communal wells in Ortíz and the wider 
conservation projects begun in 2002 following certification of the “Sustainable 
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Water Use” project by the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC 
2002).  
 
First of all, water management and water sources were complex according to 
farmers and 18 out of 38 said they had changed their primary water source since 
1995. By 2005, farmers were getting water from the San Pedro Canal, from 
private deepwater wells, from the communal wells in Ortíz, and even by 
“repumping” the San Pedro Canal water from the canal to a container to then be 
distributed in pecan groves through modern irrigation systems. It should be noted 
that in addition to these methods, some farmers put a “straw” directly into the 
San Pedro Canal itself and pumped it out with tractors if they were unable to get 
water directly due to the location of their land or if there was “agua rodada” – 
rainwater which entered the canal during the winter off-season.  
 
Thus, seven of the 38 respondents were using private water wells for most of 
their water – all of them pecan farmers – while another 12 reported using at 
certain times of year the communal wells of Ortiz, most of whom were peanut 
farmers (see Photo 5.33). Only four were not using the San Pedro Canal and 
dam water as a primary or secondary source. The changes in water 
management over the last 10 years are complex, spurred both by the changes in 
water rights management and ownership and the technological changes, 
including grated pipes and hydrants and the interconnection of deepwells. 
 
Water rights sales are common, with 21 of the 38 surveyed saying they had 
bought additional water rights from some farmers or from the water user 
association in the last five years, purchasing 60 additional water rights in 2005 
alone, a significant number in such a small sample.  Eight farmers said they had 
sold their water rights within the last five years, including four in 2005.  
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Water irrigation strategies were varied among the 38 respondents in Modulo VI. 
Thus, among peanut growers, “zurcos” – small ditches in which the water runs 
down the rows of peanuts -- was an accepted strategy – but the delivery of the 
water might come from the “hydrants” with gated pipes, from earth-laden canals, 
or “acequias revestidas” – concrete-lined canals. Those without access to the 
gated pipes would build little dams – presillas – to guide the water from the 
canals to one end of the field and then either knock the dams down or use small 
metal hoses to push the water by suction to the “zurcos.” One enterprising large 
private farmer was using drip irrigation “cintillas” – small plastic black tubes – for 
his alfalfa field – which he had planted first – and using “microaspersion” – a kind 
of minispray system aimed at tree roots for his pecan grove (Photo 5.34). 
 
Photo 5.34. Irrigation system “a la mexicana” combines spray and drip irrigation 
on this pecan grove using well water.  
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Not surprisingly, most farmers were supportive of the water conservation and 
efficiency programs which have in part led to these changes. Thus, out of the 25 
farmers who participated in the water conservation projects, 20 rated the projects 
as good or very good, and only three as being poor. When asked to respond to a 
series of statements about whether water conservation projects improve 
efficiencies, increased production and helped to share the resource, support for 
water conservation was widespread, even if some might disagree with particular 
aspects of its implementation. Only seven out of the 38 felt the projects had been 
imposed upon them, and only five thought they were designed to only benefit 
some farmers over others. There was widespread agreement – 20 out of 38 – or 
no opinion on the idea that the conservation projects were designed to benefit 
the U.S., which is of course a true statement.  
 
In terms of the drought itself, farmers in Modulo VI  overwhelmingly blamed the 
lack of water accessibility on the lack of rainfall – the drought. In fact, all 38 
respondents not only said there had been a drought over the previous decade, 
but 34 said the drought had been the worst they had ever experienced. And 37 
said the drought had caused the lack of available water “to a great extent.” But in 
addition, a variety of other secondary factors – including the sedimentation of the 
dam and San Pedro Canal, the lack of investment in the district, the U.S. demand 
for the same water, some water inefficiencies by users and the rise in high-
demand crops – also received a significant number of responses. When asked to 
elaborate on these responses, many also cited the “expansion of the district” – a 
factor not listed on the survey itself – as a cause, referring to lands added to the 
district in the 1980s downstream of the San Pedro Canal. 
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Figure  5.10. Factors cited by Rosales farmers leading to lack of access to water 
by responses (N=38) and total points (Maximum=114). 
Note: One point was assigned for a “small” factor, two points were assigned for a 
“medium” factor and three points were assigned for a large factor.  
Source: Reed, Surveys 35-73, Rosales 2005.  
 
4.  Organizational help 
 
While farmers often complained that the government had deserted them, when 
asked about specific organizations, farmers did say they had been helped. 
Topping the list were SAGARPA – the federal agricultural ministry – and 
CONAGUA, the National Water Commission. As in Saucillo, the positive 
responses  directed at SAGARPA were related to direct support from the 
agricultural agency, including Alianza para el Campo (Alliance for the Fields), 
which nine farmers cited as providing credit or grants for tractors and other 
machinery, PROCAMPO – the subsidy payments to former grain producers – 
cited by 12 farmers, ProDiesel –sometimes called “cheap diesel” – which was 
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cited by 12 farmers, and “objective” price supports for cotton crops, cited by two 
farmers. In terms of CONAGUA, they largely cited the water conservation 
projects. 
 
Besides these two large federal agencies, however, farmers cited a surprising 
number of other organizations, including banks and credit unions, cooperatives, 
private companies, the ejidos, agricultural extension agencies and the water user 
association itself. Thus, many smaller farmers cited the existence of the Milk 
Collection Center created with cooperative and government help (Photo 5.35), 
while some larger farmers spoke of ALPURA, the large cooperative dairy 
producer and ALCODESA, a private company started to provide inputs – cattle 
feed -- to large dairy operations (Photo 5.36). While there were some examples 
of farmers being hurt by either private companies, banks, or ejidos which had 
committed contract abuse or fraud, in general farmers were positive about the 
organizations that supported them (Figure 5.11).  
 
Farmers were slightly negative in their opinion of the transfer of the irrigation 
district from the government to the water user association, with 10 citing it as 
beneficial, eight neutral and 17 saying the transfer represented a disadvantage. 
That being said, many of the negative comments were related to the idea that the 
cost of water had increased exponentially since the district was transferred in 
1995, and there had been less water, factors which can not be “blamed” on the 
Modulo itself. That being said, others also felt there were too many staff 
members to pay for and it had become politicized with certain geographic areas 
benefiting more than other. Others had a more positive view, saying 
decentralization had led to more direct control and responsiveness, and citing the 
implementation of new technology and water conservation as related to the 
decentralization. Overall, farmers felt however that the district had been 
decentralized and transferred with little oversight or training by CONAGUA. 
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Photo 5.35. The “Centro de Acopio” in Meoqui has become an important facility 
for the farmers of Modulo VI, especially the small ejido farmers of Orinda and 




Photo 5.36. The 200 dairy cows of this private dairy farm are associated both with 
ALPURA, a national cooperative which buys the milk, and ALCODESA, from which 





Figure 5.11. Organizations that helped or hurt farmers in Rosales by Number of 
Responses (N=38) and total points (Maximum=114).  
 
 
Note: One point was assigned for a “small” help, two points were assigned for a 
“medium” help and three points were assigned for a “large” help. Negative points were 
assigned for organizations that “hurt” the farmer.   




Using in-depth interviews, personal observations and semi-structured surveys 
with farmers in two geographically-bounded areas within the Delicias Irrigation 
District, this chapter presented a case study of changes occurring in the district 
over the last 10 or 15 years. The chapter found that in the district as a whole, as 
well as in Saucillo and Rosales, profound changes had occurred in water use, 
crop choice and other farming practices since the mid-1990s. First of all, the 
overall view promoted by Mexican officials that because of an historic drought 
farmers in the district had been forced to make major reductions in crop acreage 
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and water use was belied by a much more complex picture of adaptation to a 
changing water environment. Thus, while farmers were forced to curtail water 
use and acreage in both areas surveyed, data from the local Modulo leadership 
reveals that a major change was a shift in the period from surface water – 
whether from the dam or the Río Conchos – to other sources of water. In the “Old 
Saucillo Canal Water User Association” Modulo, this meant not only the change 
from pure river water to dam water through the garnering of a federal water right 
concession, but also to individual water wells, communal water wells, river water 
directly pumped onto fields, shallow “noria” wells and “tajos” – literally holes in 
the earth in which water percolated up to the surface for further pumping to fields. 
These alternative sources were often informally managed depending upon water 
availability.  
 
In Rosales, on the other hand, the digging of communal wells in Congregación 
Ortíz became an official water management policy of the Rosales Water User 
Association Module itself, using Ortíz Ejido water rights to augment the dam 
water and use it conjunctively. The interconnection of the 12 water wells in 1999 
fundamentally changed water management strategies in the Module. In addition, 
wealthier farmers sought and gained permits to dig water wells of their own in the 
post-1995 period, and several pecan groves – the largest water users but also 
the most profitable crops – made the switch to private well water. The opening up 
of alternative sources of water allowed farmers – particularly the larger farmers – 
to keep and in some cases expand production of perennials like pecans and 
alfalfa at a time when these crops were “officially” being discouraged through a 
permit and cap system.  
 
Furthermore, these “alternative”  water sources were usually not reflected in 
CONAGUA data on water use and crop irrigations, meaning the “official” story 
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presented to U.S. diplomats, press and others was – if not deliberately 
misleading – partial at best.  
 
Still, in addition to the finding of the expansion of water sources, interviews, 
observations and surveys found that the lack of available water and changing 
market conditions did lead to painful changes for farmers. Thus, the efforts to 
grow some grains – such as wheat, sorghum and soybeans –all but disappeared 
in both regions as farmers abandoned or were forced to abandon winter crops. 
Corn – while still a major production crop in the area – had also seen major 
changes, with farmers more likely to turn to “modern” hybrids produced by 
subsidiaries of Monsanto and DuPont, mainly as cattle feed. In fact given the 
rising costs of water and other inputs, many farmers used both alfalfa and corn 
not as a cash crop, but as an input into their dairy farms.  
 
For many crops – such as peanuts, cotton and pecans – mechanization had 
increased yields, but also increased the costs of inputs. Farmers increased the 
use of machinery whether through purchase, loans or subcontracts.  
 
Farmers in the region had no doubt that one of the major causes of their woes 
was the drought itself, which was cited by virtually all farmers as the cause of 
loss of water and productivity. Nevertheless, in Saucillo, there was the 
recognition that competition with upstream users – from the other traditional 
farming communities – sedimentation of the river and canals – and inefficiencies 
in water use had also played a role. In Rosales, farmers did not on the whole 
blame their own management practices, but instead the lack of investment in the 
district and the decision – for purely “political” reasons– to expand the district 
downstream to “bad” lands near Julimes and Lázaro Cardenas.  
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Concern or anger about potential “stealing” of their water by the government or 
the U.S. was surprisingly mute. Farmers did not feel that they were being 
coerced into conservation, but recognized that they had to adapt to a new reality. 
They had, in fact, a much more “binational” focus than one would expect, while 
feeling that given new realities the water treaty should be renegotiated. Thus, the 
“coerced” conservation thesis espoused by Peluso and others did not appear to 
be a factor for farmers in Suacillo and Delicias, perhaps because of the 
participatory aspects of the water conservation projects, which were run through 
the Modules and not directly by CONAGUA (Peluso 1993).  
 
The water conservation projects were not without controversy. In Saucillo, initial 
efforts to reline the old Saucillo Canal – which all users share – were scaled back 
to also support the interconnection of communal wells with more modern 
irrigation equipment and “repumping” spray irrigation systems in private pecan 
wells. Smaller ejido farmers generally viewed these efforts with suspicion. 
Subsequently, the user association has focused solely on relining the Saucillo 
Canal, but was beset by delays, poor construction and decisions by CONAGUA 
to lessen the requirement for the thickness of the lining. Still, farmers felt the 
efforts were worth it and it made sense to reduce water rights so long as they 
could continue to water their fields – or even expand production.  
 
In Rosales, the improved efficiencies and availability of groundwater appeared to 
favor the larger farmers and “medium”-sized ejidatarios of Ortíz, who took 
advantage to expand production or rent land or water rights to larger-scale 
farmers for chile, onion or peanut production. Benefiting less – at least at the time 
when the surveys were conducted – were smaller farmers in the hills above the 
Ortíz fields. Often forced to abandon agricultural lands, or reduce irrigated 
surfaces, many were forced to in essence turn their efforts toward dairy 
production. Some farmers from Loma Linda couldn’t irrigate at all since their 
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rights were based on a “Convenio Precario” which only allows irrigation when 
water is plentiful. Several began experimentally with government assistance to 
grow nopales and Sivetre trees as an input to the brewing of chile chipotle sauce.  
 
The chapter also supports generally the glocalization thesis. While the state – 
whether through funding for water conservation projects, support for nopal or 
tree-growing, SAGARPA payments to farmers and some continued government 
bank support – continues to play a huge role in farmers lives, local associations 
and organizations had become the method to negotiate with the larger market 
economy and U.S. investors. Thus, smaller farmers in both locations used diary 
cooperatives and associations to collect and transport their milk to local milk 
collection sites, while other farmers signed contracts with private chile 
companies. Ejidos – long the association that helped hold farming communities 
together and an important actor in negotiating political solutions – no longer 
appear to be the social organization of choice. In nearly all ejidos visited, 
members and leaders complained that even organizing a meeting was difficult. 
Most ejidos in the area – following the change in Article 27 – had undergone the 
PROCEDE process. But even before, some ejidatarios were selling off both 
agricultural parcels and communal land rights – legally or not. In Ortíz, they 
collectively made the decision to seek full private land rights through dominio 
pleno, although with both water and land resources, there did not seem to be a 
general desire or fear that long-time farmers would suddenly sell off their water 
and lands, but more likely continue to use and/or rent them.  
 
Instead of the ejido structure, farmers across geographic boundaries had joined 
collectives like the Saucillo Cooperative, or become members of ALPURA, the 
milk cooperative. In addition, the Water User Associations themselves had 
become the defacto governing bodies for water management decisions – albeit 
with input from CONAGUA. These user associations were making collective 
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decisions about water conservation funds, crop choices and water use permits, 
alternative water supplies like communal wells and support for new crop choices. 
They had hired canal operators and engineers, implemented a water rights 
market,  purchased their own machinery to clean canals and level lands, made 
roads and sought loans on behalf of ejido members. While CONAGUA appeared 
to have no funding or made little effort to monitor and assess the multiple wells 
that had been dug as a result of the 1995 drought, the Rosales Water User 
Association was paying for a technician to keep tabs on water well levels. Thus, 
they were not only assuming management but planning and assessment, usually 
a role reserved for CONAGUA.  
 
What this mean for water use and natural resource management is more 
complex. While the water conservation efforts have reduced water use on a per-
hectare and irrigation level, the increased use of other sources of water – both 
pumping of the river itself and groundwater – counteract the more sustainable 
use of water that had been achieved. In addition, with a focus on “new 
technology” – the drip irrigation, sprayers and tuberia de multicompuerta – 
suddenly so present in the district, there is widespread concern about what 
happens when the technology begins to fail. The adoption of more efficient 
conservation measures – against the backdrop of the drought and the conflict 
with the U.S. over transboundary water resources – has been supported by 
nearly $140 million in government funds. Even in late 2005, the ironclad plans fell 
by the wayside as rising prices in oil and materials and a government decision to 
shift some resources to the hurricane-ravaged fields of Southeastern Mexico led 
to a slashing of the project budget and expected results. Thus, the farmers in 
Delicias continue to adapt to the vagaries of the market, government programs 
and the climate.  
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Chapter Six: Pearl of the Desert or Gateway to Hell? Agricultural Change in 
the Lower Río Conchos (Ojinaga) Irrigation District, 1990-2005 
 
The verdant valley that lies alongside the Río Grande where the 
Río Conchos flows into it is probably the oldest continuously 
cultivated land in what is today the United States. It was called “La 
Junta de los Ríos.”  
Cecilia Thompson. History of Marfa and Presidio County, 1535-1946. Volume 
One, 1535-1900. (Nortex Press: Austin, 1985), Page 1.  
 
Before we had wheat, sorghum, corn and CONASUPO bought it, 
and we had cotton, and cotton gyns and credit from the Rural Bank. 
Now, Langoria and Perla del Desierto have closed, except for 
Fibras del Norte, which gives only bad credit and there are no large 
buyers of corn, sorghum or wheat. If we haven’t totally lost, it is only 
because of one word: cattle. 
Farmer in Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District, Age 52, Survey No. 50, Lower 
Río Conchos Irrigation District, 2005, from Cyrus Reed. Agricultural Land and 
Water Use Survey. 2005.  
 
God didn’t charge us for water, but now they sell it and then resell 
it. 
Señora Niño, 89, from Esmeralda, Ojinaga, personal communication with author, 
2005. 
 
There was a farmer who went straight to hell after his death. As he 
sat on the fiery floor waiting to meet the Devil, he put his arms 
around his body, shivering. When the devil arrived, the farmer 
asked him for a blanket. The devil, surprised, asked him where he 
was from. “Ojinaga, Chihuahua, Mexico” answered the farmer.  
 




Lying at approximately 840 meters above sea level, the two most prominent 
topographical features in the Municipality of Ojinaga are the Sierrita de Santa 
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Cruz to the east, near La Estación, and the Cerro Alto (the High Hill), which 
overlooks the Río Grande, about 10 kilometers west of the Municipal Capital 
(Photo 5.1). Legend has it that the devil liked to dance on a cord, or swing on a 
swing, that stretched between the Sierrita de Santa Cruz (Photo 5.2) and the 
Cerro Alto, often carrying a fiery metal ball. However, on occasion he would slip 
and drop the ball, burning large swaths of land in the alluvial valleys formed by 
the Río Conchos and Río Grande, which were once verdant and full of trees. At 
some point, it is said, he tired of his game and disappeared somewhere in the 
Sierrita de Santa Cruz.  The arid landscape is thus the product of the devil’s 
clumsiness or malfeasance. One of the metal fiery balls he dropped for a time 
was actually discovered near the present location of the municipal library, 
although it was most likely a mortar from the many violent encounters that 
occurred in the region in the last century (Administración Municipal de Ojinaga 
2004: 19).  
 
In the 2004-2005 agricultural year, most of the agricultural lands that make up 
the Bajo, or Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District – often called the Ojinaga 
Irrigation District -- lay dormant and much of the terrain looked indeed like it had 
been scorched by the devil. That year, only  28 percent --about 3,000 hectares -- 
of the 10,834 hectares of total irrigable lands were under irrigation at one time or 
another. Truth be told, 10,834 hectares of irrigable land is more wish than a 
reality. For one, a considerable swath of those lands have high saline contents, 
and are more like slate – “pizarra” as the locals call it – than soil. For another, 
the dimensions of the irrigation district are being recalculated, to reflect the 
recent sale of nearly 19.7 million cubic meters worth of water rights, enough 
water to potentially irrigate 2,515 hectares of land which has now been 





Photo 6.1. Cerro Alto, which overlooks the alluvial valleys formed by the Río 
Grande west of Ojinaga.  
 
At the same time, the five “Modules” –water user associations in defined 
geographic areas – that make up the district were in their third year of an 
aggressive water conservation campaign designed to reduce water use. The 
program began in the fall of 2002 and was intended to help Mexico reduce water 
use in part to allow more water to flow down the Río Conchos and make its way 
to the Río Bravo/Río Grande (BECC 2002). Between 1993 and 2005, the river 
had become a pale shadow of its former glory, providing less than eight percent 
of the daily flow, averaged between the 1940s and 1993 (see Chapter Three).  
 
It wasn’t always so difficult. For decades, in fact, the 1000 or so farmers with 
lands in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District produced some of the world’s 
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best cotton – helped by the dry climate and sandy soils – as well as prolific 
amounts of corn, sorghum, and winter wheat. About four kilometers east of town, 
in  La Estación, the railroad would carry tons of milled wheat from a warehouse 
owned by Empresas Langoria off to Chihuahua. Langoria also ran a local cotton 
gyn, while a farmer-led collective called Oasis del Desierto and even a third 
cotton gyn supported farmers in bringing their product to market, often competing 
for the best cotton. El Banco Rural -- the Rural Bank -- provided a government-
supported line of credit to farmers, including ejido farmers without titles to private 
property. The credit allowed farmers to invest in the seeds, technology, water, 
fertilizers and pesticides needed to bring product to market, and the market – the 
cotton gyns, the wheat mills, the railroad, the bridge to the U.S. – came to them.  
 
 
Photo 6.2. The Sierrita Santa Cruz, east of Ojinaga, looks over the Río Grande and 




But change happens. Water levels in the Luis León Dam – finished in 1968 – 
began to drop after 1994. Locals say that the enactment of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement in 1994 fundamentally changed the competition faced by 
Ojinaga farmers, as wheat, corn, soybeans and sorghum from the U.S. provided 
Mexican bread, tortilla, livestock feed and other agro-industrial processors with 
other cheaper options. Others maintain that physical changes in the land – the 
invasion of salt cedar in some lands, the rise in salinity – the continued silting and 
sedimentation of diversion dams, canals and lands, took their toll as well. Many 
farmers chose with their feet, sending themselves, or their sons, to look for a 
different life in the U.S. As this chapter will demonstrate, whole communities and 
ejidos were virtually abandoned in the late 1990s. 
 
This final case study chapter reviews and discusses these changes in the context 
of the attempt to improve water use and conservation in the district as part of the 
proposed solution to the low outflow levels of water from the Río Conchos into 
the Río Grande. After reviewing some basic features of the history of the area 
and the irrigation district itself, the chapter looks in-depth at changes that have 
occurred and the reactions of the farmers in two of the five “Modules” that make 
up the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District, including “Modulo IV” – which lies in 
the desert hills south of the city and has been typified by cotton production – and 
Modulo V – the strip of land that lies upstream of the joining of the two rivers 
along the banks of the Río Grande.  
 
II. Desert Agriculture in Ojinaga 
 
Agricultural did not begin in the Municipality of Ojinaga with the official decree 
establishing the rules of operation of Irrigation District 090 in 1976. If local 
historian Cecile Thompson is correct, Spanish explorer and Conquistador Alvan 
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Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca probably visited the area of the “Junta de los Ríos” in 
1535, writing in his Relaciones of a “river that flows between mountains and a 
village where there was the first adobes we saw that were like ‘real houses.” 
(Núñez Cabeza de Vaca as quoted in Pupo-Walker 1993: 101). He wrote of corn, 
squash and beans lining banks of the river, a kind of flood agricultural.  
 
La Junta – as the region became known – had in fact been settled for a long 
time, with Archeologist J. Charles Kelley finding artifacts – rock shelters and 
crude weapons – that date back to 4,000 B.C. (Thompson 1985: 2). Kelley and 
others surmise that it was often inhabited by nomadic cultures and became a 
center for trading with the Paquimé cultures to the southwest in Nuevas Casas 
Grandes as well as Texas and New Mexico-based cultures between 1200 and 
1400 (J. Charles Kelley 1992: 138). With movements by both the Anasazi 
cultures from Northern New Mexico and Pueblo cultures from Southern New 
Mexico, La Junta may have been an important link in the spread of corn and 
beans from present-day Mexico into the American Southwest. There are 
indications La Junta became a melting pot between the Anazasi, Mogollan, and 
Puebla tribes. Later, the Jumanos, who are thought by some as a precursor of 
the apaches, but by others as a distinct culture, probably arrived in the late 1400s 
or early 1500s, and came under the influence of the Conchos to the South 




Photo 6.3.  Mural rendering of the Jumanos Indians that once farmed the alluvial 
valley near the outflow of the Río Conchos into the Río Bravo. Accessed from 
http://www.jumanos.net/jumanos/. 
 
In 1582, Fray Fernando Beltran traveled with adventurer Antonio de Espejo, and 
chronicler Diego Luján, who spoke of a smaller indigenous pueblo which they 
called Santo Tomas, which was later renamed San Francisco de la Junta de los 
Ríos, as well as a larger pueblo downstream of the Junta, which they called 
Santiago. He wrote of damp lands, islands and bays downstream of La Junta, 
and people living in flat-roofed long houses, along the edges of fields that they 
farmed with corn, bean, squashes and even types of melons (Thompson 1985: 
15). While they write of some 10,000 people living along the river in the La Junta 
area, it is probably an exaggeration meant to aggrandize the importance of their 
expedition. (Jordan 1956: 49).   
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Photo 6.4. Mural in Ojinaga Municipal Palace depicts Cabeza de Vaca and his 
three companions along the Rio Grande near Cerro Alto as a “future” 
Conquistador looks on.  
 
Other tribes inhabiting the area – slightly to the south of the outlet itself -- may 
have included the Conchos, Sisimbres, Cacalotes and Mezquites, all of whom 
would have farmed the alluvial river lands along the Río Conchos, principally with 
corn (Residencia de Agrología 1965: 70).  
 
In 1715, the Misión de San Francisco de La Junta de los Ríos was founded for 
evangelization purposes (Administración Municipal de Ojinaga 2004; see Photo 
6.5). However, the indigenous population had already plunged by that point. The 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo Treaty of 1848 would convert the Río Bravo from a river 
shared by many communities into the natural frontier between two nations, and 
thus also convert water management from a local to a regional issue. In 1865, 
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following the defeat of the Napoleanic forces in Mexico led by Maximiliano, 
President Benito Juarez renamed Presidio de Belen “Ojinaga,” in remembrance 
of Manuel Ojinaga, the young general who had led Chihuahua’s forces against 
the French invaders in 1864. 
 
 
Photo 6.5. Church of San Francisco de La Junta de los Ríos in the Ejido of the 
same name. While this particular chapel was built in the early 1900s, the Mission, 
established by the Jesuits, dates from 1715.  
 
Following the revolutionary battles between Pancho Villa and the Federales – 
including the capture of Ojinaga by Villa himself in 1913 -- new lands were 
opened for farming along the Río Conchos in towns like Mesquite, Valverde, San 
Juan, El Ancon, and Paradero as part of the government land distribution 
programs of the 1920s and 1930s. Many of these farmers began to grow corn, 
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winter wheat and especially cotton, dedicated to support national industrialization 
schemes (Jiménez González 2003; see Photo 6.6).  
 
“We built the canals,” remembered Natividad Lujan, an elderly farmer who lives 
among the dust, mesquite and cactus fields of Valverde, south of Ojinaga. “We 
built them with shovels and picks, and when the river flooded and destroyed the 
canals we would meet as an ejido, and build them again.” (Natividad Lujan, 
Valverde, farmer, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
 
Photo 6.6. Wheat Mill, long abandoned, San Juan de la Colmena 
 
By the 1950s, the farmers began to petition the government for the creation of 
more permanent infrastructure to support their development. In 1955, the 
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Secretaria de Recursos Hidraulicos responded to their petition to create a new 
irrigation district between the Cañon del Peguis which overlooks the Río 
Conchos and its outflow into the Río Grande, and began a series of studies 
(Residencia de Agrología 1965: 2). The drought of the mid-1950s, followed by 
the sudden flooding of the Río Conchos in 1958 – due in large part to the 
flooding of the Río Florido in Durango and southern Chihuahua – was another 
impetus to control flooding and irrigation in the Valley of Ojinaga (Residencia de 
Agrología 1965: 3). Still, it was not until 1968 that the Luis León Dam was built, 
and not until 1976 that the Irrigation District became official (Jiménez González 
2003: 3).  
 




The Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District consists of a water supply dam, two 
distribution dams, 730 kilometers of primary and secondary cement and dirt 
canals, roads and drains, four electric pumps which move water from lower to 
higher grounds and some 10,800 hectares of irrigable lands – at least until recent 
water rights sales (see Table 6.1).  
 
Located 130 kilometers south of the Irrigation District itself, Luis León Dam – 
more commonly known as El Granero – began its operations in 1968. With a 
capacity of 850 million cubic meters, including 90 million for sediment control, 
500 for flood control and 260 for agricultural use, the dam has fundamentally 
changed agricultural – both in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District – but also 
in the 18 “Unidades de Riego” – irrigation units which operate south of Ojinaga 
along the banks of the Río Conchos between the Dam and the beginning of the 
District.  
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(12 pumps at 4 
stations) 
34.5  5.25/sec  
Source: CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego 090 Bajo Río Conchos, Características Generales 




Figure 6.1 shows the annual storage, total releases, and Lower Río Conchos 
Irrigation District deliveries from the Luis León Dam as well as outflows into the 
Río Bravo between 1984 and 2005. Beginning in 1995, the graph also shows 
Irrigation Unit water deliveries as CONAGUA began to estimate water use for 
these less regulated irrigation entities. Table 6.2 shows the average of this 
information for the 21 year period, as well as the average for the first 11 years 
and the last 10, clearly indicating a rapid decline in storage capacity, releases, 
irrigation district use, and inputs into the Río Grande. Interestingly, the estimated 
water deliveries to the irrigation units appear stable during this period, indicating 
that they were less affected by the reduced releases from Luis León, courtesy of 
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their geographic proximity and perhaps less regulation by CONAGUA. For the 
irrigation district itself, on the other hand, the curtailment of water deliveries is 
obvious over the latter portion of the period.  
 
Figure 6.1. Luis León (El Granero) Dam Storage Levels, Releases, Irrigation Water 
Use and Outflows to Río Grande, HY 1984-2005 in 1000 Cubic Meters per Second 
 
Source: CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego 090, information provided to author, 2005.  
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Table 6.2. Annual Storage Levels, Releases, and Deliveries from the Luis León 


















1984-2005 324,363 616,555 71,237 30,640 609,488 
Average HY 




96-2005 256,044 171,071 54,352 30,640 163,692 
Source: CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego 090, information provided to author, 2005.  
 
According to CONAGUA officials, there has been much less direct regulation and 
measurement of the Irrigation Units as compared to the irrigation district itself 
(Oscar López,  Operations Manager, Distrito de Riego 090, CONAGUA, personal 
communication with author, 2003). Nonetheless, in the last several years, as part 
of the larger “Sustainable Use” project, these irrigation units have been placed 
much more directly under the supervision of CONAGUA.  
 
Today, the 18 irrigation units that dot the banks of the Río Conchos between Luis 
León Dam and the irrigation district collectively enjoy water concessions for some 
24.8 million cubic meters to irrigate some 3,560 hectares (see Table 6.3).  While 
there is still not an accurate estimate of actual water use, since the 1995-96 
agricultural year, CONAGUA estimates water deliveries of between a low of 21.3 
million cubic meters in 1995-96 to a high of 46.9 million cubic meters in the 2000-
2001 agricultural year, indicating that water use has often exceeded concession 
levels. Interestingly, these irrigation units range from large communities with 
small ejido tracts of land, to individual landowners, one of which – El Consuelo – 
is a single pecan orchard of 130 hectares (Photo 6.7). Recent activities on behalf 
of the Irrigation Units have included a rehabilitated diversion dam (Photo 6.8). 
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Table 6.3. Irrigation Units, Number of Users and Total Hectares 






ALDAMA Maclovio Herrera 
I & 2 
107 615 
  Colonia Pueblito 86 693 
COYAME Bufalo 1 70 
 Francisco Portillo 19 225 
 La Suaceda 28 80 
 El Consuelo 1 130 
 El Peñeno 1 46 
 Las Garzas 1 30 
 El Ahogadero 1 28 
 San Pedro 34 236 
 Bajios San Pedro 13 160 
 La Paz de 
Mexico 
68 281 
 El Diamante 1 100 
 Cuchillo Parado 65 630 
 Fortin II 1 7 
 Cañon de 
Barrera 
22 210 
Total  450 3,561 




Photo 6.7. “El Consuelo,” a pecan farm of 130 hectares lines the banks of the Río 
Conchos approximately 40 kilometers south of Ojinaga and is owned by a former 
state government official.  
 
Some 130 kilometers down from the release of Luis León Dam, after passing 
through the spectacular Canyón Peguis (Photo 6.9), the Río Conchos arrives at 
“El Peguis Chico” Distribution Dam, as the river emerges from canyon walls into 
a small river plain (Photo 6.10). The irrigation district itself has begun. On the 
edge of the dam, the district’s primary canal travels northeast toward El 
Mesquite, a desert community that once produced thousands of tons of cotton 
and wheat and makes up the lands of “Modulo III.” Northeast of El Mesquite, the 
canal splits: part of the canal continues parallel to the river itself, while a series of 
pumps actually sends a portion of the water up above the river floodplain along 
the desert mesas of “Llano de Dolores,” irrigating the ejido fields, until 2005, 





Photo 6.8. This Diversion Dam Structure was rebuilt in 2003 as part of the 
“Sustainable Water Use” projects for the benefit of the Ejidos of San Pedro,  La 
Paz de Mexico and a private pecan farmer among others.  
  
 
A few kilometers later, the canal splits again, part following the eastern path of 
the Río Conchos until it flows into a second distribution dam, while another part 
of the canal actually turns northwest, pumped under the Río Conchos itself, to 
emerge near the community of  Santa Teresa. These are the arid lands of 
“Modulo IV,” which includes the communities of Santa Teresa, San Juan, 






Photo 6.9. The spectacular view of “El Peguis” Canyon north of Ojinaga.  
 
The Presa Derivadora Gral. Toribio Ortega – universally referred to as El 
Tarahumara – is larger but less panaromic than its counterpart (Photo 6.12). 
Serving the lower part of the irrigation district, and located about 10 kilometers 
due west of the Ojinaga bridge to Presidio, El Tarahumara at present has a large 
swath of vegetation – much of which is salt cedar or tamarisk growth on a sand 
bar island in its middle (Lujan 2005: 13). There are two canals which emerge on 
either side of the diversion structure. One serves “Labores de Ojinaga -- Modulo I 
– which is dominated by larger private farmers, some of whom have begun 
growing pecan orchards in recent years. The other canal travels nearly due north 
of the river, through Tocolote, and then further northwest past San Francisco, La 
Esmeralda, El Paradero and Cerro Alto, parallel to the Río Grande itself.  In El 
Paradero Alto, the canal stops at a series of electric pumps, which sometimes 
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pump the water above to irrigate fields in El Paradero de Arriba and Cerro Alto. 
This area – the largest in the district --  is Modulo V  -- Paso del Norte. Map 10 
shows the outlines of the five Modules making up the Irrigation District and the 
location of the dams and canals.  
 
Photo 6.10. The El Peguis Chico distribution dam, which serves three of the five 




Photo 6.11. The Lands of Llano de Dolores, Module II, have been abandoned, with 
its owners selling off their water rights. The ejidal house is in the background.  
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Photo 6.12. The Tamarisk-choked Distribution Dam of “El Tarahumara”, Lower Rio 




Source: Miguel Pavón, Borderlands Information Center, Texas Natural Resource 
Information Service, 2007.  
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B. The Farmers, Irrigated Land & Water Use 
 
In  1994, the water district was divided into five “Modulos” or water user 
association areas (see Table 6.4). According to information provided in 2004, 
1,156 water users had rights to irrigate up to 10,884 hectares of land. There was 
slightly more private farmers – 582 – than “communal farmers” and a slight 
majority of the land was “private” property (see Table 6.5).  
 
Since four of the modules have part of their irrigated area served by pumps 
which send the water to higher ground, a significant amount of land in the district 
– some 40 percent – depends upon the electric pumps.  While the now extinct  
Module II depended completely upon water that is pumped to lands above, and 
Module IV has slightly more irrigable land dependent upon “pumped” water, the 
other modules rely mainly on the magic of gravity to irrigate their lands.  
 
Water deliveries have been well below the volume of the water concessions for 
the individual Modules, with the exception of Module I. There is an explanation. 
Module I is the irrigation association unit most dominated by private landowners, 
has the least problems in terms of water deliveries because its canals are located 
near the point of control, and all of its lands are irrigated by gravity. In contrast, 
Module II – which depends entirely upon pumping – actually “went out of 
business” in the 2004-2005 agricultural year as ejido farmers chose to sell off 
their water rights in a government buy-back program (see Photo 6.11). In fact, 
Module I had water use volumes above its official concessions in several years, 
as farmers who had lands in more than one module “transferred” their water 
rights into Module I, or private farmers in Module I transferred water rights 
through water rights purchases from other areas within the district. All of the 
other modules experienced significant curtailments in water use and irrigated 
lands between 1994 and 2005. 
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El Ancón” 2,879.9 2,832.0 1,314.3 1,517.7 291 138 153 
Modulo V 
“Paso del 
Norte”  4,209.4 4,102.8 1,609.6 2,493.2 430 212 218 
Total 11,134.1 
 10,833.6 5,135.3 5,698.3 1,156 572 584 
Source: CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego: 090 Bajo Río Conchos, Características Generales del 
Distrito de Riego 2004.  
 
Table 6.5. Irrigable Lands, Gravity-Fed and Electric-Pumped, Water Rights and 




































I 1,398 1,397.8 24.0 0.0 0.0 11,168 13,599 
II 832 0.0 0.0 831.6 821.6 6,647 1,466 
III 1,669 1,041.3 626.9 628.1 515.9 13,841 7,447 
IV 2,832 1,487.8 327.3 1,344.2 987.0 21,448 13,163 
V 4,103 2,481.6 1,303.7 1,621.2 305.9 31,886 20,054 
Total 10,834 6,408.5 2,281.9 4,425.1  2,630.4 84,990 55,648 
(1) Actual water releases at point of control. Efficiencies of water deliveries to actually users 
vary, but generally average 80 to 85 percent for the district as a whole, although within 
individual Modulos, efficiencies can be as low as 55 percent.  
Source: Comision Nacional del Agua, Distrito de Riego 090, Funcionamiento Hidraulico de las 
Obras (Anexo 3), information provided August of 2005.  
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C. Land Distribution 
 
Most of the ejidos of the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District – including San 
Juan, San Juan de la Colmena, La Esmeralda, and El Paradero --  were formed 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s as part of the land distribution reforms following 
the Mexican revolution. Another – San Francisco -- formed after the Río Grande 
changed course in the late 1960s and early 1970s (IBWC 1970; IBWC 1968). 
The changing of the river’s course following significant flooding led to the creation 
of a swath of land known as La Cruz – the cross – which today is occupied 
mainly by members of the San Francisco ejido, in essence an off-shoot of the 
larger “Esmeralda” ejido (Guadalupe Torres, Ejido San Francisco, personal 
communication with author, 2005). Other ejidos – Tierra Nuevas, Llano de 
Dolores and El Agrillal – were successful attempts by farmers to organize 
collectively and open up additional lands for irrigation in more recent decades.  
 
A small number – 19 – of users are “colono” farmers – who farm 223 hectares of 
land in Module III, while the rest of the communal ejidal farmers – 584 users with 
713 water rights – have rights to farm some 5,700 hectares of land. In reality, 
there is no difference in how these different farmers are treated by the Modules 
or irrigation districts. They receive the same amount of water per water right, they 
rent their land and corresponding water rights when they want, and they choose 
which crops to grow. It is interesting to note that while ejido farmers generally 
only possess a single tract of land and one water right, a significant number of 
small private property owners have several water rights to cover more than one 
tract of land, since they purchased land at different times.  On the other hand, 
there are private land owners with a large tract but only one water right.  
 
CONAGUA’s official numbers were not reflective of  the reality of Ojinaga’s ejidos 
in 2005. Llano de Dolores disappeared in 2004 with the sale of all of their water 
rights; only a few farmers in El Paradero still farm, the majority of whom have 
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emigrated to the U.S. and “traditional” ejidos like San Juan de la Colmena and La 
Esmeralda are a pale reflection of their former glory, as some ejidatarios have 
sold their land – legally or not – and other have emigrated and only return for 
special occasions(Reed, Chihuahuan Land and Water Use Survey, 2005). Thus, 
while the number of registered ejidatarios district-wide may be close to 600, the 
number actually residing and farming their lands is much lower, perhaps about 
half. While none of the Ojinaga ejidos that make up part of the Irrigation District 
have officially privatized their lands through the PROCEDE process, many 
ejidatarios sold off their land and moved away, according to local agricultural 
officials (“Pepe” Corrales, Desarrollo Rural-Ojinaga, personal communication 
with author,  2005).  
 
Table 6.6. Ejidos with lands in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District 









San Juan de La 
Colmena 
198 185 2,214.6 2,156 
El Agrillal 57 46 295 295 
San Juan 30 27 255.5 251.5 
Llano de 
Dolores 
77 68 579.2 576.0 
Tierras Nuevas 137 79 488.1 488.1 
San Francisco 2 55 362.4 362.0 
La Esmeralda 22 21 85.4 85.3 
El Paradero 90 72 709.1 698.1 
Colonos 19 19 223.0 223.0 
Private Property 713 584 5,921.7 5,698.4 
Total 1,345 1,156 11,134.1 10,833.5 
Source: Comision Nacional de Agua, Distrito de Riego 090, “Resumen de Derechos y 
Numeros de Usuarios, 2004,” June of 2004.  
 
Overall, about 73 percent of ejido farmers in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation 
District own 10 or less hectares of irrigable land, and 97.5 percent have 20 
hectares or less (Table 6.7). Among private farmers about 63 percent also have 
10 hectares of land or less, about 26 percent have between 10 and 20 hectares, 
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seven percent – about 41 farmers – have between 20 and 30, and 19 farmers 
have 30 or more hectares. It is important to note that these percentages probably 
undercount the consolidation of lands, since lands may be registered in different 
family member names but may be controlled by a single individual.  Thus, ejido 
land distribution in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District can be said to be 
more “equitable,” with most farmers having a similar amount of land. Yet some 
say this is precisely the problem: the small sizes of lots make it inefficient to farm 
commercially (Alonso Valenzuela, Fibras del Norte Cotton Gyn, personal 
communication with author, 2005). In recent years, some private farmers, 
particularly in the gravity-fed lower part of the district have bought up smaller 
tracts of land to gain access to water rights that go along with the land and thus 
have more flexibility in crop choice. (Alonso Valenzuela 2005).   
 
Table 6.7. Property by Size and Category in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation 
District, 2004 
Private Property 
Owners Number of Owners % of Owners 
Irrigable Land 
(Hectares) % of Land  
 0.0  to   5.0 230 39.38% 608.4 10.68% 
5.1  to 10.0 140 23.97% 1,021.3 17.92% 
10.1  to  20.0 154 26.37% 2,267.8 39.80% 
20.1  to  30.0 41 7.02% 972.6 17.07% 
30.1  to 40.0 7 1.20% 229.9 4.03% 
40.1  to 50.0 7 1.20% 315.7 5.54% 
50.1 to 100.0 5 0.86% 282.7 4.96% 
Greater than 
100.0 0 0.00% 0.0 0.00% 
Totals:  584 100.00% 5,698.4 100.00% 
Ejido Land 
Owners     
 0.0  to   5.0 101 18.26% 349.9 7.12% 
 5.1  to  10.0 300 54.25% 2,248.0 45.76% 
10.1  to  20.0 138 24.95% 1,923.3 39.15% 
Greater than 
20.0 14 2.53% 391.1 7.96% 
Totals: 553 100.00% 4,912.2 100.00% 
All Lands: 1,156 100.00% 10,833.5 100.00% 
Source: Comision Nacional de Agua, Distrito de Riego 090, Clasificación de Tierra 
Agricólas, Sumario del Distrito, 2004   
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Irrigation of lands in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District rose throughout the 
early and mid 1980s, fell significantly in the early 1990s, and rose again in 1995. 
Thereafter, significant curtailments began– both in water deliveries and irrigated 
lands (see Figure 5.1, Table 6.8). However, this simple statement – that water 
use and irrigated lands have shrunk in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District 
significantly since 1995 masks a more complex reality, with significant changes in 
the geography of production, the types of crops grown, and the growing season. 
There has been a gradual shift away from cotton, and grain production (for 
human consumption) toward feed production (for livestock) and even a slight 
increase in pecan production. Thus, in some cases, the decrease in irrigated 
lands has represented a shift to higher water-demand crops like alfalfa, pecans 
and rye grass (see Figure 5.2). In essence, the number of irrigations have gone 
up to meet the demands of these new crops – increasing the amount of water 
used per hectare -- while the total amount of land irrigated and total volume of 
water used has gone down substantially over the period. Thus, while only some 
500 hectares of perennial crops were grown in 1992, by 2004, some 1500 
hectares of these crops were grown throughout the district. 
 471 
 













of Water Used 
1974-75  1,914   9,953  5.2 28.1 
1975-76  1,418   7,799  5.5 22.4 
1976-77  4,075   22,413  5.5 62.9 
1977-78  3,376   17,893  5.3 51.0 
1978-79  3,677   18,753  5.1 56.6 
1979-80  4,013   22,072  5.5 62.7 
1980-81  4,414   24,718  5.6 69.7 
1981-82  6,907   35,362  5.1 110.4 
1982-83  6,222   35,275  5.7 99.5 
1983-84  6,551   36,420  5.6 100.0 
1984-85  7,037   38,743  5.5 117.1 
1985-86  7,344   39,810  5.4 132.2 
1986-87  7,008   33,366  4.8 104.5 
1987-88  7,010   35,775  5.1 104.9 
1988-89  6,760   36,913  5.5 110.8 
1989-90  6,802   38,153  5.6 125.9 
1990-91  5,410   24,283  4.5 138.7 
1991-92  3,306   16,414  5.0 101.7 
1992-93  4,374   28,327  6.5 123.8 
1993-94  4,444   30,911  7.0 111.3 
1994-95  5,513   40,994  7.4 145.4 
1995-96  3,142   17,034  5.4 52.0 
1996-97  4,730   33,884  7.2 90.5 
1997-98  4,332   30,475  7.0 78.5 
1998-99  3,650   26,812  7.3 72.3 
1999-00  3,664   23,132  6.3 62.9 
2000-01  2,762   19,125  6.9 55.9 
2001-02  2,292   12,734  5.6 51.4 
2002 - 2003  2,559   13,324  5.2 52.1 
2003 - 2004  2,825   13,082  4.6 38.2 
2004 - 2005  3,006  NA  NA  NA 
Average, 1974-
2005 
4,809 27,586 5.7 88.6 
Average, 1995-
2005 
3,847 25,622 7.0 77.7 





Figure 6.2. Crops grown in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District, 1982-2005 by 
Growing Season 
 
Source: SAGARPA, Ojinaga District, Information Provided to Author 2005.  
 
2. Winter Crops 
 
The studies supporting the creation of the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District 
listed winter wheat as the region’s most important crop, stating that over 2,100 
hectares of winter wheat were irrigated in the mid-1960s, or about 30 percent of 
the land irrigated in that period (Residencia de Agrología 1965: 70). By the mid-
1980s, over 4,000 hectares of winter wheat were being irrigated, yet by 1995 
there was only twelve hectares irrigated. Things didn’t change much over the 
next decade.  
 
Before the bottom fell out, three different large buyers served the Ojinaga district, 
including Empresas Langoria, Harinas de Chihuahua and Industrias E.M.A 
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(Table 6.9). By the mid-1990s these businesses no longer had mills and storage 
centers located in Ojinaga, as they consolidated their efforts in a few places, or 
chose to import wheat from the U.S. (Bolivar, Empresas Langoria, personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
 


















1,669 1,799 2,410 3,450 
Harinas de 
Chihuahua 
1,370 1,360 0 754 
Industrias 
E.M.A 
577 827 526 44 
Seed 
Production 
80 0 30 120 
Local 
Consumption 
574 156 195 76 
Contracted with 
Outside Buyer 
394    
Total 4,664 4,142 3,161 4,444 
 
Source: SAGARPA, Distrito de Desarrollo Rural 009, Bajo Río Conchos, 1993. 
 
In 2003, SAGARPA began a price-support program to pay producers to irrigate 
wheat with the hope of reactivating this traditional sector of the economy. After 
some initial problems related to payments, by the 2004-2005 growing season the 
project had some success, with 33 farmers in the Municipality of Ojinaga planting 
over 340 hectares with winter wheat, including approximately 25 farmers in the 
Irrigation District, virtually all of whom are private farmers, mainly in Modules I 
and V (SAGARPA, Distrito de Desarrollo Rural 009 2005). Still, these growers 
must send their production all the way to Chihuahua City, signifying high 
transportation costs. 
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3. Summer Crops 
 
Summer crops have continued to be important in the district, but there have been 
changes. First, the so-called “Segundo Cultivo” – literally a second summer crop 
– for the most part no longer exists. A large factor in this abandonment of the 
“Second Crop” was the difficulty in accessing water in the late 1990s, which 
forced farmers to consider where best to “spend” their water rights. Summer 
grains intended for human consumption – corn, soy beans, beans, sorghum for 
grain –witnessed large declines between 1990 and 2005. (see Figure 6.3).  
 
The sudden contraction in summer crops irrigated in the mid-1990s has little to 
do with water deliveries – which at the time were still available --  and everything 
to do with the sudden failures in credit, pests, and  falling worldwide cotton prices 
in 1992 and 1993, which caused farmers to leave cotton fields unattended, 
according to local observers  Following the sudden fall in market price, farmers 
reacted, with both ejido and private property leaders forming not one but two 
cooperatives intended to reactivate the cotton-growing region of Ojinaga. Perla 
del Desierto – Pearl of the Desert – was a kind of security fund intended to 
channel credit and insurance to cotton-growing farmers, while Ultimo Esfuerzo – 
literally the Last Effort – was a productive cooperative which obtained credit and 
for several years operated a cotton gyn at the “curve” – a curve in the road 
between Ojinaga and Valverde, not far from where the Río Conchos crosses 
under the old highway (Natividad Luján, Valverde, personal communication with 








Figure 6.3. Number of Hectares of Basic Grains and Cotton Irrigated in Lower Río 
Conchos Irrigation District 090, 1982-2005 
 
Source: SAGARPA, Ojinaga District, Information Provided to Author 2005.  
 
By 1994 and 1995, with credit again offered, and cotton gyns operating, Ojinaga 
farmers reestablished cotton in the upper part of the district. In fact, 1997 was a 
bumper year for the crop, with over 2,000 hectares irrigated. Yet both rural 
associations ultimately failed and by the turn of the century, the cotton gyn run by 
the farmers – as well as another run by Empresas Langoria – had closed up 
shop, and cotton production plummeted (Ing. Juan de Dios Guardarrama, 
SAGARPA, Ojinaga District, personal communication with author, 2005; Photo 
6.13).  While water availability from the dams was clearly a factor, as a relatively 
low-water demand crop, it was not the major one. Cotton again virtually 
disappeared in the early 2000s, but again, rose slightly in 2003 and 2004 with the 
advent of a government-price-support program,  the opening of a new privately-
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run cotton gyn in  Tocolote, just south of Ojinaga, and a rise in world prices 
(Figure 6.4; Photo 6.14).  
  
 
Figure 6.4. World Cotton Prices (Series A) per Quintal and Total Hectares Irrigated, 
Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District, 1994 – 2005. 
 
Note: The COTLOOK A INDEX is intended to be representative of the level of offering prices on 
the international raw cotton market. It is an average of the cheapest five quotations from a 
selection (at present numbering nineteen) of the principal upland cottons traded internationally. 
Source: Cotlook Daily Internet Service, Available at www.cotlook.com and SAGARPA, Ojinaga 




Photo 6.13. Abandoned Cotton Gyn at “La Curva” once run by the Ejido 
Cooperative “El Último Esfuerzo” (The Last Effort) 
 
In addition to a government price-support program, since 2002 the State of 
Chihuahua has worked with the U.S. and Texas Department of Agriculture on a 
Binational Boll Weevil and Pink Bollworm Eradication Program. As a member 
state, all cotton producers in Chihuahua must join the program, and there are 
frequent meetings between government officials in both countries to review 
progress made under their compact.  
 
Charged with implementing the Programa Binacional de Erradicacion para 
Picudo del Algodonero y Gusano Rosado is the Local Agricultural Safety Board – 
La Junta Local de Sanidad Vegetal. By 2000, officials from Texas, Chihuahua 
and New Mexico proposed and signed a joint agreement to standardize the use 
of hormones, insecticides, sterilized pests and other methods to help lower the 
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use of pesticides and eliminate the boll weevil and pink bollworm from cotton 
crops (Dirección General de Sanidad Vegetal 2001: 7).  
 
 
Photo 6.14. “Fibras del Norte” Cotton Gyn in Tocolote began operations in 2001 
and is the only cotton gyn operating in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District 
 
In Ojinaga, between 2002 and 2005, the Junta Local was busy implementing the 
program. As a first step, all fields were globally positioned through hand-held 
GPS units and put in a GIS mapping system. “Scout” traps – impregnated with 
“grandlure” pheromones -- were placed approximately one trap per 15 hectares 
of cotton to detect boll weevils as a first step, although the density of traps was 
later increased to a trap per every six hectares. If significant populations are 
detected through the traps, or random testing, then additional traps are located 
around heavily-invested lots. In addition, those lots with significant boll weevil 
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populations also receive an order to be sprayed with “ultra-low volume” 








The techniques for controlling pink bollworms are similar, with mapping, trapping, 
detection and controls, mainly through the use of traps and sex pheromones 
(“Gossyplure”) to disrupt their mating patterns, and potentially an 
organophosphate insecticide when traps and spot checks reveal high levels of 
the worm (above 5 percent of plants in field). The program also recommends the 
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use of transgenic cotton (El-Lissy and Hill 2006).  
 
Still, cotton farmers have been faced with a severe credit crisis. Under the 
program, farmers were expected to pay $1,800 Mexican pesos (about $160 in 
2005) for each hectare of planted cotton to the Junta Local de Sanidad Vegetal. 
Essentially, farmers in Chihuahua were forced to participate, but in return, costs 
per hectares would decline since there is less reliance on pesticides and a higher 
use of pheromones, cultural controls like row harvesting and traps. Even so, 
most farmers must rely on some type of credit.  
 
At one time, ejido farmers in Ojinaga would have relied on the Rural Bank to pay 
for these inputs. But after the peso collapse and subsequent banking crisis, the 
Banco Rural –today called Financiera Rural -- no longer offered credit to any 
farmer with outstanding debt, which is the situation of most small cotton farmers 
in the district (Ing. Juan de Díos Gaurdarrama, SAGARPA, personal 
communication with author, 2005). Farmers also relied on the local cotton gyns -- 
Empresas Langoria and Perlas del Desierto -- for credit, but they both closed 
their doors in the late 1990s (Alonso Valenzuela, Fibras del Norte, personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
 
According to local agricultural officials and newspaper reports, the eradication 
program has been inefficient due to a problem of payments in the Irrigation 
District and surrounding area. Thus, farmers are often waiting for the proceeds 
from the sale of their crops, as well as the new government price-support 
“Objective Price” payment to pay back the costs of the inputs they put on their 
crops six months earlier. Officials at the Junta Local de Sanidad Vegetal report 
that in the Ojinaga Municipality there were over 130 hectares of land “in debt” in 
the 2003-2004 agricultural season and even more – 392 – in the 2004-2005 
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season (Ing. Soto, Junta Local de Sanidad Vegetal, Ojinaga, personal 
communication with author, 2005).  
 
Table 6.10. Debt on Cotton Pest Eradication Payments, 2003-2004, Ojinaga 
Municipality  




2003-2004 136.68 $177,684 $1,300  
2004-2005 392.07 $627,312 $1,600 
Source: SAGARPA, Ojinaga District, information provided to author, 2005.  
 
In 2005, only one cotton gyn – Fibras del Norte – was offering any credit to 
cotton farmers within the Irrigation District, while several banks also had credit 
available – to farmers with good credit histories. “Fibras del Norte” – Fibers of the 
North – is a private enterprise formed by several U.S. and Mexican investors, but 
run by the local Valenzuela family, an important local agricultural family. Current 
manager Alonso Valenzuela said the cotton gyn began operations in 2000 on a 
“very small scale” but really took off in 2001. By 2004, they were providing credit 
to 48 farmers within the irrigation district, but the problem of payments became 
so severe that they only worked with 30 farmers in 2005 (Table 6.11). 
 
Table 6.11. Number of farmers receiving credit from Fibras del Norte Cotton Gyn, 
2001-2005 and Production Totals 
Year Number of 
Producers 











2001 10  410  84 
2002 24  1,280  1,280 
2003 40 15 2,379 400 2,379 
2004 48 18 3,290 600 2,390 
2005 30 18%    
Source: Alonso Valenzuela, Fibras del Norte, August 2005.  
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Valenzuela said that many farmers use their own money or receive credit 
elsewhere. In the case of Fibras del Norte itself, the cotton gyn receives credit 
from a private bank – Banco Rural de Ojinaga – but they have had difficulty 
meeting payments because of the “lack of culture of payments” from the farmers 
themselves. To “protect” themselves, the cotton gyn only provides credit “a 
medias,” about $700 pesos per hectare in 2005, or only about 40 percent of the 
requirement imposed by the eradication program, which itself does not include 
the costs of fertilizers, machinery or water.  
 
Valenzuela said the cotton produced in Ojinaga is still among the best, and that a 
private cotton broker in 2004 had tested the cotton and certified it was “10 
percent better than Arizona cotton.” Still, local farmers surveyed complain that 
the cotton testers always subtract points, and that the cotton gyn undervalues the 
cotton they provide credit for, a charge Valenzuela denied.  
 
“Producers are never happy, but I give them the options to produce,” he 
explained. “This year we sent packs of cotton to Phoenix, Delicias and Las 
Bombas to classify them to avoid the problem of under classifying the cotton.”  
 
Valenzuela said the real problem of cotton production in Ojinaga is not credit or 
but good quality, contiguous plots of land.  
 
“The lots of land here are too small,” he explained. “A farmer with five lots of one 
hectare each spends much more than a farmer with a single five-hectare lot of 
land, and we need more agrarian reform so it is easier to buy and sell land.”  
(Alonso Valenzuela, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Valenzuela said you need at least 10 hectares of continuous land to make a 
profit and large tracts of land in the district are hard to find. For one, insurance 
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companies will not provide insurance to lands that are too close to the Río 
Conchos, because of the constant risk of sudden desert flash-floods, which is 
one of the reasons that these lands have become pecan and alfalfa fields, more 
resistant to flooding damage than cotton, easily uprooted. Secondly, he said 
because of the slow legalization of ejido titles, buying and selling ejido land is too 
risky and time-consuming. Finally, he noted that because some of the cotton 
lands were in areas where water had to be pumped – adding an expense – many 
farmers chose to sell their water rights, most notably in Llano de Dolores, the 
ejido which decided in mass to sell off their water rights, ceding once productive 
cotton land back to desert hares and cactus.  
 
Photo 6.16. Cotton field in Las Oasis, a Mennonite community founded in 1995, 




He compared the situation in the district with that in the nearby communities of El 
Oasis, Nueva Holanda and Las Bombas, three communities of German-speaking 
Mennonites which have arisen out of the Chihuahuan Desert in the last 10 or 15 
years to the east. Using ranchland and huge deep-well pumps, the communities 
have plunged into cotton farming, irrigating thousands of hectares in 2004 and 
2005. 
 
 “They know how to take advantage of the government programs and they have 
the extensions of land to do it,” Valenzuela explained.  
 
Cotton farming is more productive and the farmers are receiving more 
government support in the Mennonite communities, which only began 10 years 
before. While the Mennonite farmers have embraced the more expensive 
genetically-modified cotton known as bT cotton, at least in 2004, irrigation district 
farmers for the most part rejected the higher priced, imported seeds (Ing. Juan 
de Dios Gaurdarrama, Ojinaga Rural Development District 009, personal 
communication with author, 2005). The eradication program itself for the pink 
bollworm is based partially upon the use of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton, 
whose primary benefit according to promoters is its resistance to pests and the 
reduced use of pesticides. While Mexico has resisted the use of genetically-
modified crops – particularly corn – for human consumption, there has been a 
slow and steady increase in the use of cotton, soybeans, alfalfa and other crops 
not intended for human consumption in Mexico (Dirección General de Sanidad 
Vegetal 2001: 11).  
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Table 6.12. Cotton production in the Ojinaga Rural Development District, Coyame 
and Ojinaga Municipalities, 2003-2004 


















41 0 507 507 12.36 
El Mulato 3 0 44 44 14.66 
Coyame  4 0 42 42 10.5 
El Oasis 36 866 737 1,603 44.5 
Nuevo 
Holanda 
14 422.5 473 895.5 63.96 
Total 98 1288.5 1803 3,091.5 31.55 




Table 6.13. Cotton Price Support Program, Ojinaga Rural Development District, 
2004 
Category “Mennonites” (Nueva 
Holanda, Las Bombas, 
Nueva Holanda) 
“Mexicans” (Lower Río 
Conchos Irrigation 
District, El Mulato, 
Coyame) 
Number 79 31 
Hectares Planted 5,843 426 
Tons of Cotton Sewn 7,452 532 
Total Payments in Mexican 
Pesos 
44,979,386 2,638,459 
Payment per ton $6,036 $4,960 
 
Source: Ing. Juan de Dios Guardarrama, Rural Development District 009, SAGARPA, 




What are the farmers of Ojinaga actually growing? The answer is simple: feed 
crops and pecans. The huge increase in “perennial crops” – those crops which 
must be watered throughout the year – is due almost entirely to increases in 
alfalfa, and to a lesser extent to pecans. At the same time, sorghum for feed, 
oats for feed and rye grass have also maintained an important presence in the 
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district – with declines and increases depending on prices and access to water -- 
even with severe water restrictions due to the low storage water levels in the Luis 
León Dam (Figure 6.5). In addition to pecan nuts, the only other “fruits” grown in 
the district are a smattering of watermelon and melon crops, but despite the 
existence of local demand in Ojinaga and nearby towns like Mulato, only a few 
farmers – mainly larger private farmers – have dared to enter into production of 
these risky crops, which are susceptible to pests, coyotes, wild pigs, hails, rains, 
droughts and freezes (Figure 6.6; and Photo 6.17). (Armando Valenzuela, 
Modulo V President, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
Figure 6.5. Irrigated Hectares of Feed Crops, Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District 
090, 1982 - 2005 
 
Source: SAGARPA, Ojinaga District, information provided to author, 2005. 
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There have also been a few attempts to grow pistachio crops and one major 
effort – supported by the government – to grow eucalyptus trees on lands where 
crops had been abandoned. At one point, over 100 hectares were planted with 
the Australian arbust, but the supposed market for paper never took off, and the 
trees themselves never received the needed care. There are still groves of the 
trees which emerge suddenly out of the desert floor, but they look sickly and in 
fact have not been irrigated in years. Thus, put simply, the majority of farmers still 
operating in Ojinaga have put their faith in growing crops to feed cattle, or have 
moved into pecan production, while a few farmers – most of them ejido in 
portions of the district far away from the more productive alluvial soils– continue 
to grow cotton or winter wheat, supported by new government price-guarantee 
programs.  
 
Figure 6.6. Irrigated Hectares of Tree and Melon Crops, Lower Río Conchos Irrigation 
District 090, 1993-2005  
 
Source: SAGARPA, Ojinaga District, information provided to author, 2005. 
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Photo 6.17. Watermelons face a difficult time in the Ojinaga region due to freezes, 
livestock, coyotes and feral pigs 
 
E. The Geography of Production in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation 
District 
 
The shrinking of the district has not occurred equally between small and large 
farmers, nor equally among the modules. Indeed, the most startling change in the 
district is perhaps the abandonment of much of the land in those areas where 
water has to be pumped up by electric pumps, much of it in the area occupied by 
ejidos like San Juan, Paradero and Llano de Dolores. Thus, the amount of land 
that is irrigated that is “covered” by canals which rely on pumps to carry the water 
from low to higher lands has shrunk much faster that land that is irrigated by 
canals which rely on gravity. There are geographical consequences of the 
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shrinkage of agriculture in the Irrigation District. Thus, in the 1993-1996 four-year 
period, an average of 72 % of the irrigated lands occurred with standard gravity 
canals, but in the 2002-2005 period, nearly 88% of the irrigated lands were 
served by gravity canals (Table 6.14).  
 
Table 6.14. Irrigated Hectares by Type of Canal in Lower Río Conchos Irrigation 










% of Hectares 
Irrigated by 
Gravity Canals 
1993 3,425 1,170 4,595 74.54% 
1994 3,372 1,118 4,490 75.10% 
1995 3,909 2,042 5,951 65.69% 
1996 2,897 1,037 3,934 73.64% 
Average 1993-
96 
3,401 1,342 4,743 72.24% 
2002 2,458 248 2,706 90.84% 
2003 2,353 287 2,640 89.13% 
2004 2,371 484 2,855 83.05% 
2005 2,312 298 2,610 88.58% 
Average 2002-
2005 
2,374 329 2,703 87.90% 
Notes: Statistics from 1997 to 2001 provided did not break down irrigated hectares by type of 
canal. 2005 are unofficial data. Calculations by Author.  
Source: Rural Development District 009, Ojinaga, SAGARPA, 2005.  
 
Which crops were still being irrigated with pumped water? The answer for the 
present period is really only cotton and alfalfa. Between 2002 and 2005 when full 
Module-level statistics were available, most production in Ojinaga occurred in 
gravity-fed canals in Modules I and Modules V, although significant cotton-
growing still occurred in Modules III and IV, including some with pumped water. 
These figures suggest that along with the overall shrinkage of hectares irrigated 
in the district  was a concentration of production in the private lands of Module V 
and Module I along the river corridors of the lower Río Conchos and Río Grande, 
upstream of the entrance of the Conchos. Thus, while only about 25 percent of 
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the district lands were “irrigated” in 2005, over 55 percent of the gravity-fed lands 
of Module I and some 35 percent of gravity-fed lands in Module V were used. 
 
 Table 6.15. Changes in Hectares Irrigated by Module, Lower Río Conchos 
Irrigation District, 2002-2005 
 Irrigable 
Lands 



































































10,834 2,706 2,640 2,855 2,610 
-3.55% 24.09% 
Note: Percentages calculated by author.  
Source: Rural Development District 009, Ojinaga, SAGARPA, 2005. 
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F.  Why the abandonment?  
 
Physical, managerial and economic factors caused the abandonment of 
agriculture in some areas of the district according to local farmers and officials.  
First of all, the cost of water increased in the Lower Río Conchos Water District 
since the district was turned over to its users, and in particular, the cost of 
pumped water has soared. Between 1984 and 1992, prior to the transfer of the 
district over to its users, CONAGUA charged water users based on the hectares 
irrigated and whether the crops being irrigated were high or low-water demand 
crops as well as other factors. In 1989, CONAGUA also began charging a 
separate price for irrigating lands using pumped water. Thus, by 1990, 
CONAGUA was charging those growing alfalfa – a high water demand crop -- in 
pumped canals 136,150 old Mexican pesos, about 10 times the cost they were 
charging for low-water demand crops in gravity-fed canals.  
 
When the district – or at least its infrastructure—was turned over to the Modules 
in the 1993-1994 period, the modules eliminated the tiered system of high, 
medium and low-water demand crops in favor of one price for gravity-fed lands 
and another price for those served by pumps. Expressed in U.S. dollars, adjusted 
for the exchange rate, the real price of gravity-fed water rose from a low of about 
$7.50 per hectare in the 1985-86 agricultural season to approximately $56.00 in 
the 2004-2005 season, while the price of pumped water rose from about $25.00 
in 1990 to over $100.00 in 1993-1994 – when the Modules suddenly realized the 
high cost of maintaining and operating the pumps. The  price has remained there 
since. Clearly, given a choice, few farmers were willing to spend an extra $40.00 
per hectare to irrigate their crops in 2005 with small cotton farmers – low water 




Figure 6.7. Average Cost in Mexican Nuevos Pesos Per-Hectare for Gravity-Fed 
Canal and Pumped-Fed Canal Irrigations, Lower Rio Conchos Water District, 1984-
2005 
Note: To convert to New Mexican Pesos, values before 1992-1993 were divided by 
1,000. 
Source: CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego 090, Cuotas Históricas de Agua, 2005.  
 
In fact, the real price of pumped water is not reflected in the figure. In recent 
years, as the number of hectares of land irrigated with pumped water has 
plummeted, the Modules have adopted a system where those users that actually 
make use of the pumped water pay the cost of electricity of the pumps. Thus, in 
2005, users paid $1,000 new pesos per hectare for the use of the water plus 
approximately $20 pesos for each hour of irrigation. It is thus not surprising that 
with the exception of cotton, few farmers used pumped water by 2005. The 
transfer of the district’s operation from CONAGUA to the Module system in 1992 
led to a wholesale increase in the cost of water overall, and particularly of 
pumped water as the Modules were placed in charge of paying for and operating 
the pumps and corresponding canals.  
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Beyond the rise in the actual cost to the farmer to irrigate his lands with pumped 
water, the pumps – which were constructed decades ago – have had a series of 
failures and problems which have been also been inherited by the Modules as 
CONAGUA turned them over to the user associations. The pumps continually fill 
up with muck, silt, sand, garbage and vegetation, particularly after heavy rains, 
and need continual maintenance and cleaning. In Module IV, for example, in 
2005, only one of its three pumps was working properly (see Photo 6.18).  
 
Then there is a simple reality: many of the lands relying on pumped waters have 
inferior soils, problems of saline soils and invasion of vegetation, decreasing their 
viability as agricultural lands. This reality was recognized by the hydrologists, soil 
scientists and agricultural officials who studied the Valley of Ojinaga in the mid-
1960s when Luis León Dam was being built.  
 
In describing the proposed district, these soil scientists contrasted the “Ojinaga” 
soils lining the river valleys with the “Mezquite” and “Divisadero” soils on the 
small hills and mesas above the river valleys. Thus, the report states: 
 
The highest quality soils belong to the Ojinaga Series, which is also 
the most extensive. The Soils with the highest internal drainage 
deficiency are those of the Esmeralda and Mezquite series, which 
are formed by very compact clays of a yellow color…. The only 
soils affected by soluble salts and sodium in high levels were the 
Esmeralda Series in all its horizons and the Mezquite soils in its 








Photo 6.18. Members of the Module IV Water User Association clean out Pump No. 
3, Santa Teresa Pump, Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District 
 
In fact, the report states, the approximately 3,500 hectares that could be farmed 
through pumping water up to canals located three or five meters above the 
regular gravity canals:   
 
belong to the Mezquite Series, and are poor in organic content and 
very compact in its horizons, making their internal drainage difficult. 
Currently, they are affected by salts and sodium in their lower 
horizons, so that when putting these lands under cultivation, it is 
vitally important to grant them artificial drainage and manage the 
irrigation carefully to prevent salinization. (Agrologia 1965: 2C). 
(author’s own translation).  
 
Thus, some of the physical issues faced by farmers in the lands served by 
pumps were recognized even before the district was formed.  
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Another “physical” problem faced by farmers – which in part explains the 
abandonment – is the sudden arrival of flood waters, which can cut through a 
planted field in minutes. You wouldn’t know it most days – with only about 25 
centimeters of rain per year – but the smallest downpour in the hills surrounding 
Ojinaga can cause a huge amount of water to flood fields – either on the banks of 
the Río Conchos itself – or even in desert lands above the river valley.  
 
In Modulo IV, on a bright sunny day,  one passes a creek bed to get to a farmer’s 
land planted with sorghum and alfalfa on the banks of the Río Conchos. There is 
a rumbling of sorts which breaks the sound of the occasional fly. Is it a truck 
coming down the creek bed, one might wonder? No, laughs the farmer, it is water 
– it rained that morning in the mountains to the west of the district and the water 
rushes by, changing a once dry bed into a ravaging river. We will need to wait 
about an hour until the muddy water goes by to be able to cross with my Honda 




Photo 6.19. Rumbling Tributary to the Río Conchos Fills Up Quickly Due to Local 
Rains, as farmer looks on. At times, local floods can move overbank and ruin 
agricultural fields. 
 
The water – and desert wind – create other problems – huge amounts of 
sediment and silt, carried both by the Río Conchos into the derivation dams as 
well as into the canals themselves if local observation is any indication. Go by 
any canal and unless one of the Water User Association back-hoe operators has 
just cleaned out the muck, there will be inches or even a foot of sand, silt, rocks, 
vegetation and garbage impeding the free flow of water. In those canals which 
have not been cleaned for a long time, there also will be “tule,” a kind of cattail 
which shoots up unexpectedly from the desert floor in a scene more reminiscent 






Photo 6.20. Muck and vegetation can take over canals (left) in a matter of weeks 
say local farmers. 
 
 
“It is a very particular problem here that affects efficient conduction of the water,” 
explained Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District manager Eliseo Calderón, an 
engineer who first came to run the district in 2002. “Enormous amounts – 
exaggerated amounts of sediment accumulate so that in just one year the 
distribution dams get silted up.”  (Elías Calderón, Irrigation District 090, personal 
communication with author,  2005). Module IV President Domingo Rey (2002-
2005) confirms this view, stating “the real problem is not water but the silt – it is 
what affects irrigation.” (Domingo Rey, Module IV, personal communication with 
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author, 2005). Rey said a significant amount of their outlays are merely cleaning 
out the canals so the water can run (see Photo 6.21). 
 
 
Photo 6.21. Back-hoe operator cleans out primary canal in Lower Río Conchos 
Irrigation District as silt, sands and vegetation fill canals up quickly, local officials 
say.  
 
G. Water Use, Conservation and Water Right Sales 
 
During the time period of the present study, two new unique programs 
spearheaded by CONAGUA were being implemented in the district. On the one 
hand, CONAGUA began to receive federal support for the district to implement 
water conservation projects intended to improve the conduction efficiency of the 
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canals, as well as for on-farm irrigation systems, either through leveling of land, 
relining or lining of distributive canals, as well as some more advanced irrigation 
systems for individual farmers. At the same time, in 2003, CONAGUA began 
exploring the resizing of the district through a program of the buy-back of water 
rights (Elías Calderón, Irrigation District 090, CONAGUA, personal 
communication with author, 2004). 
 
Known as the “Sustainable Water Use Program in the Río Conchos Watershed,” 
the efforts to conserve water – at least in a more coordinated sense – came out 
of, in part, the dispute between Mexico and the U.S. over the lack of flow from 
the Río Conchos (IBWC 2002; IBWC 2003, see Chapter Two). As part of these 
binational efforts, dozens of meeting occurred throughout 2002, as state, federal 
and CONAGUA officials – in coordination at times with the Border Environment 
Cooperation Commission – met with the farmers and their representatives in the 
Water User Associations, including in Ojinaga itself (Gonzalo Bravo, BECC, 
personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
In return for the promised investments of monies into the district to improve their 
efficiency and the productivity of the lands, each water user association was 
asked to sign a document, obligating them to give up part of their water rights 
after the water conservation projects were completed in 2007. In Ojinaga, despite 
some initial opposition, all of the association members approved the agreements 
and all of the local officials signed the document.   
 
Modulo V president Arnaldo Valenzuela (2002-2005) noted that “there were 
many opposed to signing the document, but we pointed out that the reduction in 
the water concession was only in return for the saved water, and we had the 
hope that they would also make the concession more favorable (Arnaldo 
Valenzuela, Module V, personal communication with author, 2005).  
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Whereas Delicias was given approximately 15 thousand cubic meters per 
hectare, the Ojinaga Water District’s water concession is only 7.8 thousand cubic 
meters per hectare, according to Valenzuela, a profound difference.  
 
Valenzuela said the benefits of the water conservation efforts have been notable, 
but have fallen well short of expectations. In Module V, the main benefit has been 
the relining of the main canal, as well as the laser-guided leveling of hundreds of 
hectares to be able to more efficiently irrigate. Nonetheless, he noted, the 
promised money has not covered the need, and many farmers, rather than wait 
for the promised leveling of their land to arrive, “became desperate and went 
ahead and planted before the leveling arrived.”   
 
The other major problem is that instead of the money being used in the irrigation 
district itself, much of it has flowed instead to the Irrigation Units above the 
district, spreading the wealth but decreasing the effectiveness of the program 
within the district itself.  
 
“They are still leveling lands in the irrigation units upstream, even though we 
have two years without leveling here,” he complained. 
 
The data confirms the story. The total planned investment for the area is $168.5 
million pesos over a four year period, but approximately 40 % is being invested in 
the irrigation units above the district itself (see Table 6.16). Through 2005, a total 
of $97 million pesos had or was being invested as part of the conservation 
efforts, with about $57 million going to the Irrigation District. Interestingly, in 
2005, only about $4.2 million out of $25.8 million being spent was flowing to the 
district itself, with the vast majority being used to reline main canals in the 
irrigation units in Aldama and Coyame.  
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Table 6.16. Amount of Monies Invested in Lower Río Conchos Watershed in 
Conservation Programs, 2002-2005 








and Gates to 
Derivation 
Dams 
10,268,164 17,443,615 27,311,844 
Relining of 
Other Canals 












9,103,069 0 9,013,069 
Leveling 7,157,458 0 7,157,458 
Executive 
Projects 
1,125,111 1,977,710 3,102,822 
Supervision 5,060,502 3,804,083 8,864,585 
Total 57,617,698 37,227,510 94,845,208 
Source: CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego No. 090, information provided to author, 2005.  
 
According to CONAGUA, part of the rationale for devoting so much of the water 
conservation budget to the irrigation units is that they have not been regulated by 
CONAGUA, and have therefore had significant water efficiency challenges. Thus, 
the single largest investment in the period was the rehabilitation and construction 
of a new, modern derivation structure to serve the communities of San Pedro and 
La Paz de Mexico, as well as the large pecan grove (El Consuelo) owned by one 
individual (Oscar López, Operations Manager, CONAGUA, Distrito de Riego 090, 
personal communication with author, 2005; See Photo 6.8).  
 
In the district itself, the largest project was the relining of the first 3.8 kilometers 
of the main canal from the Tarahumara Derivation Dam – located in Module I --  
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as well as significant investments in new structures, valves and the main gates 
from the two derivation dams (see Photo 6.22 and Photo 6.23). In terms of the 
leveling of land, the wealth has been spread around, with each Module – with the 
exception of Module II where only limited leveling was done – having between 
400 and 500 hectares of land leveled as well as distribution canals relined. 
 





Photo 6.23. New gates to guide the water from the Peguis Chico and Tarahumara 
diversion dams to the main canals were bought for the district in 2003 and 2004.  
 
While it is difficult to ascertain who particularly has benefited, the relining of the 
main canal from the Tarahumara Dam, and the replacements of its doors, seals, 
the higher rate of rehabilitation of other canals seem to suggest that there has 
been more work accomplished and more funding earmarked to Modules I and V 
– the lower portion of the district dominated by larger, private farmers.  
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For Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District manager Elías Calderón, the effort to 
conserve water did not arise out of the drought and failure to meet the terms of 
the treaty, but “the need to achieve a sustainable use of water.” CONAGUA 
initiated a policy change in 1993, he noted, as part of the National Water Law 
and began to look at the water needs on a watershed basis, including the 
increasing needs of the urban areas.  
 
“The new (water) Law of 1992 initiated the concession of water by use and by 
volume – instead of just the number of hectares – which forced us to recognize 
over time that our concessions were exceeding the availability of water – 
particularly in drought years – as well as other needs in the watersheds.”  (Elías 
Calderón, CONAGUA, Irrigation District 090, personal communication with 
author, 2004).  
 
Once, Calderón said, this “disequilibrium” was recognized, CONAGUA began to 
consider programs to reduce the use of water by the agricultural sector, in part by 
reducing concessions, and in part by conservation infrastructure. The way to do 
that he said was to buy back water rights from some unproductive farmers, while 
reducing water use by those who were still productive.  
 
According to Oscar López, CONAGUA’s operations manager for the district, the 
“Programa de Adquisicion de Derechos, Uso de Agua y Redimensionamiento de 
los Distritos de Riego (PADUA)” was a water right buy-back program that really 
began in Ojinaga. It was a test case – a pilot project -- for other larger districts. 
 
“We needed to reduce the pressure in the district and the Irrigation Units above,” 
explained López, who said the drought had contributed to but not caused the 
need to consider buying back water rights. “We had given concessions for 150 
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million cubic meters when only about 115 million cubic meters are sustainable.” 
(Oscar López, Operations Manager, personal communication with author, 2004).  
 
Therefore, both the buy back of water rights and the attempt to make water use 
more efficient are part of the same program – the sustainable use of water. As a 
first step, he said, they began identifying those areas that because of high costs 
to pump water, bad soils, or infrastructure problems would be subject to buy 
backs. At the same time, they began to discuss the program with the five 
modules. While they first proposed prices based on the suitability of the land for 
production, with more productive lands receiving higher payments, they later 
based the water rights price on the average use of water over a five-year period.  
 
While some Modules accepted an offer of $12,864 per hectares – based on the 
price of $1,643 pesos for a thousand cubic meters --  others – like Modulo IV –
declined. Eventually, however, all five Modules joined the program, and in its 
initial phase, over 2,500 hectares were eliminated from the district through the 
sale of water rights – including the total disappearance of Module II, which only 
the year before had grown more than 115 hectares of cotton. (Calderón 2005).  
 
The Module officials charged with negotiating the payments and determination of 
which lands would be eligible remember it differently. Thus, Domingo Rey, 
Module IV president (2002-2005), said the initial offers ranged from only $3,000 
to $8,000 Pesos per hectare, later raised to $8,000 to $12,000 depending again 
upon the terrain – how far it was from the main canals and whether the land was 
saline. It was the farmers, he explained, not CONAGUA, which insisted on a 
single price for the water rights, and while the farmers first held out for $16,000 
per hectare, they eventually agreed to the lower $12,864 per hectare price. 
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In Module II, Llano de Dolores, Module President Federico Garza (2002-2005) 
said the process was also conflictive, but that most farmers were happy to sell 
since many owned or rented lands in other modules and had not farmed the ejido 
lands for many years. Still, he said, there were a few who wanted to hold onto 
their lands, with the hope that CONAGUA would invest monies in the pumps and 
relining of the main canals and that the land would once again become 
productive. But, he said, the temptation to sell was simply too much for most 
ejido members. Once the majority signed on, the rest saw the possibility that 
CONAGUA would invest for just a few farmers as minimal (Federico Garza, 
Llano de Dolores, personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
For their part, CONAGUA officials say the emergence of PADUA forced them to 
change plans for the Water Conservation Program. They put off investments into 
the lands served by “pumped” water because they were still determining which 
lands and which farmers were selling off their water rights. It just didn’t make 
sense to fix up canals or reline them or level lands if the areas might never be 
farmed. For another, the shrinking of the district – and contraction of water rights 
– meant they had to reconsider where to invest the monies. Thus, in 2005, they 
decided to put much of their effort into the Irrigation Units south of the district and 
in essence stopped investing major funds into the district.  
 
In Module V, many farmers who relied on the pumps in Paradero and Cerro Alto 
had quit farming years before, many emigrating to the U.S., and most agreed to 
sell off their water rights. Nonetheless, several ejido and private farmers who rely 
on the pumps – including President Arnaldo Valenzuela (2002-2005) -- decided 
to hold onto their water rights, hoping that at some point, the federal government 
would invest in updating the pumps and infrastructure.  
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“I am a friend of Dr. Rendón from Mexico City from CONAGUA,” noted one 
elderly farmer – referring to a high-ranking CONAGUA official charged with 
overseeing the buy-back. “He told me that if enough of us held onto our land, 
they would invest money in the pumps to make it profitable to farm again.” 
 
Module V president  Valenzuela confirmed the statement, saying that based on 
the first round of the sale of water rights, there was approximately 50 hectares 
between Paradero and Cerro Alto that would be “modernized” and a single more 
modern pump would replace the existing dilapidated pumps. Valenzuela himself 
has significant hectares irrigated here, growing alfalfa, melons and watermelons. 
 
“Money ends, but land can sustain generations,” Valenzuela noted.  “After the 
drought we were doing badly and here comes a program that has easy money, 
but it hurts to see good lands sell off their water rights for a pittance.” 
 
Thus, in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District, the two main programs – 
PADUA and the Sustainable Use of Water – have served to reduce the amount 
of water used by farmers, and in fact, to reduce the actual amount of land that 
can even be considered for irrigation purposes. In addition, it appears that the 
programs have mainly benefited the private farmers of Modules I and V that have 
gravity-fed lands. This is again related to the fact that modules with large 
amounts of lands previously served by the pumps have not received significant 
investments from the Sustainable Use monies as CONAGUA made efforts to get 
those farmers to sell off their water rights. Thus, the programs have primarily 
benefited the larger, private farmers, a significant equity issue.  
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Created when the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District was turned over to the 
farmers in 1993,  Module IV is about  2,700 hectares of desert hills, mesas and 
river valleys. Known as “Santa Teresa – El Ancón A.C.” after the southern and 
northern-most communities within its area, Module IV is served both by the Santa 
Teresa pumps and gravity-fed canals which originate at the Peguis Chico 
Diversion Dam. About 290 farmers – equally split between ejido and private – are 
on the “rolls” of the users directory, although in reality, says President Domingo 
Rey, “much less than half are farming.” (see Table 6.17). Of some importance in 
the district are winter crops – wheat, oats and rye grass – as well as alfalfa, and 
especially cotton. Other summer crops – sorghum, chile, vegetables – are grown 
in only small quantities, and only two farmers began to grow pecan trees –one in 
2004 and one in 2005, hoping that in 8 or 10 years the trees will provide 
productive yields. The only crop that is grown in substantial amounts in the area 
served by pumps in 2005 was cotton, with 156 hectares (see Figure 6.8). 
 
Table 6.17. Basic Data on Module IV, 2005 













327 1,161 1,488 249 
Farmers 138 153 291  
Total 1,314 1,518 2,832 406 




Photo 6.24. These fields in Module IV were abandoned several years ago, due to 
the high cost of pumping water here and the nature of the soils, full of “pizarra,” 
literally slate.  
 
The Water User Association – now 12 years old – is run on a shoe-string budget. 
As the number of hectares of irrigated land has shrunk, the Water User 
Association has been forced to increase the cost per-hectare for providing water. 
In addition, because the cost of electricity has also increased, the amount they 
must collect from those farmers using the pumps has also increased. 
Interestingly, even though there were slightly more hectares irrigated in 2004 
than in 2003, increasing the income from sales of water, expenses went up even 
more, because of the price of gasoline, as well as the increased cost of electricity 
on a per-hour basis (see Table 6.18). Thus, says Domingo Rey, the association 
actually ran in the red in 2004, and as a result, in 2005, they let one of their two 
canal operators go, forcing Domingo’s cousin, Sarmiento, to be the water 
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distributor of both the gravity-fed and pumped area. In 2004, the Association also 
spent about $50,000 pesos – or $5,000 – performing routine maintenance of the 
pumps and cleaning out the canals that come from the pumps (Domingo Rey, 
Modulo IV, personal communication with author, July 2004).  
 
Figure 6.8. Hectares of Crops Irrigated in Module IV by Gravity-Fed and Pump-Fed 
Canals, 2005 
Source: SAGARPA, Ojinaga District, information provided to author, 2005.  
 
According to “El Canalero,” the spindly, fast-talking middle-aged Sarmiento, who 
hails from the dusty town of Valverde, his salary has stayed largely the same 
even as he travels from one end of the district to the other, listening to 
complaints, attempting to avoid conflicts, relieving flood waters that fill up the 
canals due to local flash floods, and generally trying to respond to the demands 




“They are always asking me for a little more water, and I just tell them the day 
they are allowed to get it,” Sarmiento says matter-a-factly. (Sarmiento Rey, 
personal communication with author,  2005) 
 
Table 6.18. Expenses and Income of Module IV, Lower Río Conchos Irrigation 
District, 2003-2004 in Nuevo Pesos 
 2003 2004 
Cost of Electricity (Pumps) 134,965 79,013 
Payments to CONAGUA for 
Water 69,500 92,000 
Salaries 109,900 127,895 
Fuels for Vehicles 113,482 138,777 
Conservation and 
Maintenance of Gravity 
Canals 58,371 17,983 
Conservation and 
Maintenance of Pumps and 
Canals 24,535 49,872 
Total Expenses 517,061 617,666 
Hours of Electricity Sold for 
Water Pumped 155,048 81,412 
Regular Water Sales 263,544 371,605 
Renting of Heavy 
Equipment 152,431 121,485 
Total Income 584,657 578,544 
Source: Modulo IV Santa Teresa El Ancon A.C., “Resumen de Ingresos y Egresos y 
Gastos de Conservación,” Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District, 2004.  
 
B. The Farmers 
 
In July and August of 2005, 31 farmers from Valverde, San Juan, Santa Teresa 
and El Ancón were surveyed as part of the present work. Approximately a third 
were from Santa Teresa and Valverde in the upper part of the Module, a third 
from San Juan in the middle section and a third from the “private” lands near El 
Ancón at the lower end of the Module. All farmers reported having been born in 
the Municipality of Ojinaga, including Valverde, San Juan, La Loma and Ojinaga 
itself. All 31 farmers were male. The average age of the respondents was 53, 
with a maximum age of 85 and a minimum of 31. The present chapter presents 
an overall summary, more detailed survey results are available upon request. 
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1. Land Ownership 
About 2/3rds of the surveyed farmers were ejido farmers, while 12 were private 
farmers. On average, the private farmers had larger lots than the ejido farmers. 
Thus, the average size of ejido farms were 10 hectares, while the average land 
owned by private farmers was 16 hectares. Finally, 13 out of the 31 farmers were 
also renting some land for irrigation purposes. When the amount of owned land 
and rented land that is irrigated is added together, overall the 31 farmers irrigated 
between 0 and 63 hectares in 2005, with an average of 14.20 hectares.  
 
Based upon this distribution of land, farmers were classified into three categories: 
small ejido farmers (16), small private farmers (7), and medium-sized farmers (8), 
which included five farmers with some ejido lands. The small private and ejido 
farmers all irrigated 20 hectares or less while the medium-sized farmers irrigated 
more than 20 hectares in 2005.  
 
The surveys supported the information collected by the agricultural authorities of 
Ojinaga: the only crops of consequence in Module IV in 2005 were cotton, alfalfa 
and rye grass. Connected to the growing of these crops was the raising of cattle, 
which in itself was an agricultural “crop” reported by 18 of the 31 farmers. All 
three groups of farmers grew these crops, regardless of the size of their plots. All 
those growing cotton were growing it for the domestic market, selling to the local 
cotton gyn. All of the farmers grew rye grass to feed to their own cattle 
exclusively, letting the cattle graze there at times, while alfalfa and sorghum were 
grown to partially feed their own cattle, and partially to sell to the domestic 
market, which itself is connected to the meat export market.  
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Figure 6.9. Distribution of Land Owned or Rented that Was Currently Planted, 
2005, among Surveyed Farmers (N=31) 
60.050.040.030.020.010.00.0

























2. Changes, changes 
 
The single biggest change mentioned by respondents was the reduction in the 
amount of hectares irrigated. Thus, 17 out of the 30 respondents mentioned it as 
a change, with nine of them saying it had been a change to a medium extent and 
six to a great change. Eight respondents also mentioned the abandonment of 
agricultural lands, seven mentioned the conversion of agricultural lands to 
livestock raising and four mentioned renting their land to others. In terms of crop 
choice, 14 respondents mentioned a switch to perennial crops, while 11 
mentioned the elimination of winter crops. While there did not seem to be a real 
pattern in terms of changes in inputs to the land – with nearly an equal number 
saying they either increased or decreased pesticide and fertilizer use – 11 
respondents specifically mentioned the increased use of technology and 
machinery, and nine cited the decreased use of labor.  Many of these comments 
were related to cotton and the change in cotton from a hand-picked product to 
one relying nearly exclusively on machinery over the last ten years, a 
transformation also mentioned in interviews with the manager of Fibras del Norte 
and local agricultural officials (Alonso Valenzuela, Fibras del Norte, 2005).  
 
Based on cross-tab analysis by category, smaller farmers were more likely to 
state that there had  been a decrease in the number of hectares irrigated, as well 
as related changes, such as  the conversion of some of  their land to livestock 
production, or the renting or partial abandonment of their agricultural land. 
Increases in the number of hectares irrigated, on the other hand, showed the 
opposite tendency, with a greater number of large farmers responding positively 
than would be “expected.” It is somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophesy since small 
farmers were precisely those that may have abandoned or rented their own land.  
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When asked why these changes had occurred, the focus was on rain that had 
not fallen, a market which had abandoned them, banks that no longer lent them 
money, and the high costs of inputs (See Figure 6.11). Topping the list of factors 
responsible for changes on their land with the highest number of responses was 
the “presence of drought,” with 23 out of the 27 farmers responding that drought 
had been a contributing factor in changes on their land, although most farmers 
said it was a medium or small factor and not a major one. When adjusted by 
scale – with “major” factors weighted more than “small” factors  -- the single most 
important factor mentioned by farmers was the change in the costs of inputs to 
agriculture. Thus, 22 out of the 27 listed it as a factor, with 12 saying it had been 
a major factor. Also receiving 22 responses were changes in prices for 
agricultural goods, with twenty out of 22 calling it a major or medium factor.  In 
essence, many of the crops that farmers in the region once grew no longer 
offered them favorable prices compared to the costs of inputs – the fertilizers, 
pesticides and the water that now cost more. Thus, both the presence of the 
drought, and the related access or availability of water – which received 17 
positive responses – were for the most part seen as secondary factors compared 
to changes in the cost of inputs and the prices of agricultural goods.  
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Figure 6.10. Changes cited by farmers in Modulo IV (Valverde-El Ancón) by 
Number of Responses (N=31) and Number of Points (Maximum =93) 
Note: Changes were assigned one point for a “small” change, two points for a “medium” 
change and three points for a “major” change.  
Source: Reed 2005, Ojinaga Survey, Surveys 1-31. 
 
The other factor mentioned by a majority of farmers had to do with access to 
credit and funds for the purchase of inputs. Thus, 17 of the 27 farmers who 
responded cited access to credit as a major change over the previous 10 years, 
with 14 of them saying it had been a major or medium factor. Ejido and small 
private farmers were more likely to cite the cost of inputs as a greater factor than 
larger farmers, as well as the lack of government support and access to credit. 
Moreover, five of the six respondents who said that an increase in government 
support had been a factor were larger farmers. The responses suggest that 
smaller farmers had been impacted more negatively by the changes than larger 
farmers, or put another way, some farmers were able to adapt through access to 
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credit and land and transition to new crops, while smaller farmers were less 
successful.  
 
Figure 6.11. Factors cited by Module IV farmers in agricultural change in 
responses (N=27) and responses (N=81) 
 
Note: Factors were assigned one point for a “small”, two points for a “medium” and three points 
for a “major” factor.  
 
Source: Reed 2005, Ojinaga Survey, Surveys 1-31. 
 
In addition to these standardized responses, a total of 25 of the 31 farmers listed 
additional factors. Thus, the disappearance of the cotton gyns in the late 1990s 
not only wiped out – or severely reduced --  a market for their product, but also 
wiped out access to credit and several farmers expounded on this factor.  
 
Similarly, several mentioned the closing of the wheat mills and cotton gyns, and 
the organizational problems inherent in these ventures. Two different 
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respondents put the problems and changes in agriculture in the region as due to 
the lack of markets. There simply was no where to sell many kinds of crops. No 
one to take the place of the gyns and mills that had closed. Several specifically 
mentioned the North American Free Trade Agreement and the competition in 
wheat, corn and beans as a negative factor in the changes that had occurred. On 
a positive note, many farmers mentioned the continued healthy price of alfalfa in 
the market, which even though a large water user, continued to provide income 
to farmers in the area, as did meat from cattle raised on the alfalfa, sorghum and 
rye grass in the area. Thus, it was not all bad news for Ojinaga farmers. In terms 
of cotton, several farmers mentioned the existence of the government price-
support program as a key factor in its continued presence in the area.  
 
Several farmers also mentioned physical challenges, including land which was so 
distant that it was hard to irrigate properly, as well as lands that were highly 
salinized or contained “pizarra” and were no longer productive. An additional 
factor was the high rains and flooding between 1991 and 1992, which destroyed 
many of the irrigable lands near San Juan, Valverde and El Ancon. After some 
years of neglect, these lands were invaded by woods of tamarisk, mesquite and 
other shrubs, changing the terrain and characteristics of the soils. Farmers chose 
to leave them alone, and with help from the irrigation district and Module, built a 
perimeter of raised land around them to prevent further incursions from new 
floods. The woods now serve as a barrier between their irrigable lands and the 




Photo 6.25. These “woods” arose after the 1991 and 1992 floods, and since are 
used only to provide shade and space for livestock, the area long abandoned for 
farming.  
 
In a recent work, local science teacher Humberto Lujan contracted with U.S. 
environmental organization Environmental Defense to survey the vegetation and 
study landsat maps for the presence of tamarisk along the Río Conchos, 
particularly upstream of the Tarahumara Diversion Dam. His conclusion? 
Tamarisk did not really exist in the area until after releases from Luis León dam 
were severely curtailed after 1992 (Lujan 2005: 16-17). Based on sampling sites, 
Lujan found 62 fields affected by tamarisk invasion within the district, most of it 
just upstream of the Tarahumara dam near El Ancón along the banks of the Río 
Conchos (Table 6.19).  
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Table 6.19. Surface area affected by Tamarisk invasion, Lower Río Conchos 
Irrigation District 
MODULO No. of Fields 
Affected 
Total Surface 





I – Labor de 
Ojinaga 
4 83.92 21.55 25.69% 




42 347.34 101.69 29.27% 
V-Paso del 
Norte 
6 57.30 20.06 35.01% 
Total 62 642.56 211.46 32.9% 
Source: Humberto Lujan, “La Invasion de Tamarisk (Cedro Salado) en el Bajo Río 
Conchos, Aguas Arriba de la Presa Derivadora “Tarahumara,” (Austin, Texas: 
Environmental Defense, March 2004).  
 
3. Water, drought and conservation 
 
There were two major sources of water for Module IV farmers. Some 25 of the 29 
farmers who responded said their major source of water was the irrigation 
canals, with four reporting water from the canals served by the pumps as being 
their major source of water. One respondent said they had dug a “noria” – a 
shallow well near the Río Conchos to augment their supply. This respondent was 
the only farmer who said they had “changed” their source of irrigation water, a 
significant difference with the farmers surveyed in Delicias (see Chapter Five), 
where surveys showed that the majority of farmers switched water sources. 
 
All those who provided detailed information relied on a main canal, connected to 
a secondary canal, connected to individual canals on their land, whether or not 
the water was pumped. What differed to some degrees is whether these 
secondary and individual canals, known as “acequias” were earthen or cement. 
In addition, while many farmers reported using “mangueras” – small plastic hoses 
– to carry the water onto their rows of crops, others used “presillas” – small 
earthen dams to irrigate one section – or one row of crops -- of the land at a time. 
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In general, those growing cotton used the more precise “mangueras” while those 
growing alfalfa, rye grass or sorghum – which are not planted in precise rows -- 
used “presillas.” Four different cotton farmers also said in recent years they had 
changed to planting the rows of cotton to 30 or 32 inches apart, rather than 38 or 
40 inches as part of an effort to make better use of water and increase 
production, a change that has been promoted by the local agricultural extension 
office (see Photo 6.26). 
 
 
Photo 6.26. Typical Cotton Field near San Juan in Modulo IV. Note Plastic 
“Mangueras” coming From Acequías and foraging cow.  
 
While the survey size is probably too small to make any definitive conclusions, it 
appears that the number of irrigations has gone down compared to years when 
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water was more easily accessible, but the number of hours has remained about 
the same.  
 
Some of the changes in water use per hectare are related to participation in the 
water conservation projects recently enacted in Module IV, including both the 
lining of secondary canals and the leveling of some lands for more efficient 
irrigation. A full 20 out of the 31 surveyed farmers said they had participated in a 
water conservation project either at the communal or individual level. 
 
Farmers were supportive of the water conservation projects, though disappointed 
with some of the results to date. While most recognized that part of the reasons 
for the programs was precisely to assure more water to the U.S., few felt it had 
been imposed, although more – particularly small farmers -- felt it was benefiting 
some more than others. Thus, the disagreements with the programs were not 
related to the need for water conservation and water efficiency, but to how it was 
being implemented, and who it had benefited.  
 
All the farmers surveyed believed there had been a drought that had affected the 
District, and 24 of the 31 saying it had been the worst drought they had 
experienced. There was little doubt among farmers that the principle factor in 
less water being available was the drought itself, although other factors were also 
cited (see Figure 6.12).  
 
Thus, 21 out of the 31 respondents felt that the U.S. demand for water from the 
Río Conchos was a factor in the lack of access to water for irrigation over the last 
10 years. A common feeling among respondents was, in fact, the sense that their 
share of water from Luis León had been directly limited by the need to release 
water to the U.S. Not only did they know it to be true from reports, but they had 
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actually seen releases during dry spells go down the Río Conchos past their dry 
and thirsty fields.  
 
Figure 6.12. Factors in the lack of water cited by Module IV farmers by affirmative  
responses (N=31) and points (Maximum=93) 
 
Note: Factors were assigned one point for a “small”, two points for a “medium” and three 
points for a “major” factor.  
 
Source: Reed 2005, Ojinaga Survey, Surveys 1-31. 
 
Similar to this belief, was the idea expressed by several farmers that water that 
fell locally and fed the river “did not count” toward meeting Mexico’s water treaty 
obligations. While untrue, this common myth among the farmers led to the belief 
that only water specifically released from Luis León that bypassed their own 
irrigation system counted, and led in part to the widespread belief that the lack of 
water was in part due to water demands by the U.S.  
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Most – 25 of the 31 farmers surveyed in Modulo IV – also felt that their access to 
water had been severely curtailed by the lack of investment in basic water 
delivery infrastructure. There was too much sediment in canals and too little effort 
to clean it, and the pumps intended to irrigate the lands above the river valleys 
were old, ill-equipped and had frequent problems. Young, old, rich and poor 
farmers all felt that rather than small distribution dams and a major reservoir – El 
Granero – located 140 kilometers upstream, the Mexican government should 
build a storage and distribution reservoir somewhere near El Peguis – the 
stunning canyon about 20 kilometers south of the district – or increase the size of 
the existing diversion dams.  
 
“It doesn’t make any sense to lose all the local rains because our diversion dam 
is too small,” noted Modulo IV president Domingo Rey. “We could store more and 
give more water to the U.S. and our farmers.” (Rey 2005).  
 
A similar factor is the large amount of silt, sand and sediments that washes 
through the riverbed, diversion dams and irrigation distribution system, which 22 
of the 31 farmers cited. Some of the comments related to the lack of investment 
were directly related to the high amount of silt and sand common in the district.  
 
In addition, 20 out of the 31 farmers said that invasion of vegetative species – 
primarily salt cedar – had been at least a minor factor in the loss of water – or 
really the reduction in irrigable land – while the same number said highly 
salinized soils – literally salt accumulating into the soils -- had been a factor. 
Often of course the two factors appeared to be related with invasive species 
increasing the saline content of their lands.  
 
Other factors receiving comments included inefficient use of water by farmers, as 
well as the use of high-demand crops. Other factors – such as water pollution 
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and the high cost of water itself – also received multiple positive responses, while 
“competition with others” – notably competition with the upstream irrigation units 
received much more limited replies.  
 
4. Organizational help 
 
Farmers were asked about the organizations that assisted them (see Figure 
6.13). Topping the list was the agricultural ministry – SAGARPA. Interestingly, 
eight of the nine larger farmers who said the ministry had supported them said 
they had done so at a medium or high level, and a cross-tabs analysis indicates 
larger farmers said they received more help than smaller farmers from the federal 
agricultural commission.  
 
CONAGUA also received multiple positive responses, mainly related to the water 
conservation projects, with most citing the land leveling projects as the major 
help. Sanidad Vegetal – the local agricultural extension agency – received 
significant positive response, related to the Boll Weevil and Pink Bollworm 
Eradication Program.  
 
Farmers were decidedly mixed in their opinion of the water user association, 
which runs Modulo IV, including the distribution of water. While 15 users did say 
it provided a small amount of help, and five respondents said they received even 
greater levels, four said the water user association had been no help at all, and 
one respondent claimed he had been hurt by the association – due to high water 




Figure 6.13. Organizations cited by Module IV farmers as helping or hurting them 
in number of responses (N=31) and points (Maximum =93) 
 
Note: Organizations were assigned one point for “small” help, two points for “medium” and three 
points for “major” help. Negative points were assigned if an organization “hurt” the farmer.  




Farmers were asked whether the major policy change that occurred with the 
1992 National Water Law – the transfer of the irrigation districts from CONAGUA 
to individual water user associations – had been of benefit. Farmers have a 
mixed feeling about taking over the district for themselves. Of the 23 farmers who 
answered the question, 11 considered it a disadvantage, eight an advantage and 
four were neutral.  
 
On one side, many felt that because the management of the district was now 
their affair, they had a better sense of how to manage it. On the other was the 
opposite view, that while in theory it might be a good thing to administer your own 
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resources, it had been poorly managed. In general, farmers had the view that 
CONAGUA had turned over the district, but without the oversight – or the funding 
– needed for the farmers themselves to improve service. Thus, farmers waited 
around depending on the local water user association to clean canals or respond 
to problems, but these water user association had neither the training or the 
funds to properly respond. As one farmer noted, “the price has gone up, but not 
the service.”  
 
Less than half of those surveyed mentioned private companies. Most of these 
either mentioned the only cotton gyn operating in 2005 – Fibras del Norte – or 
mills or cotton gyns no longer operating. Most were referring to help in previous 
years, when mills and cotton gyns gave farmers an outlet for their products. 
There was a dearth of private companies in 2005, a stark contrast to Delicias. 
 
The 16 respondents who were members of ejidos gave some credit to the ejido 
structure itself for providing help. However, all of the comments were not so 
much related to the organization of the ejido, but to the fact that several 
government programs are geared toward helping communities at the ejido level. 
Others mentioned the credit they had received in the 1980s and early 1990s from 
Banco Rural, again credit provided through the ejido structure. Thus, there was 
not overwhelming support for the ejido as an organizational entity.  
 
Similarly, out of 31 respondents, only 10 said they had received credit or help 
from banks, one saying it had actually hurt due to high interest rates. Nine out of 
the 10 respondents were in fact referring to credit provided in the past by Banco 
Rural, most of which ended in the late 1990s.  
 
Only six farmers reported having been involved in some kind of producer 
association. Of these six, one reported having been actually harmed by his 
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membership and two said the association had provided no benefit whatsoever. 
Two of those responses were related to the previous cooperative efforts to run 
and finance cotton gyns, knows as Sociedad Ultimo Esfuerzo and Sociedad 
Perla del Desierto, both of which ultimately failed.  
 
The final organization that provided some assistance was the Rural Development 
division of the local Ojinaga Municipality. Here, most farmers credited the division 
with providing needed assistance, particularly during drought years when access 
to cattle feed was difficult. Still, several respondents faulted the agency saying 
that they had applied for benefits they never received, such as one heard there 
were goats available but never received a response.  
 
The answers to this part of the survey reveals a farming population which 
depends heavily on support from government programs such as PROCAMPO, 
and to a lesser extent from Desarrollo Rural, which previously had support from 
banks and private companies – most of which has dried up -- and which does not 
have significant organizational support through either its ejido structure or 
producer associations. Thus, the credit, private company contracts, producer 
associations bank loans and cooperatives which pepper the Delicias Irrigation 
District are in short supply in Ojinaga, leaving farmers to depend on the 
government for help.   
 




Modulo V – officially known as “Paso del Norte, Asociacion Civil” (North Pass 
Civil Association) – is the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District’s largest in terms 
of land area of the five water user associations. Officially created in January of 
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1994, Modulo V expands over 4,200 hectares and includes kilometers of alluvial 
fields along the banks of the Río Grande, stretching from just below Cerro Alto – 
the highest peak in the area – to the banks of the Río Conchos itself, just above 
its meeting with the Río Grande. Further south, the Module also includes some 
desert hills in small communities like La Esmeralda, San Francisco de la Junta 
de los Ríos, Tierras Nuevas and Tocolote. It is a big and expansive area, with 
hills, mountains, alluvial fields and small towns lying just south and west of the 
City of Ojinaga itself. Some 430 farmers in the Module own 501 water rights to 
farm the area – at least on paper --  but many of the towns and fields have been 
partially abandoned, say local officials (Arnaldo Valenzuela, Modulo V, personal 
communication with author, 2005 -- see Table). 
 
Ejidos with lands in Modulo V include La Esmeralda, San Francisco, El Paradero 
and Tierras Nuevas. Farmers living in San Francisco – largely blood relations to 
the farmers from Esmeralda -- wanted their own lands separate from Esmeralda, 
and a new ejido was also born in the early 1980s once the river changes course 
(Guadalupe Torres, San Francisco de la Junta de los Ríos, personal 
communication with author,  2005).  According to one ejido official, however, the 
unity farmers displayed in the early 1980s to win the land has largely dissipated 
and “only about 12 of us are still active.” He said that some 15 ejidatarios had 
sold off their lands, and many had migrated to the U.S. (“Jose,” Ejido Official, 
San Francisco,  personal communication with author, 2005).  
 
According to local Esmeralda resident “the Widow Niño“, her family founded the 
town of Esmeralda in the 1920s, coming from San Luis Potosí “in search of land 
in a cart with mules.” Using little ditches from both the Río Grande and Río 
Conchos, they began to grow corn, and increasingly, cotton. Others also arrived, 
and by the late 1920s, the town was already part of an ejido structure.  
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“There were trucks loaded with cotton and bushels and bushels of corn,” she 
remembered, and said the residents of the ejido would often irrigate light at night 
using kerosene lamps to save water. “God didn’t charge us for water, but now 
they sell it and then resell it.”  
 
If you travel northwest parallel to the Río Grande past San Francisco and 
Esmeralda, and past the private lands known as the “Pequeñas Propiedades,” 
you come to the Paraderos – Paradero de Abajo and Paradero de Arriba, twin 
dusty towns which have for the most part been abandoned (see Photo 6.27). 
With water scarce and incomes from farming reduced, most here have let their 
feet to the walking, emigrating either to Ojinaga itself or crossing the border to 
the U.S.  
 
One elderly couple who have stayed live in a dilapidated house at the end of a 
street full of abandoned homes. They grow a tiny amount of vegetables around 
their home, irrigating a few dirt canals from the main canal about a hundred yards 
away. They have long ago abandoned the agricultural fields. They say the ejido 
no longer meets, and many members took advantage of the recent government 




Photo 6.27. Homes, church and streets in Paradero de Abajo, largely 
abandoned.  
 
The land in Module V is divided between those served by the main irrigation 
canal and its secondary distribution canals which provides access to water to 
about 60 percent of the Module, and three pumps in Paradero de Arriba, which 
pumps the canal water to the lands between Paradero de Arriba and Cerro Alto 
(Photo 6.28). Here they also take advantage of supplementing the pumped water 
with local “wild” waters from the Río Grande when it rains. A diversion device 
was built in 1957 and some farmers have rights to half of the flow. While suffering 
from years of neglect, the diversion device still “works” and serves as an 
important resource to local farmers whose cost of water has risen along with the 
cost of electricity from the pump.  
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According to statistics from the local rural development district of SAGARPA, the 
federal agricultural ministry, as of July, 2005, only about 950 hectares had been 
irrigated that agricultural year, with only slightly more than 100 hectares being in 
the area served by the “pumps.” In fact, since 2002, very little has changed in the 
number of hectares irrigated in the district as only a handful of farmers – 
approximately 100 of the 430 – are still making a living off the land. Overall, the 
farmers of Modulo V were only farming about 25 percent of the irrigable area, 
including about of a third of the lands served by “gravity” and only some seven 
percent of the land served by pumps (see Figure 6.14).  
 
 
Photo 6.28. The Pumps of Paradero de Arriba 
 
In 2005, the leading crops were alfalfa (380 hectares), cotton (211 hectares), rye 
grass (106 hectares), oats (84 hectares), sorghum for feed (51 hectares) and 
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winter wheat (53 hectares). Only two farmers were growing pecans in the Module 
(see Figure 6.14).  
 
Figure 6.14. Hectares of Crops Irrigated in Module V by Gravity-Fed and Pump-Fed 




Source: SAGARPA, Ojinaga District, information provided to author, 2005.  
 
Modulo V had hired a single canal operator to serve the 4,200 hectares. The 
canal operator received about $3,000 U.S. per year plus gas money as he 
traversed the district in a beat-up sedan. As the number of hectares of irrigated 
land has shrunk, both CONAGUA and by extension the Water User Association 
has been forced to increase the cost per-hectare for providing water. In fact, in 
2004, the Module actually spent more money than it took in, due in part to 
failures in some of the machinery and the need to invest more money in the 
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pumps. Thus, the “taking over” of the district’s infrastructure has been a difficult 
prospect for the water user association, due to decreasing water sales.  
 
 
Photo 6.29. Alfalfa field in La Esmeralda. Alfalfa has become by far the dominant 
crop in Module V in recent years; Note the Secondary Canal has been Relined with 
Cement making Irrigation more Efficient 
 
 
Adrian, the 30-something canal operator of Module V – “El Canalero” – said it is 
difficult work. “There is always canals that need cleaning so that the farmers can 
irrigate,” he said on a hot afternoon in 2004, indicating Lateral No. 10, which at 
that moment was being cleaned out. He said there are problems with the users, 
who sometimes break the locks on the little valves so they can sneak in a nightly 
irrigation. “They sometimes take water without asking.”  (Adrian, Canal Operator, 
Module V, personal communication with author, 2004).  
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The farmers are supposed to ask him for water for the upcoming week by 
Tuesday, and he then is supposed to report it to his bosses, who in turn report it 
to CONAGUA every Wednesday. Sometimes, however, the farmers ask for the 
water “out of turn,” forcing the Module and canal operator to juggle around 
scheduled deliveries to meet farmers’ demands.  
 
“When there is water no one wants it and we sometimes just let it flow. When 
there isn’t any water is when suddenly the people ask for it,” he noted (Adrian, 
Canal Operator, Module V, 2004). 
 
At a local meeting of the Modulo V on July 20th, 2005, Adrian, Modulo V 
president Valenzuela, members of the local “Comité de Vigilancia “ (Watch 
Committee) and members of the Esmeralda Ejido gathered at the local primary 
school to discuss issues. These types of meeting – where a “section” of the 
Module reviews progress and registers complaints – is common in the Module 
during the irrigation season.  
 
The meeting – with approximately 30 farmers crammed comically into children’s 
desks – is part information session and partly the vetting of complaints. 
Valenzuela notes that they have cleaned most of the laterals and the main canal, 
but “while we are full of eagerness, we lack money.” He lays out the schedule for 
cleaning canals for the rest of the year as well as emphasizing the need to get 
their irrigations schedule in order “so that we can make sure there will be enough 
water from CONAGUA for the rest of the summer.”  
 
Part of the discussion revolves around how to actually keep the module running 
properly since, as Valenzuela states, “it would take 600,000 pesos to clean all 
the secondary canals for the 1,000 hectares that are being irrigated,” money the 
Module clearly doesn’t possess (see Table 6.20). Problems discussed include 
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the sedimentation of the canals, the frequent problems with the dirt roads, which 
can become impassable during intense rains, the garbage which flows into the 
canals, and poorly installed or  broken canals and valves. He also says that while 
they have sufficient monies to clean out the main secondary canals before the 
end of the year, there is no money from CONAGUA for more land-leveling as 
part of the water conservation efforts “until 2006.”  
 
There is then a frank and open discussion about the robberies, violence and 
distrust that exists among some farmers in the Module. Apparently, fights 
between farmers over water have occurred, and the canal operator has been 
threatened several times over misunderstandings about the water schedule. Of 
particular concern are the scattered incidents of robbery – where locks have 
been cuts or valves opened illicitly without the knowledge of the canal operator or 
the module. The question to the farmers is what should they do?  
 
The farmers agree that after a first offense, the farmer committing the violation 
and the other farmers downstream impacted should sit down with the leadership 
and remedy the situation, but that future problems should lead to actual 
sanctions against the farmer. As one farmer puts it, using a soccer analogy,  a 
“yellow card” for a first offense – a warning – and a “red card” – expulsion -- for a 
second.  
 
Finally, looking to the future, Valenzuela discusses the need to take water 
conservation and the orderly delivery of water more seriously. “The entrance of 
water from the Conchos is charged to us by CONAGUA in millares (thousand 
cubic meters), not hectares and we have paid over 100,000 pesos through June,” 
he said. “But here in the Module we pay the same amount – whether for oats, or 
pecans – by hectare.”  
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Adrian, the “Canalero” also reminds the farmers to cut off the flow when they 
finish irrigating so that water is not wasted. The solution, say both Valenzuela 
and other farmers, is to charge by the “volume utilized” and “not by hectare,” 
although Valenzuela says it will be up to future administrations. Such a change 
would represent a major change in the local culture but one that Delicias 
undertook ten years earlier. 
 
Table 6.20. Income and expenses for Modulo V, Lower Río Conchos Irrigation 
District, 2002-2004 in Nuevos Pesos 
 2002 2004 
Cost of Electricity (Pumps) NR 59,395 
Payments to CONAGUA for 
Water Delivered 153,706 135,273 
Salaries (Canal Operator, 
Manager, Administrators) 101,527 84,841 
Fuels for Vehicles 55,487 75,270 
Loan Payments for “Back 
Hoe” heavy machinery 49,035 54,168 
Maintenance and Repair  of 
Vehicles 40,393 98,576 
Conservation and 
Maintenance of Gravity 
Canals 18,180 16,870 
Conservation and 
Maintenance of Pumps  6,264 39,462 
Total Expenses 471,105 649,386 
Hours of Electricity Sold for 
Water Pumped NR 50,221 
Regular Water Sales 421,384 547,677 
Renting of Heavy 
Equipment 60,963 12,650 
Total Income 493,588 629,827 
Source: Modulo V Paso del Norte A.C., “Resumen de Ingresos y Egresos 
Correspondientes Al Ciclo de Octubre de 2003 a Septiembre de 2004,” Lower Río 
Conchos Irrigation District, 2004.  
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B. Survey: The Farmers of Modulo V 
 
1. The Farmers 
 
In July and August of 2005, 34 farmers from Modulo V were surveyed in 
Esmeralda, San Francisco de la Juntas, “Las Pequeñas Propiedades”, Paradero 
de Arriba and Paradero de Abajo, Cerro Alto, Tierras Nuevas and El Tocolote. 
Approximately a third were from San Francisco and Esmeralda near the meeting 
of the Río Grande and Río Conchos, a third from lands in “Los Pequeños” and El 
Paradero – in the bluff above the Río Grande -- and a third from the southern 
part of the Module in Tierras Nuevas and El Tocolote.  
 
Not surprisingly, all 34 were male, since the owners and workers of land were 
sought.  Land distribution of those surveyed clearly shows most farmers are 
small farmers, with 15 out of the 34 farmers surveyed irrigating 10 hectares or 
less of owned or rented land in 2005. Most of the  farmers – 12 of the 16 -- who 
were renting additional lands were private farmers. Based upon this distribution 
of land irrigated, farmers were classified into three categories: small ejido farmers 
(15), small private farmers (13), and medium-sized farmers (6). All the “small” 
private and ejido farmers were irrigating less than 20 hectares in 2005.  
 
While ejido lands were found near the communities of San Francisco and 
Esmeralda, private lands were contained in the Pequeñas Propiedades and El 
Tocolote (see Photo 6.29). While the majority of private farmers had relatively 
smaller tracts of 10 or 20 hectares, a number of individuals and families did buy 
up properties during the 1990s and early 2000s (Arnaldo Valenzuela, President, 
Modulo V, personal communication with author, August 2005). Thus, there was a 
concentration of land ownership, particularly in Pequeñas Propiedades, a series 
of long rectangle strips of land  which extend from the main canal to the banks of 




Photo 6.30. The lands of the Pequeñas Propiedades have been bought and 
sold with frequency.  
 
With the exception of some cotton – most of it grown by one large grower -- most 
farmers surveyed were growing crops for cattle feed, including sorghum, oats, 
rye grass and especially alfalfa. Alfalfa was grown by large and small farmers 
nearly equally. In addition to these crops, farmers were also growing “cows,” 
either for meat or more often for dairy intended for local, home cheese 
production. Thus, one ejido respondent said they made homemade cheese, one 
said he raised goats for meat, and two others reported selling off calves, while 
three private small farmers also reported making “asaderro” cheese (Photo 6.31). 
Another respondents said he had begun raising sheep for meat. Finally, among 
larger farmers, two reported raising dairy cows and one was raising and 
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exporting calves (Photo 6.32). There was a smattering of cotton grown by some 
farmers surveyed, one farmer reported growing melons of various types, and 






















Photo 6.31. Farmer and sons make asaderro cheese in their home in Tierras 
Nuevas. 
 
Production thus was either for use primarily as an input to cows for cheese 
making, or to sell to the domestic market for calves being exported to the U.S. 
With the local one-stop cattle export shop some four kilometers west of Ojinaga 
 541 
in El Mulato, it is a short trip for most local farmers, and provides some needed 
profit to their farming operations for those selling to the buyers and sellers of 
cattle awaiting export to the U.S. 
 
 
Photo 6.32. Cattle await export to the U.S. from La Estación, which serves as a 
destination for locally grown alfalfa, oats, corn and rye grass.  
 
Other than cattle and in one case pecans, the only exports across the river were 
local cheese makers which sold small quantities to shops and individuals across 




Nearly all – 32 out of 34 -- of the farmers reported that their had been changes to 
the way in which they used their land over the last 10 years (Figure 6.15). The 
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single biggest factor mentioned by respondents was the switch to perennial 
crops. In terms of total hectares irrigated, 13 respondents said there had been a 
reduction in the total number of hectares they were irrigating – mainly a “medium-
level” change – and seven said there had been an increase. Some 10 
respondents mentioned the elimination of a winter crop as a change over the last 
10 years, referring to winter wheat. Seemingly related to the increase in the 
irrigation of cattle feeds like sorghum, rye grass and alfalfa, more respondents 
said they had decreased pesticide and fertilizer use than increased it, as well as 
increasing imported seeds. Because only a few respondents were growing cotton 
– where the use of machinery has increased – there were few responses related 
to the use of technology.  Only six respondents mentioned the complete 
abandonment of agriculture – still a high number considering the small sample -- 
only two said they had switched their land to livestock production while three said 
they had been renting more of their land to others. These tended to be smaller 
farmers.  
 
Smaller farmers were more likely to answer positively to the statement that there 
had been a decrease in the number of hectares irrigated, while larger farmers 
were more likely to say there had been an increase in the number of hectares 
irrigated. Similarly, all three who responded that they had been renting their land 
to others were ejido farmers. There did not appear to be other major differences 
between the categories of farmers in terms of crop choice or input use. 
 
Just why did theses changes occur? Farmers were asked to “rate” a series of 
factors which might have influenced the changes that had occurred on their land, 
including both physical, economic and climactic changes. Not surprisingly, for 
most farmers, it appeared that a combination of new market realities and to a 
smaller extent drought conditions had influenced changes in the volume of land 
and crop choice. As in Module IV, topping the list of factors responsible for 
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changes on their land with the highest number of responses was “changes in 
market prices” and “costs of inputs.”. Thus, while drought and access to water 
might have been a factor – particularly in the amount of land irrigated – the major 
changes were related to the cost and prices of good. 
 
Figure 6.15. Changes cited by farmers in Module V by Number of Responses 
(N=32) and Total Points (Maximum=96) 
 
Note: Factors were assigned one point for a “small”, two points for a “medium” and three points 
for a “major” change.  
 
Source: Reed 2005, Ojinaga Survey, Surveys 32-66. 
 
When asked about additional factors not listed on the survey, nearly all of the 
responses were related to market conditions and organizational issues. Thus, 
several mentioned the closing of the wheat mill and the difficulty and near 
impossibility to grow wheat again given the high transport costs to send the 
product all the way to Chihuahua City. Similarly, others mentioned the lack of 
credit for farmers in the area, while several others put the problem as 
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organizational – there was no good mechanism or association to market their 
products. Finally, one respondent mentioned a very important market force in the 
area – emigration to the U.S. as an option for Ojinaga farmers. As one farmer 
remarked, “we don’t export crops, we export labor.”  
 
Figure 6.16. Factors related to agricultural change cited by farmers in Module V, 
by number of responses (N=32) and Points (Maximum=96) 
 
Note: Factors were assigned one point for a “small”, two points for a “medium” and three points 
for a “major” change.  
 
Source: Reed 2005, Ojinaga Survey, Surveys 32-66. 
 
3. Water Issues 
 
While drought and access to water were not cited by farmers as the major 
causes of changes in their crop selection, they were nonetheless important. Of 
the 32 farmers who responded to the section of the survey on water use – two 
farmers were renting their land to others – all said their primary source was the 
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irrigation canal itself, with two farmers saying they augmented it with pumped 
water from the main pump, two mentioning they used a tractor at times to pump 
from the canal, and two others saying they used Río Grande water on occasion 
(see Photo 6.33 and 6.34). 
 
Photo 6.33. Some farmers pump directly from the irrigation canal using tractors. 
 
Farmers in Modulo V irrigated their crops in much the same way that those in 
Modulo IV did. Thus, there was no mention of spray or pivot irrigation systems, 
but there was talk of “acequias” – earthen canals connected to secondary canals 
--  which themselves came off of either the primary canals or secondary lateral 
canals. There were differences. For example, some farmers irrigated their fields 
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with “presillas” – little mounds of dirt creating a mini-dam which was then opened 
between raised earth mounds – melgas – to irrigate alfalfa fields. Others – 
particularly the few irrigating cotton – used “mangueras,” little rubber hoses that 
carried water into individual ditches. There were several farmers – four in all – 
who specifically mentioned that they had changed from “presillas” to 
“mangueras,” even when irrigating alfalfa fields. There were also some farmers – 
13 in all -- who reported now having a cement-lined individual canal, while most 
continued to irrigate with earthen canals on their land. 
 
Photo 6.34. Diversion device in Río Grande provides some farmers in Modulo V 
with additional rights to irrigate crops. 
 
Most of those surveyed –23 – reporting owning only a single water right, three 
small private farmers reported having two water rights, and four other private 
farmers reported having between three and five water rights. No farmer reported 
 547 
buying additional water rights in 2005, and only two reported selling their water 
rights, including one who participated in the government buy-back program.  
 
There did not appear to be major changes in irrigation schedules, although for 
winter crops there had been severe curtailments. Several farmers mentioned that 
the lining of canals and the leveling of fields – part of the major water 
conservation efforts – had allowed them to lessen the number of hours needed to 
fully irrigate their fields since the water flowed more evenly and quickly.  
 
All of the farmers surveyed that were actively farming were aware of the new 
investments being made in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District to help 
“save” water and most of them had been involved in one project or another. 
While 21 were involved in water conservation projects, they felt their level of 
participation in the projects was fairly limited, largely “watching” the experts level 
fields and line canals. Virtually all who participated in projects were involved in 
some kind of leveling of their lands for more efficient irrigation practices or lining 
of canals. Nonetheless, in many of these cases, the farmers said the project had 
not lived up to their expectations, either because the project was not properly 
completed, they had been unable to farm that particular plot of land, or it was too 
little of an area to make a difference in total water use. 
 
Farmers –no matter whether larger or small – believed water conservation 
projects not only were of benefit because they could reduce water use, but 
because they could also potentially be used to increase the amount of land 
irrigated. About a third did believe the water conservation projects were 
benefiting some farmers more than others, but few felt they had been imposed. 
Most – 23 out of 32 -- did recognize that part of the benefit would flow to the U.S., 
though they did not necessarily think that was fair. Thus, two farmers mentioned 
that it was unfair that Chihuahua was “paying for other states.” 
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“We can’t pay it when there is no water. I am not going to take away a glass of 
water from my own son to give it to a neighbor,” another farmer explained simply.  
 
All farmers replying said there had been a drought and 26 out of the 32 said it 
had been the most severe in memory. Who exactly was to blame? The farmers 
of the lower part of the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District believed the lack of 
rain was the major factor. But there was plenty of blame to go around.   
 
Figure 6.17. Factors cited by farmers in Module V, Lower Río Conchos Irrigation 
District, related to lack of water in responses (N=32) and points (Maximum=96) 
Note: Factors were assigned one point for a “small”, two points for a “medium” and three points 
for a “major” factor.  
Source: Reed 2005, Ojinaga Survey, Surveys 32-66. 
 
The majority of farmers blamed sedimentation of the river, dams and canals as a 
major factor in their lack of access to water. They were more likely to cite this 
factors as compared to the farmers upstream in Module IV, which is likely due to 
their geographic position at the bottom of the Irrigation District. Thus, the physical 
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reality of continual sedimentation of canals and the distribution dams – and for 
the few farmers utilizing the Río Grande waters the river itself – was a major 
constraint to irrigating their fields.  
 
Also cited by a majority of respondents – 28 out of 32 – was the “lack of 
investment in water infrastructure.” Many farmers felt that improper maintenance 
of the dams and canals had allowed them to frequently silt up. There was a litany 
of complaints about the silting of the dams themselves, about the failure to 
upgrade the pumps, the grade of the canals to make water flow properly and in 
more than a few cases – a particular call for a new dam that would increase 
access to water in the district.  
 
Also receiving a high number of positive responses – 25 out of 32 – was the 
demand for Río Conchos water from the U.S. Farmers were acutely aware that 
their water was subject to an international treaty and therefore U.S. demands for 
water. Farmers also blamed themselves.  First, 22 of the 32 farmers blamed 
inefficient water use as being part of the problem. The recognition that the move 
to higher-demand water had been a factor in limiting total water use was cited by 
half of the respondents.  
 
The high cost of water itself – the $630 new pesos per hectare farmers were 
paying in 2005 to irrigate their crops was another factor which farmers felt had 
limited their access to water.  
 
Thus, the answers provided by farmers in Module V were similar to those in 
Module IV, indicating that while the drought was the main culprit of reduced 
access to water for farmers in Modulo V, the release of water to the U.S., 
sedimentation and vegetative invasion of dams and canals, the lack of 
investment in the district itself and a variety of other physical and social 
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management issues had also plagued the district and its water user association 
in recent years.  
 
4. Help on the way?  
 
Farmers in Modulo V were asked about the organizations and government 
agencies that assisted them (see Figure 6.18). The answers were very similar to 
those in Module IV. Topping the list in Modulo V among respondents was the 
agricultural ministry – SAGARPA. While virtually all the support for ejido farmers 
were the direct production payments of PROCAMPO, private farmers were more 
likely to mention Alianza para el Campo, suggesting they had more access for 
such programs that allowed them access to machinery and other inputs.  
 
CONAGUA also received significant responses, with 16 farmers saying they had 
been helped by the National Water Commission and two saying the “help” had 
actually hurt them. Most – seven in all -- cited the land leveling projects as the 
major help they received, while others said more generally “water conservation 
projects” and “relining of canals.” The two negative responses were related to 
water conservation and land leveling projects that “were badly done.” There were 
much fewer positive responses to Sanidad Vegetal – the local agricultural 
extension agency – in Modulo V than in Modulo IV, simply because most of the 
quasi-governmental agency’s work is related to the cotton boll weevil eradication 
program and pecans, neither of which is grown to a great extent in Module V.  
 
Also receiving generally good marks was the local municipality’s Rural 
Development agency, with 13 farmers saying they had received assistance. 
Three of the six larger private farmers said the agency had helped them secure 
funding to build a “Tejabán” – literally an open-air roofed structure to store alfalfa, 
oat and rye grass hay. Farmers were decidedly mixed in their opinion of the 
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water user association. While 11 users said it provided a small or medium 
amount of help, several said it was no help at all, and  two respondents claimed 
they had been hurt due to high water prices and poor maintenance of canals. 
 
When asked to comment on the transfer of the irrigation districts from CONAGUA 
to individual water user associations -- eight of the respondents chose to provide 
additional, largely, negative comments. There was a general feeling that the 
district had been transferred with little oversight, little training and little power. As 
one larger private farmer noted, “the water was so much cheaper and more 
plentiful when CONAGUA ran it, now they only give us a percentage.”  
 
Figure 6.18. Organizations cited by farmers in Module V, Lower Río Conchos 
Irrigation District, that helped or hurt farmer by responses (N=32) and Points 
(Maximum=96) 
 
Note: Organizations were assigned one point for  “small”, two points for “medium” and three 
points for  “major” help. Negative points were assigned for organizations that “hurt” the farmer.  
Source: Reed 2005, Ojinaga Survey, Surveys 32-66. 
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Very few farmers cited help received from private companies, with only 10 
individuals mentioning specific companies. Four of these individuals said their 
association with the private company had “hurt a little bit,” which was related to 
problems of payment with the local cotton gyn. Most farmers seemed to scramble 
to sell their products – be it cheese, alfalfa, cattle or cotton – rather than enter 
into long-term contracts with particular companies.  
 
Similarly, out of 34 respondents, only 10 said they had received credit or help 
from banks, six of which were referring to credit from Banco Rural from the 
previous decade. Thus, credit appeared to play only a small role in the district 
since the collapse of the agricultural government-supported banks in the 1990s.  
 
No farmer reported having received help from a non-profit, non-government 
organization. Only one reported having been involved in some kind of producer 
association --  a local sheep production association – which opened a new 




The Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District faced special challenges throughout 
the 1990s and early 2000s. Rather than a simple tale of reduced rainfall, water 
delivery curtailments and a shrinking farming base, farmers reported that a new 
market reality – the elimination of wheat, cotton and corn beginning in the mid-
1990s and the rise of cow-feeds like oats, rye grass and especially alfalfa – was 
the key to changes in the district. Thus, while irrigated hectares were reduced 
substantially, there was also a fundamental shift in crop choice. This crop choice 
favored those crops that were inputs to cattle and other livestock, some of which 
were exported for meat, and others which were used for local cheese production.  
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Drought did cause water curtailment in the district, a fact supported by both 
factual information from CONAGUA as well as survey data, but this fact was also 
complicated by the “transfer” of the district from CONAGUA – the National Water 
Commission – to five local water user associations known as Modulos. These 
Modulos began to hire their own administration and canal operators and charge 
farmers for hectares irrigated. While farmers are generally supportive of running 
the district themselves, they complained of mismanagement, favoritisms, but 
especially of the lack of support for basic infrastructure and training to better 
manage water and land. Essentially they felt CONAGUA had set them free 
without a parachute.  
 
Compounding these issues were organizational and credit issues. Unlike Delicias 
– with a more integrated and organized market – farmers in Ojinaga had few 
options for credit, had largely failed in their attempts to organize collectively, and 
had seen private companies that previously provided support and credit fail, 
including both wheat mills and cotton gyns. While a new cotton gyn did open up 
in the early 2000s – in part responding to new government price-support 
programs – farmers complained that the gyn was not providing the credit or 
assistance to make cotton profitable. Still, cotton enjoyed a rebound in 2003 and 
2004 due to the presence of the gyn and the government-support program.  
 
The other organizational entity --- the ejido – seemed to have lost much of the 
communal spirit that may have once existed in the district. While recognizing that 
the ejido structure was still useful in securing support from government 
programs, most ejidos in the district were largely inactive; communal lands were 
largely unused; and many ejidataríos had simple left their lands abandoned, long 
having moved to the U.S. or to other parts of Chihuahua.  
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Indeed, there was a general concentration of farming in private hands in the 
lower part of the district in Module I and Module V, while pump-fed canals in the 
upper and western part of the district were abandoned. The reason was related 
to salinity and poor soils in these lands, the increasing costs of electricity to pump 
the water and the infrastructure itself – which received limited investments from 
the Module and CONAGUA during the period. Faced with these issues, many 
farmers in 2004 and 2005 chose to abandon these fields and even permanently 
sold off water rights to the government, a program that was both lauded and 
criticized by local farmers. In fact, one of the five “modules” disappeared in 2005, 
as the Llano de Dolores ejido collectively chose to sell off their water rights rather 
than face an uncertain future of pumping expensive water over desert hills. 
 
Thus, the case study supported the notion that in the context of reduced water 
flow and releases to farmers, and the buy-back, privatization and decentralization 
of water rights, larger farmers benefited more. With more flexibility in land 
ownership and water rights, they seemed to adjust to the challenges of the late 
1990s better and were able to buy up lands and water rights and gain access to 
programs like Alianza del Campo to acquire machinery.  
 
The conflict over the lack of outflow of the Río Conchos between the U.S. and 
Mexico was recognized by local officials and farmers, as was the general need to 
use water more wisely and share the resource. Farmers did not generally feel 
that the conservation programs had been imposed upon them, nor that they 
benefited one class of farmers more than another, although there was a 
significant number surveyed who did feel there had been mismanagement of 
funds to benefit certain farmers. They did, however, feel that part of the impetus 
was to assure that more water flowed to the U.S. – and were generally critical of 
the Water Treaty. A significant number in both the upper and lower district felt 
that part of the reason for the lack of water were the “releases” to the U.S. during 
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winter months from Luis León Dam – a generally true statement – but also 
blamed the water debt on the fact that local flood waters falling into the Río 
Conchos didn’t count toward meeting treaty obligations – a myth repeated by 
both large and small farmers.  
 
The curtailment of water did lead to changes on the land. Many farmers had 
participated in the water conservation projects, lining distribution canals and 
leveling their land to improve water management. Generally, most farmers 
reported reducing either the number of irrigations or the number of hours they 
irrigated, although not to a large extent. Many changed the irrigation practice 
itself – for example using small hoses rather than earthen “dams” to distribute the 
water among rows of crops – or using “corrugados” – similar to a corrugated tin 
roof for the water to flow more smoothly from higher to lower ground. Cotton 
farmers often increased the densities of their crops to increase yields and take 
advantage of less water availability. Still, local leaders complained that farmers 
often did not participate in the implementation of the local water conservation 
projects, or had not adopted irrigation practices that took advantage of the newly 
leveled-lands and lined canals.  
 
As a border community, farmers in the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District 
often had an option to leave the area – legally or not – and from local discussions 
it was clear that in the 1990s and 2000s given the uncertain future of water and 
markets, many farmers – and sons of farmers – did choose to leave. Thus, in 
San Juan, in 2005, a family returned from Odessa Texas to celebrate the 15th 
birthday of their daughter with the family that had remained. They rented out a 
local center in Ojinaga, provided music, while the local farmers killed and bled 
cows and pigs for the occasion. The sleepy town of San Juan came alive for a 
week-end and the only two-story house – built with money earned in the U.S. – 
came alive again. It was a reminder how life once was in the Lower Río Conchos 
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Irrigation District, when credit, local mills and cotton gyns, plenty of water at a 
cheap cost and no direct competition with U.S. imports gave local farmers a more 
sustained livelihood. It was the pearl of the desert.  
 
In 2005, on the other hand, farmers faced a more challenging existence, and 
farmers either responded by buying up or renting land and water rights, and 
largely converting their farms into crops for cattle feed, or selling or renting their 
land and water rights, and abandoning farming altogether.  
 
There have been some attempts provide new opportunities for these farmers. On 
July 24, 2005 at the Asociación Ganadera No. 3 – the local offices of the 
Chihuahan Cattle Association -- approximately 100 farmers from Ojinaga, 
Manuel Benavides and Coyame listened and approved plans to create a new 
cooperative. The attempt to create from scratch such a cooperative of ejido and 
private farmers and cattleman is ambitious and is modeled on some successful 
efforts in recent years throughout Mexico. Officially dubbed as the “Centro de 
Abastos de Insumos del Agropecuario del Semi-Desertico,” (Agriculture and 
Cattle Supply and Input Center of the Semi-Desert), the promoters described it 
as “new kind” of cooperative.  
 
“Before people would together and try to collectivize work, so that if one person 
didn’t produce, everyone was affected,” explained José Castillo, the coordinator 
of the statewide efforts. “But with this cooperative, the work is individual, but the 
benefit is for everyone who works.”  
 
Castillo told the crowd that the model was already working successfully in three 
other areas of the state, and while it was not a government program, the federal 
government could put up to $10,000 Mexican new pesos per associate as 
“working capital” for specific projects, such as creating a factory for producing 
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feed. He also explained that unlike purely producer-led cooperatives, they would 
have a manager and administrative staff to run the cooperative, while the 
producers would form the board of directors to “avoid corruption and conflicts that 
have occurred.”  
 
One member of the audience from Coyame agreed. “When it’s run by the 
producers, it never works because they always take action to favor some 
relative.”   
 
The crowd endorsed the formation of the new association, electing Santiago 
Ortiz, a local cattleman, as its president. In 2005, the plan was to begin with 
surveys and a diagnostic of the region to determine which inputs might benefit 
from purchase in bulk and what products might benefit from a joint marketing 
strategy.  
 
For his part, local Rural Development director  “Pepe” Corrales  said that the 
“Centro de Abasto” would be a welcome addition locally due to the low level of 
commercialization in the area. He said he would like to create marketing 
opportunities for local producers through cooperatives and government support 
(Pepe Corrales, Rural Development, Ojinaga Municipality, personal 
communication with author, 2005).  He said of utmost importance to the region 
would be increase the price of milk and cheese sales, perhaps by opening a 
LICONSA milk collection center to provide local dairy producers a local sales 
option, as well as moving more heavily into goat and sheep production through 
local associations.  
 
“We need to organize the milk producers so they can either sell directly to 
Chihuahua, Saucillo or Camargo or we can bring milk production here – bring a 
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milk bottler here or a collection site for the government program,” Corrales 
explained.  
 
The farmer in Ojinaga cuts a lonely figure against the desert sky, with only his 
extended family to aid him. The ejidos are largely dormant, the public and private 
banks have abandoned him and private industry has not stepped in to support 
him. Imports from the U.S. in basic grains have fundamentally changed his crop 
options. Still, it would be wrong to paint a totally pessimistic picture. Some 
farmers have managed to survive by changing to more of a cattle-based 
economy, often renting or buying up abandoned land, while others have sought 
other alternatives, including broom sorghum production, honey production, sheep 
and goats and rabbit meat. While some of these experiments – including a brief 
attempt to grow eucalyptus trees – have failed, the presence of farming despite 
all the obstacles encountered throughout the 1990s is a testament to the 
perseverance of farming itself in an arid region of Mexico, scorched by the Devil 
himself.   
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Chapter Seven: Droughts, Disputes, Discourse, Decentralization and 




Droughts have been recorded as a problem for farmers in Texas and Mexico 
since Spaniards explored the area. When Spanish explorer Álvar Núñez Cabeza 
de Vaca made his westward journey from Galveston across the Chihuahuan 
desert, he is believed to have stopped near present day Ojinaga, where the Río 
Conchos meets the Río Grande at the Junta de los Rios.13 There, the natives 
were restless.  
 
As related by Cabeza de Vaca:  
 
It is a heavily populated land. We asked why they did not sow 
maize; they replied that they were not doing so in order not to lose 
the crop, for during two consecutive years the rains had failed and 
the weather had been so dry that all had lost their whole crop of 
maize, and they did not dare sow it again until first there had been 
copious rain. And they begged us to tell the heavens to rain, to 
implore them to do so, and we promised them that we would do 
this. We also asked them from where they had brought that maize, 
and they said from the direction the sun set, and in that land there 
was maize everywhere; but the maize closest to us was in that 
direction.  (Cabeza de Vaca, as cited in Pupo-Walker 1993: 101.) 
 
Back in the 1530s, communities such as those described by Cabeza de Vaca in 
the Chihuahuan desert were facing drought, impacting their agricultural 
production, forcing them to trade with other communities less affected by the 
                                                
13 There is disagreement about the exact route Cabeza de Vaca and his remaining cohorts took across 
Texas, Mexico and the West. Thus, Enrique Pupo-Walker puts the voyage to the north of present day 
Presidio and suggests that the meetings of rivers discussed was actually along the Pecos. Instead, the 
travelers did not meet up with the Río Grande until near El Paso, before heading to the south. See page 137 
for a discussion of the Jumanos and Conchos Indians likely encountered by Cabeza de Vaca. (Pupo-Walker 
1993:137). 
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vagaries of climate. They asked for help from outsiders – albeit in spiritual 
intercession rather than material goods – and awaited climate change. What 
then, has really changed in 500 or so years?  
 
In one sense, not a whole lot. Drought in northern Mexico and Southwestern U.S. 
continues to be common, both locally and regionally (Liverman 1999; Goodrich 
and Ellis 2006). Farmers continue to make decisions about natural resource use 
based on climactic, supply and demand conditions, and continued to look to the 
world outside their immediate soil, land and watersheds for markets, assistance 
and new technologies.  
 
On the other hand, as this dissertation has shown, conditions in the Río Conchos 
watershed changed significantly from previous drought-like conditions, at least in 
the period of record, with significantly less flow in the river and significantly 
greater populations, interest and demands on the water resources. In addition, if 
indigenous farmers in the 1500s traded with nearby indigenous communities and 
asked for help from other cultures during times of drought, they did so without the 
benefits or drawbacks of a water governance structure, trade regime and land 
tenure system.  As part of an international boundary and international water 
treaty – not to mention an international trade treaty which created new rules on 
investments, imports and tariffs beginning in 1994 -- farmers in Chihuahua were 
also subject to much larger “outside” interests in decision-making about their 
resource use, from large environmental organizations, to grain importers, to cities 
like Chihuahua to U.S. interests like South Texas farmers and the politicians that 
supported them, to the larger scale of world markets, which often set the prices 
of the products they were growing (IBWC 1944; NAFTA Secretariat 1994). They 
were part of a much larger network of relationships across different geographic 
scales, and not just a chance meeting with some lost Spanish explorers. In fact, 
significant differences would be found even comparing farmers of the 1970s and 
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1980s and present-day farmers in these areas, as the pressures and realities 
facing them were very different, as well as the connections to international 
markets and governance regimes.  
 
This final chapter reviews the key findings of the study, as well as how these 
findings contribute to the larger literatures within differing strains of geography 
and natural resource studies. Finally, the chapter outlines future areas of 
research related to this region and topic and considers if the physical and 
institutional architecture now exists to resolve future binational disputes over 
water, or to utilize water in a sustainable fashion.  
 
II. Some Key Findings: Dispute and Discourse over an International 
Resource 
 
While presenting case studies of natural resource use by farmers in specific 
geographic locations in a time of drought, the dissertation began by reviewing the 
causes, real and imagined, consequences and proposed solutions of the dispute 
between the U.S. and Mexico over low inflows coming from Mexican tributaries to 
the Río Grande, the international boundary between El Paso and Brownsville. 
Because the Río Conchos has been the major hydrological “input” to the Río 
Grande below the Elephant Butte reservoir in New Mexico, there was particular 
attention in the media, among politicians and interested parties in what was 
happening in this watershed that had caused such low outflows (see Chapters 
Two and Three). There were two major findings.  
 
First of all, the research found that a number of explanations were offered by 
interested parties for the low flows from Mexico into the Río Grande. Mexican 
officials and academics pointed to an “historic” drought which while not as 
intense as droughts of the 1950s and 1960s had been much more extensive 
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geographically and temporally. The intense drought of the late 1950s had been 
replaced by an extended period of low rains and low inflow into the dams 
throughout the basin (Reyes Gómez et al. 2005). U.S. officials, farmers, 
academics and consultants pointed instead to dam management decisions and 
the expansion of agriculture in the Delicias Irrigation District as either the primary 
or secondary causes of the lowflow. Thus, on the one hand, Mexican officials 
claimed there simply was not sufficient water to meet basic needs and allow 
water to flow into the Río Grande, while U.S. farmers and officials said that there 
was, and that Mexico was “stealing” this natural resource by hoarding the water 
at Mexican dams for the benefit of the expansion of Mexican farmers.  
 
A third narrative emerged from environmental organizations and to some extent 
entities like the Drought Center in central Chihuahua which focused not only on 
the lack of rainfall, the change in timing of rainfall – potentially related to global 
climactic changes – but also on land use changes, in particular deforestation in 
the uplands, contributing to lower rains, filling dams with sediment and impacting 
base flows.  
 
Without necessarily assigning a single cause, the research noted that much of 
this discussion utilized differing data sets to bolster their case. Thus, Mexican 
officials focused on dam releases, overall rainfall patterns and the number of 
hectares under irrigation, as reported by “official” sources – the National Water 
Commission or CONAGUA – while U.S. officials and their consultants relied on 
overall and average dam levels, the total quantity of water in the dams – 
cumulatively added over time -- the timing of releases and the total amount of 
hectares irrigated in the Conchos irrigation districts, culled from satellite imagery 
and other sources (Brandes 2000; Center for Space Research 2003). Data from 
the Drought Center focused on rainfall differences regionally and runoff 
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coefficients, influenced by fire and deforestation (Reyes Gómez et. al. 2005; 
Rodríguez Piñeda et. al. 2005).  
 
The research then looked at the data on many of these issues, and again, 
without necessarily assigning an essential “cause” found that there was evidence 
that several of these factors did contribute to the lowflows. Thus, there was little 
doubt that rainfall decreased in the 1990s in the Conchos watershed, although 
the lack of rainfall and stream gauges in the upper Río Conchos made precise 
conclusions difficult. At the same time, while overall irrigation of hectares did 
decline in the three major irrigation districts– along with overall water use – there 
appeared to be a slight increase in the amount of water used per hectare 
throughout the mid and late 1990s. In addition, while the number of hectares that 
relied on “official” water from the irrigation district dams declined precipitously, 
many farmers began to rely on alternative sources, and statistics from the 
agricultural ministry – SAGARPA --  demonstrated much greater levels of 
hectares irrigated and production than from the data provided and continually 
cited by Mexican politicians from CONAGUA, the National Water Commission. 
Thus, in response to the drought – which lowered hectares of land irrigated and 
overall water use – farmers often turned to other water sources, which 
themselves could have impacted the flow of the river. These findings were 
confirmed throughout the case study chapters.  
 
At the same time, CONAGUA and irrigation representatives did make decisions 
to change the timing and release of water from some of the major dams in 
Chihuahua, in essence turning off the dams in winter months due to the drought-
like conditions. This probably changed the “normal” flow of the Conchos River 
which in previous decades had received significant runoff from irrigation of winter 
wheat, alfalfa and oats grown in the winter as well as more frequent fall rains.  
 
 564 
Another obvious factor was the very existence of the dams themselves. In 
previous droughts in the 1960s, Luis Leon dam – downstream of Delicias 
Irrigation District -- did not exist, meaning rainfall and return irrigation flow flowed 
downstream and was not captured at Luis Leon. The completion of the dam 
potentially aggravated lowflow conditions, due to curtailed releases, silting and  
evaporation during drought-like conditions. 
 
The study presented no definitive evidence on how deforestation and land use 
change might have impacted flow, but observations and interviews suggest that 
local impacts in the upper watershed both from deforestation and mining of 
materials in riverbeds led to substantial tributary blockage and observed 
sedimentation which may have reduced runoff to the larger river and the 
downstream dams. Thus, the research suggests a multi-faceted cause of low 
inflows into the Río Grande, from increased overall water use – including 
groundwater pumping from alluvial aquifers and direct pumping of the river – to 
low rainfall, to new dam management to local land use changes. This multi-
scaled explanation stands in stark contrast to the “essentializing” tendencies of 
the major narratives explaining lowflow among interested parties in the U.S. –
Mexico conflict (Ellis 1996). Furthermore, the research also looked at how 
changes in water and land policy, as well as the North American Trade 
Agreement were also part of the story, because of their influence on which types 
of farmers might have benefited and which types of crops were thus more likely 
to be grown. This approach, influenced by the field of political ecology, suggests 
that part of the cause in natural resource use change can be attributed to market 
forces and changes in policy which decentralized and privatized the use of water 
and land, influencing production and use patterns.  
 
Another major finding was how the transboundary conflict was changed from a 
narrow technical discussion over water quantity to a more comprehensive 
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discussion of water and river shed management. Groups and interested parties – 
including the governments themselves -- used the conflict to promote water 
conservation and efficiency as well as land stewardship as viable solutions to the 
lack of water flowing into the Río Grande.  
 
Thus, a group of 20 environmental groups from both sides of the border called on 
the two governments to change the focus from water scarcity issues to water 
management (Texas Center for Policy Studies 2001). The water conservation 
option – advocated among other recommendations by the groups – was 
incorporated into the official “minutes” or agreements by the International 
Boundary and Water Commission in both Minute 308 and Minute 309, becoming 
the basis for a unique financing agreement through two new binational 
organizations, the Border Environment Cooperation Commission and North 
American Development Bank (IBWC 2002; IBWC 2003: BECC 2002). Although 
originally focused on potable municipal water supply issues, wastewater 
treatment and solid waste management, these new institutions expanded their 
mandate to also include a focus on agricultural water use and irrigation practices, 
a change that was also pushed in part by environmental groups working on 
issues along the U.S.-Mexico border (Kelly, Reed and Taylor 2001:19; 
NADBANK 2000). Thus, the recent dispute utilized new actors – from 
environmental organizations to farmers to new binational institutions – and new 
solutions – water conservations and land management practices – to help 
resolve an environmental conflict (Browning-Aiken et. al. 2004).  
 
Similarly, while the eventual resolution of the conflict occurred largely through 
releases of stored dam water in Tamaulipas – flush with water from the 
hurricane-related storms of 2005 – and was conducted chiefly by the state 
departments of both countries with technical advice from CILA and IBWC, the 
presence of officials from the State of Texas – representing in some sense the 
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vocal farmers of South Texas – was a unique change from previous more narrow 
resolutions of transboundary environmental conflicts between the U.S. and 
Mexico at higher national levels.  
 
The proposed solution was not uncontroversial since it in essence invested 
monies into Chihuahua’s irrigation districts in return for a promise to reduce total 
water rights to the water user associations making up the irrigation districts. Still, 
ultimately all water user associations signed a document pledging to implement 
the water conservation projects and –if there were confirmed water savings – 
give up a portion of their water rights.  Whether or not these agreements served 
to help reduce overall water use and increase the flows of the Río Conchos, 
these projects did result in part from the binational crisis and along with the buy-
back of water rights from farmers became major investments at a time of great 
transitions for Mexican farmers.  
 
Beyond the more narrow focus on water conservation in Chihuahua’s irrigation 
district,  other organizations with projects within the Río Conchos watershed 
“sold” their projects to funders as ways to increase water flows in the river, again 
an effect of the focus on resolving the transnational natural resource conflict. 
Thus, in the upper catchment – where it all begins – the water dispute and the 
lack of water coming from the Río Grande – was highlighted in a number of local 
projects at the community and regional level. In particular, World Wildlife Fund 
began a watershed project which included not only salt cedar removal along the 
Río Grande, but also contracting “local” NGOs to work on community-level 
resource management projects in Bocoyna and Carichí counties in an ultimate 
effort to restore riparian and reduce deforestation, purported to have contributed 
to the low rainfalls in the first place (WWF 2004). The project involved funding 
from major international corporations and banks as well as the U.S. Agency for 
International Development.  
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Similarly, a region-wide effort to declare the Sierra Tarahumara a UN biosphere 
reserve was expanded to include the Río Conchos watershed in 2004, in part 
because of the rationale that it would protect the upper watershed from 
deforestation, impacting river flows. Led by the Mexican government, and 
supported by a coalition of environmental and indigenous-groups, the effort was 
mired in controversy because of the fear it would create a new level of control 
over decision-making among farmers and other interest groups – including  
miners, loggers, farmers, indigenous communities and local governments. At the 
same time, the Mexican government also created new programs – including 
Environmental Service payments for “hydrological” services – to help increase 
flow – as well as one for decreasing carbon dioxide emissions largely through 
reforestation and preservation, both of which were potentially made available for 
communities in the Upper Río Conchos. Thus, again, these can be seen as 
examples of how impacts on local communities due to climate change become 
part of a much larger debate over resource use in a binational and even 
international – i.e. global climate change – context.  
 
In addition, local groups like CONTEC began working with local ejidos on their 
own community management plans, but with a particular focus on legal 
strategies, preservation of communal land rights and democratization of decision-
making. These efforts would have existed with or without the international water 
dispute, but the projects themselves became more focused on the connection to 
river flows and to conservation of natural resources as donor interest was 
peaked. 
 
Thus, both the emphasis on water conservation in the Chihuahuan irrigation 
districts, as well as the development of projects aimed at improving land 
management in the Upper Río Conchos among indigenous communities and 
 568 
ejidos owe part of their impetus to the debate over low-flows from the Río 
Conchos. Conservation– be it water or land resources – was presented as part of 
the solution to overcome “inefficiencies” in the use of resources by farmers.  
 
III. Agriculture Change and Solutions 
 
A. Changing Land and Water Policies and their Impacts 
 
Information about three agricultural areas, and specific agricultural communities 
were presented in the middle chapters. Chapter Four addressed several 
communities within the Municipalities of Bocoyna and Carichí – the forested 
uplands of the Río Conchos waterbasin -- while Chapters Five and Six looked at 
water and land use within the Delicias Irrigation District and Lower Río Conchos 
Irrigation District, located within the Municipality of Ojinaga, as well as particular 
communities within them.  
 
The chapters revealed the complex economic and policy changes facing the 
natural resource users of the Río Conchos. On one level, a major agricultural 
shift took place in the mid and late 1990s as many of the crops grown in the 
previous decade declined in terms of the area planted and harvested – including 
corn for grain, sorghum, beans and winter wheat – while new crops – notably 
pecans, alfalfa and chile peppers – were increasing. Part of this downturn is 
related to the fall in world prices for the former goods, as well as changes in tariff, 
quota and investment policy related to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.  The research contributes to the long tradition within geography to 
study the impacts of world systems and markets on local resource users.  
 
Nonetheless, rather than a simple story of markets shaping resource actors, 
other changes, including water policy changes, also contributed to this shift. As 
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water management and pricing was decentralized to the irrigation water user 
associations, the price of water increased, becoming a factor in the decision 
taken by many farmers to grow crops that on a per-unit of water were the most 
economical. Thus, even though high-water demand crops like pecans, chile 
peppers and alfalfa were more expensive, and required more frequent irrigations, 
these crops were ironically the ones that increased their presence over the time 
period. The change in ownership of the irrigation districts also helped spur 
creation of a new market in the buying and selling of water and water rights, 
which provided both an opportunity for some farmers, as well as some pressure 
for others to sell those rights. These changes may also have had important 
equity and indeed geographic implications. 
 
Both forested and other “ejido” land were also subject to new “opportunities” and 
pressures to change basic property management within the Río Conchos 
watershed. Thus, following the major changes to the National Forestry Law and 
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, private owners could legally increase 
holdings within forested lands, and ejidos could voluntarily enter a complex 
process known in Chihuahua as PROCEDE to legalize and potentially privatize 
their own land. This process included federal and state agencies, communities 
and some organizations assisting them. Despite dire warnings from some 
interested parties of the impact of changes to the Mexican constitution and 
Mexican land tenure law and regulations, most ejidos in Chihuahua rejected total 
privatization of ejido communal lands, while titling and in some cases privatizing 
individual parcels and household lots.  
 
In the upper watershed, several indigenous communities and ejidos did enter the 
PROCEDE process in an attempt to clearly define their ejidos’ boundaries but 
rejected calls for privatization either of individual plots or communal lands. Thus, 
Bacabureachi – working with the non-governmental organization CONTEC – 
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decided as a community that it was better to develop and enforce internal rules 
on the use of communal lands, rather than let lands become divided legally, even 
if it practical  terms it was already happening. In essence, they were rejecting the 
notion that the lands would be better managed through privatization than as 
communal property and instead believed that a clear management scheme was 
needed to prevent the “tragedy of the commons” that those in favor of 
privatization argued had occurred in the region.  
 
In the Irrigation Districts of Ojinaga and Delicias, ejidos adopted differing 
strategies toward privatization of lands in Mexico. While  ejidos near major cities 
like Delicias did undergo a process of privatization – as urbanization drove up the 
cost of land -- other ejidos maintained their more traditional scope. One ejido  
covered in a case study – Congregación Ortiz near Rosales in the Delicias 
Irrigation District – chose to seek complete privatization. This should be viewed 
as a unique case. The ejido does not possess communal lands, access to credit 
was limited without private title to land, and the community possessed a resource 
which was managed communally: deep, interconnected water wells. In essence, 
the social ownership and management of water was more important to the 
community than any social ownership of land and helped belay any fears of 
communal loss.  
 
In Ojinaga, ejidos maintained their relevance, but only nominally. Ejido leaders 
complained of the difficulty in even meeting to discuss issues related to ejido 
management or access to communal lands. More than privatization itself, the 
apparent weakness of the ejido as a socially relevant unit was often related to the 
obstacles facing small-scale agriculture, not the “threat” of privatization. Thus, in 
Ojinaga, while many ejidos were still officially on the books, and still “possessed” 
communal lands for grazing or mining, their members had emigrated, leaving 
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behind virtual ghost towns, or in the case of Llano de Dolores, selling off their 
water rights – in essence their livelihood – back to the government.  
 
B. Regional Differences: Markets, Governance and Use of Natural 
Resources 
 
In addition to interviews with officials, farmers and representatives of agricultural 
companies and banks, some 175 surveys were conducted with farmers in three 
agricultural areas (see Table 7.1 and Appendix A for survey instrument). 
Throughout the basin, farmers interviewed and surveyed believed that the mid-
1990s and early 21st century were marked by a region-wide drought which 
impacted their ability to produce high agricultural yields. The vast majority of 
these farmers believed that the drought was severe and these responses did not 
depend on whether the farmer owned private or ejido land or how much land they 
owned (Figure 7.1).  
 
Table 7.1. Surveys Conducted in Present Study, 2005 
Municipality  Community or Area Number of Surveys 
Conducted 
Carichí  Bacabureachí  18 
Carichí  El Consuelo/Arroyo del 
Agua 
20 
Saucillo  Modulo XII (Saucillo Canal) 34 
Rosales Modulo VI (Rosales) 38 
Ojinaga Modulo IV (Valverde) 31 
Ojinaga Modulo V (Labor del Paso) 34 
Total  175 
Source: Reed, Chihuahua Land and Water Use Survey,  2005.  
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Figure 7.1. Farmer (N=175) Opinion on Severity of Drought Post-1995 by Area 
Surveyed 
 
Source: Reed, Chihuahua Land and Water Use Survey,  2005.  
 
Nonetheless, when asked what factors contributed to the low moisture content 
for those that relied on direct rain or lack of access to water for those who relied 
on irrigated water, responses varied. While all farmers obviously cited the lack of 
rain, farmers in the upper Río Conchos cited such factors as “climate change” – it 
was hotter and the rains arrived later in the agricultural season --  deforestation, 
invasive species and soil erosion (see Figure 7.2).  
 
Middle-basin farmers in Delicias, on the other hand, cited drought, water use by 
upstream farmers, dam sedimentation and expansion of the district in the 1980s 
as causes of the drought. Lower-basin farmers in the Lower Río Conchos 
Irrigation District blamed the drought, but also sedimentation of the dams and 
canals, U.S. demand – and Mexican releases – of the water, the lack of 
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investment in the district itself, invasive species like tamarisk and salinized soils, 
along with the high cost of water, particularly when water had to be pumped up to 
irrigation canals (Figure 7.3).  
 
Figure 7.2. Farmer Responses to Contributing Factors of Lack of Humidity in 
Soils, Lack of Access to Water in Carichí by Total “Points” (Maximum=114 points) 
 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “major” factor, two for a “medium” and one for a 
small “factor.” 
 
Source: Reed, Chihuahua Land and Water Use Survey, 2005. 
 
To a more limited extent, farmers in all three areas recognized that a partial 
factor was their own use of natural resources, from poor soil management in 
Carichí to water waste, overuse and the growth of high-water demand crops in 
Delicias and Ojinaga (see Figure 7.3). Place and location mattered in terms of 
attributing causes to the drought. Even within regions, there were substantial 
differences among farmers in their opinions. Thus, farmers in Saucillo were much 
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more likely to blame competition with other upstream farmers for the lack of 
access to water, as they gain part of their water from the river itself, competing 
with farmers from Camargo, while in Ojinaga, farmers in Modulo IV with lands 
along the Rio Conchos near the diversion dam were most likely to cite the 
impacts of invasive species – Tamarisk, or salt cedar.  
 
Figure 7.3. Farmer Responses to Contributing Factors in Lack of Access to Water 
in Delicias and Lower Río Conchos Irrigation Districts, Total “Points” (Maximum in 
Ojinaga=195; Maximum in Delicias =216) 
 
 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “major” factor, two for a medium and one for a 
small “factor.” 
 
Source: Reed, Chihuahua Land and Water Use Survey, 2005. 
 
Similarly, farmers had varying responses to questions about changes over the 
previous decade. Thus, in the upper basin, low yields, a reduction in hectares 
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planted and some crop change – particularly the lack of bean production – was 
cited by many farmers. Much of this change was directly related to low rains and 
the change in timing of rains which had thrown off their ability to plant additional 
crops. To compensate, farmers said they were changing their pre-planting cycle, 
often tilling twice rather than once to increase humidity in their soils and 
increasing the use of natural fertilizers, while decreasing commercial fertilizers, 
particularly as the cost of commercial fertilizers increased. Other wealthier 
farmers – the few surveyed in the communities – were raising more cattle, often 
utilizing communal lands for grazing purposes (see Figure 7.4).  
 
Figure 7.4. Major Changes Cited by Farmers in Carichí as a Percentage of Total 
Points 
 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “major” factor, two for a medium and one for a 
small “factor.” 
 
Source: Reed, Chihuahua Land and Water Use Survey, 2005. 
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In the middle basin, in the Delicias Irrigation District, the major responses 
indicated that major changes were the elimination of winter crops like winter 
wheat, a move toward perennial crops, in particular alfalfa and pecans and a 
reduction in hectares irrigated, though some respondents mentioned they had 
increased the number of hectares irrigated. The other major change cited by a 
large number of respondents was the shift in water source. In Rosales, survey 
respondents indicated that larger private farmers dug their own groundwater 
wells, while smaller ejido farmers used either communal wells or “norias” – 
shallower wells which rely on shallow aquifers. Another area surveyed – the Old 
Saucillo Canal – had similar reactions, although instead of deeper wells, farmers 
were either digging norias or tajos – essentially a hole in the ground which also 
taps shallow wells or even runoff – or pumping directly from the Río Conchos, 
often using their tractors as pumps.  
 
This fact – that farmers during the drought had turned from “dam” water covered 
under the 1944 Water Treaty with the U.S. – to alternative sources of water 
communally or individually – is a major finding, at least for this portion of the 
watershed and helps explain how Mexico could insist that agricultural water use 
had been reduced substantially even as the U.S. was producing satellite photos 
showing expansion of agricultural lands. The water source changed (see Figure 
7.5).  A number of respondents – virtually all small farmers – also mentioned 
abandoning some land, renting out their land and/or converting agricultural land 
to cattle grazing. 
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Figure 7.5 Major Changes Cited by Farmers in Delicias Irrigation District as 
Percentage of Total “Points” 
 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “major” factor, two for a medium and one for a 
small “factor.” 
 
Source: Reed, Chihuahua Land and Water Use Survey, 2005. 
 
In Ojinaga, respondents also pointed to a  reduction in hectares irrigated, the 
elimination of winter crops – principally winter wheat --  as well as upon a shift 
toward perennials related to cows and cattle – notably alfalfa. Whether for local 
cheese or milk production – or more likely – to grow crops for young cattle 
destined for export to the U.S. – the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District 
changed from a producer of winter wheat, cotton and corn to one of cows, and 
the feed – sorghum, alfalfa and oats – needed to feed them. A particular boost to 
local producers – highlighting to the connection between the local natural 
resource use and the wider “global” economy – was provided by the cattle export 
station located just kilometers from the district boundary itself, as young cattle 
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made their way to fattening stations in Kansas, Texas, or Oklahoma. While some 
areas continued to grow cotton, such production relied heavily on the promise of 
government subsidies and problems related to payment and credit  with the one 
local cotton gyn were major obstacles for local farmers. A few farmers began the 
slow but profitable process of planting pecan orchards.  
 
Figure 7.6. Major Changes Cited by Farmers in Ojinaga, as a percentage of total 
“points”  
 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “major” factor, two for a medium and one for a 
small “factor.” 
 
Source: Reed, Chihuahua Land and Water Use Survey, 2005 
 
While the survey did not reveal major shifts in input, a few trends were apparent 
based on the limited survey details as well as interviews with farmers and 
government officials. One is that in both Delicias and Ojinaga, as probably could 
be expected, technology had begun to replace labor for some crops. Thus, 
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wealthier pecan farmers began to use “shakers,” “sweepers” and “harvesters” to 
gather pecans in October, even while smaller ejido farmers with pecan orchards 
continued to use more traditional methods. Peanut farmers in Congregación Ortiz 
also invested in machinery to pull the peanut roots out of the ground, while 
leaving the plant behind for cattle feed more efficiently. As more farmers grew 
corn for feed rather than for “ears” or grain, huge stacks of corn were mashed up 
and sold as cattle feed through the use of rented or owned “harvesters”.  
 
Cotton was also an example of this transformation, with “pickers” and “polishers” 
replacing manual labor among virtually all Ojinaga cotton farmers. Many farmers 
complained that technology – while more “efficient” – had impacted the quality of 
the product since individual pickers could be more careful in selecting and sorting 
cotton from cottonseed, or had priced them out of the market. Some farmers with 
smaller extensions of land had neither the funds nor the access to government 
programs or credit to purchase such machines.  
 
This is not to say labor – particularly day labor – did not continue to be an 
important part of labor inputs. But it was clear that more and more farmers – 
particularly larger ones – found it more economical to invest in machinery rather 
than people. This decreased the ability of local farmers to supplement their 
income from their own land by helping their wealthier neighbors work theirs.  
 
Furthermore, while the study did not detail use of pesticides and fertilizers in any 
kind of systematic way, there was some indication that while short of going 
“organic,” pecan farmers in Delicias had begun to reduce their use of insecticides 
and use natural “pest” killers – wasps and ladybugs -- to control damage to 
pecans. Local officials and academics at the Agricultural Extension Service in 
Rosales and the local extension agencies in Meoqui, Saucillo and Ojinaga were 
assisting in this transformation as were U.S. demands for pesticide-free pecans. 
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In terms of cotton, the binational eradication Program being implemented in 
Chihuahua – while a target of many Chihuahuan farmers wrath for credit and 
payment problems – was cited as having reduced the indiscriminate spraying of 
dangerous pesticides.  
 
In addition, while far short of a movement, many farmers reported using natural 
fertilizers from their animals, to boost production on a wide variety of crops, in 
many cases as a replacement of chemical fertilizers. Part of this initial 
transformation was also supported by the high costs of fertilizers and pesticides. 
This was particularly true in the upper Conchos.  
 
The changes that occurred in production, crops and inputs in the agricultural 
areas examined in this study were related to many factors. While the lack of 
access to water in the irrigation districts was clearly cited as a factor – particularly 
in regards to reductions in hectares irrigated as well as the major shift in water 
source to non-dam water-- the major causes of these agricultural changes were 
also the rising cost of agricultural inputs and the market prices offered for 
agricultural products. Thus, at the field level, prices and costs were the major 
factors cited for agricultural change rather than the drought itself, although with 
local variation. In addition, problems related to lack of credit in all three areas – 
particularly compared to previous decades when credit was more available – also 
had played a major part in decision-making.  These answers – supported as well 
by interviews and observations – also revealed how much world and regional 
prices of goods – from the price of pecans set in the U.S. – to cotton, corn and 
even meat prices from cattle – played into the decisions being made at the local 
level (Figure 7.7). Not surprisingly, in Carichí, the changes in non-market 
sustenance farming practiced by local indigenous farmers was mainly due to the 
drought and climate change, not market conditions.  
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Figure 7.7. Factors Cited by Farmers as Causing Changes in Agricultural Practices 
by Region, as % of Total Points 
 
Note: Three points were assigned for a “major” factor, two for a medium and one for a 
small “factor.”  Source: Reed, Chihuahua Land and Water Use Survey, 2005 
 
C. Conservation and Governance of Natural Resources 
 
The present study was conducted at a time when policies first developed in the 
early 1990s were being fully implemented as part of Mexico’s embrace of neo-
liberal policies and decentralization of its governmental responsibilities. Thus, the 
decentralization of government control over water, forestry, agricultural and 
environmental programs since 1992 were all being enacted at the municipal  and 
regional levels. In terms of water management, one of the key policy changes in 
terms of water was the decision to “transfer” the irrigation districts from the 
CONAGUA to individual water user associations, geographically known as 
Modulos, a process which occurred rapidly in both the Delicias and Lower Río 
Conchos Irrigation Districts. (Elías Calderon, General Manager, CONAGUA, 
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Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District, personal communication with author, 
2005).   
 
In addition, legislative changes to forestry laws in 1992, 1997 and 2005 
reemphasized the communal ownership of forested ejidos, while also allowing for 
privatization of some forested lands (Guerrero, Kelly, Reed and Vegter  2002). In 
the meantime, the 1992 changes to the Mexican Constitution, Article 27, and 
eventually  to the “Rural Development Law” in 2001 allowed ejidos to begin a 
process of regularization and in some cases privatization of individual plots and 
communal lands (SAGARPA 2001 Finally, agricultural government programs 
were in a process of decentralization, with both state and local municipal rural 
development departments taking a more active role in decision-making and 
distribution of agricultural subsidies (SAGARPA 2001).  
 
There is an established literature on the benefits of decentralization toward more 
efficient, and conservation-minded natural resource use, as well as more 
equitable distribution of resources,  a view that has been supported in Mexico by 
the World Bank and other development organizations (Asad, Seroa da Motta, 
Azevedo, Simpson & Kemper, 1999; Briscoe, Anguita Salas & Peña 1998). 
Others have argued that such a process can have the opposite effect by allowing 
wealthier individuals within a county to increase control and used of natural 
resources, in concert with global interests, in essence seizing control of natural 
resources (Wilder 2002; 2006).  
 
Recent literature based on field research in Sonoran irrigation districts found a 
decidedly mixed result of this transformation, with transfer of the irrigation district 
not being used for improving efficiency or equity, but “as …channels for preferred 
treatment for capital accumulation by private entities as well as a legitimized way 
for the state to transfer the financially and politically charged burden of water 
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management to non-state institutions.” (Wilder and Romer Lankao 2006;  see 
also Martínez Rodríguez and Reed 2002). In essence, these authors argue, the 
transfer was an expedient way for the government to rid itself of the headache of 
managing and facilitating natural resource use, although there were some 
benefits as well, mainly in democratization of decision-making, and the 
acceptance of a conservation “ethos,” although focused on short-term need to 
conserve water rather than long-term management. Thus “producers believe that 
the transferred districts are more democratic and have streamlined processes 
that facilitate issuance of permits and other transactions (Wilder 2002)” although 
smaller farmers were less likely to have such a view.  
 
The study also found that the increase in water prices – reflective of the move to 
make water more of a commodity – had been – in combination with other 
changes in market prices, access to credit, and the increasing costs of inputs – a 
factor in squeezing out smaller, ejido farmers.(Wilder 2002; Wilder and Romero 
Lankao 2006).  
 
The present study supports the view that decentralization has been a mixed 
blessing for Mexico’s irrigation-based farmers, and that it has had equity 
consequences which tend to hurt smaller rather than larger farmers. Farmers in 
the two irrigation districts in the district were asked to rate the help they received 
from their local water user association as well as to rate the transfer and provide 
comments on the benefits and drawbacks. Many farmers supported the idea of 
the transfer – and believed that they could theoretically manage the water more 
fairly than CONAGUA had – but believed the transfer had been enacted without 
the financial, managerial or oversight needed to make the “Modulos” run 
efficiently and fairly.  
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This was particularly true in Ojinaga, where the much smaller geographic entities 
known as Modulos had little access to funds to hire or train competent managers 
or canal operators, and where the high costs of operating the Modules was not 
fully supported, even by the increasing costs of water. The fact that there were 
fewer farmers farming and fewer thousand cubic meters of water being paid for 
made the situation that much more difficult for farmers and the associations 
running the irrigation districts. There were complaints – though not widespread – 
that the leadership of the water user associations had benefited certain classes 
of farmers, or more frequently, certain “geographies” – particular ejidos or areas, 
such as Congregación Ortíz in the Rosales User Water Association in the 
Delicias Irrigation District.  This was not a universal feeling, however, and overall 
farmers supported the transfer – they just felt it was unfortunate it had happened 
at a time when market and climactic transformation had conspired against them. 
Indeed, the Module in Delicias on the whole appeared to be run efficiently and 
professionally with sophisticated managers and equipment. 
 
In terms of water conservation, water use data, survey results and observation of 
projects support the view that Mexican farmers embraced water conservation 
and that its benefits have been for the most part equitably distributed – at least 
among farmers still working the land.  Thus, per-hectare water use – when 
comparing the same crops – fell, although some of these benefits did not 
translate into large overall water savings as farmers turned from low-water to 
high-water demand crops like pecans, alfalfa and chile peppers because of 
market forces. Still, as a response to drought and less access to water, and 
access to new monies for conservation projects, farmers did reduce hectares 
irrigated from dam water.  
 
The savings in Delicias seem to be more widespread than in Ojinaga. There was 
evidence in both official water numbers as well as in responses to the survey that 
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individual farmers had reduced their water use on a per-hectare basis for 
particular crops. Thus, many pecan farmers in Delicias had changed irrigation 
systems – adopting drip or spray irrigation systems  rather than flood irrigation – 
either as part of the conservation projects or using their own resources. Cotton 
farmers in Ojinanga – largely on advice from local vegetation control boards – 
began to grow rows of cotton closer together to get a higher yield per-unit of 
water, while some alfalfa farmers had leveled their lands for quicker and more 
efficient irrigations.  
 
In the upper basin, the participants in soil conservation projects in the 
communities of El Consuelo and Bacabureachi were optimistic about the projects 
even though results had been less than spectacular – due in large part to the 
continued lack of timely rain – but did not feel they were “coerced” into adopting 
conservation methods or that the projects were designed only to benefit 
particular members of the community. This is due in large part to the careful 
implementation of the projects by CONTEC hand-in-hand with the community. 
“Outsiders” in the community who did not participate in the projects were more 
pessimistic about the worthiness of such project, often believing that their own 
soil conservation and planting techniques were superior.  
 
In the Municipality of Bocoyna, leaders interviewed were similarly positive about 
WWF-funded efforts to better manage their natural resources, but were 
uncomfortable with the lack of funding available to actually implement the 
projects and unclear about  the future directions of the projects, including the 
relationship between WWF, local non-governmental organizations charged with 
overseeing the projects and the communities themselves. There was 
considerable fear and concern over discussions of a biosphere reserve, with 
many community leaders concerned that decisions over land and resource use 
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would be controlled by government or non-governmental entities outside the 
control or “scale” of community structures.  
 
Figure 7.8. Farmer Opinion of Soil and Water Conservation Projects by Area by 
Number of Responses 
 
 
Source: Reed, Chihuahua Land and Water Use Survey, 2005. 
 
Support for conservation and sustainability of water resources was focused more 
on the short-term need to reduce water use from the dams in a time of reduced 
supply, rather than an overall plan to live sustainable within the confines of all 
water sources – the dams, the rivers, and the shallow and deep aquifers in the 
area. The move toward sustainable use of water on the part of the government 
was complicated in Delicias by the large number of both “legal” and illegal wells, 
norias, pumping of river water and other water management strategies, with 
virtually no actual oversight or measurements of aquifer water levels. Thus, 
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assuming that the crisis in water supply led automatically to a new conservation 
ethos is a fallacy.  
 
In fact, the farmers themselves – again while nearly universally endorsing the 
need to stretch water supplies through more efficient water use by relining 
canals, installing low and high-pressure irrigation stystems and leveling farms– 
organized themselves in Ojinaga to ask for a new, bigger and better diversion 
dam to capture local rains, while farmers in Delicias – particularly wealthier 
farmers with better access to credit and government subsidies – rushed in the 
mid-1990s to dig new wells and develop new supplies when the government 
restricted access to dam water and turned off the spigot in the winter. In addition, 
farmers relying on the Francisco Madero Dam – Las Virgenes – pushed and 
supported the construction of a “Rubber Lip” – adding height to the dam outlet to 
increase total capacity.  
 
Farmers in all four surveyed areas in the two irrigation districts did not generally 
believe the water conservation projects were benefiting certain farmers rather 
than others. Nonetheless, equity concerns clearly weighed on individual farmers 
and leader’s minds. Thus, in both the Old Suacillo Canal as well as Rosales 
region, after initially approving plans to implement a wide variety of irrigation 
systems in the first year, farmers and their water user association representatives 
noted that such variety was benefiting the few at the expense of the many, and 
instead worked on more communal approaches to water conservation.  
 
It is clear that certain farmers benefited more overall from water conservation 
projects, and government projects in general. Those with private land had an 
easier time accessing credit. Government programs such as “Alianza para el 
Campo” rely on both government support and private participation so that only 
farmers with either their own funds or access to credit can afford to participate in 
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projects like individualized irrigation system. By using their water more efficiently, 
private farmers were able to either expand production or often get off of the 
“communal” water supply altogether and move toward private groundwater 
sources. In essence, the opening up funds and projects for water conservation 
helped wealthier farmers privatize water resources by tapping into deep wells 
and make their farms run more efficiently. At the same time, this move toward 
privatization was counteracted by the presence of funds for the water user 
associations to increase technology and efficiency at the communal level. 
Examples include the transformation of canals to pipes, hydrants and “tubos de 
multicompuertas” in Congregacion Ortiz, or the lining of the Old Suacillo Canal, 
which improved efficiencies for the majority of farming residents – large and 
small – in Modulo XII in the Delicias Irrigation District. Thus, benefits did not 
correspond only to larger farmers.  
 
In the Lower Rio Conchos Irrigation District, on the other hand, the water 
conservation projects seemed to favor those farmers with gravity-fed lands 
nearest the Río Conchos itself, and in particular the larger private farmers of 
Modulo I, the land along the highway leading into the municipality of Ojinaga. The 
transformation of this land into pecan orchards and alfalfa fields – while ongoing 
since the mid-1990s – was clearly aided by the water conservation project 
money. At the same time, the selling off of water rights back to the government in 
Modulo II – the Llano de Dolores Ejido that in essence disappeared between the 
2004 and 2005 growing seasons – as well as in “pumped” water areas of 
Modulos IV and V –impacted smaller ejido farmers more than larger farmers. 
Thus, the transformation of the Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District into a land 
of pecan farms and cattle feed clearly had equity implications with private 
farmers with lands near the major rivers benefiting the most.  
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Finally, in terms of governance and water conservation, while all of the Modules 
signed documents stating their willingness to give up water rights in return for 
water savings from conservation investments, they were clearly focused on 
saving water for their own needs, rather than to augment flows to the U.S. or to 
municipal users. They signed the documents, and knew it was intended to flow 
partially to the U.S. (see Figure 7.9), but they just didn’t necessarily believe that 
the promised water savings would materialize, and they generally felt they could 
use the saved water to increase production not just decrease water use (See 
Figure 7.10) 
 
Figure 7.9. Farmer Opinion on Statement that Water Conservation Projects Were 
Intended to Benefit the United States Through Increased Flows to Río Conchos 
(number of responses by category) 
 
 





Figure 7.10. Farmer Opinion on Ideas that Water Conservation Projects Could be 
Used to Expand Production (number of responses by category) 
 
 D. Social organizations, market networks and government aid: 
Glocalization revisited 
 
The research also revealed the power – or lack thereof – of social and market 
organizations. While each family farmer made decisions on their own – where 
and when to grow based upon access to land and water inputs – these decisions 
were made and influenced by networks of decision-makers. The research, while 
viewing farmers as independent actors making choices, also recognized they 
were part of larger networks which influenced and could curtail those decisions, 
as well as a “structure” – government programs, market forces and rules of trade. 
In fact, their decisions were influenced both by global and local issues and 
actors, a kind of “glocal” network of decision-makers (Swyngenouw 1997).  
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Thus, on one level, farmers who were part of an ejido might collectively make 
decisions about access to communal lands – including privatization -- or apply 
collectively for government aid. Nonetheless, other networks and decision-
making were being formed outside of this traditional structure. First of all, the 
devolution of power from CONAGUA to the Water User Associations, also known 
as “Modules” of the Irrigation District, meant that these elected bodies were 
involved in decisions affecting local farmers, including implementation of the 
water conservation projects. This created new relationships and networks 
through the Water User Association presidents and other board members with 
individual farmers interested in installing more efficient water systems. Similarly, 
the federal water rights buy back programs were organized through this structure 
of the water user associations.  
 
 
In Saucillo, the investment by a U.S. chile processor created new networks with 
farmers and the water user association, while a local cooperative allowed 
members to pool their resources and lower prices. The at least initial success of 
SEDESOL’s federal milk program was a new kind of networking approach which 
went beyond either individual farmers or ejido networks toward collective action. 
The government worked with the local cattle or dairy association to help bring 
milk to milk collection centers, bypassing the normal government-ejido 
relationship through a new private-public partnership.  
 
Most other relationships – such as the networks of chile and pecan buyers and 
sellers who contracted with individual farmers – were more fluid and dependent 
upon market conditions. It should be noted that while there were some examples 
of mutually beneficial agreements between buyers and sellers, many farmers felt 
they were at a disadvantage in the relationship. For these small farmers, they 
were often competing against a world price for their products, each other – both 
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locally and regionally -- and buyers who had the ability to pick and choose when 
and where to purchase their products. It was essentially every farmer for himself. 
 
Other farmers signed specific, longer-term contracts with companies, from the 
largest pecan producer of the Saucillo region signing a long-term contract with 
Mexico’s huge agricultural conglomerate Bimbo, to contracts between peanut 
farmers and several local peanut distributors. Several local pecan farmers also 
revealed that they had formally or informally received advice or contracts with 
U.S. growers to help them reach the export market. Farmers – usually relatives – 
also sometimes shared machinery as the district move toward technology and 
machinery. Several U.S.- connected chile importers were also forging alliances 
with local growers.  
 
The success in Delicias of local credit unions was still evidence of local farmers 
coming together to create relationships with larger market forces, while 
cooperatives like ALPURA and ALCODESA that had turned into major 
purchasers of crops in the area helped medium-sized and larger farmers 
maintain livelihoods in a time of scarcity and significant competition from U.S. 
imports.  
 
In Ojinaga, these networks were less successful.  Experiments throughout the 
period with cotton production, eucalyptus trees, pistachios, various new breeds of 
cattle and goats had ended in failure, either through local associations or existing 
ejido structures.   A nascent experiment to begin a new kind of cooperative 
modeled on other successful experiments within Mexico – and with governmental 
support – was evidence that some farmers had not given up hope on working 
through producer associations. Still, with the rise of cattle in the region, new 
relationships were being formed between local farmers and the cattle export 
center as demands for oats, sorghum and alfalfa increased. 
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In the highlands of Carichi and Bocoyna, local NGOs like CONTEC, WWF and 
Fuerza Ambiental – and local Catholic missionaries -- worked both within and 
outside of the local ejido structure, attempting to balance the need to respect 
traditional forms of social organization with the need to avoid working with 
“entrenched” leaders. Some of these relations were not focused on markets per 
se  for agricultural products but on the promise of environmental services, the 
idea that by taking care of the land, downstream users like the irrigation districts 
could be convinced to support local farmers and their incomes.  
 
The promise of this vision, however, did not necessarily match the reality of day-
to-day decisions or structures, and there was understandable suspicion of these 
possibilities, as well as with a proposal to create a biological reserve. Some local 
NGOs like CONTEC were also suspicious of such schemes, and were faced with 
the difficult reality facing local farmers in a time of limited rainfall. Attempts to 
utilize local resources like organic pesticides and fertilizers – and preserve native 
corn seeds  as well as the local eco-tourism project in Bacabureachi were all 
attempts to preserve cultural and economic livelihoods in a respectful way. What 
is apparent through the case study approach is that it is unlikely that new 
international actors like environmental organizations will abandon areas like the 
upper Río Conchos watershed, due to its importance both in terms of biodiversity 
as well as a catcher of rains. These communities – whether they wish it or not – 
have become linked with the ongoing debate over environmental services, 
climate change and biodiversity, forming new glocalized communities.  
 
IV. Afterthoughts: Water Management post-2005 
 
The resolution of the Texas-Mexico water dispute – thanks in large part to 
hurricane-aided rains in Tamaulipas and Mexico’s willingness to release waters 
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from upstream dams– did not end discussion of water management issues along 
the Río Grande. Indeed, “activity” by interested groups has continued and 
intensified since the official resolution of the treaty dispute in September of 2005 
(IBWC 2005C). While the rhetoric from the politicians has died down, the water 
conservation projects dreamed up as a solution have gone forward and were 
being implemented between 2002 and 2006 if at a reduced and less glamorous 
pace than initially contemplated and approved (IBWC 2003; BECC 2002). While 
some of the expected “gains” in water savings have not materialized, they are 
now part of a larger program being implemented by CONAGUA to make the 
irrigation districts in Mexico more “sustainable,” and find a way for the growing 
industrial and municipal water needs to meet their demands (Elías Calderon, 
Lower Río Conchos Irrigation District, personal communication with author, 
2005).  
 
In 2004, CONAGUA contracted with analysts from the decentralized Instituto 
Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua (IMTA) (Mexican Water Technology Institute) 
to assess the water conservation projects, but also to make recommendations on 
how best to manage irrigation districts in a more sustainable fashion, including 
the districts in Chihuahua. While the seeds to begin to look at water use and 
management clearly predate the water dispute with the U.S., the political capital 
to go forward with the IMTA analysis were given impetus from the dispute over 
the lack of water, as was the government program to buy back water rights from 
farmers as a means to “shrink” the amount of land that could be irrigated 
(Calderón 2005).  Thus, as a result of the decision to invest monies in the 
irrigation districts of Chihuahua to “save” water to help assure flow back in the 
Conchos, CONAGUA and other officials have taken a much broader and active 
look at sustainable water use in the irrigation districts.  
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As such, following the decision in the mid-1990s to decentralize the irrigation 
districts through the creation of the water user associations, favoring local 
control, CONAGUA in a sense is attempting to reassert its “control” over overall 
water use and water management through implementation of water management 
plans, conservation projects and buy-back schemes. In some sense, more 
research and attention needs to be devoted to studying the benefits and 
drawbacks of decentralization and privatization of water resources in the 
irrigation districts of Northern Mexico and the appropriate role of government 
oversight. Clearly, the present research suggests the experiment has been a 
mixed success, with more attention to short-term conservation and more 
equitable distribution of the resource and democratic decision-making, but 
considerable difficulty in obtaining sufficient resources or training to more 
efficiently run the districts. This research also clearly suggests that larger farmers 
have benefited more from decentralization.  
 
The attention of academic and environmental organizations on the Sierra 
Tarahumara and wider Conchos watershed has also continued. WWF’s 
Chihuahuan office continued to look at watershed restoration both at the local 
scale of individual ejidos but also at the larger dream of having irrigation districts 
and municipalities downstream pay upstream land managers to keep the forests 
and soils intact. In 2006, the Mexican arm of WWF worked on passage of a new 
state-level water law in Chihuahua that would more explicitly recognize the water 
needs of the environment and allow for more flexible programs to protect 
upstream land as a fundamental part of water management, as well as an effort 
to have the Government of Mexico sign the United Nation’s Convention on the 
Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which similarly 
recognizes the ecological role that transnational rivers like the Río Conchos and 
Río San Pedro play (WWF 2006).  
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The minutes – amendments to the 1944 Water Treaty -- passed through the 
IBWC to help resolve the water dispute continued a push for the IBWC to 
consider binational water management policies and move beyond their more 
technical, legal role (Browning-Aiken et. al.  2004). In particular, the call in Minute 
309 for a drought management plan and for a panel of “experts” on water 
management led directly to the Río Grande Binational summit held in McAllen in 
November of 2005 (IBWC 2003; IBWC 2006). The summit was not the first or 
last conference on water management issues on the Río Grande sponsored by 
official government sectors, nor did it lead to major policies decisions or shifts, 
but the sponsorship and presence of high-level IBWC, CILA, CONAGUA, State 
Department and other officials so immediately after resolution of the water 
dispute indicated a new willingness to engage civil society on these issues. The 
participation of large and small farmers from Chihuahua to Tamaulipas allowed 
these farmers to view their water management policies and practices not as a 
local decision-making process, but part of a wider management issue that 
impacted farmers throughout the Rio Grande basin.  
 
The water dispute also created the expectation for more funding and attention on 
water management issues between the two countries. While expectations have 
been tempered against the very real drain of political attention and monies to the 
“War on Terror,” a number of projects throughout the wider Rio Grande basin 
have begun to assess and implement better water management practices.  
 
Thus, in 2000, the U.S. Congress passed the Lower Río Grande Conservation 
Act, which provided $10 million in grant funding to help local irrigation districts in 
South Texas to make their management and use of Río Grande water more 
efficient, an effort that was coordinated with the Irrigation District Engineering and 
Assistance Program (IDEA) at Texas A & M. These funds helped bolster the 
monies also provided by the North American Development Bank to improve 
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efficiencies on the U.S. side of the border in irrigation districts (Dr. Guy Fipps, 
Texas A & M, personal communication with author, 2006). Congress also funded 
the Río Grande Basin Initiative in 2001, which is run by the Texas A&M 
University Agriculture Program and the New Mexico State University College of 
Agriculture and Home Economics Department. The RGBI, which involves a 
variety of agricultural extension programs and universities in Texas and New 
Mexico, is divided into nine “tasks” – ranging from basin wide hydrology and the 
design of GIS layers for the basin and even on-farm irrigation technology – and 
the project received funding every year from the U.S. Congress between FY 
2001 and FY 2006, enacting a number of projects (Texas Water Resources 
Institute 2007). While focused mainly on the U.S. side of the border, they have 
involved collaborations with Mexican academics. 
 
A separate but related effort has been the “Sustainable Agriculture Water 
Conservation in the Río Grande” Project operated through the Texas State 
University System. Funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the SAWC is a 
dizzying number of project which range from physical assessments of the Río 
Grande’s middle section – sometimes called the Forgotten River – to 
characterizations of groundwater to surveys of ecologies and land use (River 
Systems Institute 2006).  
 
Somewhat related to this effort is another project led by universities, NGOs and 
some governmental entities. Known as the "Physical Assessment Project,” the 
Natural Heritage Institute in California describes it as  “a collaboration among 
non-governmental organizations and universities on both sides of the border to 
illuminate the potential for solutions that transcend the boundaries of the 
management units into which the basin has been traditionally divided.” (Natural 
Heritage Institute 2001). 
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Finally, in 2005, UNAM – Mexico’s largest university – developed a project with 
Texas State University and Mexico’s federal water authorities – CONAGUA – to 
seek funding from the United Nations Development Program’s Global 
Environment Facility (UNDP GEF), an arm of the United Nations which was 
created in 1991 as a means to fund “sustainable” environmental projects. 
Because one of their project categories is “International Waters,” the proposed 
projects seeks to create the institutional means to implement transboundary 
solutions that move beyond the narrow confines of the 1944 International Water 
Treaty and IBWC’s traditional role (River Systems Institute 2006).  
 
While the initial application asked for only $50,000 to create a background 
document and convene a region-wide meeting, which was held in 2006, the 
ultimate goal of the UN-funded project is much greater and would require greater 
funding. According to the initial 2005 application:  
 
To this end, this proposal seeks to develop a framework for the 
coordinated management of the entire Río Bravo drainage basin in 
a sustainable manner, based upon an agreement between the two 
countries, and establishment of an appropriate institutional 
framework.  It is viewed as the necessary initial step for the joint 
development, elements and implementation of a long-term 
binational plan to meet future human and ecosystem water 
demands on both sides of the border in the Río Bravo drainage 
basin in a sustainable manner, as well as for development of 
possible short-term, interim measures and actions to meet current 
and near-future water shortages. (Rivers Systems Institute 2005).  
 
V. Institutional Framework for Future Disputes 
 
Whatever the worth or ultimate outcome of these various efforts, it is clear that 
the water quantity dispute raised awareness, funding and interest in water 
management issues along the U.S.-Mexico border. The Rivers Systems 
Institute/UNAM application, whether ultimately fully funded or not, as well as the 
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Rio Grande Basin Initiative and Sustainable Agriculture Water Conservation in 
the Río Grande all have the ultimate goal of moving to a watershed approach to 
resolve issues of water management that would move beyond the more legalistic 
role of the IBWC.  
 
They also raise the question of whether the institutional mechanisms currently 
exist to “handle” future droughts and disputes between the two countries over 
water quantity. They clearly propound that the current institutional regimes and 
mechanisms do not. The projects are aimed at regionalizing decisions about 
water management or at least considering more scientifically how individual 
management decisions affect the wider river and riverbasin. In some sense, they 
suggest a further regionalization of decision-making may be necessary and 
inevitable as individual decisions are put through the microscope of the wider 
watershed and treaty compliance, and may result in a further layer of control over 
natural resource use.  
 
Thinking historically, natural resource decisions made in the Río Conchos 
watershed were once primarily local in nature;  became more regional with the 
building of dams, the creation of irrigation districts, and the implementation of the 
1944 International Water Treaty; and finally the more recent efforts are aimed at 
creating a kind of supra-regional network of decision-makers mutually reinforcing 
and influencing water management decisions. Even the decision to involve the 
treaty compliance agencies in an effort at drought management and water 
conservation – if only in an oversight capacity – is truly historic and represents an 
emerging role.  
 
Still, the resolution of the transboundary environmental resource between the 
U.S. and Mexico in 2005 was partial at best. Indeed, even with more releases in 
the 2005-2006 period, and the water savings from water conservation projects, 
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Mexico was still slightly behind meeting the five-year 2002-2007 cycle in mid-
2007, and a conscious effort to release waters was needed to meet the 2007 
water debt. Ultimately, even contemplating a more regional water management 
plan is difficult to imagine given the competing local interests of the Rio Grande 
and its tributaries, and the decentralized nature of water management in both 
countries, as well as the apparent realization that global and regional climate 
change is likely to stress the watershed even more no matter what local entities 
do in terms of water use.  
 
For the moment, decisions about natural resource use can still be thought of 
neither local, regional or international, but a continual process that stretches 
among these geographic scales of production. The slow recognition of a 
riverbasin as a distinct geographic space for decision-making will still operate 
within this “glocalized” sphere, where networks of producers influence and are 
influenced by government subsidies, market prices, international investors, 
export opportunities, and local biophysical processes, including rainfall, itself 
impacted by wider climactic change. At the end of the day, it is still the individual 
farmer deciding which crop to plant, or whether to pack up and leave for a 
different kind of life.  
 
Still, the basic contradiction between local decentralized decision-making  and 
the wider “needs” of the entire watershed – particularly in drought-like conditions 
– are not unattainable. The attention to water conservation, infrastructure 
improvements and efficiencies and land use changes are all a welcome addition 
to the discussion over water use. Yet without proper oversight and training and 
assurance of proper and appropriate technology – culturally, technically and 
economically – such projects may not offer long-term solutions. Thus, the reality 
of a growing municipal population with municipal needs would require that water 
management solutions must involve the urban sector as well. In addition, a new 
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institutional framework to respond to future droughts would need to take into 
account the economic and market realities – and social networks that underpin 
such realities – and thus have significant flexibility. Farmers can not be expected 
to grow low-water demand crops if neither the markets nor the social and 
economic relations exist to make such crops work for their livelihoods.  
 
It is also clear that the failure of either local management plans – including the 
recent IMTA efforts to come up with management plans for the Mexican irrigation 
district – as well as the IBWC management framework essentially ignore half the 
problem – the local and transboundary aquifers which are hydrologically 
connected to the Rio Grande and its tributaries. Thus, water management 
decisions must incorporate the existence and proper management of 
groundwater as well, a task for which the present institutional framework simply 
does not exist though recognition and initial analysis and studies of aquifers have 
occurred (Mumme and Aguilar Barajas 2003).  
 
Other issues that the present framework does not adequately address in a 
wholesale fashion are the non-traditional users of water – the ecological habitat 
formed by the river that as WWF states is the lifeblood of the Chihuahuan desert 
(WWF 2004), as well as water quality. That is not to say there has been no action 
on these issues, including a major effort to restore flows in the so-called 
“Forgotten River” stretch between Fort Quitman and Presidio, where the Rio 
Grande is a denuded, tamarisk-infested shade of its former glory, as well as a 
series of studies throughout the 1990s looking at water quality of the Río Grande 
and of course, through the BECC/NADBANK framework, hundreds of millions of 
dollars spent for new wastewater treatment plants throughout the Border, 
responding to concerns about both health and water quality (Kelly, Reed and 
Taylor 2002). But neither the 1944 Treaty and subsequent minutes through the 
IBWC/CILA framework nor the BECC/NADBANK framework adequately address 
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in any fundamental way such “sustainable” concepts as water quality or non-
traditional uses of water as part of overall water management (Mumme and 
Barajas 2003: 69-73). 
 
Thus, this work’s title. For the efforts at water conservation in the irrigation 
districts of the Río Conchos watershed as well as the efforts at land stewardship 
in the upper Río Conchos watershed were always only partial resolutions, more 
products of the reaction to a temporal climate crisis than a fundamental change 
in land or water use toward sustainable development or drought management 
planning or a response to the political demands of the natural resource users. 
The willingness of farmers in all three areas surveyed to initiate and adapt to 
changes involving resource use is a hopeful sign. Nonetheless, to get to a more  
fundamental change, than the users themselves – the farmers of the Río 
Conchos – must be given the tools and markets to make the changes work for 
their needs as well as those of the wider basin, while the institutional framework 
must be expanded to deal with extended drought, groundwater, non-traditional 
uses of water and water quality and initiate a longer-term drought management 
regime.  Only then could true “resolution” of disputes between the two countries 




Appendix A: Copies of Survey Instrument Used in 2005 (Spanish only) 
Encuesta sobre el uso del agua y la tierra en Chihuahua, 2005 
 
Gracias por participar en esta encuesta sobre el uso del agua y la tierra en Chihuahua.  Como queda de 
manifiesto en la página adjunta – el documento en el que nos da su consentimiento – el propósito de este 
estudio es terminar una disertación para el Departamento de Geografía de la Universidad de Texas en 
Austin.  El tema de la disertación es el cambio en el uso de la tierra y el agua en la cuenca del Río Conchos, 
particularmente en respuesta a la reciente escasez de agua, problemas con el manejo del agua y la disputa 
entre los Estados Unidos y México por el agua.  Si bien yo le invito a que participe en esta encuesta, la 
decisión es suya.  Si decide participar, puede contestar sólo las preguntas que desee.  En todos los casos, su 
nombre individual no será usado en relación con la encuesta, y sus respuestas serán completamente 
confidenciales.  Sólo se presentarán resúmenes de las respuestas a la encuesta en conferencias y en la 
disertación.  Esta encuesta podrá tomar aproximadamente una hora para ser contestada. 
 
1. ¿Es usted dueño o usuario de algún terreno en el que se hayan cultivado productos agrícolas en los 
últimos 10 años? 
 
Sí ____       No_________ 
 
 
Si no, gracias por su tiempo.  No es necesario continuar. 
 
Si contestó que sí, prosiga. 
 
Sección A. INFORMACIÓN DEMOGRÁFICA BÁSICA 
 
1. Sexo: M_____ F_____ 
 
2. Año de nacimiento:    ___________________ 
 
 
3. Lugar de nacimiento: Chihuahua____  (Si es Chihuahua, vaya a la sección B) 
Otro ___                (Si es otro, proceda al 4) 
 
 
4. Si no nació en Chihuahua, ¿en dónde nació? 
 
Otro estado de México ______ 
Por favor anote el estado _____ 
Otro país _________________ 
Por favor anote el país_______ 
 
 
5. Si no nació en Chihuahua, ¿cuándo se mudó al estado de Chihuahua? 
 
     Año aproximado _________ 
 





SECCIÓN B. PROPIEDAD DE LA TIERRA 
 
7. ¿Es usted dueño de propiedad PRIVADA en Chihuahua? Sí _______ Si sí, proceda al 8. 
       No _____ Si no, proceda al 17. 
 
8. Si contestó que sí, ¿cuándo adquirió la propiedad?   Año aproximado _________ 
9. ¿La propiedad se encuentra dentro de los límites de un distrito de riego? Sí ____ No____ 
10. Si contestó que sí, ¿cómo se llama el distrito de riego así como el módulo? 
      Distrito ______________  Módulo _________________ 
11. ¿De qué cantidad total de terreno es usted dueño en Chihuahua? Cantidad en hectáreas ______ 
 
12. ¿Qué cantidad de la propiedad se usa actualmente para producción agrícola?  Cantidad en hectáreas___ 
13. ¿Qué cantidad de la propiedad se usa actualmente para producción ganadera?  Cantidad en 
hectáreas___ 
  
14. ¿Toda su tierra está en un solo terreno, o está separada en diferentes áreas o lotes? 
Un solo terreno _____ En diferentes lotes _____ 
15. Si está localizada en diferentes áreas o lotes, por favor describa ____________ 
 
16. ¿Es usted miembro de un Ejido? Sí ______ Si contestó que sí, vaya al 17 
     No _____ Si contestó que no, vaya al 22 
 
17. ¿Cómo se llama el Ejido?  _____________________ 
18. ¿En que año se hizo miembro del Ejido?  ________________ 
19. Dentro del Ejido, ¿qué cantidad de la propiedad total usa usted individualmente?  
      Cantidad en hectáreas ______ 
20. Dentro del Ejido, ¿qué cantidad de la propiedad total usa usted comunalmente?  
      Cantidad en hectáreas ______ 
21. ¿Qué cantidad de la tierra ejidal total está actualmente en producción agrícola?   
      Cantidad en hectáreas ______ 
22. ¿Qué cantidad de la propiedad se usa actualmente para producción ganadera?  
     Cantidad en hectáreas ______ 
 
23. ¿Es usted miembro de una Colonia/Colono? Sí ______ Vaya al 24 
      No _____ Vaya al 30 
24. ¿Cómo se llama la Colonia/Colono?  _____________________ 
25. ¿En que año se hizo miembro de la Colonia?  ________________ 
26. Dentro de la Colonia, ¿qué cantidad de la propiedad total usa usted individualmente?  
      Cantidad en hectáreas ______ 
27. Dentro de la Colonia, ¿qué cantidad de la propiedad total usa usted comunalmente? 
      Cantidad en hectáreas ______ 
28. ¿Qué cantidad de la tierra total de la Colonia está actualmente en producción agrícola?  
      Cantidad en hectáreas ______ 
29. ¿Qué cantidad de la propiedad se usa actualmente para producción ganadera?  




SECCIÓN C.  USO DE LA TIERRA 
 
30. Actualmente, ¿usted arrienda o renta tierra de otro dueño para uso agrícola?  Sí ___ No ___ 
Si Sí:  Cantidad de tierra:  _____ Hectáreas 
31 ¿Cuánto tiempo tiene rentando tierra de otro dueño?  ______________________________ 
32. ¿Cuál es el costo aproximado de arrendar la tierra de otra persona?  _____________________ 
33. En el pasado, ¿ha arrendado tierra de otro dueño para usos agrícolas?   Sí ___ No ___ 
   Si Sí:  Cantidad de tierra:  _____ Hectáreas 
34. ¿En qué años usted arrendó la tierra?  ___________ 
35. ¿Cuál fue el costo aproximado de arrendar la tierra?  _____________________ 
36. Actualmente, ¿está usted arrendando su propia tierra a otro usuario agrícola para producción?   
Sí ___ No ___ 
37. Si sí, ¿cuál es la cantidad total de tierra que está arrendando a otro usuario?   
Cantidad en hectáreas _____________ 
38. ¿Cuándo comenzó a arrendar esta tierra al usuario actual?  ________ 
39. ¿Cuál es la ganancia aproximada que usted obtiene por arrendar su tierra?  __________ 
40. En el pasado, ¿ha usted arrendado su tierra a otro usuario para uso agrícola?  Sí ___ No ___ 
       Si sí, cantidad de tierra ___________ 
41. ¿En qué años arrendó su tierra?  ______________ 
42. ¿Cuál fue su ganancia aproximada por arrendar su tierra?  _______ 
43. En la tierra de la que usted es dueño o que usted trabaja, ¿qué cultivos tiene actualmente o planea tener 








































        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        





44. De los cultivos que usted tiene, ¿qué porcentaje es para consumo personal, cuánto para consumo directo 




Consumo personal Consumo de 
ganado 
 
Mercado doméstico Mercado de 
exportación 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
  
  
45. Para la presente temporada agrícola, ¿qué opina usted que será su producción total, comparada con años 
anteriores? 
 
Muy buena _____ Buena ____ Regular ____ Mala ______ Muy mala ________ 
 
46. Para la presente temporada agrícola, ¿qué opina usted de su producción total, por cultivos 
individuales, comparada con el año pasado? 
Cultivo Muy buena Buena Regular Mala Muy mala 
      
      
      
      
      
 
   
   
47. Durante los últimos 10 años, ¿han habido cambios significativos en las cantidades y tipos de cultivos 
que tiene? 
Sí _____________ Por favor llene 48, 49, 50 y 51 




48. Voy a mencionar cambios que podría haber occurido en sus terrenos. Por favor marque y califique hasta 
qué grado han sido importantes los siguientes cambios en los últimos 10 años. Responda a toda los factores.  
 
  
A un grado alto 
 
A un grado 
mediano 
 










total de tierra 
de cultivo 
     
Aumento de la 
cantidad total 
de tierra de 
cultivo 
     
  
Reducción de 
la cantidad de 
tierra de 
cultivo, pero 
aumento de la 
producción en 
el mismo  
terreno 
     
Abandono de 
los terrenos de 
cultivo y de 
agricultura 
     
Renta de 
terrenos a otros 
     
  
Cambio de 
granos a frutas 
y verduras 

















     
  
Uso de cultivos 
más resistentes 
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a la sequía 
  
Uso de cultivos 
modificados 
genéticamente 
     
  
Aumento en el  
uso de 
fertilizantes 
     
  
Disminución 
en el uso de 
fertilizantes 
     
  
Disminución 
del uso de 
pesticidas 





     
  
Aumento en el  
uso de 
pesticidas 
     
  
Uso de cultivos 
más resistentes 
a los pesticidas 
     
Cambio en 
fuente de agua 
     
  
Cambio en el 
uso de la tierra, 
de producción 
agrícola  a 
producción 
ganadera 





     
Uso de Menos 
Mano de Obra 
     
Uso de Mas 
Mano de Obra 
(Jornaleros) 
     
 
  
49. Por favor mencione otros factores             _______________________________________ 
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50. ¿Cuáles han sido los factores más importantes para los cambios en los tipos y cantidades de sus cultivos 
que ha hecho?  Por favor marque todos los que sean aplicables. 
 
  
A un grado 
alto 
 
A un grado 
mediano 
 






No se aplica 
  
Precio de los 
productos 
agrícolas 




     
  
Sequía 
     
Falta de apoyo 
del gobierno 




     
 Acceso a 
mercados 
internacionales 


























     
  
Problemas de 
tenencia de la 
tierra/acceso a 
la tierra 








SECCIÓN D.  DERECHOS Y USO DEL AGUA 
 
52. ¿Actualmente riega usted sus cultivos con agua (además de sólo agua de lluvia)?   
Sí ___ Vaya a la siguiente pregunta.   
No ____ Pase a la pregunta 66 
 
  
53. Si sí, ¿de dónde viene el agua?  Marque todas las que se apliquen, dando le prioridad de más importante 
a menos importante. 
  Subterránea de un pozo privado o comunal _________________ 
  Agua de la superficie, por un canal o por tubería de irrigación ________ 
  Almacenamiento del agua de lluvia en la superficie ___________ 
  Canal directo de un río/presa _______________________________ 
  Otro________________________ 
 
54. Por favor describa cómo hace llegar el agua a sus terrenos actualmente.  
 
55. En la última década, ¿ha cambiado la fuente de suministro de su agua?  Sí _____ No _____ 
56. Si contestó que sí, por favor describa ________________________________ 
57. ¿Actualmente es usted propietario de derechos sobre el agua?  Sí _____ No ______ 
58. Si contestó que sí, ¿cuál es la cantidad total de derechos sobre agua que usted tiene? __________ 
59. ¿cuál es la cantidad total de millares que le correspondía por derecho este año agrícolo? 
60. ¿Cuál es la mayor cantidad de derechos sobre el agua que le han proporcionado en los últimos 15 años, 
en Millares?  ____________________ Millares 
61. ¿Aproximadamente en qué año ocurrió eso?    Año ________________ 
62. ¿Cuánto le cobran actualmente por cada Millar/derecho de agua que recibe?  
____________________Pesos 
63. ¿Cuánto es lo menos que ha pagado por Millar?  _____________Pesos 
64. ¿En qué año ocurrió eso?  Año _____________ 
65. ¿Cuánto es lo más que ha llegado a pagar por Millar?  _____________Pesos 
66. ¿En qué año ocurrió eso?  Año _____________ 
67. ¿Alguna vez ha comprado derechos de agua de otros agricultores? Si ______   No______ 
68. Si si, ¿en que año?      Año _____________ 
69. ¿Cuanto pagó?  
70. ¿Alguna vez ha vendido derechos de agua a otro?   Si ________    No_________ 
71. Si si, ¿en que año?      Año _____________ 
72. ¿Cuanto pagó?                __________________ 
73. ¿Qué tecnologías usa actualmente para hacer llegar el agua a sus campos? 
 
74ª. ¿Cuántas veces durante al año agrícola regó o va a regar sus cultivos este año? Llene lo siguiente 
 
Cultivo Num de 
Aplicaciónes de 
Agua 
Cantidad de Agua 
por Aplicación  
Num de 
Aplicaciones de 
Agua en Año en 
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75. Para los que sólo usan agua de lluvia para regar sus campos, por favor describa lo que hace en su tierra 
para asegurarse que sus cultivos reciban el agua adecuada. 
76. ¿Ha hecho usted algún cambio en años recientes para asegurar que el agua de lluvia llegue a sus 
cultivos? 
 
SECCIÓN E.  IMPACTOS DE LA SEQUÍA 
77. Es su opinión, en los últimos 15 años, ¿ha habido una sequía en su área? 
Sí _____ No _____ 
78. Si contestó que sí, ¿cómo calificaría la severidad de esta sequía? 
La peor     Muy mala  Similar a otras sequías  
No tan mala como en otros períodos No fue un gran problema 





A un grado 
alto 
 
A un grado 
mediano 
 







No se aplica 
 Sequía      
 Uso 
ineficiente del 




     
Contaminación 
del agua 
     





     
Salinización/ 
Erosión de los 
suelos 





y ríos  




urbanos y de 
otros tipos 
     




     
El alto costo de 
la agua 
     
 Los Estados 
Unidos exigen 
más agua 
     
Cedro Salado      
 612 
80. Por favor mencione otros factores. 
 
SECCIÓN F. PROYECTOS DE CONSERVACIÓN 
 
Esta sección incluye una serie de temas relacionados con el uso del agua y la participación en proyectos 
dirigidos a la conservación del agua. 
 
81. ¿Usted está participando actualmente, o ha participado, en algún proyecto de conservación del agua? 
 Sí ________________  No ________    
 
82. ¿El proyecto de conservación del agua se está implementando en su campo/terreno, dentro del módulo 
o en un distrito completo?  Marque todas las que se aplican. 
 
Distrito _________Módulo_____________Terreno individual___________ 
 
83. En los proyectos de conservación del agua para el módulo o distrito, ¿qué tanta participación tuvo 
usted? 
 
Mucha, yo lo determiné 
Una poca; me dijeron qué hacer, pero cambié algunas cosas 




84. Si el proyecto de conservación del agua está en su terreno, ¿qué tanta participación tuvo usted? 
 
Mucha, yo lo determiné 
Una poca; me dijeron qué hacer, pero cambié algunas cosas 




85ª. Hicieron bien el proyecto? 
 
Muy Bien      Bien       Normal      Mal        Muy Mal  
 
 




86. Por favor dé su opinión sobre qué tan eficientemente se usa el agua en su área. 
 
  
Uso del agua 
muy eficiente 
 





El uso del agua 













usted usa el 
agua 
eficientemente 
     
  
Califique hasta 
qué grado sus 
vecinos usan el 
agua 
eficientemente 
     
Califique hasta 
qué grado el 
módulo usa el 
agua 
eficientemente 
     
  
Califique hasta 
qué grado el 
distrito usa el 
agua 
eficientemente 








De acuerdo en 
grado alto 
 
De acuerdo en 
grado mediano 
 
No estoy de 









en grado alto 
  
Usar menos agua 






     
  
Los proyectos de 
conservación del 
agua nos 
ayudarán a usar 
el agua más 
eficientemente, 
para poder tener 
más cultivos 
     
  
Los proyectos de 
conservación del 
agua tienen 










     
Los proyectos de 
conservación del 




agricultores, no a 
todos   
     
  
Los proyectos de 
conservación del 
agua tienen 
como fin darle 
más agua a los 
Estados Unidos 






88. ¿Hay actualmente una disputa entre los Estados Unidos y México acerca del agua que fluye de los 
Estados Unidos hacia México? 
Sí _____  No _____ No sé _____ 
  
89. ¿Qué entiende usted sobre la disputa que hay actualmente entre los Estados Unidos y México por el 
agua?  Por favor encierre en un círculo sus respuestas que sean aplicables. 
 
La deuda del agua ha sido pagada.  No se ha llegado a ningún acuerdo.  
 
 La deuda del agua no ha sido pagada, pero se ha llegado a un acuerdo.    
 
No tengo conocimiento sobre la disputa. 
 
SECCIÓN G.  LOS IMPACTOS DEL LIBRE COMERCIO 
 
90. Desde que entró en vigor el tratado de libre comercio con los Estados Unidos y Canadá en 1994, 
algunos analistas dicen que ha habido cambios importantes en los precios, acceso y propiedad de la tierra. 
 
¿Cree que el TLC ha sido un beneficio para usted como productor agrícola? 
 
 Un gran beneficio 
 Un pequeño beneficio 
Neutral 
Una pequeña desventaja 
Una gran desventaja 
 
 




92. ¿Usted exporta algún producto agrícola a los Estados Unidos?  Sí_____ No _____ 
 
93. ¿Usted importa insumos o materiales agrícolas de los Estados Unidos?  Sí_____ No _____ 
 
SECCIÓN H.  OPINIÓN SOBRE LAS ORGANIZACIONES, GOBIERNOS 
94. En sus campos agrícolas, ¿cuáles organizaciones le han dado ayuda, consejos o financiamiento a hacer 
cambios a sus terrenos?  Por favor encierre en un círculo las que sean aplicables. 
Comisión Nacional de Agua 
Sanidad Vegetal  
Secretaria de Agricultura 
SEMARNAT 
Comisión para la Cooperación Ambiental para la Frontera 
Banco Norteamericano de Desarrollo 
Otra organización gubernamental    Nombre ____________________ 
Organización no gubernamental    Nombre ____________________ 
Compañía privada     Nombre ____________________ 
Banco privado      Nombre ____________________ 
Asociación o módulo de irrigación    Nombre ____________________ 
Ejido        Nombre ____________________ 
Organización del gobierno de los Estados Unidos  Nombre ____________________ 
Organización no gubernamental de los Estados Unidos  Nombre ___________________ 
Otro       Nombre ____________________ 
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96. Por favor describa cómo le han ayudado, o no, estas organizaciones. 
 
 
97. Ha sido un beneficio la transferencia del distrito de CONAGUA a los Modulos? Porque?  
 
Gran Beneficio   
Pequeño Beneficio           
Neutral          
Pequeño Desventaja        
Gran Desventaja 
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Appendix B: Letter of Informed Consent to Participate in English and Spanish 
Informed Consent to Participate in Research 
The University of Texas at Austin 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  This form provides you with information 
about the study. The Principal Investigator (the person in charge of this research) will also 
describe this study to you and answer all of your questions. Please read the information below 
and ask questions about anything you don’t understand before deciding whether or not to take 
part. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you can refuse to participate. Any answers or 
information you provide will be confidential and anonymous and no statements will be attributed 
to you. .   
 
Title of Research Study:  Changing Land and Water Practices in the Agricultural Fields of the 
Rio Conchos (Chihuahua) Watershed: Conservation, Water Rights and Communal Lands 
in a Time of Drought and Free Trade 
 
Principal Investigator(s) (include faculty sponsor), UT affiliation, and Telephone Number(s):   
Cyrus Reed, a P.H.D student in the Department of Geography  at the University of Texas in Austin, 
Texas, is the Principal Investigator of this study. His home address is 4205 Ave. F, Austin, Texas 
78751. His home number is 512-419-7260.  
 
Professor Gregory Knapp is the supervising sponsor. He is the Chairman of the Department of 
Geography at the University of Texas in Austin.  
 
His address is: University of Texas at Austin, Department of Geography, 210 W. 24th St. Austin, 




The study is being funded by personal finances as well as some funding from the University of 
Texas, including a grant from the Mexico Center (E.D. Farmer Research Fellowship). It is not 
receiving funds from any private business or foundation.  
 
What is the purpose of this study?  [ Please include the number of subjects] 
 
Cyrus Reed is conducting research for his PHD. He will be conducting research on land use, water 
use, water conservation and crop production  along the Rio Conchos. The study has four basic 
objectives: 
 
(1) Analyze basic hydrological and meteorological data over the last ten to fifteen years 
within the Rio Conchos Basin; (2) Analyze ownership and use of land and water over the 
last 10 years within the Rio Conchos Basin; (3) Investigate how the reduced amount of 
water available has impacted the ownership, control and use of water and land resources 
within particular agricultural communities; and  (4) Investigate how local resource users 





What will be done if you take part in this research study? 
 
Your answers will help determine the findings of this study. However, no individual answers will 
be made publicly available. Instead, answers will be summarized and analyzed without attributing 
them to an individual.  
 
What are the possible discomforts and risks? 
 
There are no known risks for participating in this study.  
What are the possible benefits to you or to others? 
 
The benefit of this study will be to learn to what extent the efforts to improve production and 
lower water use are working. This information will be presented at conferences and to policy 
makers.  
If you choose to take part in this study, will it cost you anything? 
 
No. There is no cost to take part in this study.  
Will you receive compensation for your participation in this study? 
 
No. There is no compensation for participating in this study.  
 
If you do not want to take part in this study, what other options are available to you? 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You are free to refuse to be in the study, 
and your refusal will not influence current or future relationships with The University of 
Texas at Austin. 
 
How can you withdraw from this research study and who should I call if I have questions? 
 
You are free to withdraw your consent and stop participation in this research study at any time. You 
are free to refuse to answer any questions you do not want to answer. Throughout the study, the 
researchers will notify you of new information that may become available and that might affect 
your decision to remain in the study. If you wish to stop your participation in this research study for 
any reason, you should contact:  Professor Gregory Knapp at the University of Texas at (512) 232-
1589.    
 
In addition, if you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact 
Clarke A. Burnham, Ph.D., Chair, The University of Texas at Austin Institutional Review Board 
for the Protection of Human Subjects, 512/232-4383. 
 
How will your privacy and the confidentiality of your research records be protected? 
 
Authorized persons from The University of Texas at Austin and the Institutional Review Board 
have the legal right to review your research records and will protect the confidentiality of those 
records to the extent permitted by law.  If the research project is sponsored then the sponsor also has 
the legal right to review your research records. Otherwise, your research records will not be released 
 619 
without your consent unless required by law or a court order. If the results of this research are 
published or presented at scientific meetings, your identity will not be disclosed. 
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Consentimiento para participar en un estudio académico de investigación 
 
The University of Texas at Austin (Universidad de Texas en Austin) 
 
Le está pidiendo ser participante en un estudio de investigación. Esta forma le provee 
información sobre el estudio. El Investigador Principal (el encargado del estudio) también 
describirá el estudio y responderá a cualquier pregunta o duda sobre el estudio. Favor de leer la 
información abajo, preguntar sobre cualquier duda que se tenga antes de decidir a participar o no. 
Su participación es voluntaria y puede rehusarse a participar. Cualquier respuesta o información 
que provea será confidencial y anoníma y no se atribuirá ninguna palabra a su persona.  
 
Nombre del Estudio de Investigación:  Prácticas de Uso de Suelo y Agua en la Agricultura de la 
Cuenca del Río Conchos: Conservación, Derechos de Agua y Tierras Comunales Durante 
Sequía, Libre Comercio y la Disputa de Agua entré Estados Unidos y México  
 
 (Changing Land and Water Practices in the Agricultural Fields of the Rio Conchos 
(Chihuahua) Watershed: Conservation, Water Rights and Communal Lands in a Time of 
Drought,  Free Trade and Water Dispute 
 
Investigador Principal, Afiliación e Teléfono:  
Cyrus Bayard Hutchins Reed es un estudiante de doctorado en el Departamento de Geografía y 
Ambiente en la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Es el investigador principal del estudio. Su 
dirección en Austin es 4205 Ave. F, Austin, Texas 78751. Su número de telefóno es el  512-419-
7260 y su celular es el 512-740-4086. Su e-mail es cyrus_reed@mail.utexas.edu. 
 
El Dr. Gregory Knapp es el supervisor del proyecto. Es profesor del departamento de 
Geografía en la Universidad de Texas.  
 
Su dirección es: University of Texas at Austin, Department of Geography, 210 W. 24th St. 
Austin, TX, 78712. Su número de teléfono es: (512) 232-1589. Su e-mail es el 
gwk@mail.utexas.edu. 
 
Fuente de Financiamiento: 
 
El estudio es financiado con una beca (E.D. Farmer Research Fellowship) del Centro Mexicano de 
la Universidad de Texas en Austin y finanzas personales. No hay fondos de fundaciones o negocio 
privado. 
 
Cual son los objetivos del estudio?    
 
Cyrus Reed está emprendiendo una investigación para su doctorado en  geografía. El estudio se 
centra en un estudio del uso de suelo, agua, conservación de agua y producción de cosechas 
durante los últimos 10 años en la Cuenca del Río Conchos. Tiene cuatro objetivos básicos: 
 
(1) Analizar datos hidrológicos y meteorológicos de los últimos 10 a 15 años en la cuenca del Río 
Conchos: (2) Analizar tenencia y uso de tierra y agua en los últimos 10 a 15 años en la cuenca del 
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Río Conchos; (3) Investigar como la escasez de agua ha impactado la tenencia, control y uso de 
agua y tierra adentro de comunidades agrícolas particulares; (4) Investigar como los usarios de 
agua y tierra han respondido a los programas de conservación de agua y suelo.  
 
Que pasa si participa en el estudio?  
 
Sus respuestas ayudarán a determinar los resultados del estudio. Sin embargo, ninguna participación 
o respuesta individual será disponible al público. En cambio, las respuestas serán analizadas sin 
atribuirlas a alguien en particular.  
 
Hay riesgos en participar?  
No hay ningun riesgo en participar que se conozca como sus respuestas serán anónimas. 
 
Cuales son los beneficios? 
 
El beneficio es entender hasta que punto los intentos de mejorar la producción y bajar el uso de 
agua están dando fruto y cuales han sido las experiencas de los agricultures en estos años de 
cambio. La información podrá ser presentada en conferencias y a los políticos.  
 
Y si no quiere participar uno en el estudio que opciones hay? 
 
Su participación es completemente voluntaria.  
 
Y si empieza uno a participar y después no quiere participar?  
 
En cualquier momento puede uno retirar su participación en el estudio. Uno también puede negarse 
a responder a una pregunta en particular pero si participar en las otras preguntas. Si tiene algun 
problema con el investigador principal o quiere platicar directamente con el supervisor del proyecto, 
siempre puede comunicarse con el Professor Gregory Knapp en la  University of Texas al teléfono 
(512) 232-1589.    
 
Además si tiene preguntas sobre sus derechos como participante en esta investigación, puede 
comunicarse con el Clarke A. Burnham, Ph.D., The University of Texas at Austin Institutional 
Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects, 512/232-4383. 
 
Como se mantendrá la confidencialidad de los resultados de la investigación?  
 
Los resultados de esta investigación no serán entregados a nadie sin su consentimiento, o a no ser de 
que una corte o ley lo requieran. Si los resultados del estudio son publicados o presentados en una 
reunión científica, su identidad quedará  en forma confidencial como los datos serán presentado en 
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